Human Trafficking

Mu Sochua is the deputy leader of the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), and one of Cambodia's most prominent women in politics. This past week, a Cambodian court issued treason arrest warrants for eight leading members of the CNRP in exile, including Sochua.

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering January 26 to February 2, was compiled with support from Rebecca Turkington and LaTreshia Hamilton.

This year’s Nobel Peace Prize went to Nadia Murad, a survivor—and activist for other survivors—of sex trafficking by the Islamic State group, and Denis Mukwege, a gynecological surgeon from the Congo in recognition of their work “to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.” It is heartening that Mukwege and Murad are receiving the recognition that their work deserves. Let us hope that this publicity will turn into action.

A new CFR Infoguide sheds light on the causes and costs of modern slavery around the world. 

Slavery, long banned and universally condemned, persists in many corners of the world, victimizing tens of millions of people.

Slavery, long banned and universally condemned, persists in many corners of the world, victimizing tens of millions of people.

Each year, the U.S. Department of State issues a report on human trafficking world-wide. The report includes a list of the countries of the world sorted into ‘tiers’ according to their compliance with a particular piece of U.S. legislation, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. That legislation sets our “minimum standards” for the elimination of what amounts to a contemporary form of human slavery. These standards are based primarily on law, law enforcement, and judicial involvement.  Tier 1 includes countries fully in compliance. There are thirty-five countries in Tier 1, mostly highly developed countries in Europe, North America, and East Asia, though some small Caribbean countries (e.g. Bahamas, Guyana, and St. Martin) also make the cut. No country on the African continent is included in Tier 1. Tier 2 includes countries in which the government is not fully in compliance but is making an effort to become so. There are eighty countries in Tier 2, of which fourteen are in sub-Saharan Africa. They include the most developed countries in the region, such as Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa. Also included, however, are less-developed Angola and Ethiopia. The Tier 2 Watch List includes countries attempting to come into compliance (as in Tier 2), but where trafficking is high or increasing. There are forty-five countries in this tier, of which nineteen are in sub-Saharan Africa. They include Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. Tier 3 is countries where the government is not in compliance and is making no significant effort to become so. There are twenty-three countries in Tier 3, of which thirteen are in sub-Sahara Africa. They include countries that, in effect, are in a war or just emerging from one, like the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan. The legislation authorizes, but does not require, the U.S. executive to suspend certain types of assistance to Tier 3 countries. In Africa, there is general recognition that trafficking is a scourge, and that a high proportion of the victims are Africans. How, then, to account for the high proportion of sub-Saharan African countries on the Tier 2 Watch List and on Tier 3? The answer is going to vary from one country to another. However, as noted above, some are in the midst of, or emerging from, prolonged periods of security instability. In others, suppression of trafficking is simply not a high priority. In still others, governance in general is weak and poor, like in Zimbabwe, for example. There is also the general issue that poor countries often lack the bureaucratic, legal, and judicial infrastructure that is strong enough to meet the requirements of U.S. legislation, even if they have the political will to do so.  

Learn more about modern human trafficking—and how it affects women and girls—through six publications from the Women and Foreign Policy program.

Despite a verbal commitment to international standards, the Chinese government lacks the political will to take on trafficking and protect broader human rights.

