Drones in Pakistan in 2011 (NSC)

Set in Spring, 2011. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has pursued a vigorous campaign against terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. The U.S. intelligence community believes they have identified the location of al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden. The United States must decide whether to try to kill or capture bin Laden—and if so, how. Each policy option—including a drone strike, a raid by special operations forces, a request that Pakistan act, and inaction—has costs and benefits for U.S. security and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Drones, in particular, have become a core element of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, but their use is controversial. 

After a decade-long search, the CIA has come upon credible evidence of the location of Osama bin Laden. A man whom they believe to be the al-Qaeda leader is living inside a large compound in Abbottabad, a populous city near Pakistan’s capital of Islamabad. The compound also houses roughly twenty women and children, believed to be bin Laden’s relatives. However, based on surveillance of the compound, no one can say with absolute certainty that the individual they have identified is indeed bin Laden. Most of the CIA analysts involved have put their confidence level at 80 percent; some report 95 percent confidence, others rate their confidence as low as 40 percent. 

The president has convened a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) to receive advice on how to proceed. If the president decides to authorize action, three main options exist. The first is to conduct a drone strike against the compound, likely killing those in it. This option would risk civilian casualties and potential damage to an already tumultuous relationship with Pakistan. The second option is a raid by special operations forces. A raid could be effective in that troops could correctly identify individual targets and take caution to protect civilians. Troops could also collect computers and documents for intelligence. However, this option poses greater risk to the lives of U.S. service members and could also damage the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. Third, the president could ask the Pakistani military to capture or kill bin Laden. This would respect diplomatic ties but has a lower chance of success. Given the lack of complete certainty, the president could also decide to wait for additional confirmation or a better opportunity to strike. However, waiting risks losing the chance to act entirely if the occupants of the compound move and the CIA loses track of them. The president needs to decide quickly whether to authorize action to kill or capture the man believed to be bin Laden and, if so, what action to take.

CFR Education extended simulations use a variety of pedagogical tools to create an effective, meaningful, and memorable learning experience for students that builds their global literacy. Students will develop crucial skills such as critical thinking, communication, collaboration, and creativity. Students will complete authentic assessments that feel relevant: instead of five-paragraph essays and book reports, students will write policy memos and participate in a role-play of a meeting of a foreign policy–making body. There are no right or wrong answers in actual policy deliberations, and there are none here, either; students will walk away from this experience with an appreciation for the complexity of policy questions.

In this simulation, students will learn about the National Security Council, as well as meeting these learning outcomes specific to this simulation:

Concepts

Issues

This section presents context, potential benefits and drawbacks, and other information about the policy options outlined in the case that you could find helpful as you guide the role-play and assess students. 

The U.S. involvement in this case stems from not only September 11 but also a long history of al-Qaeda attacks against U.S. service members, civilians, and interests. Especially since 9/11, U.S. military forces, diplomats, and intelligence personnel have operated both unilaterally and in conjunction with local security forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the world to detect and disrupt terrorist plots. A primary tactic has been killing certain al-Qaeda leaders and a vastly greater number of anonymous militants through drone strikes and other counterterrorism operations. 

The principal options available in this case are as follows:

Conducting drone strikes on the compound believed to be inhabited by bin Laden

A drone strike offers a relatively low-risk option that could provide a strong chance of eliminating bin Laden if he is present at the compound. It would not put U.S. personnel in harm’s way. Drones can also be incredibly precise, capable of killing targeted individuals while leaving those nearby unharmed. Despite this precision, drones do still pose the risk of killing or injuring any civilians in the immediate area of the strike.  The precision of strikes only matters if the intelligence is timely and accurate. Additionally, after a drone strike, it could be impossible to confirm the identity of the target. Given the range of confidence levels in the available intelligence and the extremely high priority of bin Laden as a target, this option could therefore leave an intolerable amount of uncertainty over whether the strike indeed killed bin Laden. Finally, given the public opposition to drones in Pakistan, this option would risk further damaging already delicate relations with Pakistan. 

