U.S.-India Relations, With Ashley J. Tellis

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is U.S.-India relations.

With me to discuss the challenges and tensions inherent in the evolving relationship between Washington and New Delhi is Ashley J. Tellis. Ashley is the Tata chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He specializes in international security and U.S. foreign and defense policy with a special focus on Asia in the Indian subcontinent. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, he served as senior advisor to the undersecretary of state for political affairs and senior advisor to the ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi during the George W. Bush administration. He's the author of Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia. Earlier this month, he wrote "America's Bad Bet on India" for Foreign Affairs. Ashley, thank you for joining me.

TELLIS:
Pleasure, Jim. Happy to be here.

LINDSAY:
Ashley, I want to dive into the current state of U.S.-Indian relations into the extent to which the interest and values of the two countries align or diverge. It's clear that the two countries have gotten a lot closer in recent years, but it hasn't always been that way. So could you provide some context on how U.S.-Indian relations have evolved over the last several decades?

TELLIS:
Certainly, the Cold War was obviously a very difficult period for U.S.-Indian relations because the United States was embarked on this major project of containing the Soviet Union and India, which had recently become independent that just about the time that the Cold War was beginning did not want to find itself trapped between the two bipolar blocs as they evolved. And so India pursued a policy of non-alignment, and that policy of non-alignment essentially meant that it would not be either a close partner of the United States or a close partner of the Soviet Union, but it did seek to exploit the competition between those two great powers in order to advance its own interests. That was pretty much the story until the end of the Cold War in 1991. 

Now, of course, there were moments throughout that period when U.S.-India relations ended up being atypically intimate. So for example, when India went to war with China in 1962, the Kennedy administration really bent backwards to support India during that conflict. But that didn't last for very long, and it was then replaced by all the frictions that people remember vividly to this day. So it's been a sort of a yo-yo throughout the Cold War period.

LINDSAY:
And there was a particular irritation in India with U.S. support for Pakistan, correct?

TELLIS:
That was a major element. So I think there were two or three dimensions why India felt alienated from the United States. First, I think it looked at the U.S. primarily as the successor state to Great Britain in terms of the management of the international system. The U.S. was of course not a colonial power in the subcontinent, but it took over Great Britain's responsibilities and how it managed the system. And India, which was a post-colonial state, did not particularly warm up to the idea that it was moving from a colonial era now to an era of great power competition where countries like itself would have no voice or have a limited voice. So I think that was the first dimension.

The second dimension was that bipolarity forced choices on India, which India didn't want to make. It didn't want to be part of either bloc. And then the third was that because of bloc politics, the United States ended up in an awkward position of being allied with Pakistan, not because Washington actually thought about Pakistan as a serious partner, but because the Pakistanis were smart enough to exploit block politics through the mechanism of joining an alliance as opposed to India, which attempted to exploit block politics by essentially sitting out of alliances. But Pakistan's choices exploiting bloc politics by joining the alliance meant that the United States could provide Pakistan with both significant economic and military assistance. And guess what? You know that military assistance was obviously used by the Pakistanis against India. And that colored New Delhi's perceptions of Washington in ways that were not particularly conducive to building the relationship that both sides wanted in the abstract.

LINDSAY:
Now that tension changed somewhat during the administration of George W. Bush. You played a major role in it. You were working as an aide to the U.S. ambassador at the time, Robert Blackwill, who, for the purposes of full disclosure I will note, is a senior fellow here at the Council on Foreign Relations. And in particular, you brokered a civilian nuclear deal that I think many people regard as a pivotal point in U.S.-Indian relations that sort of change the course and tenor of the conversation between the two capitals. Could you walk us through that pivot point a bit?

TELLIS:
Sure. And let me actually start Jim by talking about the post 1991 period. After the Soviet Union collapsed, one of the three pillars of U.S.-India antagonisms disappeared. Bloc politics didn't matter anymore, and the demise of the Soviet Union meant that the grievances that we had about India and its affiliations with the Soviet Union didn't matter. But there were two other pillars. One was India's state run economic system, which thankfully also began to transform after 1991 thanks to India's economic reforms. And so India began to shift from state control of the economy to a more market led economy, and that offered opportunities for U.S. businesses and for the U.S. government. So there were two of the three big impediments that disappeared post 1991, but there was a third, and the third impediment sort of is rooted in India's 1974 decision to test a nuclear weapon.

And that test alarmed the United States because it woke us up to the challenges of nuclear proliferation. And after that 1974 test, the United States responded by creating an ever tightening sanction regime of which India was a principle target because we were trying to prevent India from becoming a full-blown nuclear weapons power. Now, India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998, during which time the Clinton administration, which was then in office again piled on a further set of sanctions on India. So by the time George Bush comes into office, the one big impediment structurally that still prevents the full transformation of the relationship was India's nuclear status. And Bill Clinton attempted to resolve that problem by trying to put the genie back in the bottle and telling India that although it tested nuclear weapons, it must not deploy nuclear forces. That was the essence of the bargain that he thought would be palatable.