Caroline O’Leary is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. April was Sexual Assault Awareness Month, which brought a deserved spotlight to the 5,551 cases of human sex trafficking reported nationally in 2016. Across the globe, however, a parallel crisis gets far less attention: violent conflict—which creates weakened legal infrastructure and increases economic instability—has left tens of millions vulnerable to sex trafficking. The sexual abuse and trafficking of refugees is a little-acknowledged facet of the refugee crisis in Europe and the Middle East. However, it is a very real part of life for many forced to flee their homes because of violence from Syria and Iraq. The total number of people forcibly displaced by conflict reached 65.3 million by the end of 2015. These refugees face a dire economic situation; for instance, 90 percent of Syrian refugees are living below their host country’s national poverty line. As former Secretary of State John Kerry once noted, “Wherever we find poverty and lack of opportunity…we find not just vulnerability to trafficking, but zones of impunity where traffickers can prey on their victims.” Migration to Europe for work is considered a perilous necessity for many unable to support themselves or their families. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), at least 1,883 migrants have died so far in 2017—70 percent while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea. The conditions in which migrants travel can not only be deadly, but also open venues through which they can become ensnared in sex trafficking rings. In some circumstances, migrants voluntarily make the decision to take on sex work—which smugglers promise will be lucrative and not require foreign language skills or documentation—as a means of surviving financially. However, upon agreeing to this work, many are abused and treated as sex slaves as well as taken further from home, where they often fall deeper into poverty. Others are unaware of their coercion into the trade until it is too late. Smugglers promise safe passage into Europe in return for payments that run on average from $3,400 to $6,800, according to a 2015 Interpol report. However, smugglers frequently use physical and sexual abuse to demand more money from their victims than initially agreed upon. The IOM notes that this exchange often leads to sex trafficking, where victims are “repeatedly raped or forced to prostitute themselves in near slavery condition” in order to pay back their “debts.” Despairingly, refugee sex trafficking victims often then find themselves unable to report abuse due to their legal status, for fear that alerting authorities may result in their own arrest rather than that of their abuser. Child refugees are decidedly vulnerable as well. They currently account for more than half of the refugee population, and often find themselves parent-less and destitute. At least ten thousand unaccompanied minor refugees have been reported missing after reaching Europe, and many of them are believed to have fallen victim to trafficking and sexual exploitation. Europol has also found crossover between the gangs that help smuggle refugees into the European Union and those exploiting them for sex and slavery. Since this illegal trade takes place largely underground, it is difficult to craft responsive policy. However, a humanitarian crisis of this proportion demands attention and deserves the response of policymakers. To combat sex trafficking and abuse among refugees, the United States should: Increase contributions to refugee resettlement programs to provide alternative work options and asylum in refugees’ new home countries. While potentially highly impactful, this would be difficult to implement due given the current political climate in the United States. The massive scope of the population in need of resettlement is also a significant challenge. Continue to encourage international reflection periods similar to what the European Union has. Such periods provide a reprieve from deportation to allow identified sex victims to seek emergency health and aid services while being legally classified as victims of crime, thereby mitigating any concerns victims may have regarding reporting their abuse. Strengthen legal systems for victimized refugees in order to empower them to get in contact with law enforcement authorities, should they wish to. The benefits of doing so contribute not only to individual refugee empowerment, but also the long-term goal of bringing down sex trafficking rings. Sex trafficking is just one symptom of an enormous refugee crisis—the largest since World War II. To respond to such an issue will take years of cohesive anti-sex-trafficking strategy on the parts of governments around the world—particularly around areas of conflict. Implementing policies that streamline the legal aid and rehabilitation of victims, however, is an achievable way to humanize refugees in a time of uncertainty and fear.

Tyler Falish is a student in Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development and a former intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. The Global Slavery Index estimates that 45.8 million people are currently subject to modern slavery. Modern slavery can take the form of forced labor, domestic servitude, forced marriage, child slavery, and debt bondage, among other forms. Within this definition, it is estimated that India, China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have the highest prevalence of modern slavery. In Mauritania—a former French colony in the Maghreb—a conservative estimate suggests that 43,000 (just over 1 percent of the population of four million) Mauritanians are enslaved. Although this figure appears to indicate an impressive drop from a 2014 estimate of 140,000, the change may be due in large part to more robust statistical techniques and improvements in survey methodology. Precision aside, thousands of Mauritanians remain enslaved. Slavery in Mauritania is hardly ‘modern.’ It is an institution deeply rooted in the history of the country and region. The ruling minority Beydanes (Arab-Berbers) historically enslaved Haratin (or “Black Moors”). Afro-Mauritanians—black Mauritanians who do not have slave lineage—and the Haratin comprise 70 percent of Mauritanians, and both are largely excluded from political life and severely disadvantaged economically. But ethnic cleavages also exist between these groups, as the Beydane-dominated government used Haratin soldiers to kill and torture Afro-Mauritanians in waves of ethnic cleansing in the early nineties. Further, some Afro-Mauritanians were once slaveholders themselves. In 1981, Mauritania became the final country to abolish slavery. But it wasn’t until 2007 that the government passed a law allowing slaveholders to be prosecuted. However, it is uncommon for slaveholders to be arrested and those who are often see immediate release or are handed meager sentences. The government—led by President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz—largely denies the existence of slavery in Mauritania (by referring only to “vestiges” of slavery), a stance that in and of itself hinders progress toward the elimination of the practice. Abolitionists, such as Biram Dah Abeid, leader of the Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA), have risked much to keep pressure on slaveholders and the government, increase awareness abroad, and advocate for both freed and enslaved Mauritanians. On August 19, thirteen IRA members were handed prison sentences from three to fifteen years, after being found guilty of rebellion, among other things, for organizing a protest against the forced relocation of an informal settlement. According to their attorney, they were all tortured while in custody. A Mauritanian blogger, who had written posts criticizing the country’s caste system, remains on death row after his 2014 conviction for blasphemy. Slavery in Mauritania is sometimes justified by an aberrant interpretation of Islam, though perhaps more importantly, it is largely an economic and psychological institution. Enslaved Mauritanians are often bound to their “masters” by economic necessity and a sense of loyalty. A dearth of economic opportunities inhibits the ability of freed slaves to support themselves and their families. While abolitionists like those of the IRA attempt to create the space necessary for enslaved Mauritanians to envision and seize a life outside of bondage, the government’s continued denial of the existence of slavery perpetuates the institution and the caste system, from which the ruling elites benefit. Despite the efforts of the abolitionists and human rights groups, it is unlikely that President Abdel Aziz’s government will change tack. Abdel Aziz is an ally to the West in a region threatened by terrorist groups, which likely insulates him from any intense pressure from foreign governments. He recently expressed interest in a proposal for a referendum on constitutional changes that would allow him to remain in power for at least a third term, if not longer.

