Asia

Philippines

  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    The Road Not Taken
    In chronicling the adventurous life of legendary CIA operative Edward Lansdale, The Road Not Taken definitively reframes our understanding of the Vietnam War.
  • Southeast Asia
    Populism Might Not Be Ebbing
    In early 2018, I wrote a short article for the Washington Post, arguing that the global populism wave would likely continue sweeping through countries that year—despite the fact that, at least in parts of the world, it appeared to be plateauing. And indeed, in 2018 populists won control of governments in Brazil, Italy, and Mexico, among other countries. Meanwhile, populists like the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte maintained extraordinarily high popularity ratings—one recent poll showed that Duterte still enjoyed an approval rating of 81 percent, according to a Pulse Asia survey taken in December. Most world leaders never approach such popularity levels. Now, in 2019 and 2020, some political observers are again arguing that populism has already peaked. Gideon Rachman recently contended, in the Financial Times, that populism “faces its darkest hour” in 2019. A recent New York Times Interpreter column claimed that populism had a “rocky” time in the West in 2018, citing the Democratic Party’s gains in the U.S. midterm elections, and mixed election results for Poland’s populist Law and Justice Party in recent elections, among other factors. Nonetheless, the populist wave seemingly will continue rising this year and next—with potential new victories both in the West and in other parts of the globe. For more on the continued populist resurgence, see my new piece on World Politics Review.
  • Philippines
    Rodrigo Duterte: Fire and Fury in the Philippines: A Review
    In the months before Brazil’s elections in October 2018, many experts both within and outside the country dismissed the possibility that Jair Bolsonaro, a former army captain and previously obscure far-right congressman, could win the presidency. Bolsonaro did not belong to one of the major political parties, and had a history of pro-dictatorship, racist, and misogynist rhetoric that seemed beyond the pale for the fourth-largest democracy in the world. Yet in late October, Bolsonaro notched a resounding victory, winning the Brazilian presidency with 55 percent of the vote. The rise of extreme, anti-establishment heads of state is not confined to places where immigration or opposition to free trade are driving populists’ rise. In fact, as I have written, the rise of leaders like Bolsonaro and Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte reveals that autocratic populism is highly flexible, thriving in many different scenarios, and driven by different core grievances. It is thus actually even more dangerous to international stability than it would be if it only could grow in the soil of Europe and North America. Duterte’s brand of brutal leadership can thrive in a wide range of environments, posing a global threat to democratic government. For more on how Duterte is, in many ways, a model for autocratic-leaning populists in other parts of the world, see my new review of Jonathan Miller’s biography of Duterte in the Washington Monthly.
  • Southeast Asia
    Southeast Asia Recap 2018: Democracy Continues to Suffer
    In addition to regression on the issue of press freedom, Southeast Asia witnessed backsliding on rights and freedoms in many other areas in 2018, with Malaysia as a notable exception to this trend. Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, and even Indonesia exemplified a continued democratic regression. Cambodia became a clearly one-party state after a sham election in July, although at the end of the year Hun Sen and the CPP, under pressure from foreign governments, slightly relaxed their pressure on the opposition and civil society. However, this relaxation was probably just a means of convincing major foreign donors not to impose tougher sanctions against Cambodia, and not really a shift in how Hun Sen treats the opposition or civil society. Meanwhile, the Thai junta did everything it could to prevent real political opposition from coalescing. It banned political parties from organizing for most of the time before the February 2019 elections, putting most parties at a disadvantage before the election. The ban was only lifted in December. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte cracked down hard on press freedoms, as I noted in a previous blog, including trying to shut down the Rappler, one of the country’s best-known independent outlets. But he also appears to be trying to intimidate other journalism outlets, and has floated plans of launching more extrajudicial killing squads, in addition to those already tasked with wiping out drug suspects – these new squads would purportedly attack anyone linked to a communist insurgent group. Duterte also continued to weaken the independence of the judiciary and the power of the political opposition. In Laos, where the country’s new leadership has promised to take tough measures to root out graft, there are signs of progress on fighting corruption, including the firing of two provincial governors alleged to have been involved in corruption. But overall, the anti-corruption campaign has made modest inroads at best, and promises by the new leadership to bolster transparency and accountability have had no real effect on what remains a highly authoritarian and opaque government. And in Myanmar, the National League for Democracy/Aung San Suu Kyi government has proven a massive disappointment, overseeing stalled democratic reforms, regression on press freedoms, and a scorched earth policy toward the Rohingya in western Myanmar. However, 2019 might not be so grim for rights and freedoms in Southeast Asia. Although Thailand’s junta has tried to stage-manage elections called for February to ensure that the outcome is favorable to the military – and possibly even one resulting in a former general as prime minister – it cannot completely control the actual election. There is considerable reason to believe that, although the election will not be totally fair – the military is trying to slant the playing field against the long-ruling Puea Thai party – the actual Election Day will be free, marking some progress after nearly five years of military rule. In addition, an election brings some degree of uncertainty, and there is a chance that the vote will result in a parliament that has real authority and popular legitimacy and puts the country back on the path to democratic rule. There are other potentially hopeful signs in 2019 for rights and freedoms in the region. An election in Indonesia could showcase continued democratic consolidation there, even despite Jokowi’s increasingly authoritarian actions in the past year, and his selection of a cleric as running mate who has, in the past, made harsh statements about a range of minority groups in Indonesia. Malaysia’s government, which has made a strong start on democratic reforms, needs to move quickly to reform the country’s institutions, and set the stage, via legislation, for making lasting inroads against graft. In 2019, the Malaysian government has a chance to push through serious reforms designed to battle corruption, improve government transparency, and protect civil society, showcasing real democratic progress.
  • Southeast Asia
    2018 in Review: Press Freedom Under Assault in Southeast Asia—Maria Ressa and More
    2018 was a brutal year, in many ways, for civil society activists, rights advocates, and democratic politicians throughout Southeast Asia. Cambodia’s government transformed from an autocratic regime where there was still some (minimal) space for opposition parties into a fully one-party regime. Thailand’s junta continued to repress the population, attempting to control the run-up to elections in February 2019 that the junta hopes will result in a victory for pro-military parties and their allies. The Myanmar government continued to stonewall a real investigation into the alleged crimes against humanity in Rakhine State, despite significant international pressure to allow an investigation. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte appears to have moved on from using extrajudicial killings in his war on drugs to preparing to utilize extrajudicial killings in other ways. Last month, Duterte raised the idea of creating a new death squad to fight against communist rebels in the Philippines, for instance. And even in Indonesia, one of the freest states in the region, the Jokowi government has given off worrying signs of increasingly authoritarian tendencies. Jokowi has politicized top law enforcement posts, overseen criminal investigations of opponents, and shown other worrying signs, according to an analysis of his growing authoritarianism published in New Mandala by Tom Power, a PhD candidate at Australian National University. (Malaysia is a rare bright spot for rights and democracy in Southeast Asia this year—in fact one of the few global bright spots for democracy in 2018.) Perhaps nowhere has the increasing crackdown on rights and freedoms in Southeast Asia been more visible than in the area of press freedom. Of the journalists featured on Time magazine’s series of covers of people of the year, three are from Southeast Asia. Two of those featured are Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, journalists for Reuters who have been jailed in Myanmar, essentially for investigative reporting into aspects of a massacre against the Rohingya. (They are officially charged with breaking the Official Secrets Act.) The two men have already been in jail for a year—despite their trial being decried as a sham by rights organizations and prominent rights advocates—and they face in total seven-year prison sentences. Suu Kyi has defended their jailing, and the two reporters’ time in prison is emblematic of Myanmar’s worsening climate for independent journalism, even under Suu Kyi’s government. As the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has noted, three other Myanmar journalists were arrested in October, and overall the Official Secrets Act, defamation charges, and physical threats are chilling the climate for reporting in the country. The climate for press freedom is poor in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam as well. For example, in Cambodia, one of the leading print outlets, the Cambodia Daily, closed in 2017, reportedly under pressure from the Hun Sen government. Another leading independent outlet, the Phnom Penh Post, was sold to a new owner in 2018, amid worries that the new management would curb critical and investigative reporting. Many Phnom Penh Post staff members quit. Meanwhile, in Vietnam the government continued to aggressively shut down independent bloggers and writers, and Thailand’s junta has continued to harshly repress reporters and editors, such as reportedly pushing for the sacking of the top editor of the Bangkok Post, a leading Thailand newspaper, for his critical coverage of the military regime. Maria Ressa, the head of Rappler, one of the Philippines’ toughest and most groundbreaking news sites, is probably the best-known case of press freedom under attack in Southeast Asia. Before becoming the CEO of Rappler, Ressa had amassed a broad range of experience, including working for two decades for CNN, for whom she covered everything from the rise of Islamist terror networks in Southeast Asia to the post-Marcos era in the Philippines. She has received a wide range of awards for her work, including an Emmy nomination and an Overseas Press Club award. Like many authoritarian-leaning populists, Duterte aggressively demonizes the media, and Rappler in particular seems to infuriate him, with its hard-hitting, deep-digging style. The Duterte administration seems determined to put Rappler out of business. In early 2018, the Philippine SEC announced that it was revoking Rappler’s license. The media organization fought, and continued operating, but it was then accused of libel by the Philippine national bureau of investigation, and then was hit with tax evasion charges by the Philippine tax agency. Ressa herself also was charged with tax evasion, only a few days after she got a press freedom award from CPJ. She and the media outlet deny the charges, and noted how quickly the Philippine government had moved to file charges, seemingly without considering all motions and evidence. The case is now proceeding—but the climate for press freedom in the Philippines, which long combined tough investigative reporting with one of the most dangerous environments for journalists in the world, looks like it will only get grimmer in 2019.
