Sub-Saharan Africa

Kenyatta ICC Trial Temporarily Adjourned

On December 19, International Criminal Court prosecutor Fatou Bensouda asked the judges to adjourn the trial date of Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta because one of the prosecution’s witnesses is now declining to testify and another has confessed to giving false evidence. She is asking for the adjournment to give her more time to seek other evidence before proceeding with the trial. She said: “Having carefully considered by evidence and the impact of the two withdrawals, I have come to the conclusion that currently the case against Mr. Kenyatta does not satisfy the high evidentiary standards required at trial. I therefore need time to complete efforts to obtain additional evidence, and to consider whether such evidence will enable my office to fully meet the evidentiary threshold required at trial.” Kenya’s President Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto have been indicted in connection with the bloodshed surrounding the 2007 presidential elections. At that time, Kenyatta and Ruto were on opposite sides. Kenyatta was a leader of the Kikuyu ethnic group, while Ruto was a leader of the Kalenjin ethnic group. The two ethnic groups have long been bitter enemies. The origin of the enmity appears to be dispute over land in the Rift valley. However, political figures on both sides have previously fanned the enmity in pursuit of their own agendas. It looks like that might have happened in 2007. At least 1,200 people were killed, and the international community, led by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan intervened. In 2013, however, Kenyatta and Ruto reconciled their personal differences and led a united ticket against Raila Odinga. Kikuyu and Kalenjin found themselves on the same side. They won in elections that most Kenyans decided were credible. That victory means that Kenya’s president and vice president are both under ICC indictment. Since the elections–and even before–ICC officials, including prosecutor Fatou Bensouda have complained of witness intimidation and general Kenyan non-cooperation. Kenya has sought Africa Union support against the ICC, and the Kenyan parliament has called for withdrawal from its jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, as the years go by, it is likely that it will be increasingly difficult for Bensouda to make her case against Kenyatta. However, Ruto’s case, generally regarded as the stronger of the two, started in September 2013, and is going forward. Should the ICC case against the Kikuyu Kenyatta go away, and should the Kalenjin Ruto be convicted, it is unclear whether that would re-ignite the ethnic conflict between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, up to now held in abeyance by the Kenyatta/Ruto alliance.

Post by John Campbell December 30, 2013 Africa in Transition

Sub-Saharan Africa

Nigerian Archbishop Kidnapped, Freed

Peter Akinola, retired primate of the Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion) and his driver were kidnapped the day before Christmas as he drove away from his office in Abeokeuta, Ogun state (in Yorubaland). Some reports–but not others–say his daughter was also kidnapped. There are other contradictions and inconsistencies in the details of the episode in the press reports. They were freed unharmed shortly thereafter when the archbishop convinced his captors that as a retired clergyman, he had no money to pay ransom. Though the archbishop was unharmed, the circumstances remind us that kidnapping can be brutal. The archbishop–who is almost seventy years old–was according to one report forced to lay on the ground. When he and his party were released, they were dumped on the side of the road and had to make their way through dense bush until the police found them. Even though the archbishop has been one of the most powerful religious leaders in the country, and is one of the Nigerians best known outside of Nigeria, the kidnapping appears to have had no political or "terrorist" dimension. It looks like it was solely a criminal act with the goal of collecting a ransom. Another Anglican archbishop was kidnapped in September 2013, and an Anglican bishop was kidnapped in January 2010 and another in September 2010. Up to now, the Church of Nigeria has avoided publicizing the kidnapping of senior clerics in hopes of avoiding copy-cat episodes. It is unknown whether ransoms have ever been paid. But, many other prominent people and their relatives are kidnapped almost on a regular basis. The criteria for victim selection appears to be the perceived ability to pay ransom. One notable victim was the elderly mother of Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. Others have included elderly relatives of governors, traditional rulers, and business people, especially if they do not have bodyguards. The motives appear almost always to be ransom, not political. Before he retired, Archbishop Akinola was the primate of the Anglican Church of Nigeria, with perhaps twenty million communicants, probably the largest Christian denomination in Nigeria, and the second largest part of the world-wide Anglican Communion (after the Church of England). The archbishop was also the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria, a powerful interdenominational advocacy group. He is a leader of Christianity in the Global South; in 2006 Time Magazine included him in its list of the hundred most important people in the world, in the category of "Leaders and Revolutionaries." A low-church evangelical, he is a social conservative and strongly opposed to gay rights. He organized the Convocation of Anglicans in North America (CANA) for dissident Episcopalians after the Episcopal Church (the branch of Anglicanism in the United States) ordained an openly gay bishop. Kidnapping is not usually political, but it has a political consequence. The Nigerian government’s inability to suppress it contributes to the lack of confidence many Nigerians have in their institutions of government.

