Thailand

Thailand and Cambodia Compete to Throw Out Refugees

News this week that the Thai government would begin forcibly repatriating some 4,000 Hmong back to Laos was greeted by condemnations from the UN, the United States, and various human rights organizations. With good reason: Laos has a poor record of human rights abuses against the Hmong, many of whom fought with the United States in the Vietnam War, and the Thai government admitted, even as it was forcing the Hmong back, that it feared for the safety of some in the group who were more overtly political. The current Thai government hasn’t exactly set a high standard for refugee protection – when a group of Burmese Rohingya Muslims set out to sea, fleeing harsh repression, the Thai navy allegedly intercepted their boats and cast them adrift, with little food or water. Still, the Hmong deportation rises to another level, since, as I learned from many U.S. officials and even some Thais, a solution could have been worked out that would have allowed many or all of these Hmong to be resettled in the United States. There’s a lesson here for the United States. Hard on the heels of Cambodia’s decision to send a group of Uighurs back to China, another decision condemned by many Western democracies and the UN, Thailand’s move points up the diminished power of the United States in the region, after years of neglect of Southeast Asia by Washington. During the 1970s and 1980s, a time when the United States had far more influence in Southeast Asia, Washington was able to convince the Thais, who historically have been loathe to house any refugees, to at least allow Lao, Hmong, and Cambodians fleeing war to stay in Thailand until a home could be found for them. But these days it’s simply much easier for countries in the region to thumb their noses at the United States – since China provides an alternative to American power, the United States’ own moral standing has been degraded so far that it’s debatable whether Obama can restore it, and leaders like Thai Prime Minister Abhisit no longer will sacrifice their natural impulses and domestic constituencies to win Washington’s favor. (Though I’ve never seen a scientific survey, I’m sure that if a poll were taken most Thais would support deporting the Hmong back to Laos.) Unfortunately, the region’s leaders’ natural impulses and domestic constituencies don’t exactly provide much comfort to the oppressed.

Post by Joshua Kurlantzick December 29, 2009 Asia Unbound

China

Asia and World (dis)Order...

Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Larry Downing For 30 years, the G7 ruled the roost--Americans, Canadians, Europeans, and Japanese. And with the exception of the Japanese, there was nary an Asian in sight. The G7 took the big decisions about the international economy. And with the many opportunities for side meetings on strategic and political issues, G7 summits became, in many ways, the top table of international relations. But last week in Copenhagen, the United States hashed out a climate deal with Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, and South Africans--and with nary a Canadian, European, or Japanese in sight. How extraordinary is this photograph? What about this one, as the President of the United States briefs European leaders on a deal he has already struck with China and India? The world has changed. Out of the mayhem in Copenhagen, there are at least two pieces of good news about the United States, Asia, and the world: First, what happened in Copenhagen puts the United States squarely at the center of efforts to address the mismatch between today’s international architecture and the realities of power and capacity. Those who create--or can solve--major international problems ought to be the ones at the table. We don’t live in 1979, much less 1949. Yet the dominant international institutions, pacts, and agreements still reflect a world that is fast disappearing. Just look at the International Energy Agency (IEA), which coordinates oil stockpiles among major consuming countries. The IEA doesn’t include China and India--the two fastest-growing energy consumers in the world. And what kind of “international energy agency” is that? It’s good, then, that international institutions are being updated--for instance, through the creation of the G8 Plus Five (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa), the emergence of the G20 (which includes additional Asia-Pacific powers, such as Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea), and the establishment of the Financial Stability Board. But unless real agreements are reached to deal with real problems, these steps will amount to little more than adding a few more deck chairs. Whatever one thinks of last week’s climate deal, at least the United States reached it with China and India. The second piece of good news is that the agreement is likely to encourage a more ad hoc approach to global issues. In every crisis of recent years, the most effective global and regional problem-solving has been borne of necessity and focused on results. The most successful groups have assembled quick-moving countries, animated by the urgency of crises, which combine interest, resources, and expertise. They are unencumbered by ritualistic institutions and big international bureaucracies. And they focus on discrete, often imminent problems. Take another look at that photo of Barack Obama, Wen Jiabao, and Manmohan Singh. They reached their agreement around a conference table. And that sort of ad hoc multilateralism reflects a straightforward lesson of recent years: ﬁrst identify the functional problem, then assemble the right group of players. Put differently: avoid geometry for its own sake. That’s the good news. But Copenhagen also raises three, more vexing issues: First, where was Europe in American calculations? China and India are the big winners from recent efforts to update international decision-making but Europe is, quite clearly, the big loser. When the Bush administration championed IEA membership for Beijing and New Delhi in 2008, it quickly ran up against resistance from small European countries, whose weighted voting shares will be reduced if these Asian giants join the organization. How will the United States manage these transitions with Europe? And will the liberal values Americans and Europeans take for granted in so many international institutions become less relevant as China, in particular, assumes a greater role? Second, what about Japan--a pivotal American ally in Asia that also ought to be a partner on global issues? Japan is undergoing a crisis of confidence, and its foreign policy is in transition. But the world’s second-largest economy, second-largest aid donor, and a U.S. ally of fifty years should be among America’s closest global partners. It’s not enough that Japan helps to maintain a balance of power in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance will stagnate, then become much less relevant, if Washington and Tokyo do not also concert their policies globally. But this will mean addressing divergent perspectives on the use of force and philosophical differences in American and Japanese approaches to international institutions. Third, the coming era of major power relations is clearly going to be very complex. The United States and India have, in recent years, built a strategic partnership, and both Washington and New Delhi are ambivalent about the rise of Chinese power. Yet Chinese and Indian views in Copenhagen were far more congruent than American and Indian views. As I blogged last week, many in India increasingly fear a U.S.-China condominium on issues of direct importance to India. And Indians have become increasingly sensitive to suggestions that the United States looks to address global issues bilaterally with China, fearing that this will sideline New Delhi and work against Indian interests. But what happened in Copenhagen was quite the reverse. What conclusion, then, will the administration draw from India’s six daily coordination meetings with China in Copenhagen, or the fact that India and China “cooperated and collaborated each word at every step”?

Post by Evan A. Feigenbaum December 22, 2009 Asia Unbound

China

Power and Pique: Cambodia’s Uighur Deportation

The news this week that Cambodia would deport a group of Uighurs who had fled China and turned up in Phnom Penh, via an underground railroad route normally used by Koreans fleeing North Korea, sparked two different types of reactions. Most human rights groups, understandably, criticized Cambodia’s decision – Amnesty warned that the Uighurs could be tortured when they returned to China, while the UN complained that its staff in country could not see the Uighurs in time to prevent deportation. (China claimed that the Uighurs were “criminals” who should be sent back; the Uighurs argued that they had fled after the Xinjiang riots last summer and would be endangered if they returned.) Other observers commented on how the deportation reflects China’s rising power in Southeast Asia – and particularly in Cambodia. Ten years ago, most Southeast Asian nations would not have acceded – at least not so quickly – to this kind of pressure from China. Now, it was almost assumed among most of my SE Asian diplomat friends – and even many Uighur activists – that these Uighurs probably would be sent back. China certainly wields enormous influence in Cambodia. It’s the largest aid donor and one of the biggest investors. But it’s a two-way street: China’s rise has proved much of a boon for Cambodia itself. China gives Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen an alternative to relying on Western powers; if Hun Sen does not want to accede to Western demands, now he can always turn to China. The prime minister clearly relishes this geopolitical shift – he seems to take every opportunity to remind Western nations they no longer can control him. China’s influence, in this case, also provides Hun Sen, who has no love for the UN, a chance to thumb his nose at Turtle Bay. (Hun Sen has some reason to dislike the UN: After all, he remembers when the UN sat an opposition alliance that included the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of Cambodia.) As the Uighur situation shows, Hun Sen rarely passes up such opportunities to make life difficult for the UN. In the run-up to the Khmer Rouge tribunal, he seemed to spend as much time blasting the UN as he did actually facilitating the tribunal.