Needless to say, the Indians wanted no part of that kind solution. What President Bush did was that he recognized that our extent not proliferation policy towards India failed, ditto for Pakistan, and they needed to change course. And throughout the first term... And this is really a tribute to Bob's leadership at the embassy actually in Delhi. Throughout the first term of the Bush administration, Bob led a campaign to create a rapprochement between India and the United States on nuclear matters. And we really were advocating some sort of a deal. The precise contours of the deal are not pertinent at this point, but we were advocating a deal. In the second term, after Bush got reelected, he made this very bold decision to then move forward with the deal. 

And the deal in its core, essentially accepted India as a defacto nuclear weapon state. And so he offered India something that we have not offered to any non-NPT signatory. The NPT being the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We gave India the privilege of maintaining its nuclear weapons program and doing whatever it wanted with this nuclear weapons program while still offering it full opportunities for nuclear cooperation, as well as cooperation in other areas of advanced high technology. So in other words, India, although not being an NPT signatory, could maintain its weapons program while still having a new and very productive relationship with the United States. And that's really what opened the doors to the remarkable change in the U.S.-India relationship that has occurred since that day.

LINDSAY:
Well, let's talk about that remarkable change. Ashley, how would you describe it and what are sort of the highlights of that improved relationship?

TELLIS:
So there are several dimensions to it. In fact, it is so encompassing that it is hard to summarize Jim in any way that does justice to the change. But let me sort of flag the following. Today in the area of diplomatic coordination, we coordinate very, very deeply and extensively with India. In fact, I think there are few non-allied partners that we cooperate as extensively with as we do with India.

LINDSAY:
I think it's an important point to flag that the United States and India, while their relations have improved, they are not allies in the sense that the United States has allies in NATO or allies with Japan and South Korea.

TELLIS:
Absolutely. Absolutely. In that sense, the relationship with India is unique and that uniqueness makes the fact that we have such deep diplomatic intensity of engagement all the more remarkable. So that's one area. Second area is defense and strategic policies. During the Cold War, we had very tenuous links with India in the realm of defense relations. Today, our defense relations have expanded in, again, in exponential ways. If you look at the linkages between our two societies, there were always Indian Americans present in the United States, particularly after 1965. But today, the Indian American community is really a community that has enjoyed all the benefits of the American dream and has contributed in remarkable ways to the United States. So you have very tight ties now between the two societies.

LINDSAY:
You can certainly see that in the high-tech industry with a large number of Indian Americans as CEOs of big tech companies.

TELLIS:
Absolutely. Absolutely. And you can see that in the linkages that this community has brought with the technology communities back in India and the interlinkages between Silicon Valley and Bangalore and so on and so forth. If you look at now our cooperation in energy, in the area of science and technology, in the area of education, there doesn't seem to be a single area that you can identify where there have not been quite sterling successes. And so when one looks back at this relationship from the 2000 to 2004 vantage point, when Bob and I were in Delhi, it looks like nothing that we could have imagined, really, really remarkable changes. And yet the point that you made, Jim, is really the point that we always need to remember that we have a relationship now with a developing country that is also a very proud and independent country.

And the relationship that it wants with the United States is obviously one of benefit, one of mutual benefit whenever possible. But also in many ways, one of asymmetric benefit, that is India has the ambition to become a great power someday like the United States itself, and it wants U.S. assistance in getting there. But precisely because India does not want to become a confederate of the United States, does not want to sacrifice its independence even as it is assisted by the United States. It's very cautious and always very conscious about the limits of its partnership. And that's the point that I think we need to remember because sometimes Americans tend to be excessively romantic. We think of our partnerships as partnerships between friends.

LINDSAY:
We are comrades in arms.

TELLIS:
That's right. As opposed to partnerships between countries that have unique interests. And that I think is when we get into trouble in terms of misplaced or inflated expectations. And that's really the issue that is worth pondering on when we think about the relationship with India.

LINDSAY:
Well, Ashley, let me draw you out on that. As you read the mood here in Washington, DC, how would you describe what Washington thinks India is going to do down the road or what they hope India will do down the road?

TELLIS:
I think first there is a real affection for India in a way, again, that is quite startling compared to the totality of the Cold War experience. There is a genuine desire to help India rise in capacity. And that is driven by the imperatives now of the new competition with China. And the most sophisticated among policymakers will emphasize that even if China was not an issue, it is still in our national interest to have a good relationship with India. And I have no difficulty buying that argument to a point, but I think the competition with China intensifies the desire to strengthen the partnership because of the belief that that partnership helps create a certain geopolitical equilibrium in Asia that advances U.S. interests. So I would say when I look at Washington today, the relationship sort of swings between two bookends. One bookend is the desire to build up Indian power as a way of creating a geopolitical equilibrium in Asia, but without asking anything much of India in return.