  • Women and Economic Growth
    Investing in Equality: How the Private Sector Benefits From Women’s Financial Inclusion
    Podcast
    Today, close to one billion women worldwide are unbanked, which offers a significant market opportunity for financial service providers. Salie Mlay, Dr. Tosan Oruwariye, and Dr. Dolores Torres join us to discuss innovative approaches to strengthen women’s savings and financial inclusion, and explore how financial institutions stand to gain by diversifying their customer base. Mlay, Dr. Oruwariye, and Dr. Torres are members of the She Counts initiative, a global platform that aims to harness the power of financial services to put savings and financial tools in the hands of underserved women. This meeting is part of the ExxonMobil Women and Development Roundtable Series.   Transcript VOGELSTEIN: Good afternoon, everyone. Good afternoon. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. Thank you for prying yourselves away from CNN’s political ticker long enough to be with us today. (Laughter.) I’m Rachel Vogelstein. I lead the Women and Foreign Policy Program here at the Council, which analyzes how elevating the status of women and girls advances U.S. foreign policy objectives. Our discussion this afternoon is focused on the role of the private sector in advancing women’s financial inclusion and how financial service providers can benefit from women’s access to savings accounts. We know the research that tells us that close to one billion women worldwide are unbanked and that the gender gap in access to financial services is particularly pronounced with women at the bottom of the pyramid, 28 percent less likely than men to have a bank account. We also know that numerous studies show that women’s financial inclusion offers a host of development benefits. So, therefore, we know what women and their families stand to gain from women’s financial inclusion. But what does the private sector stand to gain by diversifying its customer base to include more women? How significant is the market opportunity posed by women who are unbanked worldwide? And how can financial service providers capitalize on this opportunity and best reach women who currently lack access to bank accounts or who don’t make use of them? Today we are privileged to host three private sector leaders from around the world whose work is helping us answer these questions. They are all members of the She Counts initiative, a global platform to put savings and financial tools in the hands of women, spearheaded by ExxonMobil in partnership with Women’s World Banking and the Center for Global Development and launched here at the Council earlier this year. Today we’ll talk with these leading financial service providers about the opportunities and the challenges in reaching low-income women with savings programs. And these insights that they’ll provide will help inform the private sector strategy and government policy related to the economic advancement of women. So I’d like to begin by introducing all three of our panelists. First, we are thrilled to be joined by Dr. Dolores Torres, the vice chair of CARD Bank, a top microfinance bank in the Philippines, which was recognized as the financial inclusion champion of the central bank in the Philippines. Second, we are very pleased to be joined by Dr. Tosan Oruwariye, the cofounder of a digital financial services platform in Senegal, focused on using digital technology and entrepreneurship to facilitate access to financial services. And third, we are privileged to be joined by Salie Mlay, the acting business head of retail banking at NMB Bank, which is one of the largest commercial banks in Tanzania. Thanks to all of our distinguished speakers for joining us. Before we get started with our discussion, I want to welcome and thank two of the visionary leaders behind the She Counts initiative, first, Jim Jones, who leads ExxonMobil Foundation, including its catalytic work on women’s economic empowerment—thanks for being her today—as well as Mary Ellen Iskenderian, the president and CEO of Women’s World Banking, which is a global NGO devoted to women’s access to financial services. Mary Ellen, I’d love to invite you up to offer some opening remarks, and then we’ll go ahead and get started. Mary Ellen, over to you. (Applause.) ISKENDARIAN: Thank you, Rachel. And thank you for this wonderful event. And I couldn’t agree more, it’s such a wonderful distraction from everything that’s going on outside today. So thank you very much to CFR more broadly for hosting this event today. As Rachel mentioned, we were here six months ago. And I think I remember seeing a few of you around the room when Women’s World Banking and the ExxonMobil Foundation and the Center for Global Development announced the launch of She Counts. And we envisioned this as a global platform for best-in-class financial service providers serving low-income women specifically with savings, and that’s a really critical difference. And we’re so grateful to Jim and the ExxonMobil Foundation for having the farsightedness really to recognize the importance of savings and how important savings are to women and bringing women into the formal financial sector, because at Women’s World Banking we’ve been focused there for a long time. Because we know that whether women are saving under the mattress or in some other informal savings group, that’s a key part of their financial interaction. But as Rachel mentioned, not enough financial service providers are recognizing the enormous market opportunity that those women savers represent. So when we announced She Counts, we had only just started a fairly rigorous process of due diligence. We, as I said, we wanted this to be best in class, so we were looking all over the world for really the best examples of sustainable and equitable solutions for low-income women to build the safety nets that allows them to build more secure and prosperous futures for themselves and their families. And so I’m particularly excited to announce the first cohort of institutions that have joined both She Counts and we were thrilled they’ve also accepted the invitation to our global network, the Women’s World Banking Global Network of Institutions. Each one of these institutions you’ll hear from today is showing that it is possible to build both a business and a social case for serving women well with savings products. Each of these institutions is working in a slightly different way with different models, in very different markets, and they’ve come up with different solutions. So, again, to repeat Rachel, she’s introduced you already to Dorie Torres, who’s worked with us for many, many years from CARD Bank in the Philippines, the national microfinance bank NMB in the largest retail bank in Tanzania, and then I think we’re all particularly excited to hear the digital story that MaTontine will bring to the picture today. So we will continue to build this—oh, and I’m sorry. We had—we had Diamond Bank with us by phone and I gather the hookup, the connectivity was perfect, so the team from Diamond was participating right along in the conversation this morning. But we’ll continue to build this group beyond this initial cohort and really look forward to continuing to share what we learn about serving women well with savings, with the broader CFR community as well. Thank you so much for joining us. (Applause.) VOGELSTEIN: Mary Ellen, thank you for those framing remarks and for reminding all of us what’s at stake here. So let’s go ahead and get started with our discussion. I’d like to start by posing a question to all of you and asking you to define the market opportunity that’s at stake here. Tell us what private sector financial institutions stand to gain by, as we mentioned earlier, diversifying their customer base and ensuring women’s financial inclusion. How significant is the economic opportunity posed by unbanked women in the country in which you work? Why don’t we start here, Dolores, and we’ll move down the line. TORRES: Yeah. In the Philippines, we do serve the poorest of the poor and primarily women. Right now, we have 6.8 million clients, but the start—but the start was very difficult, you know, to convince women to go to meetings every week, to save weekly a compulsory savings. Now it’s one U.S. dollar equivalent weekly savings. So we started training them with discipline, because before, they don’t pay government loans, so that was a—that was a huge, huge barrier that we had to overcome in terms of assisting them. So we were able to train them with very good discipline. After they are saving weekly, we provided the small loans also. We started with only less than a U.S. dollar in 1986. Now we have three banks in our organization, two rural banks and an SME bank. An SME bank is to graduate the microfinance clients to get more loans. And while they were very poor, they become good at managing their business, and now they are entrepreneurs, small and midsize entrepreneurs, and we are serving them in the bank. While it was very difficult at the start, we did not give up on women. We said women must really learn how to save, and then we provided other services. But apart from that, we would like to bring them up from poverty. And through savings and then providing them with loans, now they own most of the institutions that we have (by card ?). We have twenty-two we call (card ?) mutually enforcing institutions, who are all helping to eradicate poverty in the Philippines. And the women clients who have proven to be good at managing their business and in saving every week are now the owners of most of these institutions. The biggest of the twenty-two institutions that we have established is the insurance. So we started with savings, now it has grown to another major need of the women, which is insurance. And they own that company. We started with one company that provides life insurance, now we have three other companies that provide non-life, health, and other insurance needs of the clients. So we started with, you know, sourcing funds, like from Women’s World Banking. We had a standby letter of credit available from here in New York—or, no, with a commercial bank here with a standby letter of credit, the Women’s World Banking. But now the entire twenty-two institutions are all sustainable and are all mutually enforcing our poverty eradication mission in the Philippines. And we have, you know, partnership with companies also that do adhere to our mission. Like, we have a partnership with a commercial insurance and, you know, commercial insurance, they do pay claims in one year, three years, or five years. We made it one day, three days, and five days. (Laughter.) And that commercial company is now adhering to that. And they don’t use their adjuster, they use us to tell them it’s time to pay in one day, three days, and five days. But we continuously challenge it. Now