Rohingya

As 2017 comes to an end, it’s time to assess which stories from South Asia had the most impact. By this I mean which events or ongoing developments shaped a country or the South Asian region, or had an outsized effect on the world. This year, a number of stories from the region drew global headlines, including from countries that do not always make front page news. Here are my top ten South Asia stories of the year: 1. The Rohingya Flee to Bangladesh The Rohingya Muslim minority has faced ethno-religious discrimination in Myanmar for decades. In August, this persecution descended into widely-acknowledged ethnic cleansing, with horrific violence perpetrated by the Myanmar military on Rohingya men, women, and children that has shocked the world. More than 655,000 Rohingya have fled the country since August, adding to the more than 210,000 Rohingya already living in Bangladesh as refugees. The International Rescue Committee has called this the “fastest-growing humanitarian crisis in the world.” The problems inside the refugee camps in Bangladesh have attracted less media attention than the stories of brutal violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, and the tragic indifference of Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi to the suffering. But with nearly 870,000 Rohingya refugees in legal limbo, and surviving under rudimentary conditions in Bangladesh’s Teknaf Peninsula, attention should shift urgently to funding the relief operations there, supporting Bangladesh financially so this lower-income country does not have to shoulder the responsibility for the refugees on its own, and identifying a path forward for the Rohingya to find permanent residency in hospitable third countries. (Myanmar will not be able to guarantee their safety, and Bangladesh is not equipped to handle such a large refugee burden.) I place this story at the top of my list due to the depth of the atrocities committed and the scale of the tragedy. This crisis will last well into 2018. 2. India and China Go Eyeball to Eyeball in Doklam, Bhutan In most years, an event in the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan wouldn’t rise to near the top of a list of the year’s most important regional developments. But this year, the border between Bhutan and China found itself the site of a military standoff between the armies of the world’s two giants (in terms of population), China and India. In mid-June, following the move of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to extend a road in the Doklam Plateau area of territory disputed between Bhutan and China, the Indian Army stepped in to defend Bhutan’s territory and prevent forward territorial seizure by the PLA. The two armies remained in a tense stalemate for almost three months. The situation was resolved only at the end of August on the eve of the BRICS Summit—hosted by China in Xiamen. (The last-minute agreement ensured that the standoff would not mar the summit.) The standoff showed that India will not hesitate to stand up to China when New Delhi perceives that its vital interests are at stake. We have not heard the last of the Doklam dispute: as of mid-December, press reports continue to emerge regarding a Chinese troop buildup in the same general location. 3. India Implements an Ambitious Goods and Services Tax (GST) It took five years to pass a law introducing a national goods and services tax in India. The national tax replaces a plethora of levies and effectively stitches all of India’s states and federally administered union territories into a single market for the first time in the country’s history. As you would imagine with an exercise of this magnitude, progress was tortuous. The 2011 introduction of a GST bill in parliament during the Indian National Congress–led United Progressive Alliance government did not gain sufficient support, and lapsed with the end of the government’s term in 2014. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government introduced a different GST bill, which eventually secured sufficient parliamentary support to pass into law in 2016, and subsequently received ratification by more than half of India’s states, required in order to bring this constitutional amendment into force. On July 1 this year, marked by a special midnight session of parliament, this hard-fought GST finally rolled out nationwide. It was a complicated debut, with multiple tax bands and a bewildering, non-intuitive assignment of goods and services across them. The complexity dented economic activity as businesses struggled to adjust—but as India irons out the wrinkles, it ought to realize the benefits of a unified domestic market with reduced red tape. In its November note upgrading India’s sovereign rating to Baa2 from Baa3, the first upgrade in fourteen years, Moody’s noted the implementation of GST as the first “key element” of India’s “wide-ranging program of economic and institutional reforms.” Consolidating the world’s seventh-largest economy into a single market bodes well for India’s economic growth. 4. Trump Unveils a New South Asia Strategy for Afghanistan In August, U.S. President Donald J. Trump announced the results of a long-awaited South Asia strategy review. Most notably, the administration shifted to a “conditions-based” rather than a “time-based” approach to the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, and approved a slight increase in troop numbers—but without disclosing the actual number. The administration also bluntly called for an end to the ongoing presence of terrorist groups and sanctuary for them in Pakistan. Finally, the president publicly praised India’s economic and infrastructure support to Afghanistan, and asked for more. Each of these elements represented an incremental rather than quantum change in Washington’s approach to the United States’ longest-running war. But they could nonetheless have important consequences. 5. Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port Reveals the True Costs of the Belt and Road In July, the Sri Lankan government reached an agreement with the Chinese government to essentially hand over operations of the new Hambantota port to a Chinese state-owned enterprise on a ninety-nine year lease deal that gives the Chinese 70 percent of the equity in the operating company, worth more than $1 billion. The port—built in a strategic but commercially unviable location under the terms of a loan agreement from China inked in 2007—has not been profitable, and the handover at Hambantota marked a debt-for-equity swap designed to reduce Sri Lanka’s debt to China. External observers saw the swap as a sign of what Belt and Road infrastructure development deals extract from countries in the long term. These are not freebies. They come at a significant cost to smaller economies. 6. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Is Disqualified From Office In July, a chain of events that began with the Panama Papers (private documents of a secretive legal firm that helped hide offshore wealth, provided to a consortium of newspapers by an anonymous source) reached a political conclusion in Pakistan: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was deemed ineligible to serve in parliament as he could not be certified “honest” and “truthful” given revelations about an income source he had failed to disclose earlier. Pakistan’s Supreme Court rendered this verdict after receiving the findings of a special “Joint Investigation Team” appointed by the court and which included two members of military intelligence agencies. Sharif resigned. His departure from the top office appeared to observers as one more step toward the consolidation of power for Pakistan’s military. Just four years back, with Nawaz Sharif’s election Pakistan could rightly boast of its first successful transition of power from one elected civilian government to another—an important milestone for the country given its history of military rule. Sharif’s efforts to make peace with India, and assert civilian authority, did not succeed. Pakistanis will again head to the polls to elect another national government in 2018, so expect this storyline to remain relevant. But for now Pakistan’s democracy looks shaky as the country’s generals reassert their power over elected politicians. 7. Islamist Protestors Cow the Government of Pakistan Part two in the existential question of where Pakistan is headed involves the continued rise of Islamic extremists. In late November, after weeks of street protests in Islamabad, the government of Pakistan caved to the demands of a few thousand Islamist protestors, and the country’s law minister resigned. The Islamists had accused him of blasphemy following proposed changes (quickly reversed) to the oath of office taken in Pakistan; the Islamists also accused the minister of being a member of the persecuted Ahmadi minority faith as they viewed the proposed change to the oath as beneficial to Ahmadis. Blasphemy is an explosive charge in Pakistan—those accused of it often face vigilante violence, and the offense itself carries a potential death penalty if convicted. In the end, the army negotiated a “truce” with the protestors. The government climbdown illustrated the level of ineffectiveness of the civilian government, the more visible street power of Islamist extremists, and the army’s willingness to side with the extremists even at the cost of discrediting the Pakistani state. 8. Yogi Adityanath Becomes Chief Minister of India’s Most Populous State In March, after India’s BJP swept state-level assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, the party’s selection for chief minister gave an indication of where they plan to pivot: to religious nationalism. Adityanath is a five-time member of parliament from Gorakhpur, where he is a monk and head of the influential Gorakhnath temple. Adityanath is also the founder of the Hindu Yuva Vahini, or “Hindu Youth Brigade,” best known for its vigilante street power, and his public oratory has featured tough talk against Muslims, India’s largest religious minority. The BJP’s election campaign in Uttar Pradesh did not project Adityanath as a potential chief minister, so his appointment came as a surprise to many. Observers see his selection as a sign that, in the absence of faster economic growth and much more robust job creation, the BJP has shifted its emphasis from the development-and-governance mantra of 2014 toward hardline Hindu nationalism. 9. Maldives Signs a Free Trade Agreement With China In early December, the tiny island nation of the Maldives (population: 417,000) signed a free trade agreement with China, becoming the second country in South Asia after Pakistan to do so. (The Maldives’ major export is fish, which the country hopes to send more of to China, and Chinese tourists are the single largest source of visitors to Maldivian resorts.) The agreement surprised New Delhi, and has sparked yet another round of soul searching in India about its regional influence—and China’s growing visibility across the entire Indian Ocean region. (See Hambantota above, and Nepal below). 10. Communists Return to Power in Nepal Nepal held elections in late November and early December, its first under a new constitution ratified in 2015. When all the votes were counted in mid-December, it became clear that a coalition of two Communist parties (one Maoist, and the other Marxist-Leninist) would oust the centrist Nepali Congress from power. Since emerging from a violent insurgency in 2006, Nepal has had a tumultuous time politically—it has had ten prime ministers since 2008—affecting its governance and its ability to deliver services to citizens, including the still-incomplete rebuilding work from the catastrophic earthquake of 2015. The return of a Communist government in Kathmandu will likely mean a further strengthening of ties with Beijing—yet another arena for concern in New Delhi. A pro-China Communist government in Nepal will likely also be less receptive to the Tibetan refugee community living in Nepal. Alyssa Ayres is senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. Her book about India’s rise, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, will be published in January by Oxford University Press.