This is a guest post by Jacob Zenn. Jacob is a fellow of African affairs at The Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. Since Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to self-proclaimed Islamic State’s leader Abubakar al-Baghdadi in March 2015, Boko Haram has been known as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). From that pledge until August 8, 2016, the formerly bombastic Shekau had not been seen publicly. During this period, Shekau and his former rival for Boko Haram leadership, Mamman Nur, appear to have been locked in a factional feud, with the two of them sending audios behind-the-scenes condemning one another. Nevertheless, until August 3 the Islamic State recognized Shekau as the “wali,” or governor, of ISWAP. Mamman Nur is wanted by Interpol and the FBI for masterminding the UN Headquarters attack in Abuja in August 2011, which killed more than twenty people. Nur accuses Shekau of being dictatorial, religiously uncompromising, killing or maiming (via sharia punishment) innocent Muslim civilians, and burning down mosques over small "violations," including being disloyal to Shekau. There are also disagreements between Islamic State leadership, Nur, and Shekau over the practice of slavery and the fate of the Chibok captives as well as Shekau’s “not giving enough weapons to soldiers [of the other faction],” which forced them to withdraw and “be replaced by unbelievers” in the “Islamic State.” Nur’s criticisms of Shekau resemble those of other breakaway factions, such as the Yusufiya Islamic Movement in 2011 and al-Qaeda in the Magreb (AQIM)-aligned Ansaru in 2012-2013. On August 3, the Islamic State announced that Nur-aligned Abu Musab al-Barnawi (the son of Boko Haram’s founder, Muhammed Yusuf) is the new "wali" of ISWAP. Shekau immediately responded with an audio, where he made clear that he is reverting to his former position as “imam” of Jamaatu ahlis Sunna li’Dawati wal Jihad (JAS, the original name of the surviving followers of Muhammed Yusuf). In the audio, Shekau complained that Caliph al-Baghdadi did not respond to his messages about Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s “unbelief.” On August 8, JAS then released a video of Shekau acknowledging Abu Musab al-Barnawi is the new “wali” of ISWAP, but that he will continue the “jihad against Nigeria and the world” as the leader of JAS. So, the catch now is that the ISWAP faction and Shekau’s JAS faction all still consider Abubakar al-Baghdadi as the caliph. The Islamic State, however, only recognizes ISWAP and the “governorship” of al-Barnawi. Shekau, therefore, is no longer with the Islamic State. But his JAS faction may still be larger and stronger than ISWAP. Moving forward there are three main questions. First, will the rise of Abu Musab al-Barnawi to the leadership of ISWAP lead to changes on the ground, such as a renewed focus on Niger? Moreover, could Nur’s connections to militancy in the Sahel attract the so-called Islamic State’s sub-Saharan African foreign fighters who are now fleeing Libya, thus allowing ISWAP to launch attacks outside of the Lake Chad region? If so, this could bolster al-Barnawi’s claim to leadership vis-à-vis Shekau. Second, can the Islamic State instigate a factional truce between JAS and ISWAP? For example, Shekau and al-Barnawi could both be “governors” of different “provinces” based on their respective strengths in Borno State and the Lake Chad basin area. Though, the animosity and ideological divide between the two factions and Islamic State’s own struggles in Libya will make this an unlikely prospect. Third, where does al-Qaeda stand in relation to the feud? In other theaters, such as Yemen and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda deployed loyalists to infiltrate, divide, and weaken Islamic State’s new provinces and pull fighters back to al-Qaeda’s orbit. Could al-Qaeda do the same through covert operations, making use of AQIM? On the one hand Nur has a history of being aligned with AQIM, while there may be regret in Shekau’s faction about having joined Islamic State and a desire for new resources and legitimacy. It will also be important to see whether Nigeria can exploit the internal ideological differences among these groups to isolate one or both factions and benefit from a potentially weakened insurgency due to infighting.