Post by John Campbell December 27, 2013 Africa in Transition

Sub-Saharan Africa

No Christmas for South Sudan

The current crisis in South Sudan escalated on December 15, when President Salva Kiir accused his long-time political rival former vice president Riek Machar of attempting a coup. Since then, there has been widespread fighting between the supporters of the two, with “thousands” killed and yet more thousands displaced. Foreign governments, including the United States, are evacuating their nationals, many of whom have fled to UN encampments. The fighting is likely to impact on South Sudan’s oil production, though thus far it does not appear to have spooked the international oil markets. Mostly Christian South Sudan’s struggle for independence from al-Bashir’s repressive, Islamist government in Khartoum has long been a popular cause, especially in the developed world but also in much of sub-Saharan Africa. In the two years since South Sudan’s independence, international donors has greatly expanded their assistance levels, and there are now significant numbers of expatriates working on various aid projects. Accordingly, there has been the usual handwringing and official statements by leaders of the UN Security Council and countries that have citizens on the ground in South Sudan calling for a cessation of this round of fighting. The European Commission is sending a special envoy, Alex Rondos, to South Sudan. He is scheduled to arrive on December 26. Also scheduled to arrive the same day is Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta. The goal is to organize and facilitate negotiations between the two warring factions. However, Machar has said at various times that he will enter negotiations only after Salva Kiir releases the former’s supporters held captive. At other times, Machar insists on Salva Kiir’s resignation as a precondition. Getting genuine negotiations underway will likely be a challenge. In the meantime, on Christmas Eve, the UN Security Council voted to increase the number of UN peacekeepers from 7,000 to 12,500 and the international police in South Sudan from 900 to 1,300. The troops and the police, all from sub-Saharan African countries, will be pulled from UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Abeiyi, the territory disputed by Sudan and South Sudan. Commentators place the fighting in an ethnic context, conflict between the Dinka, led by Salva Kiir, and the Nuer, led by Machar. That there is now an important ethnic dimension to the killing is undeniable. However, Andreas Hirblinger and Sara de Simone, in “South Sudan: What is "Tribalism" and Why does it Matter,” places the ethnic struggle in a sophisticated context. They argue, inter alia, that “ethnicity provides a lens through which power struggles have been framed throughout most of South Sudan’s recent history.” They show how personal and factional rivalries within the presidential guard spread to the armed forces, and how the threat of ethnic conflict can further an often personal agenda. As external involvement in South Sudan intensifies, Hirblingier and Simone are essential reading. Their article appeared December 24 in African Arguments.

Post by John Campbell December 26, 2013 Africa in Transition

Sub-Saharan Africa

Presidents Obasanjo and Jonathan on the State of Nigeria

On December 2, former president Obasanjo sent a letter to President Goodluck Jonathan cataloguing the shortcomings of the latter’s administration. Eighteen pages in length, it is a thoroughgoing indictment of the Jonathan administration, cataloging shortcomings ranging from security to corruption to the president’s leadership of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Altogether, President Obasanjo’s letter is a familiar critique of Nigerian governance under Jonathan, if perhaps more bluntly stated than is usual in public among Nigeria’s establishment. Though ostensibly private, the letter soon appeared in the media, and it looks as though it was Obasanjo’s intention that it should eventually become public. In a letter dated December 20 that appeared in the media on December 22, President Jonathan, has replied. While President Jonathan says that because of the press of business, he cannot provide a point-by-point response, his reply is lengthy and detailed. His bottom line: “…you have done me grave injustice with your public letter in which you wrongfully accused me of deceit, deception, dishonesty, incompetence, clannishness, divisiveness, and insincerity, amongst other ills.” The two letters, read together, constitute a debate on the state of Nigeria. There are very few points of agreement between the two. Jonathan flatly denies some of Obasanjo’s most pointed accusations, e.g., that the sitting president has developed a “security watch list” with a thousand names on it. Jonathan notes that Obasanjo’s claim that almost U.S.$50 billion in oil revenue is unaccounted for is “spurious,” and based on a letter from the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria Lamido Sanusi that (per Jonathan) its author now says is “misconstrued.” Jonathan also claims that many of Nigeria’s problems began before he entered office: he dates Boko Haram from 2002 and the first major kidnapping for ransom in 2006. Jonathan lists what he sees as his security achievements in the northeast: the re-organization of the security forces, a “carrot and stick” approach to Boko Haram that leaves the door open for negotiation, and even the establishment of numerous new universities in the North to address the education deficit. As for the troubles within the ruling Peoples Democratic Party, Jonathan says they are largely the result of the run-up to the 2015 elections, and that they have been fomented by politicians pursuing their own agendas--including Obasanjo. A point-by-point analysis of these letters, with their accusations and refutations, is far beyond a blog post. In the short term, it is clear that the break between Obasanjo and Jonathan is profound. It is also evident that the superficial unity among Nigeria’s hitherto competing but also cooperating elites is gone. The political structures of post-1999, when civilian government was constituted, will need to be rebuilt. That will be a challenge. According to the Nigerian press, the new, big opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), is putting out feelers to Obasanjo. In response, Nobel Laureate Wole Soynka on December 22 warned, “Shipwreck Ahead.” Soyinka quotes Lagos state powerbroker and a leader of the APC Bola Tinubu as saying that the APC had resolved to rescue Nigeria, appealing to Obasanjo to lead the mission: “We’re resolved and determined to rescue Nigeria. We want you as navigator.” Soyinka, long a bitter critic of Obasanjo and the Nigerian political establishment, added, “If [Tinubu’s] attribution is correct, may I urge you, as an urgent public service, to advise families to begin the stockpiling of life-belts for the guaranteed crash. Don’t forget to alert the coastguards—ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African states), AU (African Union), UNO (United Nations Organization) etc. to be on the alert for possible salvage operations.”