Post by Alyssa Ayres December 29, 2017 Asia Unbound

Southeast Asia

Events in Southeast Asia to Watch in 2018

Part Two Read Part One here. In addition to several crucial elections, other events in 2018 will shape Southeast Asia’s economies, security, and regional politics. Some more events to watch in 2018: 1. The ongoing crisis in Rakhine State Bangladesh and Myanmar supposedly have discussed plans for repatriation of Rohingya back to Myanmar, and Bangladesh news outlets have reported that Dhaka has drawn up a list of one hundred thousand Rohingya to be repatriated first. Still, any repatriation seems unlikely anytime soon. Bangladesh’s government has made clear that it does not want Rohingya to leave the camps, and hopes to draw down the population of the refugee camps as soon as possible. The camps are in dire shape, with massive overcrowding and a high risk of disease. But given that the Myanmar government seems unwilling to make any real reforms in Rakhine State, provide some guarantee of security for Rohingya, or even admit any culpability at all for the massacres in Rakhine State, the only way Dhaka will be able to repatriate Rohingya, probably, is to force them back across the border. Many Rohingya rightly fear that, if they do return to Rakhine State, they could easily be interned in the state by the army and local police, detained in one of the internment camps dotting Rakhine. And without any real repatriation from Bangladesh, the large number of people in the camps inside Bangladesh well could grow in 2018, with no real long-term solution in sight—and with militant groups seeking recruits in the camps. Meanwhile, in Myanmar there is a strong possibility that journalists and rights organizations could reveal other atrocities that have been committed in Rakhine State, like the recent revelation of a mass grave, which seems to have prompted the authorities to jail two Reuters journalists. Such revelations would put further pressure on outside actors to take stronger measures against Naypyidaw, and would further isolate major democratic leaders from Aung San Suu Kyi, who has refused to engage with international interlocutors regarding any evidence of major crimes in Rakhine State. 2. Singapore as chair of ASEAN With the most skilled diplomatic service in the region, Singapore is often the most effective chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (The chair rotates from country to country each year.) After a year in which ASEAN, with the Philippines as chair, again failed to address the biggest issue collectively confronting Southeast Asian states—how to deal with China’s South China Sea strategy—Singapore is the organization’s best hope for developing some common South China Sea approach that all members can sign onto at regional meetings. Unlike the Philippines, which is increasingly aligned with Beijing’s South China Sea policy, Singapore is at least likely to make ASEAN states discuss the South China Sea at ASEAN meetings—to put the South China Sea high up on meetings’ agendas. In addition, if any concrete progress is to be made on the ASEAN-China talks on a South China Sea Code of Conduct, Singaporean officials stand the best chance of actually achieving such progress toward a legally binding code. (I am doubtful that such progress will be made, however.) In addition, Singapore could work to ensure that tools being put into place to prevent tensions between South China Sea claimants from escalating into dangerous encounters—such as the planned Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea—are actually finished and utilized. 3. Southeast Asia forging its own path on trade With the United States having pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the White House reportedly gearing up to impose new trade actions against China, Southeast Asian states are trying to take their own trade paths. Several states, including Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia, have pushed forward with the TPP. Other states in the region, including the Philippines have become increasingly open to, and are touting, China’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Southeast Asian states will more closely embrace RCEP in 2018 if the TPP is not finalized—Canada seemingly is not ready to finalize the TPP. And despite the Trump administration’s touting of the potential for bilateral trade deals between the United States and Asian states, no Southeast Asian nations seem eager to explore a bilateral deal with Washington. 4. The Islamic State in Southeast Asia Although the Philippine government has ended the siege of Marawi, in Mindanao, the threat from self-proclaimed Islamic State-linked actors in Southeast Asia has not receded. Islamic State-linked groups will continue to recruit in the southern Philippines, in Indonesia, and in other parts of Southeast Asia. In addition, the rise of larger, conservative Islamist groups as major players in politics in Indonesia will potentially bolster militant organizations’ recruiting efforts.

