Ethiopia

Amid Misinformation and Suppressed Free Speech, Ethiopian Conflict Erodes Abiy's Credibility

As 2020 draws to a close, the terrible toll of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region is coming into sharper focus. The human costs continue to mount; the United Nations estimates that 1.3 million people need emergency assistance as a result of the conflict, and over 50,000 people have fled to neighboring Sudan. Eritrean refugees that had fled to Ethiopia have reportedly been attacked, in some cases forcibly repatriated. UN agencies remain unable to access some areas with humanitarian relief. And despite the federal government’s assertion that the military operation ended in late November, some fighting clearly continues. The overall number of civilians killed remains unknown. The toll on regional stability will only become apparent over time, but it is already clear that Sudan’s fragile transition is suffering new perils as a result of the conflict in Ethiopia. Prime Minister Abiy’s credibility is also among the losses. His claims in late November that not a single civilian was killed in the military assault on Tigray were contradicted by desperate testimonials that emerged despite the state’s attempt to impose a total communications blackout across the region. Ample, alarming evidence belies Abiy’s repeated denials of the involvement of Eritrean forces in Ethiopian territory. Journalists are being beaten and harassed, presumably for reporting the truth and sullying the rosy rhetoric from the leadership in Addis Ababa. This loss of credibility may seem insignificant compared with the numbers killed, wounded, and displaced, but it is grave nonetheless. Ethiopia had long played an important stabilizing role in the region, and it had been emerging as a leading voice on behalf of the continent as a whole in important global discussions. Around the world, leaders embraced the vision of a stable, prosperous, inclusive, and accountable Ethiopia—a state strong enough to stand up for African interests and for shared global norms. But now the international community has reason to doubt the veracity of Abiy’s words and to second-guess his intentions—hardly a solid basis for fruitful partnerships. The cost, calculated in missed opportunities, could be staggering.

Post by Michelle Gavin December 30, 2020 Africa in Transition

COVID-19

Resurgence of COVID-19 in Africa

It was long expected that Africa, with its weak public health infrastructure and the impoverishment of its population, would face particular disaster with the outbreak of COVID-19. It arrived later than in other parts of the world, apparently mostly from Europe. The disease's earliest, high-profile victims were among those able to travel abroad, and South Africa—the country with probably the most extensive links to the rest of the world—early became the epicenter of the disease. Of the big African countries, it has the best public health infrastructure and the best statistics. Hence, there can be greater confidence in official statements about how pervasive the disease has become. South Africa is once again the epicenter of the current wave of infections, driven, apparently, by a mutant strain of the virus. According to health experts cited by Western media, South Africa now accounts for an estimated 40 percent of COVID-19 cases in all of Africa. South African hospitals are overwhelmed. President Cyril Ramaphosa has responded by re-imposing strict restrictions on public behavior in an effort to "flatten the curve" of new infections. Supported by a population terrified by what had happened elsewhere, when the first wave of the disease arrived, African governments moved quickly to apply the conventional methods to control the disease: closed borders, lockdowns, exhortations for mask wearing and hand washing, and social distancing. Economic ruin, however, led African governments to abandon most of the more draconian steps. Nevertheless, the disease appeared less deadly than elsewhere. That led to some research and more speculation about why Africa was doing better. Hypotheses included the swift action taken by African governments to the young population (COVID-19 is particularly fatal among the elderly) to speculation about the impact of earlier vaccination campaigns for other diseases might have had. But now the disease appears to be roaring back, with South Africa particularly hard-hit. But media treatment continues to be largely anecdotal, heart-rending stories of deaths caused by equipment shortages in overburdened public hospitals. There is new speculation that COVID-19 may be just as bad in Africa as it has been in the rest of the world. Lack of hard information makes it hard to generalize about COVID-19 in Africa, nevertheless, here goes. There is significant variation from one country to another on a huge continent with more than fifty countries. For example, South Africa has the highest level of social and economic development in Africa. It also has a larger percentage of elderly people vulnerable to the disease. It also has a good statistics service. Both factors contribute to the country seeming to have a much higher level of infection than the rest of the continent. On the other hand, it is difficult to estimate the pervasiveness of the disease in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo that lack a strong statistics office and where the public health infrastructure is less developed. Even in good times and before COVID-19 arrived, the disease burden in Africa is heavier than in other parts of the world. Weak statistics make it hard to determine actual mortality rates and, not least, in some African cultures, people return home to die and their deaths are not counted officially. As elsewhere in the world, the poor are most of the victims. It remains to be seen when the coronavirus vaccine will become available. South Africa’s Ramaphosa says the government is negotiating with pharmaceutical companies. That said, it also still appears likely that mortality rates from the disease are lower than in other parts of the world: for example, new, mass grave sites visible from the air are rare. Hence, the question remains: even if the disease in Africa is terrible, it appears less terrible than elsewhere. Why? The answer to that question is important, but it will require hard research and analysis rather than anecdotes.