LINDSAY:
So in essence, a counterweight to China?

TELLIS:
Correct. Building a counterweight that serves its own purpose, that creates its own benefits and leave it at that. And there's a second bookend, which is build up Indian power in order to balance China's rise, but also perpetually linked to the hope that India will do things for us in the context of our own rivalry with China. So these are the two bookends. One bookend says build Indian power because that's a good thing in itself. And there's another bookend that says build Indian power because admittedly it is a good thing in itself, but also because it has the potential to help us in our rivalry with China, however, that evolves over time. And I think those are the two bookends that policymakers are always grappling with. And different layers of the government and the bureaucracies obviously are moved by one bookend more than the other, but that's pretty much the sort of decision space within which U.S. policy choices are made.

LINDSAY:
Now I take it from your article, particularly it's title, Ashley, you are skeptical that India is going to be willing to follow the United States in terms of any confrontation it might have with China, especially if those confrontations don't directly involve India. And I'd like you to sort of explain to me why that is. I take it that part of the argument is that India sees it as a proud independent country that doesn't want to tether its future to another country. Americans should be at least somewhat sympathetic to that because there is a long strand of that similar thought in American foreign policy going back to George Washington and his farewell address. But I would imagine it's also reflects India's particular geopolitical position. It shares a border with China, which has been contested recently, which I imagine sort of changes the perspective from Delhi. It looks different than it does from Washington.

TELLIS:
Quite clearly so Jim. I mean, New Delhi has a vested interest in making certain that Chinese power does not come to dominate Asia, because if China comes to dominate Asia unambiguously, then India will be condemned to playing second fiddle. And so there are strong incentives for India to partner with the United States in making certain that Asia is a genuinely multipolar system. But there are limits to what India is willing to do for the United States, even in the context of that quest for multipolarity. And there are several reasons for that. First, the U.S. grievances with China are not always India's grievances with China. So while India has a stake in a certain outcome that is China not dominate Asia, it does not necessarily support the United States in every detail of the U.S. competition with China. So that's one very simple reality. India has its own interests, they converge with ours, but they're not always congruent with ours.

Second, India can do much for the United States and is willing to do much for the United States in the areas of diplomatic coordination, in the areas of economic cooperation, even in the areas of defense cooperation. But I think it is still skeptical and for reasons that are completely understandable from New Delhi's perspective about engaging in any coalition military activities vis-a-vis China. And in my mind, there are two stark reasons for that. The first is India cannot escape its geography. It lives next door to China. The United States lives very far away. And in some sense, the U.S. has many more options with respect to its confrontation with China than India has simply because of proximity. The second is India has a much weaker state in comparison to China. If you take raw GDP as a metric, China today is anywhere between four and five times larger than India.

And so while the Indians have a vested interest in working with the United States to limit China's capacity to harm their interests, they're not in the business of doing things that might appear to be excessively provocative to the Chinese. And so they have used American assistance and partnership to build up their own national capabilities because building up those capabilities is actually an investment in their own defense vis-a-vis China. But they're simply not eager to behave as other U.S. allies might. And the two classic opposing cases would be Japan and Australia, where Japan and Australia clearly see working with the United States, even in the context of conflict as being central to their national security interests. And that's what AUKUS means in one instance, and that's what the Japanese redefinition of its national strategy means in a different instance. Both of them see working with the United States sort of hand in glove as being very important for success vis-a-vis China.

I think India has a much more restrained perception of what managing China requires. It requires competing with China in terms of providing alternatives to other Asian states. And that's why it's working through the Quad, working in Southeast Asia, and so on and so forth. It requires creating diversification options in the area of economics so that China does not become the sole monopoly provider of goods, especially high-end goods to the world. That's something it wants to work with. It wants to work with the United States in terms of exercising, in terms of building up the capabilities to signal to China that it has powerful friends. But I think it looks at America's conflicts with China as America's conflicts with China, and does not want to make any decisions that prejudge or pre-commit it to working with the United States in the context of a geopolitical meltdown. And from an Indian point of view, it is an entirely irrational calculation on the part of New Delhi. It's not something that should surprise us.

LINDSAY:
Oh, it certainly sounds that way, Ashley. I mean, having the notion of sharing a border with the country that's also far more powerful than you. Creates a level of vulnerability that doesn't exist for Australia or for Japan. But I'm curious about that because there has been conflict in the Himalayas in what China claims is South Tibet, which the Indians say is not. What I noticed is that while the Indian army has done exercises with the U.S. military in high altitudes, we haven't seen Delhi make any overt public call on the United States for assistance in dealing with the very real conflict it faces. I mean, people are dying up in the mountains.