Post by John Campbell December 23, 2013 Africa in Transition

Sub-Saharan Africa

Hard for Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan Not to Run in 2015-But Can He Win?

Things are churning in Nigeria. There is the publication of former president Olusegun Obasanjo’s letter to President Goodluck Jonathan cataloging the latter’s political failures. There is Central Bank governor Lamido Sanusi’s letter, also publicized, reporting the failure of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to remit almost U.S.$50 billion over a thirteen month period. Earlier this week, thirty-seven members of the House of Representatives left the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and joined the principal opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC). The defectors are from Kano, Sokoto, Bauchi, Kwara, Rivers, Katsina, and Adamawa states. Five PDP governors have also joined the opposition. They are from Kano, Sokoto, Adamawa, Rivers, and Kwara states. (The map above and here shows the party affiliation of the governors following the PDP defections.) The core of the APC has been the merged political organizations of Bola Tinubu, a former governor of Lagos state and a major figure in the predominately Yoruba southwest, and Muhammadu Buhari, former military chief of state and perhaps the most popular political figure in the north. Jonathan appears to be splintering the PDP, hitherto the arena where Nigeria’s competing and cooperating multi-ethnic elites have managed their differences and ensured their access to oil riches. And there does not seem to be an alternative instrument developing for elite coordination to replace the PDP. It is early days yet, and much could change before Nigerians go to the polls in 2015. Nevertheless, the opposition increasingly looks like an alignment of the north with parts of the Middle Belt and the southwest. The states with Nigeria’s two largest cities, Lagos and Kano, are also in the opposition camp. This is not new; there is a long tradition of their opposition to any central government. The large-scale Boko Haram attack at the beginning of December in Maiduguri also serves as a reminder that the jihadi insurrection continues. With this constellation of events, will Jonathan in fact run for the presidency in 2015, can he secure the PDP nomination, even if only that of a rump of the party, and if he does secure the nomination, can he win against the opposition? Before writing Jonathan off, it is worth keeping in mind certain realities. 1) The power of an incumbent Nigerian president is enormous. He has access to “carrots and sticks” second to none. These include control of the security services and access to almost unlimited amounts of money from oil production. 2) Jonathan appears to maintain strong support in the Delta, Nigeria’s oil patch. Some of that region’s warlords are closely associated with Jonathan. Some have said that if he is deprived of the nomination or the election, they will set the Delta on fire. That has the potential to dry up the oil revenue upon which the Nigerian elites depend. Elites recognize that reality. 3) It is by no means certain that the 2015 elections will be free, fair, and credible, despite the continued presence of the well-regarded Attahiru Jega as chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission. The Anambra state elections last month—seen by many as a dry run for 2015—were an administrative and logistical disaster. That raises the potential that the 2015 elections—if they are held—will not go well, with many possibilities for rigging, and where incumbents will likely be the beneficiaries. My reading as of today is that Jonathan will run, that his campaign will have something of a PDP fig leaf covering the widening party divisions, and given the fracturing of the Nigerian elites, he is likely to prevail against an opposition candidate. But, the process will be messy and fraught with danger. And there are so many wild cards, not least Boko Haram. All of this, of course, is based on the assumption that there will be elections in 2015. That, at the moment, may be a leap of faith.

Post by John Campbell December 20, 2013 Africa in Transition