Post by Joshua Kurlantzick December 29, 2017 Asia Unbound

Southeast Asia

Events in Southeast Asia to Watch in 2018

Part One Southeast Asia, like many parts of the world, had a turbulent 2017, with many of the biggest challenges related to a rollback in rights and democracy, and the strength of populism in the region. The crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, which dates back to 2012 in its current iteration, exploded into the biggest humanitarian disaster in East Asia, with little prospect now of Rohingya safely returning to homes in Rakhine State, even though the Bangladesh government is clearly uneasy with the massive numbers of refugees who have crossed into Bangladesh. Still, it is unlikely many Rohingya will return—not while the Myanmar armed forces continue to attack parts of Rakhine State. In other 2017 events, Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law in Mindanao and oversaw a brutal siege in the southern city of Marawi, while continuing aspects of his lawless drug war. Duterte’s popularity ratings remain quite high. Indonesian politics was rocked by the upset of Jakarta governor Ahok. Ahok’s loss demonstrated, in part, the rise of conservative and Islamist groups as forces to reckon with in national politics—especially when these groups have patrons among Indonesia’s business and political elites. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen unleashed the most brutal crackdown on opposition in that country in two decades. Thailand mourned King Rama IX and witnessed Rama X seemingly grasp for more open power for the monarchy. Southeast Asian states reckoned with the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and new concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” as well as with China’s growing regional power. In 2018, Southeast Asian politics will be dominated by important elections in a number of countries, as well as the run-up to 2019 presidential elections in Indonesia, the region’s giant. In addition, the continuing crisis in Myanmar, the fact that Singapore will be chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) this year, the success or failure of multiple regional trade deals, and an increasingly hardline U.S. approach to both China and North Korea will have significant effects on Southeast Asian stability. Some events to watch in 2018: 1. National elections in Malaysia The Malaysian government must call new elections, per law, before August 24 of 2018, although it may call an election sooner, since it probably feels like it is on strong footing for a national election. Although few would have predicted it two years ago, as scandal engulfed the prime minister, Prime Minister Najib tun Razak has built a solid foundation for a victory for the ruling coalition and his continued stay as prime minister. To be sure, Najib’s image has been battered, at least among some voters and in the international community, by the 1MDB scandal and his years of crackdowns against opposition politicians and civil society. Yet Najib and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party look well-placed to win the election. The opposition is still foundering, with Anwar Ibrahim in jail and former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad an unlikely and divisive figure to lead the opposition coalition. Najib and UMNO are savvy in using government funding (as well as extreme gerrymandering) to keep their base loyal. What’s more, the prime minister and his party also have effectively—if unfortunately—worked to capture the Malay “heartland” by using dog whistling rhetoric about the Chinese ethnic minority and increasingly positioning Najib as the biggest defender of conservative religious values and ethnic Malays. It is a tactic that might undercut Najib’s international reputation as a moderate, but one that could well help UMNO peel off Malay voters from the opposition, and secure Najib’s re-election. 2. National elections in Thailand (probably) Thailand’s ruling junta has promised to hold elections in November 2018, which would come more than four years after the imposition of military rule. In December, the junta announced that it would allow political parties to prepare for the upcoming elections, according to reports in Reuters. So, it seems likely that the military will actually hold the election, after postponing it for several years. Why finally hold the election? The armed forces may feel confident that they have so defanged the Shinawatra family, with former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra having fled Thailand and Thaksin Shinawatra’s son Panthongthae allegedly facing money laundering charges, that the Thaksinite Puea Thai party will do poorly in national elections, since the Shinawatra family will be unable to play a central role in the election. The military also may feel confident that it has so changed the Thai political system, since its coup in May 2014, that no one party will ever be able to control the country again—that any party who wins a plurality in the lower house of parliament will be forced to share power