Post by John Campbell December 29, 2020 Africa in Transition

Nigeria

Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: December 19–25

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 19 to December 25, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. December 19: Five Nigerian soldiers and "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Mafa, Borno. December 19: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Kauru LGA and two deaths in Lere LGA in Kaduna. December 19: Bandits kidnapped eighty students and four teachers in Dandume, Katsina but police officers repelled the attack and rescued the victims. December 19: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna. December 20: Gunmen killed three and kidnapped one in Rafi, Niger State. December 20: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Rogo, Kano. December 20: Cult clashes resulted in nine deaths in Abakaliki, Ebonyi. December 21: Kidnappers abducted seventeen in Danmusa, Katsina. December 22: Bandits killed seven and kidnapped three in Chikun, Kaduna. December 22: Kidnappers abducted twenty-one in Batsari, Katsina. December 23: Two vigilantes, five civilians, and "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed during a clash in Giwa, Kaduna. December 23: Gunmen killed two naval officers at a checkpoint in Okene, Kogi. December 23: Soldiers killed three robbers in Mangu, Plateau. December 23: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Batagarawa, Katsina. December 24: Boko Haram killed eleven and kidnapped seven in Chibok, Borno. December 24: Boko Haram killed eight and kidnapped eleven in Gombi, Adamawa. December 24: Six bandits and two civilians were killed in clashes in Sanga and Lere LGAs in Kaduna. December 24: Gunmen killed three police officers and two civilians in Katsina-Ala, Benue. December 24: Bandits kidnapped five in Shiroro, Niger State. December 24: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Ukum, Benue. December 24: Suspected Boko Haram militants kidnapped forty loggers and killed three in Ngala, Borno. December 25: Bandits killed two police officers in Garki, Jigawa. December 25: Police officers killed two civilians at a concert in Oturkpo, Benue.

Post by John Campbell December 28, 2020 Africa in Transition

Nigeria

Darkness in Northern Nigeria

There are signs that as the Nigerian army and the police continue to fail to meet the security needs of the Nigerian people, they will turn toward repression. In November, Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai called on all troops to put themselves in a “war mode.” An internal army communication obtained by the media exhorted Nigerian soldiers to treat all individuals in the region where Boko Haram is active as suspected jihadis until they are “properly identified.” The door is opening to yet more human rights abuses by the security services. Fears that the Buhari government may revive shelved legislation that would seek greater control over social media—including the death penalty for spreading “fake news,” as defined by the government—are also surfacing. Meanwhile, the Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG), a civil society organization that focuses on the welfare of northern Nigerians, is calling on local communities to defend themselves against Boko Haram and “bandits” because the Buhari government is failing to protect them. Last week, before the resolution of the kidnapping of hundreds of schoolboys at Kankara, CNG’s national coordinator said “northern Nigeria has been abandoned at the mercy of various insurgents, bandits, kidnappers, armed robbers, rapists, and an assortment of hardened criminals,” with a “huge vacuum in the political will and capacity of government to challenge” such violent actors. Around the country, numerous state governors are organizing and supporting more-or-less informal militias, ostensibly in support of the army and the police. In the current climate, such groups are likely now acting independently more often than in conjunction with security forces. Some evidence suggests that security service abuses contribute to the alienation of the population from the government, helping drive jihadi recruitment. With the growth of militias, the Nigerian state is losing an attribute of sovereignty: a monopoly on the legal use of violence. The government is also failing to fulfill its obligation to provide security for its people.

Post by John Campbell December 23, 2020 Africa in Transition

Nigeria

Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: December 12–18

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 12 to December 18, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. December 12: Nigerian troops killed three bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. December 12: Twenty Boko Haram militants and one soldier were killed during a clash in Askira/Uba, Borno. December 12: Kidnappers abducted one and killed one soldier and one other in Ibadan, Oyo. December 12: Boko Haram killed thirty refugees in Diffa, Niger. December 13: Three escaped prisoners were killed after a prison break in Calabar, Cross River. December 13–December 14: Kidnappers abducted twenty-two in Rafi, Niger State. December 15: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Oshimili South, Delta. December 15: Suspected Fulani herdsmen killed three in Makurdi, Benue. December 15: Following a police killing of a commercial motorcyclist on December 15, protestors burnt down a number of police stations in Aguata, Anambra; during the violence, one police officer and one civilian were killed. December 16: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. December 16: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. December 17: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno. December 17: Bandits killed seven in Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna. December 17: Amotekun officers killed two civilians in Ibadan, Oyo. December 17: Kidnappers abducted five in Kaura-Namode, Zamfara. December 18: Gunmen killed eight during an attack on the Zamfara Emir's convoy in Funtua, Katsina. December 18: Boko Haram killed five and abducted thirty-five travelers during a highway attack in Konduga, Borno. December 18: A suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and three others in Konduga, Borno.

Post by John Campbell December 22, 2020 Africa in Transition