TELLIS:
And I think that will be a persistent feature of India's defense policy. So if you look at the crisis, which occurred in May 2020 when Chinese soldiers attacked their Indian counterparts, and there was the first loss of life along the Sino-Indian border in decades. India appealed to the United States for diplomatic support and we responded very publicly and very quickly. India appealed to the United States for material assistance, and we responded by providing India with cold weather gear and pieces of kit that India needed for operations there. We also provided India with very, very unprecedented levels of intelligence support in order to enable India to sort of stand its ground. But the one thing that I do not expect India will ever do is ask the United States to put boots on the ground to fight its fights because that takes India into geopolitical territory that it has very consciously stayed away from.

The point that I constantly make is that India wants capabilities that enable it to stand on its own even vis-a-vis a superior power like China. But it does not imagine that coalition defense operations against China are anywhere on its menu of options. Now remember, there's a very important historical anecdote. In 1962, during the height of the Sino-Indian War, Prime Minister Nehru then appealed to President Kennedy for assistance. And President Kennedy responded fulsomely by authorizing transfers of equipment and so on and so forth. He also authorized that the United States take responsibility for the air defense of India, and that would require, of course, American aircrafts, American pilots, American surface-to-air missiles, et cetera, et cetera, to operate out of Indian soil. Prime Minister Nehru did not exercise, did not accept that offer, even though we signed an agreement, which I think is still on the books for an air defense vis-a-vis China, but that would've been a bridge too far.

And so even someone like Nehru who was beleaguered as a result of this extreme Chinese attack in '62 simply did not cross the line where he wanted American kit, American manpower, and American capabilities essentially operating on the soil. Throughout the Cold War, even though India had a very close military relationship with the then Soviet Union, they made sure that no Soviets were present on Indian territory, no bases were operated on Indian territory, and so on and so forth. So when India says that it wants to deal with the world independently, we really need to take that seriously and not be trapped by our hopes that under some circumstances India might be willing to abridge that independence, even if it is in support of dealing with a common challenge like China.

LINDSAY:
So let me ask you, Ashley, what policy prescriptions follow from this diagnosis of the fundamental structure of U.S.-Indian relations? Does it simply mean we should expect New Delhi to disappoint us? Is it that we should realize that we have more leverage over New Delhi than we think we have? Because the hope that they will sort of follow us in dealing with China is one that will never be realized. What do we make of this structure and its consequences for policy choices?

TELLIS:
So I would say several things. The U.S. has enormous leverage over India simply because of the disparities in relative power. But whether it is wise to use that leverage in any naked form, I think needs to be considered. My own judgment is that the more we respect India's preferences and its limitations, the fewer the missed expectations that we will have about India. And so if you ask me what is the policy implication, I think the main policy implication is, you do with India all that is necessary to help it to stand on its own vis-a-vis China. But don't move into that territory where the things you are doing somehow create expectations that India will do more than it is either capable or wishes to. And if we can keep this sort of rule in our consciousness at all times, I think we will have a very balanced policy towards India.

LINDSAY:
So for example, should we be more critical of India for not being critical enough in our view of the Russian invasion of Ukraine? Should we be more critical of the democratic backslide in what we see in India?

TELLIS:
I think we've been critical on both counts, but thus far we've done it very artfully in private because of two calculations, which I think are pretty sound. First, we do not need to open more fronts of disagreement with what is otherwise a friendly state, and that would certainly be the case if we engaged in public acrimony. Remember, India is a post-colonial state. It's very proud. It does not want to be lectured by others with respect to its own foreign policy choices. And so condemning them publicly for the choices they make, I think would have just stirred the pot further.

And there's a second reason, which I think is also very important in which I think the administration appreciates, which is a public spat with India on either of these two issues, would not change the outcomes. It would not change India's policy towards Russia. It would not rectify whatever democratic backsliding is occurring. And so I think the administration has made the judgment correctly in my view, that whatever the disagreements are, we deal with them privately and we deal with them hopefully with a certain measure of candor. You don't have to understate the character of the disagreement, but I think managing that... Communicating that respectfully is the smart way to proceed.

LINDSAY:
On that note, I'm going to close up The President's Inbox for this week. My guest has been Ashley Tellis, who is the Tata chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ashley, thank you for joining me.

TELLIS:
Always a pleasure, Jim. Thank you.

LINDSAY:
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Today's episode was produced by Ester Fang, with Director of Podcasting Gabrielle Sierra. Special thanks go out to Michelle Kurilla. This is Jim Lindsay. Thanks for listening.