with pro-military bureaucrats, senators, and other unelected officials, and that the armed forces can ensure that the lower house is factionalized and ineffective, and that important decisions are taken by unelected actors. In all likelihood, the junta is right. Still, it is not impossible that Puea Thai could win an outright majority in the lower house of parliament, further scrambling Thai politics. Beyond the Shinawatra family, Puea Thai has in the past shown adaptability and flexibility, an ability to put forward non-Shinawatra candidates and still win elections. (To be sure, some of those potential candidates for the 2018 elections themselves face charges from the junta government, further sapping Puea Thai’s bench.) If Puea Thai did win a majority, would the military allow it to actually control the lower house? 3. National elections in Cambodia (but don’t expect them to be free) Cambodia also will hold national elections in 2018—Cambodia’s are scheduled for July. But in 2017, Prime Minister Hun Sen and the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) demonstrated that they would not allow the 2018 elections to be free or fair. Hun Sen’s crackdown has found a wide range of targets—leaders of the opposition party, independent media voices, civil society organizations, foreign NGOs, and other critics of the prime minister. This is clearly the toughest crackdown on opposition since the late 1990s. Even if Hun Sen responded to U.S. visa sanctions, and measures taken by other outside actors, and backed off his pressure on the opposition—which seems unlikely—it is already probably too late for the opposition to regroup and effectively contest the July elections. Many opposition politicians have fled Cambodia and would be wary of returning no matter what Hun Sen says publicly. Still, even Hun Sen must be careful not to push too far; despite Chinese aid and investment, which is helping power the Cambodian economy, the prime minister does not want to alienate Europe and other democracies like Japan even further. If the European Union froze Cambodia’s preferential trade access, it could have severe ramifications for the Cambodian economy, which has otherwise been performing strongly. So, in the run-up to the July election, the savvy prime minister, a master of alternating between repression and co-option, might make some cosmetic attempts to reconcile with Brussels, Tokyo, and Washington, while ensuring that the opposition has no chance of seriously contesting the July election. The question is, if the CPP and Hun Sen win an obviously unfree election, what does the prime minister do next? Such a scenario would leave a large number of young, urban Cambodians alienated from politics and the political system—and they could eventually revolt if the prime minister tries to hand off power to one of his sons after the July 2018 election, a move that would be highly unpopular throughout Cambodia. 4. Politicking for Indonesia’s 2019 Presidential Election Although Indonesia’s elections will not be held for another year, Indonesian politicians are already gearing up for it. The demise of former Jakarta governor Ahok, who lost after massive street protests led by conservative Islamist groups, demonstrate that a populist-Islamist alliance, backed by influential political elites, could shape the presidential contest in 2019. Such an alliance could help former Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, if he decides to run, or it could be deployed by the man who beat Ahok, current Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan. According to most polling, President Joko Widodo seems to remain in the lead for re-election, but to be re-elected he may have to win over some of the conservative Islamist groups that otherwise could be major factors against him. More worryingly, as Matthew Busch has noted for the Lowy Institute, the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial race raised the question of whether Indonesia’s elites necessarily will accept the results of an election in which their candidate loses—a problem that could have emerged if Ahok had won, and could emerge again in the presidential election. The Jakarta gubernatorial election was preceded by rallies that did not just criticize Ahok but engaged in vicious, anti-Chinese conspiracy-mongering. These virulent rallies, which went far beyond criticizing Ahok’s policies and instead portrayed him as a kind of demon, seemed to raise the question of whether these mobs, and their backers among Indonesia’s elites, would accept an Ahok victory as legitimate after so much time demonizing. Ahok indeed lost the gubernatorial election, and conceded, but Busch—and others—wonder whether Baswedan would or could have conceded if Ahok had actually won, given the public animosity stirred up against Ahok. The question will come up again if Prabowo runs in 2019, and uses massive street protests to amplify his message—and then loses. Indonesia’s elites—at least the ones backing Prabowo—are not a sure bet to transfer power peacefully after a national election loss. Read Part Two here.