we’re using eight/twenty-four, which means we pay in eight hours and within twenty-four hours. And ninety-nine percent of the claims are being paid. And we’re insuring forty percent of the Philippines—the insured Filipinos in the Philippines, the largest so far, according to the insurance commission of the Philippines. So forty percent of our country with a bank card, that started with just believing that women, when trained to do disciplined savings and borrowing, can become a major economic mover in the country. VOGELSTEIN: So a lot of different strategies and now you’ve expanded remarkably. I wonder if we can turn to you, Tosan, to talk about the economic opportunity posed by unbanked women where you are. ORUWARIYE: So we’re a fintech company about two years old and our mission is poverty alleviation. In Senegal, where I come from, where we have our core business, I’ll say about eighty percent of the population are unbanked or underbanked. We think it’s about a hundred-million-dollar business opportunity. And for the Francophone region, almost a one-billion-dollar opportunity. So before I talk a little bit about MaTontine, I will talk about what tontines are for people that might not be familiar with it, because this is the core foundation of our business model. So tontines are savings groups and there are different kinds. There’s VSLAs, that are very common with the NGOs. But ours is called ROSCAs that’s a term used here, and it’s when it’s a rotating savings and credit association. And it’s when, like, say ten people come together and they decide, oh, we’re going to contribute ten dollars every month into a common pot. At the end of the month, one person in that group takes a hundred dollars. And then the next month, they come again together, like in February, they do the same thing. And this continues until all ten of them have received a hundred dollars. That’s the way traditionally the poor have saved. Tontines are all over the world. In China, it’s called wi (ph), in India, chit funds, cundina in Mexico. So it’s used by the poor in many developing countries to save bulk money. The problem we’re trying to solve is, how do you lend small amounts of money, a hundred-fifty-dollars, to the poor at scale where we come from? We found that in our region, the cost structure and the legacy systems of the banks and MFIs have made it unprofitable and a struggle to do that at scale and profitability because they have to have branches, loan officers, and things like that to make this work. And they use the same effort, whether they are loaning ten thousand dollars or just a hundred dollars. Well, what we have done is that we have used technology, leveraged technology to digitize this traditional savings system and incorporate them into our business model, thereby reducing the cost of borrowing of up to seventy-five percent. So we do this through a basic mobile phone. So our members, who are in the rural areas where there are not branches, can, from their phone—if anybody has been to Africa, in every village they have people with an (umbrella ?) that gets them credit for their phones. And we use those—(inaudible)—networks. So they go there, give the money to the man, and it becomes mobile money, so they can save on the platform. So the issue of mobility, of them traveling far to save in the banks, it’s gone because they can do this right from the privacy of their phone, in the privacy of their home. And they (feel ?) security, of having this money at home to get stolen, it’s gone, because it’s now in digital money. So that’s what we’ve done, we’ve leveraged technology to reduce this cost of borrowing. But more importantly, in our region, seventy to eighty percent of the population are in one form of savings group or the other. And within this seventy to eighty percent, seventy percent are women. And that’s how we reach the underbanked, our target population, which are women that earn five dollars or less a day. VOGELSTEIN: And digital financial services are a critical part of the strategy that you’ve employed in Senegal. Salie, I wonder if you can talk to us about your work in Tanzania and what the market potential looks like there. MLAY: NMB, I’m working with NMB. They are the largest retail bank in Tanzania with branches—with 2,220 branches across the network. So by being on every corner, now we see, through our branches, we see what is happening in society. And we came to realize women, according to our culture, are the ones who are managing the family most of the time. They are taking care of kids, they are—they are working very hard in the farms and in areas, different areas as to keep up the family. Yes, we have men, but men, they are meeting the basic things, like investment in house building and other issues. But women, day to day of the family they are dealing with it. So by looking at this, we came to realize there is a very big potential in that class. And as my colleagues said, there is a way of traditional women, they come up as a—as a group themselves to save what little they have so that they can deposit and lend to one another or to help one another to solve their problems day to day. But how to save, they need some kind of guidance, knowledge, because some of them, they think that they have little money, they cannot save. So by being everywhere, we thought that it’s our time to take this financial inclusion to women and be able to come up with a product. And we worked together with our partners to development a product known as pamoja. Pamoja means “together.” It’s a Swahili name, as to make them feel this belongs to them and, you know, buy the idea, because most of the women, they are frightened to come to the bank, they think the bank is for the rich people. So you might find it in some areas, in rural areas, where we are, sometimes we find the branches is just close to the community, but women, they are frightened to get into the branch. So to build their confidence through education and be able to transform their savings into a bank account, which they can work together, we formed the product which is known as pamoja account. And we link it with a mobile phone, banking, whereby individual members, they can have the—they can have their private account where whatever they do they just put it, they just go to the small guys who have the agents, have, like, seven thousand agents of NMB, whom we have enabled them to receive and pay money into digital wallet so that they can transfer from one place to another, from one account from different banks can pay different services. So what happened is pamoja account is the account they were supposed to send cash. They select one day a week or a month they meet together, they collect from members, and go and deposit in their account. Some of them, they used to put it in a—in a box, they put the box on top of the table, and everybody sent their money there, they recorded who brought their money, and they carry it and hide it at home. So some of them, they were—thugs comes and, you know, they rob them. So we use the same concept to develop that account that they can put money together. We don’t charge them, they just put free of charge, and we encourage them to use the mobile phone to send the money to this account. And once they send money, the chairman and secretary of the group get the message that so-and-so member has contributed a certain amount of money. So far, we haven’t been able to fulfill the need across the country. And that’s why currently we are trying to develop the—we are (on the stage ?). We have prepared a proposal, specific proposal that now the bank and the management, as long as it’s so committed on this group, will be able to make sure that we dedicate—we come up with the team, the dedicated team, to deal with women, to increase their knowledge and the way to attend their meetings and make sure that we give them different options of savings and benefits and even knowledge of finance, how to manage their finances. That’s the proposition that we are—we are about to conclude. That’s what we’ve done. VOGELSTEIN: So you’ve each talked a little bit about the models you’ve employed, some similarities, some differences. I wonder if we could dig into that. And also, if you could speak to not just the opportunity you’ve described, but also some of the challenges in reaching and retaining these women as clients. Dolores, perhaps you can talk about the member-agent model that you’ve employed to support the acquisition and retention of clients. Has it worked? And what have the challenges been? TORRES: Yeah. Actually, we just started with the digital transformation. We were, from day one in 1986, we were doing manual recording. And then in 1997, when we started the CARD Bank, that’s when we started computerizing. But only the loan monitoring system had been computerized at the beginning. Now we’re embarking on the core banking system where the three—initially, CARD Bank will be online with all its branches. Right now, only about 35 percent of its branches are with the core banking system. And we started the mobile collection (shifts ?) wherein we don’t break collection (shifts ?) anymore for weekly meetings. Instead, they use mobile phone and—(inaudible)—for collecting. And in the mobile money or mobile financial system, we hired an agent. The agent that we hired are clients also, members who have a proven, good track record with us and who know all the members in the village, so they will be—they are trusted already. We trained them. And then we hired staff from operations, who have been with us for years, for some years, to work as the agent supervisors. What is very challenging is the acceptance of the women clients, especially the older ones, because they said they don’t have mobile phones, which is contrary to statistics, because the Philippines has one hundred million population, according to statistics we have one hundred twenty people with mobile phones. So some of them have two or three, so we don’t believe them. So we don’t give up on that. We don’t give up on the alibis of the women. But we try to—we try to bring them back to how CARD started. So we started with only twenty pesos in 1986. We have grown this much, so we don’t give up on the growth that we have done, we don’t give up on the 6.8 million women clients that we have. But we would like to do digital transformation in order to serve more and to serve the next generation because the next generation are the younger people who will be using digital technology in their transactions. So we would like the women to believe that if they apply the technology, then transactions will be cheaper. We will reduce the costs, we will reduce the interest rates when it becomes successful. So acceptance is a challenge. In fact, I was telling this morning that because predominantly women in the Philippines are Catholic, so they say novena in order for CARD