Bringing More Attention to Sudan’s Crisis

News that the Biden administration is spearheading a fresh initiative to end the conflict in Sudan is a rare positive development in a story that just keeps getting worse. The war in Sudan is as senseless as it is destructive.  The same armed actors that preempted a complete civilian overthrow of the dictatorial government in 2019—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—eventually turned on each other in 2023, robbing the country of the promise of the revolution, committing horrific atrocities, and destroying the very country they claim to wish to lead. 

An approach that elevates the issue and provides a focal point for the multitude of external actors with stakes in Sudan and the many processes that have led to endless forum shopping is most welcome. At the same time, success is far from guaranteed, given that both the SAF and the RSF have demonstrated no real appetite for peace, even as the war has fractured parts of Sudanese society and their own coalitions. But the alternative—simply letting Sudan collapse and threaten to take some of its fragile neighbors down with it—will never be the best choice.

Yet as diplomatic efforts to bring the belligerents to the table and stop the fighting continue, more decisive action is urgently needed on the humanitarian front.  The Sudanese people cannot wait for their warring generals to find common ground—they need much more help now. It’s impossible to know how many civilians have been killed, but what we do know is devastating: over ten million Sudanese people are displaced, over half of the population needs assistance to survive, and somewhere between three-quarters of a million and two and a half million people are at risk of starving to death in the months ahead, the result of deliberate choices on the part of the warring parties to make humanitarian access incredibly difficult. 

Sequencing is always difficult in complex crises like Sudan’s. But there is no time to spare when it comes to moving desperately needed assistance into the country.  Adhering to the dictates of the SAF regarding which western border crossings can be used to move aid makes no sense—they have no actual control over the area, and no real legitimacy in the first place.  There is no doubt that operating in the reality of Sudan today with a localized, patchwork approach that taps into informal, Sudanese civilian efforts carries real risks.  But the risks of not trying are worse. Policymakers must resist the temptation to put off hard and risky decisions while waiting for the latest talks to bear fruit.