Post by Joshua Kurlantzick December 28, 2017 Asia Unbound

China

Beware Chinese Influence but Be Wary of a China Witch Hunt

The recent spate of articles and books on rising Chinese influence in the Australian and New Zealand political systems has prompted U.S. officials, journalists, and others to take a harder look at how Beijing is shaping U.S. policy toward China. Already there have been articles in the press suggesting that university and think tank scholars are likely targets for Chinese influence. Yet before any steps are taken to counter this perceived influence, we need to spend time understanding the nature and implications of what the Chinese government is doing to ensure not only that we get the response right but also that we protect against a witch hunt in which American scholars and analysts are attacked with innuendo instead of real evidence. My personal observations suggest that there are some fairly straightforward challenges that Chinese influence presents to U.S. political integrity and, in some cases, equally straightforward measures that the United States government as well as private institutions and actors can undertake to respond. Market Access Some channels of Chinese influence over U.S. political and social discourse are obvious. Beijing has more than one hundred Confucius Institutes located throughout the United States. (The United States has only three somewhat equivalent American Centers in China.) The Chinese government sponsors a 24-hour English language news channel, radio stations, and multiple newspapers in the United States. No American media outlet has an equivalent opportunity to provide its content directly to the Chinese people. Rectifying this imbalance will likely require adopting reciprocity—doing to China what China does to the United States. There are many areas in which reciprocity could be initiated, but as a first step, the United States should consider prohibiting the establishment of additional Confucius Institutes unless Beijing reciprocates by permitting more American Corners. The Exchange Business The most potent weapon Beijing wields over American China analysts is the power to grant and deny visas for travel to China. Some U.S. scholars who are critical of China or tackle particularly sensitive political topics have been banned from the country for decades; others sometimes receive visas and sometimes do not; still others are made to wait until the last minute, are hauled in for discussions at the Embassy or local Consulate, or are granted a visa but denied meetings with Chinese officials. Visas allow the Chinese government to subject U.S. scholars to the same implicit threat that its own scholars face—if you cross the invisible line, you will face serious consequences, so best to remain far away from the line to begin with. Less frequently, but more intrusively, some Chinese authorities also try to influence the make-up of U.S. delegations by proposing specific U.S. participants. The objective here is to ensure that in any bilateral discussion there are voices on the American side sympathetic to the Chinese perspective. While the U.S. government can play a role in restricting visas for Chinese scholars and officials, the real power rests with American universities, think tanks, and scholars—acting both collectively and as individuals. No organization—whether a think tank, university, or other cultural institution—should agree to move forward with a project if one of its participants is denied entry to China. Beyond that, universities should ensure that all their faculty are permitted to travel to Beijing before agreeing to significant exchanges and partnerships or the establishment of centers and institutes in China. Universities have significant political leverage through these collaborative efforts: they should use their influence to ensure that all their scholars have access. In addition, organizations should not allow Chinese authorities to place specific U.S. scholars on U.S. delegations. Unless both sides are jointly determining the make-up of a conference or dialogue, there is no reason that the Chinese side should be allowed to influence the choice of who participates on the American side. The Censorship Dilemma The Chinese government also tries to shape the narrative provided by U.S. think tank and university scholars by censoring their appearances on Chinese television, interviews in Chinese newspapers, and books. In one case, a well-known Chinese publishing house not only eliminated significant sections of a book on American foreign policy but also placed its own