Post by Joshua Kurlantzick December 22, 2009 Asia Unbound

China

The Decade’s Top Ten Game-Changers in U.S.-China Relations

It’s the end of the year, and end of a decade, and we here at Asia Unbound are not immune to the easy lure of the “Top Ten” list. OK, it’s not the Top Ten “Accidental Celebrities” or “Cultural Moments” Newsweek has on offer, but below are the ten most important game-changers in U.S.-China relations from the last decade. Copenhagen (December 2009): The world’s number one and number two emitters of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2)—that would be China and the United States, respectively—threatened to hold up a new global framework for climate change. Both pledged to do too little while asking too much of the other. In the end, consensus was reached but only after President Obama (just about literally) broke down the door on some secret Chinese negotiations with the Brazilians, South Africans, and Indians. Truth be told, throughout the negotiations, the Chinese seemed not at all interested in working with the United States. Should we have been surprised? See below. Hu Hosts Obama (November 2009): Awkwardness personified. From the press conference with no questions to the town hall with no town, the first visit of President Obama to Beijing was a sad reminder of just how far our two countries have to go. While many pundits opined that boxing in President Obama was a sign of rising Chinese strength, we’re of the opinion that the Chinese lost big by trying to make the U.S. President look small. When the Chinese have truly arrived, such pettiness will be well beyond them. The Internet: Few would have predicted that China would finish the decade as the world’s largest internet playground. From 8 million users a decade ago to 359 million today, the Chinese talk, shop, and play on the web, just like users everywhere. Of course, the Chinese government can’t quite accept it all—no Facebook, no Twitter, and continued efforts to verify all the users (wish they’d do this on climate change instead). Still, we’ve watched in awe as environmentalists have rallied, human rights activists have linked up, and bloggers have written about everything that pops into their heads. The next decade only promises more excitement on this front. Global Financial Crisis (2008-Present): A $586 billion stimulus package seems to have done wonders for the Chinese economy. Growth for 2009 is predicted at well-over 8 percent, while the U.S. recovery has been tepid; as a result, China’s economy has grown from one-fourth to one-third that of the United States in just one year. Emboldened by their management of the crisis, China’s economic decision makers are looking forward to a new world economic order, if not exactly volunteering to be the first to help build it. A March 2009 paper by People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan suggested that the dollar would eventually be replaced as the world’s reserve currency. Lurking in the wings, however, are overproduction, uncontrolled bank lending, and rising debt, and we think the shift from an export-led to a domestic demand driven model of economic growth will be long and bumpy. Charter 08 (December 2008): Signed so far by over ten thousand people, the Charter calls the government’s approach to modernization “disastrous” and calls for a sharp turn “toward a system of liberties, democracy, and the rule of law.” The organizers, Zhang Zuhua, Liu Xiaobo and Wang Debang, have been harassed by the police, and in December 2009, Liu was charged with subversion and faces fifteen years in prison. There were some predictions early on that Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and other highly educated, technocratic members of the inner party might tackle political reform; these expectations, as Liu can attest, proved to be illusory. Will Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao and the rest of the fifth generation chart a more radical course once they take power in 2012? Olympics (August 8, 2008): No one event so clearly encompasses all the paradoxes and challenges of China’s rise. The Bird’s Nest, the Water Cube, and the opening ceremonies were jaw-dropping spectacles. Yet equally revealing of the new China were Beijing’s restriction of protests to three parks (and subsequent arrests of petitioners) and its Olympic-sized cover up of the scandal surrounding the sale of milk powder contaminated with melamine (which had first broken in June). Election of Ma Ying-jeou (March 2008): Policy makers in Beijing and Washington breathed a sigh of relief with the election of this Harvard-educated pragmatist. Unlike his predecessor, the independence-minded Chen Shui-bian, Ma has focused on trade and travel rather than Taiwanese identity and independence. It is not all good feelings—Beijing is still targeting roughly one thousand short-range missiles at the island and the United States just announced it will move forward with arms sales to Taiwan—but Ma has given both Beijing and Washington a little room to breathe on this perpetually thorny problem. SARS (2003) to H1N1 (2009): After incurring the wrath of the rest of the world for failing to acknowledge the spread of the deadly SARS virus in 2003, China’s leaders turned a new page when it came to the 2009 Swine Flu. Vaccines were pushed from research to development to distribution in record time, while passengers from around the world endured strict—some would say over-the-top—monitoring and quarantining. Still, questions remain as to China’s abnormally low infection rates. Maybe they’ve only turned half a page. September 11, 2001: Before the terrorist attacks, Sino-U.S. relations seemed to be on a collision course (see, for example, the literal collision of an American EP3 and a Chinese fighter off of Hainan on April 1, 2001). Former President Jiang Zemin expressed his condolences on the night of the attack, and in the weeks and months after, China coordinated with the United States on counter-terrorism, was generally supportive of the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and donated $150 million to Afghanistan for development. Over the last eight years, in part because of the massive challenges in Iraq and AfPak, the United States rarely discusses China as a potential peer competitor, but instead “welcomes China’s efforts in playing a greater role on the world stage,” in the words of President Obama. Going Global (1999): While technically not of this decade, almost nothing transformed China’s role in the world more than Jiang Zemin’s decision to encourage outbound investment. As Chinese loans and investment dollars in Africa, Latin American and Southeast Asia mounted, China became the go-to banker for much of the world. Promises to do business and not mess in internal politics also made China many new friends. After a decade of such deals, however, not everyone in the developing world is so welcoming. Chinese money that props up the regional bad guys or incurs serious environmental and labor problems may come at too high a price.