Rachel Brown is a research associate for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.  Migration across the U.S.-Mexico border is the source of polarizing debate in American politics, but rarely is it coupled with another touchy political topic: China. News of an uptick in the number of Chinese citizens smuggled across the border into southern California thus came as a surprise. In June, the San Diego Border Patrol sector reported stopping approximately 663 migrants from China over the past eight months, a 1,281 percent increase from the previous year. A spokeswoman for the Border Patrol explained, “We just weren’t getting [Chinese citizens]” before. In fact, unauthorized immigration from China is hardly a new phenomenon. Now, however, it has metastasized to different locations and taken on new, more sinister dimensions following the development of closer ties between Chinese and Latin American criminal groups. Concerns over human smuggling from China to the United States – both by land and by sea –are long-standing and have reappeared often over the last four decades. A 1993 article in the LA Times reported the arrest of over four hundred smuggled Chinese in the San Diego area and noted that “the boom in illegal immigration by sea from China’s Fujian province [the source of many unauthorized Chinese migrants in the United States] has prospered largely because of an alliance between Chinese and Latin American smuggling rings.” Despite law enforcement efforts, smuggling continued, and in 2010, Border Patrol in Tucson announced an increase by a factor of ten in the number of Chinese citizens stopped while illegally transiting through the Sonoran Desert. These numbers are large, but they represent only a small portion of the overall phenomenon. The Migration Policy Institute estimated that there were 285,000 unauthorized Chinese immigrants living in the United States, the most from any nation outside Latin America. In part, this large number speaks to the difficulty of immigrating to the United States through traditional channels. While most unauthorized immigrants simply overstay their visas, for those who are smuggled, popular routes include going by boat or flying for various legs before arriving in Mexico City or the Yucatán Peninsula and then moving north. Smuggling Chinese across the southern U.S. border appeals to traffickers because it is more lucrative than smuggling individuals from Mexico or Central America. A longer journey commands a steeper price and the going rate per person is believed to be somewhere between $50,000 and $70,000; the total value of the trade for the Chinese mafias involved has been estimated at $750 million. The role of Chinese mafia groups (triads) in bringing migrants across the border has also deepened their exposure to and ties with Latin American narcotics cartels, both in human smuggling and beyond. An “alliance between Chinese and Latin American smuggling rings” was noted as early as 1993, but today the scope of this “alliance” encompasses not just smuggling, but also other illicit activity including the sale of drug precursors from Asia and pirated materials. In Mexico, contact between triads and cartels occurs in various regions including those ruled by the ruthless Los Zetas syndicate and the Gulf and Juarez cartels, depending on what routes are used for migrants. Triad groups are believed to operate in the Mexican state of Chiapas and the Red Dragon triad, which operates in Peru, is involved not only in smuggling, but also in extortion and drug trafficking within Latin America. The wide-ranging activities of transnational organized crime groups generate additional law enforcement concerns beyond border security. Addressing the challenge of smuggling and trafficking of Chinese through Latin America will require the United States, China, and Latin America, particularly Mexico, to work together. The United States and China already operate the Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation, which was established in 1997 to address a variety of issues including “drugs, and repatriation of illegal immigrants.” During President Xi’s state visit in September, he and President Obama reiterated their commitment to expand law enforcement collaboration. Meanwhile both economic ties and other exchanges between China and Mexico have expanded in recent years. Trilateral law enforcement cooperation on immigration and drugs could be a natural extension of these existing relationships. Indeed in 2013, R. Evan Ellis of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, proposed the establishment of a “multinational anticrime mobile assessment and training team.” Such a team could help share information, address language issues, and coordinate strategies specific to each country involved. While the media often portray the relationship between China and the United States in Latin America as more competitive than cooperative, perhaps the often fractious debate over unauthorized immigration could generate a new source of collaboration.