content into the book—creating entirely new passages. Apparently the publisher believed that the American author would not check the Chinese translation. The opportunity to speak directly to one billion Chinese through interviews or books is a tempting one, and it is easy to think that “saying something is better than saying nothing.” But censorship is a slippery slope. At every juncture, an American scholar should decide whether to accept any censorship, and if the answer is yes, how much censorship is too much censorship. Unless an American scholar has a guarantee of an unadulterated view, a wiser course is to deny Chinese government media outlets the opportunity to feature opinions from American analysts. In any case, many Chinese are adept at circumventing Internet controls and accessing the ideas of western scholars through western media outlets and publications. The Stranger in our Midst Beijing is now also actively supporting the establishment of Chinese think tanks in the United States. For example, in Washington, D.C., the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS) is supported by the Hainan Nanhai Research Foundation, which, in turn, is backed by the government-affiliated National Institute for South China Sea studies. A perusal of the website of this institute indicates that it presents unexceptional and largely unobjectionable reporting and analysis. Yet, its commentary is nonetheless skewed: while there is some critical analysis of U.S. policy, there is none on China. In this way, ICAS is not a think tank but a channel for propaganda. If such Chinese think tanks proliferate, it is plausible that more positive assessments of China will begin to shape the broader U.S.-China debate, lending more weight to the Chinese government position while attempting to maintain a veneer of independence. Given the restrictive nature of the recent Chinese law on the management of foreign NGOs, Beijing’s desire to support Chinese think tanks on U.S. soil should provide an opportunity for the U.S. government to push for greater leeway in activities for U.S. think tanks with operations in China. Otherwise, Washington could consider what types of reciprocal measures might be appropriate. Pay to Play Chinese money—tens of millions of dollars—is now entering into the world of U.S. think tanks and university centers and institutes through private Chinese foundations and individuals. Much of this money is dedicated to promoting work on U.S.-China relations. It is too early to determine the effect of such money on the substance of the research. However, even if the funding does not directly affect research findings, it may well affect the research agenda. For example, a research project funded by Chinese money is more likely to focus on “How the United States and China can cooperate” than “Challenges the United States faces from growing Chinese power.” U.S. money for China-related policy analysis is scarce, and there is significant competition for the funds provided by foundations such as Luce, Starr, Smith-Richardson, and the Carnegie Corporation, among others. If Chinese money is utilized, institutions and scholars should be transparent and ensure that there is no opportunity for the Chinese funder to affect the research agenda or outcome. In this regard, the decision by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies to accept money from a sitting Chinese official for a chair on China, with the proviso that this chair direct a program in conjunction with, and serve as liaison to, the funder’s own foundation/think tank, was clearly a mistake. The American Obligation While the United States seeks to understand and curtail opportunities for the Chinese government to influence U.S. political discourse through think tank and university scholars, it should ensure that facts trump rumors and avoid overreacting. In the current divisive and amped-up U.S. political environment, there is significant danger that educational institutions, think tanks, and scholars will be caught up in a rush to root out Chinese influence. There is an added danger, as well, that these investigations are merely the tip of the iceberg—that the United States will soon be embroiled in a witch hunt that will ensnare unsuspecting and innocent Chinese students and scholars, as well as the larger community of Chinese-Americans. The United States has experienced many waves of anti-foreign hysteria, only to be followed by a deep sense of shame once cooler heads prevail. We have seen this movie before and it does not end well; there is no need to play it again.