Post by Elizabeth C. Economy December 21, 2009 Asia Unbound

China

Are China’s Neighbors Being Too Deferential to Xi Jinping?

The visit of Xi Jinping, China’s vice president and heir apparent to People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Hu Jintao, has stirred up a mini-political firestorm in Japan over the decision to set aside imperial protocol in order to facilitate Xi’s meeting with Emperor Akihito. The Chinese apparently asked that a rule requiring that a request to meet the emperor be made a month in advance of the audience be waived so that the meeting could occur. The meeting arguably contributed to a positive mood in Sino-Japanese relations, but it has also left behind a residue of political controversy. The controversy has several dimensions. One is the Japanese domestic political aspect of whether Ichiro Ozawa, the secretary general of the Democratic Party of Japan, may have utilized his influence improperly to facilitate a positive review of the Chinese request. Ozawa’s involvement is politically controversial because he returned from his own visit to China a week earlier as head of a 600-person delegation including over 140 parliamentarians. China accorded extraordinary deference to Ozawa and China’s highest leaders met with him during his visit to Beijing. Ozawa’s reception seemed to eclipse that of Prime Minister Hatoyama two months earlier, raising the question of whether Ozawa’s informal political influence is overshadowing the official procedures of the Government of Japan. A secondary aspect of the controversy is whether the short-circuiting of the rules for requesting an audience with the emperor crosses the line between state ceremony and politics by drawing him into a political and diplomatic role. Second and more complicated is whether countries should be bending protocol rules in order to accommodate Xi, who remains a vice president, despite clear indications that he may possibly succeed Hu Jintao as president of the PRC. There are reports that the government of South Korea is also treating Xi’s visit in the same manner reserved for preparations to welcome a head of state. There is no doubt that it would be foolish to needlessly offend China’s heir apparent, and there are persuasive arguments for setting aside protocol in recognition of Xi’s future role; on the other hand, it would be presumptuous for Chinese diplomatic officials to request special treatment on behalf of their future leader. Acceptance of such requests could feed an attitude that China’s neighbors should rightfully treat China’s current and future leaders with both deference and exceptionalism. If China deems that it can take such treatment for granted, such precedents may ultimately be contrary to Japan’s and South Korea’s own national interests.

Post by Scott A. Snyder December 18, 2009 Asia Unbound