not to be successful in the digital transformation. Because they—because they really love CARD and when we say we have to do digital transformation, you know, they are very loyal to us, so they might follow, even if they don’t want to follow. So some of them, they said novena so that Jesus will hear them and will not make our digital transformation successful. (Laughter.) But, you know, we didn’t give up on that one or those women who were there. We went there, we talked about the success that CARD has so far made and we don’t want to lose them, we don’t want to lose connection. We want to do the technology so that we’ll be able to reach more. Then they converted. They used the technology. And now in that village where they are saying the novena, all of them are using mobile technology. So the central bank went there and asked, are there women we can now recruit as members? No, everybody are members and all are using mobile phones. So we don’t give up on the women. We realized that they will, because they are very loyal to CARD, they will follow what we’re introducing, although with some resistance. So what we’re doing now is really to do a lot of motivational activities, especially inculcating or transferring the culture and values that made CARD successful in its program so that it will go through generations. So, yeah. And then especially the agents, the agents that we’re hiring, the staff who are supervising the agents must be the mirror of the culture and values that we—that we have at CARD. At CARD, the retirement is sixty, so in 2015 I retired from CARD. (Laughter.) I am just now advising CARD. But it is very important that we leave behind the culture and values that we set for CARD. We call it—(inaudible)—with competence, discipline, family spirit, simplicity, stewardship, you know, and we would like to leave that behind. And we are, so far, the only MFIs in the country that recruit the sons and daughters of our clients. Because we don’t have any secrets, you know, we’re very transparent, so ninety percent of our workforce of seven thousand today are sons and daughters of our clients. So if we retire, the sons and daughters of the clients will be managing CARD. And then ownership is shared also to the clients, so we’re leaving behind the institutions that we have established. And we are working hard right now to ensure that the culture and values will remain through generations. VOGELSTEIN: So a lot of different strategies to overcome some of the challenges you mentioned, persistence being one, meeting women where they are, and then, of course, this commitment to the values you articulated. Tosan, can you tell us more about your use of data analytics to provide financial services for women, including but not limited to savings? How has that been important in your model? ORUWARIYE: A really interesting question. For us, we do have a proprietary credit scoring model that we’ve overlaid on our basic savings platform, and so we do have a lot of data. But it’s important to note that the products we offer outside of savings are not necessarily based on the data analytics, they’re only based on what our members need. From the beginning of when we started this company, (one of our researchers ?) with NGOs had gone to talk to—(inaudible)—to understand why, despite the fact that they’ve had VSLA programs for many years, there was still a struggle with adoption. And one of the things we realized and from our innovation testbed, which is part of our business strategy, and talking to the members was that some of the product did not—did not address their needs. And so it was very critical for us to, in our—to, in our testbed, to co-create a product with our members. And when we did that, we found that the products we created were easily adopted. Also, we found a high issue of lack of trust in our region with the traditional FSPs. Many of them, they’re not very literate and so when they open checking accounts, you know how they charge them money for the checking account, they felt their monies were stolen, so they didn’t trust the banks, for those that could get to the banks. Then they were those that could never get to the bank because it was so far from them. So a lot of that initial research we did and in our innovation tests, but informed the kind of products we develop. Now, when we have an idea of the kind of product that they want, they might not say, oh, I want a credit product or I want insurance. They might say things like, oh, when my child is sick, I lose all my money, so we start thinking you need something in terms of insurance. Now, when they—when they talk about the products, we then bring them to our testbed and work with them to see if this product meets their needs. So we test the delivery, the interface, because everything is happening with the mobile phone, the interface, and then we look at the adoption and the usage. So that is how we decide what products we offer our members, not just savings. So right now, we offer three core products on our platform. We offer a credit platform, which is unique to our members and was co-created. It’s called a tontine advance. And that product was developed because our members said we don’t want a standard loan. The last time we worked with the MFI to give us credit, I had to sell my cow to pay back. I don’t want that. So this product was developed with input on the rates and things like that. We also have a micro health insurance product because many of them talked about illness. And we have a life insurance product that we offer currently on the platform. We have an opportunity for various other products, but as a startup we have limited resources and bandwidth to do this. But we feel that the way for us to work with our members is to really work on their identified needs. Because with our products, we have a ninety-eight percent adoption and almost a hundred percent usage, which is unheard of, because they feel it’s their own and that trust coefficient has been built. VOGELSTEIN: So in-depth market research, co-development to get at some of the trust challenge that you mentioned. ORUWARIYE: Yeah. And we—and we use human-centered design principles when we do this. VOGELSTEIN: Salie, much has been written about the promise of digital financial services to help reach low-income women. Can you tell us about some of the challenges that you’ve faced and how you’ve overcome them? MLAY: OK, thank you. Before I speak about the challenges, there’s something very important I forgot to speak at the beginning on the proposal of saving for women. As I said, most of the women are the ones who are taking care of kids. So in our savings proposition, we included—we have another phase connected, which is youth banking. We call it wajibu, “responsibility.” Wajibu is a Swahili name, it means “responsible,” “be responsible.” And whereby, we need to help women by teaching or training or taking through kids in financial inclusion by saving the little amount of money they have. And if they don’t have, to go through a certain education because that proposition of young banking, within there’s a training, there’s a package of training that trains youngsters to know how to save so that they can help their parents. If their parents, their mother, they are saving a little, they can save even the little they get when they are being given pocket money to do different things, they can save a little amount of money of which they can use in their future. And by building that culture of savings, we’ll have the women in the future who have grown up in a saving culture. So we have, like, we have divided that program into three levels. We have from one day kid to seventeen, which how we take them through the training and their product we have put up for savings. It’s different a little bit with the people who are—the kids who are starting from thirteen who are already on the street, they are doing their own things, but they are not in the family to seventeen again; and from seventeen to eighteen years where—in our country, where a youngster goes to university, they can stay on their own, they can decide to do anything with their—with their money. So from one year, to seventeen—to thirteen, when we open—to open this account, there’s no charges, we give interest, but they are managed by parents. If the young one is aged between one to thirteen, parents is the one who is managing their account. And if it’s about thirteen—we call it—(inaudible)—that means—(inaudible)—who are coming up—the account will be managed by—will be transacted by the particular kid, but whatever he or she does into that account, their parent will be notified through SMS so they can question the kid, where did you spend the money and why? Yeah? And then, from eighteen—these are the guys who go to college—they don’t need to be asked, but whatever they do, their account of savings is cheap, no maintenance charges. They get the interest. The good thing about this one is that the age from five to thirteen when they go to primary school, we have designed the training program where we—where we talk—where we have—we have—we are talking to the headmaster, headmistress of the schools. They provide us an opportunity to go to the—to the particular schools, training them. The first meeting, we call parents and the kids in that schools. We tell them about why savings, how is it possible together so that they can buy the idea. So the second session, we sit with kids themselves because they’ve already got their confidence from their parents, parents they provide everything, they provide the idea. Then we talk to them. Then after this is when we open the account. And in branches, we have provided a certain day we call kids’ day. That’s when the kids, they have been brought to the bank, although their parents can help them to fill the form, but, you know, they can—they can stand on the platform and give the money to the bank teller who can, you know—they start building. All this, we are focusing on women because women, they are carrying the whole burden and want to bridge. So you see the whole program, at the end of the day, they come, they become one. Now, the challenge of digital in this banking, savings banking. Because of the situation in our country, we have been fortunate to have—to have the program which is run through USSD and they’re the one in app. Because the young generation, they like smartphones and they can do a lot of things. But the old women, they need the simple one. And at the beginning, they were even afraid. So the issue of low level of literacy is our challenge, and that’s why our main focus is in education. And we need to really push training about using—how to keep—how to save and how to use even simple technology to be able to transact. And we are looking forward, as I said, we are looking forward, it’s something to come, even the simple group lending through their groups