Post by Elizabeth C. Economy December 22, 2017 Asia Unbound

Donald Trump

More Prominence for India and the Indo-Pacific in the U.S. National Security Strategy

The Donald J. Trump administration has released its National Security Strategy (NSS). Media attention and analysis of the document has rightly highlighted the prominence of Russia and China, identified as revisionist powers that “want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.” Observers have also remarked upon the incoherence of a strategy that claims a role for “competitive diplomacy” and “advancing American influence” while slashing the budget and the personnel of the State Department. And of course, the elephant in the room is whether the president actually believes what the strategy outlines. But one lesser-discussed area worth further attention is the more prominent place given to India and the Indo-Pacific region in U.S. national security. The NSS describes its components in four sections—following the four “pillars” of the strategy—that lead the document: “protect the American people,” “promote American prosperity,” “preserve peace through strength,” and “advance American influence.” Following these pillars, a final section charts out “the strategy in a regional context.” This format differs from those of previous NSS documents which tended to interweave specifical regional priorities within the outlines of strategic goals. But the biggest departure from previous NSS documents is the placement of the Indo-Pacific discussion—at the very top of the regions considered, above Europe and the Middle East. This is the first mention of the Indo-Pacific in any NSS, although the George W. Bush 2002 document referred to the Indian Ocean sea lanes. The Indo-Pacific framework seems driven by China’s greater assertiveness throughout the region, and the NSS characterizes the region in terms reminiscent of the Cold War: A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world. The U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic. (46) This section, while covering the challenges of China’s militarization of the South China Sea, Belt and Road investments, and North Korea, presents U.S. “allies and partners” as the centerpiece of American strategy, leading with South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The document welcomes “India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner” and it calls for more cooperation with the “Quad”—Japan, Australia, and India. It also pledges to “expand our defense and security cooperation with India, a Major Defense Partner of the United States, and support India’s growing relationships throughout the region” (47). How did previous NSS documents feature India? In the Barack Obama NSS of 2015, the president’s prefatory letter mentioned the rebalance to Asia and unlocking “the potential of our relationship with India” as among the “historic opportunities” before the United States. That strategy emphasized U.S. interests in strengthening “our strategic and economic partnership” and honed in quickly on the shared values of the United States and India as “the world’s largest democracies” (24). The Obama NSS of 2010 had a more optimistic view of the geopolitical possibilities for the United States with China and Russia, and grouped India in with both as one of the “key centers of influence” in the twenty-first century. That strategy emphasized the development of the U.S.-India strategic partnership: The United States and India are building a strategic partnership that is underpinned by our shared interests, our shared values as the world’s two largest democracies, and close connections among our people. India’s responsible advancement serves as a positive example for developing nations, and provides an opportunity for increased economic, scientific, environmental, and security partnership. Working together through our Strategic Dialogue and high-level visits, we seek a broad-based relationship in which India contributes to global counterterrorism efforts, nonproliferation, and helps promote poverty-reduction, education, health, and sustainable agriculture. We value India’s growing leadership on a wide array of global issues, through groups such as the G-20, and will seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in the world. (43–44) The George W. Bush administration placed a high priority on transforming ties with India, and indeed it was the Bush administration that spearheaded the civil nuclear agreement so critical to ending decades of estrangement between New Delhi and Washington. In its 2006 NSS, the Bush administration’s first mention of India noted that “relations between India and Pakistan have improved” (14). Later references to India focused on the country’s role as a global engine of growth (26), a partner in the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (27), and highlighted that the United States had “set aside decades of mistrust and put relations with India, the world’s most populous democracy, on a new and fruitful path” (35). And the Bush administration’s 2002 NSS contained more references to India (sixteen) than any of the subsequent documents. While the first reference to India came in the context of “the need for India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes,” further attention to India as part of the 2002 strategy looked at India’s “potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century” and sought to “transform” this relationship (10). So in terms of regional focus, the Trump administration’s adoption of the larger Indo-Pacific framework and its elevation to the top of the regional strategic priorities boosts India’s place in terms of strategy. The bigger questions, of course, lie in the degree to which this NSS will guide the administration’s actual policy steps. And that’s where we can see through some visible holes. As many have noted, the Trump administration’s goal of expanding partnerships across Asia and emphasizing the norm of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” now lacks its most important and hard-fought initiative: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). India, of course, was not a TPP member. But there is now no larger Asian trade architecture in which the United States participates that might have, down the line, appeared attractive to India to advance its own trade interests and domestic economic reforms. And as I’ve written elsewhere, there is an Asian economic consultation, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, in which India’s absence is glaring—but no U.S. administration has taken up this gap and it has not been mentioned by the Trump administration. Secretaries Rex Tillerson and Jim Mattis have referred to the challenges posed by China’s infrastructure investments across Asia, but even as Tillerson has proposed partnership with India on transparent regional infrastructure financing, the Trump administration’s treasury secretary has not supported an expansion of World Bank lending. And despite the stated interest in expanding economic ties with India—and I readily admit the economic side of U.S.-India relations is prickly at the best of times—the Trump administration’s approach emphasizes a trade deficit with India of $26 billion. This amounts to a tiny fraction of the more than $300 billion trade deficit with China. Given that New Delhi also has concerns about India’s trade deficit with China, measuring progress with India in terms of the trade deficit rather than continued progress on market access, and a more positive vision for cooperation) seems like a strange point to stress. Which is all to say: the new NSS offers a new prominence for India as part of the American approach to a higher-profile Indo-Pacific region. But whether the Trump administration will be able to fill the crucial economic gaps in the India and Indo-Pacific strategy remains an open question. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

Post by Alyssa Ayres December 19, 2017 Asia Unbound