that they have formed up. So the main challenge is education. And we really need to educate people and reach more people at the village remote areas. VOGELSTEIN: So the promise of mobile technology is great, but education, norm shifting, habit formation, incentives, a lot of what you’ve all talked about, also critical in order to capitalize on the potential of digital financial services. Well, I’d love to open the discussion to questions. So please, raise your placard, state your name and affiliation, and we’ll get to as many as we can. Please. Q: Thank you. Pardon my ignorance, I’m not nearly as sophisticated in this field as all of you are. But Rachel made a very good point that there’s a massive commercial opportunity and economic opportunity in this field. And lots of Western financial institutions have made—have done vanity projects, like Goldman Sachs did 10,000 Women and they’ve paid lip service to this issue, but it seems like it lacks substance. What do you think the primary gating issue is, each of you, to having these institutions involved in a more meaningful way? VOGELSTEIN: What do you think it would take for the private sector to reach the entire population you’ve described? Earlier, Salie, you mentioned that you’ve reached part, but not all of the population. The goal is to reach all of the population as opposed to a small part. How do you get that done? What would it take? MLAY: So it took us—it’s a journey, but I see the green light at the end. Because, for example, we have three thousand members of staff permanently employed by NMB Bank. And as I said, our bank has branches in all regions and district levels. And we have come up with NMB agents whereby we have, like, seven thousand agents so far. We started two years ago, now we have seven thousand agents scattered. And this year in the budget, we plan to add another six thousand agents. That means we need to be very close to the community. And our slogan at NMB, we said, whenever you say NMB, our customer always responds “close to you.” We want to be very close to them. And we want to use the upgrade services that are being provided by agents to be able to open an account and even answer some quick questions to the people around them because, you know, they are scattered all over. So it will take us some years, but I see every year we are moving, we are—we are—we are—we are spreading and bringing more and more customers who were not banking with us. And even the confidence, the level of confidence as you go to some villages, like when you go to the northern province or when you talk about Kilimanjaro or Arusha, you see now the level, there is a very big improvement. You go to the very remote area, you find somebody with a mobile phone, you ask do you have an account; they’ll say yes, I have an account with NMB and they transact. You say, how many times do you go to the branch? They say no, I don’t need to go to the branch. I get money. I just go to the (umbrella ?) down there, to the agent, I deposit the money. And if I want to pay for, let’s say, electricity bill, water, I just—I just call my phone, all those services are there, I can—I just pay. So you see now more and more people are becoming aware of what is happening. So that’s why we are saying our focus is to spread more knowledge. And some of the parents, funny enough, we went one of the school just to inspect one of my branch, how do they do with the school training about the kids when they go to see the young banking, they go to the schools. I did some surprise visit in one of the branches. When I went to school, I just sit at the back and listen to the discussion. So one parent raised up a hand and said I didn’t know with what I have I can save two dollars a week, I didn’t know. So that gave me a notion that what was lacking is the knowledge about what is happening and how you can manage what are the priorities on day-to-day expenses out of what you are making. So I’m glad and I’m happy the top management of NMB is really willing and they are eager to see that we push on that side of educating the community. And then in addition to that in our (CC area ?), where we take one percent of our net profit every year to return to the community, we focus on only three things: health, we help the hospitals, education. So part of it will go to the school, we busy desks so children can sit and be able to listen. And once we donate, we talk to them about—again we have the session where we tell them why we are here, and then we use that opportunity also to disseminate the education about the finance and savings. VOGELSTEIN: Tosan? ORUWARIYE: That’s a really complicated question you have asked. When you look at Africa, I think that sometimes there people use broad strokes to describe different parts of Africa. For instance, in Kenya, they have a high smart-phone penetration rate of sixty percent with an internet penetration rate of almost eighty-four percent. That means you can do a lot more with technology there and be more innovative, and opportunities for fintech and other bigger companies that want to use innovation and technology to reach the underbanked. In our own region, our smart-phone penetration is five percent, so the technology is already limited. And now we have regulation in Francophone Africa, if anybody knows it—very inflexible, and it is behind the innovation curve. So you can’t use those strategies. I think if any organized unit wants to come into Africa, it depends on the region. They ought to be thinking of coming in for the long haul. I see in our region for the next five years we’ll still be using USSD technologies and SMS just because it’s going to be a slow uptake. And any organization needs to understand that as they come in. But the opportunities for them—your research, and She Counts, and Women’s World Banking, you’ve shown that women that save consistently are more profitable in their customer life cycle, so organizations that want to work with women know that. This has been studied for years. We have also found on our platform that the best savers have the lowest default rate, who are able to upsell and cross-sell products, would include insurance, micro-insurance, and they will pay for these products which are the profit pools for the organizations as they think of coming into this market. I say they need to come in with bundled services because, for us, we’ve found that savings alone wasn’t enough of a value proposition for our clients. Bundle services, but always try to get a sense for what the clients need. I always talk about members because for you to come into our business you have a part of a group. You can’t just come in because the group, which is our risk in terms of the savings. There I always talk about members but they are also our client. VOGELSTEIN: Dolores? TORRES: Yeah. I think I’ve shared an example of a private institution who becomes successful also in joining the—for example, the CARD. It’s when they are ready also to believe in what the micro-finance institutions believe, like we need to provide fast claims; no need to wait for one, three or five years if we can do it one, three, five days. Why not? So also assisting women sincerely needs time and dedication. We will not be able to create very strong values, credit discipline among women clients if we did not commit a lot of our time also. And in doing that, profitability has to be sacrificed at the beginning, you know, where we did it without, you know, even reaching break-even point, but we didn’t give up on it. Now if we do it, and if we assist more women, then profitability comes and sustainability of what we’re doing comes. So if private institutions are willing to do that – Also addressing risk like disruptive weather, climate condition, typhoons like in Philippines. We have experienced the strongest typhoon and, you know, we need to sacrifice a lot, and the private institutions that has—helping us also sacrifice their money so that we can help the poor on day one that they were affected by strong calamities. VOGELSTEIN: Salie? Q: (Off mic)—really so very impressive. I also feel such sympathy for older people on the wrong side of the technological divide—(laughter)—but a question. Has there been concerted efforts to pull in high-net-worth women in these marketplaces? I have a lot of data showing that if you look at many growth hubs, the wealth that’s vested in women is vested in hands of people who very much want gender empowerment as part of their investment portfolio. In fact, they call it out. They want performance as badly as men, but they have a bigger basket of goods, and gender empowerment is right at the top of the list. And one would think that that would be a huge opportunity because they particularly want to invest in their own communities. So I’m just wondering whether, you know, this is being tapped into in ways I don’t know about. ORUWARIYE: Yeah, I can tell you from our journey that as a start-up you are doing something very new, and the finance industry, which have own sort of regulations, and so we had to spend the first year doing an alpha and a beta pilot, and trying to get the data that could attract the partners and tell the story we want to tell. So we did that, and we—I sort of insisted that we have a research on, and when you are doing research on the work you are doing it takes some time. We’re just completing our quasi-experimental study where we worked with the World Bank to sort of gather that data, and I think for us at this time the first two years was just getting the data, telling the story, and showing that track record. And we have found it very difficult, and we’ve not actively gone out to look for financing because our strategy was to get the data because everybody asks you, what’s the traction? So our strategy was to really look for grants to get the data and tell the story. Now we just got our partnership with the World Savings Bank Institute, and MasterCard Foundation, and COFINA Senegal, one of the largest MFIs in the country to serve fifty thousand women, and it’s because we did this groundwork that we can now go back now to investors and say, look, we now have this, we are ready to expand. We’ve seen the data, we’ve done the—this is the deal, and move forward. We have found that talking—we’ve already started talking to some social impact investors, and we found that although they say they are social impact investors, they’re not quite as willing to give the rope we expected. They want the (ten Xs ?), the time to exit is shorter than we would like, so it’s just that it seemed that—so we just started that journey, and I’m sure we’ll expand our investor pool. VOGELSTEIN: Other thoughts on investments by high-net-worth individuals? TORRES: Come again? VOGELSTEIN: Any other thoughts you want to chime in on? TORRES: Oh, yeah. I remember an event that we had in Manila where Women’s World Banking helped us gather prominent women in the Philippines in order to support the early stage of microfinance, and that was very successful. A lot of women provided funding, technical support to the early stage of the microfinance operations in the Philippines, so that—yeah, that was done with the help of Women’s World Banking because we work with the poor, and it’s difficult to entice high-network women without the help of Women’s World Banking. VOGELSTEIN: Jewel (sp)? Q: (Off mic)—World Bank or with ExxonMobil to backstop some kind of a takeout so that you could attract high-net-worth women because I agree with Sylvia Ann (sp). I’m in the same—I’m in the investment business, and we see tremendous need for impact investing, especially from women. But as a financial advisor, we would not allow them to—or we would not recommend that they invest in a startup; otherwise, we would call that a contribution, not an investment. But there is a structured finance here that could happen with your backing that I think would be quite powerful—just a suggestion. VOGELSTEIN: Another good idea. I think we have time for one final question here. Q: Hi. Rachael Wagner from Atairos Management. I think for those of us sitting here in New York, it’s really interesting to hear all the work that you are doing, and it’s very admirable what your organizations are doing. Is there anything specific—you know, for those of us who are here who, you know, are sort of very far away from the on-the-ground work that you are doing—that we could do to be helpful to each of your missions? There may not be, but I’m just curious if there is. VOGELSTEIN: That’s a great suggestion. We had one contribution here that Jewel made. Let’s broaden it out. What could folks do to support the mission that you are driving towards? Please, Salie? MLAY: Yeah, for example, I can say we are successful in this young generation banking, and we work with the world women in terms of research, product designing. We work with them very well. And what is coming, because we are looking forward after looking—(inaudible)—the women at the rural area and remote areas. Yes, they are saving, but they need a small amount to bridge them into small business. They have to give small, small loan that will match with their—what they currently do as to be able to generate more money. We are—what we can get, the kind of help that we may need is to start that proposition of group lending to women, and what kind of education that will help them to be solid and understand how to go about so that it can be sustainable because what we are looking for is to have their sustainable group lending to women, and it—and it’s a lot of work on the sense that as we—the issue of lending to women is very sensitive because of culture, the way they are born to the family and day-to-day responsibilities, so we need to design a kind of training that will help them to be able to balance their daily activity, managing their family at the same time they are being able to go with what is going on. What I’m trying to say is that if you look at the African woman from morning to the evening, what she does, in every hour, she will be—she is busy. But again, she is busy in two folds: one, it’s family responsibility of making sure there is food at the home, it has been cooked, the kids have gone to school, you know, and the other side, she has to do some little economic activity to generate few dollars, something like that. Now to get education how to balance these things and be able to stay in the game properly, so it needs somebody on the ground to understand what is happening and come up with, you know. ORUWARIYE: For us, as a startup for MaTontine, I think we need to—for me, two clear areas. One is that we need—(inaudible)—some financing to (only ?) lend our members. But despite the fact we have these partnerships with the MFIs, they are still reluctant to lend so much money, and the demand outstrips the supply. And we feel that for us to really make the impact we need more players in the field that are willing to lend. And we had initially the challenges of partnerships, so strategically we did pilots; in fact, that’s how we gathered members. We said, OK, let’s do a pilot. Let’s call in, see what works—(inaudible)—scale. We can see what works to make you comfortable. But despite that, there still was division with the traditional FSPs. Nobody wants to lend to the poor. And when they do, the rates are just almost usury, and the poor can’t make any headway from those rates. So right now we feel, as a fintech company and as a small organization, that area of being able to have some kind of structured finance and to (only ?) lend to our members, to increase and impact more women, is something we are really looking at. And also another big area for us is really working in terms of designing products for the women. As a small company, it takes a lot of our efforts, trial and error, but we feel if we have some support in that area we can really impact them because when we go and do our research in the field, they tell us a lot about what they need, what will work for them, and we just don’t have the resources to do all of that at once. TORRES: In the case of CARD, we are thirty-two years old, and fortunately the savings that we have generated is more than the loans that we have been in—outstanding with our women, but because we are embarking on digital transformation, if you can help us increase or improve the connectivity and the cost of the mobile phone to poor women, it will be a big help. VOGELSTEIN: Well, it is clear that much more work remains, but also that the economic potential for women and for the private sector is significant. So thanks to all of our speakers for joining us here this afternoon, for your insights. We are grateful to all of you. Thank you very much. (Applause.) (END) This is an uncorrected transcript
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  • Southeast Asia
    Bolsonaro Ascendant: The Similarities to Rodrigo Duterte
    On Sunday, far-right Brazilian presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro outperformed polls and won roughly 46 percent of the vote in the first round of Brazil’s presidential elections, coming close to the 50 percent threshold that would have given him the victory outright. He will now face the second place finisher, Workers Party candidate Fernando Haddad, in a run-off in three weeks, one in which Bolsonaro will be heavily favored to win. Without a doubt, autocratic-leaning populism has made enormous strides globally in the past decade, in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, among other places, and right-leaning populists also have gained power in North America and Western Europe as well. But in many respects Bolsonaro most closely resembles a Southeast Asian populist, Rodrigo Duterte, even though the two men theoretically have different political ideologies. Duterte has always said that he came from a leftist political background—and indeed Duterte has passed some progressive policies in office, albeit while simultaneously undermining democratic institutions and norms—while Bolsonaro is an unabashed political conservative. For one, both men have appealed to citizens with promises of extreme responses to crime and corruption—Duterte’s war on drugs, for instance, which has involved condoning widespread extrajudicial killings of drug traffickers, drug users, and many people additionally who had no links to drugs at all. In Brazil, where the murder rate has reached a new high, Bolsonaro has promised to give the Brazilian police, already some of the most militarized in South America, wider rein to shoot at suspects, and has at least hinted at approving Duterte-style extrajudicial killings. He also has waxed nostalgic about Brazil’s years of dictatorship, and has suggested he would pack his cabinet with military men. Both also have taken advantage of the weaknesses, in-fighting, and graft of existing political parties, positioning themselves as outsiders who can bring radical change in a country where elites have lost the public trust, and where publics have soured on democracy itself, feeling that it has led to a lack of public security, has not addressed inequality, and has offered up politicians largely disconnected from many voters. In the Philippines, despite strong growth during the presidency of Duterte’s predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, and rising investment in the Philippines, inequality remained high, and Aquino was perceived by many voters as aloof. State institutions remained fragile or nonexistent, infuriating working class and middle class Filipinos. Meanwhile, in the months before Duterte was elected in 2016, other presidential candidates continued to fight each other rather than build an alliance against Duterte, who was elected in a multicandidate race where no one received 50 percent of the popular vote. Bolsonaro, meanwhile, has risen in the wake of massive corruption scandals involving prominent figures from both the Workers Party and other parties, including former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who was the front-runner in this presidential campaign until he was jailed. Bolsonaro has positioned himself as a scourge of corruption, as a strongman who can solve deep and entrenched problems—though it is unclear whether he himself was totally clean in the past. He also has benefitted from Brazil’s severe economic decline in recent years, which has led to a spike in unemployment and fed a popular desire for any political alternative that can right the Brazilian economy. Like Duterte, Bolsonaro has benefitted from the adept use of social media, which allowed both men, as candidates, to amplify their messages and also sidestep the mainstream media. More than leaders in places like Poland and Hungary, too, Bolsonaro and Duterte thrive on brutal and misogynistic rhetoric, such as jokes about rape. They further utilize outlandish, insulting, crude remarks to shock the political system and political norms—a typical tactic of autocratic-leaning populists—test what actions they can get away with, and, not coincidentally, draw a continuous stream of media attention. A final lesson, too, to take from the Duterte era in the Philippines is that autocratic-leaning populists, such as Duterte, may make seemingly outlandish statements and promises on the campaign trail—but that voters should believe that these populists intend to at least attempt to carry out their plans. As mayor of Davao, Duterte allegedly oversaw widespread extrajudicial killings as a supposed means to combat crime, and on the campaign trail he essentially promised the war on drugs that he has overseen. Yet some analysts—and perhaps some voters too—played down Duterte’s seemingly extreme promises; but, in office, he has followed through on the drug war, and also on other campaign pledges.
  • Southeast Asia
    Hello, Shadowlands: A Review
    By Hunter Marston Over the last year, concerns about Southeast Asia’s increasingly powerful autocrats have dominated headlines and commentary about the region. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, though democratically elected, has imprisoned his critics, including even senators. Myanmar’s military has expelled hundreds of thousands of minority Rohingya Muslims through targeted violence, while the Thai junta has clung to power despite promises of elections to come. Meanwhile, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen this year won an unfree and unfair election in which the main opposition party was banned. Yet behind these headlines of creeping authoritarianism, Southeast Asian states often exhibit weak, centralized state power in many respects. Indeed, illegal economies in Southeast Asia, including narcotics, prostitution, and human trafficking, among other industries, thrive in the borderlands and frontier towns of Southeast Asia. Rather than imposing law and order, states are often either complicit in these crimes networks or lack the power to stop them. In his new book Hello, Shadowlands: Inside the Meth Fiefdoms, Rebel Hideouts and Bomb-Scarred Party Towns of Southeast Asia, Patrick Winn, Asia correspondent with Public Radio International and a veteran Southeast Asia journalist, analyzes the flourishing crime world on the periphery of state power in Southeast Asia (i.e., the “shadowlands”) and examines the “rational, complex actors” who engage in the sex and drug industries, among other illicit activities. Winn argues that these illegal economies flourish, in some place in Southeast Asia, due to the absence of powerful state institutions—but also that, where necessary, criminal networks cooperate with state authorities and security forces. Further facilitating these powerful networks, according to Winn, is the rising influence of Chinese authoritarianism and the declining power of the United States, the combination of which he sees as “a blessing for organized crime.” China’s enormous middle class, he argues, guarantees a steady stream of consumers with a rising demand for illicit exports, while the Chinese government’s preference for noninterference in neighbors’ internal affairs and disinterest in human rights dictate that Beijing will not restrict illegal trade flows. China’s expanding influence occurs as U.S. power recedes, and Southeast Asia is exhibiting a tilt toward authoritarian governance, although he notes that the United States’ approach to many of these illegal economies in Southeast Asia has often been ineffective in the past too. From the start, Winn offers vivid characters and a human dimension, making the book a compelling read. Winn’s first chapter, for instance, situates the reader in a den of methamphetamine addicts in northern Myanmar’s Kachin State, illustrating their addiction while also examining the broader reasons why the methamphetamine trade has flourished in northern and northeastern Myanmar. He moves on to focus on the lawlessness of Myanmar’s frontier towns, which facilitate a wide range of illegal trade. Winn illustrates how the flow of drugs and weapons persists outside the authority of Myanmar’s central authority, in areas controlled by ethnic Kachin militia for instance. Where the central government is present, it is unable or uninterested to enforce antidrug policies, while army officers who control key checkpoints often benefit from the drug trade by accepting bribes, and the military face allegations of a larger role in the drug trade. Winn next shifts his focus to the Philippines. Rather than just explore the drug war under President Rodrigo Duterte, Winn opts for a different angle. He tells the story of albularyo, herbal practitioners who take great risks to offer both actual drugs—albeit ones that are illegal in the Philippines and are brought in clandestinely, due to the government’s inability to police these shipments—that produce medical abortions, as well as folk remedies that supposedly induce abortions. Abortion is illegal in the Philippines, and the Catholic Church wields significant moral and political power in the country. The Duterte administration, which has pushed for broader access to birth control, has often clashed with the church, although Duterte has not pushed to legalize abortion. Facing desperate circumstances, albularyo remain popular among women with no legal access to abortion. Winn’s portrait of Karen, a woman barely making ends meet who seeks an herbal practitioner to prevent her fourth pregnancy, touches on both drug wars: the first on the modern meth trade; the other against the traditional healers who offer illicit medical abortions, many of which can be incredibly damaging to the health of the mother and child. During times where her income ran low, Karen started selling meth to make enough money to feed her children. When she heard of Duterte’s proposed amnesty for drug users and sellers who turned themselves in to authorities, she submitted her information to the government. But rather than a blanket pardon, those who took Duterte at his word learned that they were now on a list of targets for police and vigilantes enforcing the president’s drug war. Karen has narrowly dodged visitors to her home and is living on the run for fear of her life, unable to see her children. After examining how the North Korean regime uses restaurants across Southeast Asia to bring in hard currency for the totalitarian state, Winn’s tour of the growing “shadowlands” of Southeast Asia takes him to southern Thailand. In the deep south, near the Malaysian border, there is a significant sex industry—despite an ongoing separatist insurgency that often has directly targeted commercial sex workers, as well as soldiers, teachers, and anyone the insurgents see as somehow linked to or complicit in the Thai state. The insurgency, which dates back more than fifteen years in its current iteration, has killed more than 6,500 people in its current period. Insurgents often target bars and other sites in the southern border towns where sex workers operate. While prostitution is technically illegal in Thailand, many police are aware of and tolerate sex work taking place within certain bars because they are able to extract bribes. Police corruption and the heavy security presence of Thai armed forces in the south further inflame local resentment. In his afterword, Winn offers several policy recommendations designed to combat the growing illegal economy in various Southeast Asian states. These include: increase police officers’ salaries; decriminalize sex work; legalize narcotics (including meth); and create powerful anticorruption commissions to hold authorities to account and strengthen rule of law. Such commissions have demonstrated some notable results in Indonesia, for instance, whose corruption eradication commission has led to the arrest of high-profile politicians. Winn astutely points to inherent contradictions in US foreign policy that potentially facilitate illegal economies in Southeast Asia: spending billions on a global war on drugs while slashing overseas development assistance, for instance. Winn’s argument that Southeast Asian crime syndicates make rational choices and operate by certain codes of conduct holds up under scrutiny. But his broader geopolitical conclusions—that China’s rise is as preordained as the United States’ decline—come off as less supported by evidence. Winn is on firmer footing in his quest to understand the people he interviews in the shadowlands. His intimate portrait of the everyday criminals who skirt the law and live in the shadows adds an important human dimension to a still widely misunderstood domain of the global economy and Southeast Asia’s rapidly changing societies. Hunter Marston (@hmarston4) is a Washington, DC–based Southeast Asia analyst and coauthor of a chapter in the forthcoming volume Asia’s Quest for Balance: China's Rise and Balancing in the Indo-Pacific (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).
  • Southeast Asia
    Duterte the Peacemaker?
    By Richard Heydarian Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte recently signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), previously known as the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). The signing marked a major milestone towards bringing about a measure of peace and prosperity to the Philippines’ troubled south, which has been racked by decades-long insurgencies fueled by separatist and Islamist grievances. Under the new law, the national government will facilitate the creation of a Bangsamoro (nation of Moros) autonomous area, in the south, without having the south secede from the country. The BOL is part of the historic 2014 peace agreement between the Benigno Aquino III administration, Duterte’s predecessor, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the country’s largest insurgency group and the most powerful armed insurgents in the south. Ironically, it took Duterte, who has been portrayed by Aquino and many others as a reckless authoritarian-in-waiting, to finalize the key provisions of the peace agreement. Aquino failed to the pass the law due to widespread public and legislative opposition to it, after a massacre in early 2015, when several members of the MILF killed dozens of Philippine police special forces during a botched counterterror operation. Duterte, however, was the only major national leader to have openly backed the passage of the BBL in the post-Aquino era. Despite continued public skepticism that the Duterte administration would push the legislation through, the president finally certified the proposed law earlier this year, expending significant political capital to secure sufficient legislative support for the law, which is controversial among many Christian Filipinos, who are skeptical of granting autonomous to the south, with its large Muslim population. Depending on the result of a plebiscite scheduled later this year, the new autonomous region will cover most, if not all, of the Muslim-majority areas in Mindanao. By giving much of the country’s Muslim minority (there are Muslims in other parts of the Philippines, but most live in Mindanao and other parts of the south) greater socio-economic autonomy, the Philippine government hopes to stem religious and political grievances that have divided the country for centuries. For much of Philippine history, huge swaths of Mindanao, home to Muslim Moros, were largely controlled by local sultanates, which resisted Western colonial incursions, though Western powers progressively pushed into the sultanates’ traditional spheres of control. While much of the modern day Philippines adopted Christianity under Spain’s three centuries of colonial rule, the Moros largely held on to their traditions and religious beliefs. After the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Moros were reduced to a minority on their own home island, a process that began in the early era of U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines. This was achieved through a combination of systematic dispossession of their lands (with the enforcement of stricter private property laws at the expense of ancestral lands held by Muslim communities), military campaigns, and massive migration of impoverished Christian residents from the north to the fertile lands of Mindanao. In response to marginalization, which continued after the end of U.S. colonial rule and the onset of Philippine independence, and to perceived threats to Moros’ very existence, tens of thousands of Moros joined nationalist insurgent groups. Eventually, some also joined radical Islamist groups. Both types of insurgents challenged the legitimacy of the Christian-dominated Philippine state to rule the south. In recognition of what he has called a “historical justice” against Filipino Muslims, Duterte, the first president from Mindanao, promised to advocate for greater autonomy for Muslim-majority regions of the south. The BOL Duterte has launched now paves the way for demobilization of tens of thousands of armed rebels, namely from the MILF, who are expected to be reintegrated into new state institutions in the proposed autonomous southern region. The national government will retain control over, among other areas, law enforcement in the autonomous south. The local authorities, however, will enjoy significant latitude to determine their own local institutions. And under a new revenue sharing deal in the agreement, the Bangsamoro authorities are obliged to only remit a quarter of revenues generated in the south via taxes and other means of raising revenues to the national government. In other areas, provinces give 40 percent of revenues raised locally through taxes and other means to the national government. The path ahead, however, remains uncertain, largely due to deep divides among Moros, the depth of poverty and underdevelopment across Muslim-majority regions, and doubts over the ability of former rebels to lay down their arms and integrate with local politics and local institutions. For one, Duterte will have to secure the buy-in of the Tausug-dominated Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the former parent organization of the MILF, which controls the southern regions of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, smaller islands than Mindanao. The Tausug people, a maritime-oriented people in southern Mindanao, have been historical rivals of the land-based Maguindanao people in mainland Mindanao. The Tausug domination of the MNLF, which led the post-independence struggle for liberation of Moros in the 1960s onwards, alienated the Maguindanao members, who eventually broke away and created a more Islamist-oriented splinter faction, the MILF, in the 1980s. The split became final when the MNLF struck a peace agreement with the Philippine government in the 1990s. The MILF continued the fight separately, emerging as the main rebel group in the country over the past two decades. It remains to be seen if the Tausug leaders, particularly former MNLF leader Nur Misuari, will support the new Bangsamoro entity, which will be likely dominated by the rival Maguindanao tribal group, which formed the MILF. There is also the challenge of convincing more prosperous and diverse regions in Mindanao, like those in Cotabato, to join the new proposed political entity. Some regional leaders and warlords in these areas may prefer to stay under the jurisdiction of Manila rather than face the possible dominance of the MILF leadership in an autonomous southern region. According to surveys, in fact a majority of Filipinos nationally are still undecided about the autonomy deal, while many Mindanao residents remain skeptical about it as well. There is also a high chance that some of the critics of the BOL will question its constitutionality at the Supreme Court, raising concerns over its implications for the Philippines’ territorial integrity. Add to this the resilience of various radical groups, including several affiliated with the so-called Islamic State, which view the MILF leaders as apostates for compromising with the Christian government and have called for complete separation from Manila in favor of a Sharia-based society. Despite the magnitude of challenges ahead, the MILF leadership and the Duterte administration, however, are seemingly in firm agreement that the only way forward is to stay the course and push forward the peace deal. Returning to the decades-long armed conflict is, to them, apparently not an option. Richard Javad Heydarian is an academic, columnist for the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and author of Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt Against Elite Democracy (Palgrave, 2018).
  • Southeast Asia
    The Implications of Duterte’s Proposed Constitutional Changes
    By Richard Heydarian As Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte enters his third year in office, he has been fixated on his next big project: constitutional change. Under a new proposed constitution, drafted by a Consultative Committee composed of experts handpicked by the president, the Philippines is poised to potentially shift to a more federal form of government. Duterte and his supporters claim that the new constitution would empower the impoverished peripheries of the country and end the reign of so-called “imperial Manila.” The national capital region, the seat of power, generates more than one-third (36.5 percent) of the country’s entire GDP, but only contains roughly 10 percent of the country’s population. By providing individual states more autonomy under a more federal system, advocates of the constitutional reforms argue, the agricultural central and southern islands of Visayas and Mindanao would be able to close their development gap with the more industrialized north. As the first president hailing from Mindanao, and steeped in his Visayan heritage, Duterte made federalism and decentralization—which have been successful in neighboring Indonesia—a major campaign promise during the 2016 elections. Under the new proposed form of government, the Philippines would be broken down into eighteen regions, with their own regional assemblies and executive agencies. Senators would no longer be elected through nationwide elections; instead, similar to in the United States, they would hail from individual states. In this way, the new constitution hopes to make the Senate more representative of the entire country. Meanwhile, a new federal House of Representatives composed of four hundred members would replace the current lower house. The members would be selected based on geographic representation as well as proportional representation for marginalized groups. Economic and political dynasties rule the Philippines. According to academic studies, about one hundred eighty Philippine political dynasties dominate seventy-three out of a total of eighty-one provinces in the Philippines. A weak party system makes it easier for dynasties to thrive. They constitute up to 70 percent of the national legislature. In 2013, according to the World Bank, only forty family-dominated conglomerates absorbed more than two-thirds of newly-created growth in the country. The new constitution hopes to democratize the country’s socioeconomic landscape by reducing protections for domestic conglomerates, strengthening political parties, and placing tighter restrictions on the proliferation of political dynasties. Despite many reforms introduced in the new constitution, many experts, however, as well as much of the Philippine public, remain unconvinced. Indeed, the constitutional reform does not appear to be popular with the majority of public, according to surveys by Pulse Asia and Social Weather Stations, or with many opinion leaders. Close to three hundred of the country’s leading academics, including the presidents of the country’s top universities, have signed an open letter opposing the move for constitutional change. They have questioned the preparedness and capacity of peripheral regions to raise enough revenues on their own, the seemingly arbitrary designation of new regions in the constitution, the massive additional cost of the transition process, and the challenges of adding new layers of government as part of the proposed reforms. Duterte’s critics further claim that the idea of constitutional change is a thinly veiled plot to extend the president’s term in office, potentially up until 2030. The new proposed constitution abolishes the current single six-year term for the office of president in favor of a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms. Duterte is proposing a nationwide popular referendum on the new constitution, which is yet to be vetted by the legislature, by May 2019 and a full shift to a federal form of government by May 2022 if the referendum succeeds. But there are concerns as to whether the final version of the proposed constitution will have explicit prohibitions against Duterte running for president again beyond 2022. Duterte has sought to reassure the public by claiming that he will not seek office beyond his current term in office, which ends by 2022. But many remain unconvinced. Surveys show that the majority either oppose constitutional change or are unaware and unconvinced of its relevance. Indeed, there does not seem to be any public clamor for the move, which remains deeply controversial among the public. Even if Duterte does not try to gain more terms as president, the constitutional reforms could give him enormous influence over the country past his time in the presidency. Back in the early-1970s, former strongman Ferdinand Marcos extended his stay in office though introduction of a new constitution, which gave him almost unlimited powers over the country. Prominent constitutionalist Christian Monsod has described the new proposed constitution as a “Trojan horse” for the establishment of “constitutional authoritarianism.” After all, the draft constitution gives Duterte significant power to shape the contours of the Philippines’ entire political system through his chairmanship of an all-powerful Federal Transition Committee (FTC). The new body, which will come into effect shortly after the prospective approval of the new constitution, will oversee the formulation, design and implementation of the shift to a new form of government. In effect, critics claim, Duterte will become the overlord of the entire process of political transition, assuming powers that will allow him to determine, together with his handpicked members of the transition committee, the shape and direction of the new government, from its operating rules and regulations to the institutional design as well as who will be in favorable position to dominate the newly-created offices. Yet the perceived power grab has unleashed widespread backlash in government and in the broader civil society. No less than Duterte’s own allies in the more independently minded senate have opposed the railroading of the constitutional deliberation process. Most senators also remain skeptical of the need for a wholesale constitutional change. Major businesses as well as religious groups have also joined the chorus of opposition. The Ecumenical Bishops’ Forum, composed of Catholic and Protestant leaders, has criticized the proposed constitutional change as a “sinister” move, which could grant “Duterte the power to exercise a monopoly of executive, legislative and judiciary powers,” paving the way for “one-man rule.” As the president and his core allies seek to overhaul the country’s political system, a greater section of the society is pushing back with growing determination. Despite his popularity, Duterte is struggling to get his way on this issue. Richard Javad Heydarian is an academic, columnist for the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and author of Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt Against Elite Democracy (Palgrave, 2018).
  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    The Road Not Taken
    In chronicling CIA operative Edward Lansdale's adventurous life and approach to counterinsurgency, The Road Not Taken definitively reframes our understanding of the Vietnam War.
  • Southeast Asia
    Malaysia Achieved a Democratic Victory—But Don’t Expect Its Success to Spread
    In early May, Malaysia was stunned by the victory, in national elections, of the opposition coalition, led by Mahathir Mohamad and essentially (from jail), longtime opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim. Although some journalists had, in the run-up to the election, noted that the opposition’s support appeared to be cresting, in the wake of years of massive corruption allegations against former Prime Minister Najib tun Razak and his allies, the win still came largely as a shock. Najib had governed increasingly autocratically, including by detaining many prominent opponents, and his coalition—which had ruled Malaysia since independence—also benefitted from control of state media, massive gerrymandering, and the ability to hand out large amounts of cash in the run-up to election day, a strategy it had used repeatedly in the past to ensure victory. Yet despite these obstacles, the Malaysia opposition won—and Najib and his coalition (eventually) conceded, marking the country’s first democratic transfer of power. Yet democrats throughout the rest of Southeast Asia, where many elections are due this year and next, should not take too much heart from Malaysia’s example. For more on why they should not, see my new piece in the Globalist.