Ordering a U.S. special forces raid on the compound

A special forces raid offers certain advantages over drone strikes. Primarily, U.S. forces can confirm the identity of those in the compound to ensure that bin Laden was present. Moreover, special forces teams could capture individuals to interrogate and collect information and equipment that could provide intelligence about al-Qaeda. Additionally, personnel can take greater care to protect civilians. However, a raid would expose the individuals involved—and the United States’ reputation—to extreme risks. U.S. forces could be killed in a battle at the compound or by the Pakistani military should it become aware of the mission and try to disrupt it. Al-Qaeda could also capture members of the raiding party, giving the terrorist organization hostages of incalculable value and immediately presenting the United States with the agonizing choice of how to respond. All of this raises the risk of deeper U.S. involvement. Additionally, Pakistan would likely perceive a high-profile American raid—especially one so close to its capital—as an intolerable violation of its sovereignty. The operation could lead to a rupture that would end what little cooperation remained between the two countries. If the United States gave Pakistan prior warning of the mission to avoid such a rupture, elements of Pakistan’s government could pass on the information to al-Qaeda leaders allowing bin Laden and others to flee. 

Asking the Pakistani government to capture or kill bin Laden

This option would spare American lives and eliminate the chance of an irreparable diplomatic breach. However, it also offers a far more uncertain chance of success. The Pakistani government could refuse to pursue bin Laden or it could agree but tip off bin Laden or execute the mission incompetently. Despite occasional successes, the United States has had a long history of frustration with Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. This frustration has contributed to bilateral tensions and the belief among many American policymakers that the United States needs to pursue major terrorist targets itself. Especially for such a high-value target, the risks of entrusting this operation to another country would be significant.

Doing nothing

Given the drawbacks of the other available options and the lack of complete certainty from the intelligence community, the president could choose to delay action and continue to monitor the compound. Such a step has the downside of diminishing the utility of timely intelligence and allowing bin Laden to continue operating unhindered, possibly leading to further attacks on the United States or its allies. Moreover, similar issues to those considered here are likely to arise the next time intelligence on his location emerges. Given the particular circumstances of this case—including the possible presence of civilians at the targeted site—the president could decide to pass on this opportunity. There is a chance that the target’s whereabouts and U.S.-Pakistan relations will be more favorable in the future. At times in the past, the United States has carefully considered the consequences of a counterterrorism operation for its relationship with Pakistan. In 2005, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld aborted a large-scale raid on senior al-Qaeda members located in Pakistan’s tribal areas because it had the potential to jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan relations and place many American lives at risk.

CFR Education extended simulations are project-based learning activities. Project-based learning (PBL) leads to better learning outcomes and improves skills, and is more fun than traditional instructional methods. The website that students will navigate throughout the simulation is divided into several parts:

In the NSC Guide, students will learn about the National Security Council, the body they will be simulating. Included are details on its history, how it works, who its major players are, and more. There is also a video interview with experts who have served on the body.

In the Case Notes, students dive into the actual situation they will be trying to solve in their simulation. At the beginning is a clear decision point: the question that students will debate during the role-play. This is followed by detailed background material and a discussion of the role that the United States plays.

Preparation and Role-Play includes details on the various roles students could take on, guidelines for the memorandum they will write (the student playing the role of president has a slightly different task), as well as an outline of how the discussion will flow during the role-play.

The Wrap-Up is an important part of the project and includes reflection questions and guidelines for reflecting in a class discussion and in a second memorandum. For historical cases, this section also includes a short description of how the decision point was addressed by policymakers in real life.

The simulation also includes Student Resources, which include a reading list to support research, additional directions and exemplars for writing assignments, and other tips students may find helpful.

Once students have read the simulation and prepared their position memos, here is how we recommend structuring the role-play:

Tips for the National Security Advisor
In Round 1, call on everyone for their opening statements, keeping to a strict time limit—if students have more to say, they can say it in Round 2. The president doesn’t have a specific time limit, but you should keep things moving by not letting the president get bogged down on one issue or policy option.

In Round 2, students do not need to follow a prescribed speaking order; you can call on them as they raise their placards. Work to include everyone and prevent anyone from dominating. As debate goes on, remind students they can change their minds. If it will help move things along, help students see when they are agreeing with each other without realizing it. Feel free to pose questions or propose discussion topics if you feel that certain issues are not receiving adequate consideration. Ultimately, it’s up to you to judge when Round 2 has run its course and it is time to move on to Round 3. You will want to move on when all policy options have been discussed and all of the president’s questions have been answered. The room does not need to come to a consensus—every option just needs to have a fair airing.

In Round 3, ask students to make a final case for their positions. If, during the course of the discussion, some students seem to have coalesced into blocs, you could ask one student to present on behalf of the bloc. If consensus seems possible, you could work toward it; if not, just make sure each option has been clearly presented to the president. Remember, the NSC is not democratic and is an advisory, not decision-making, body. There is no vote, and the president does not need to choose the most popular option.

Tips for the President
Before Round 1, review all the position memos, if you can. During Round 1, as students are presenting their opening statements, you can ask questions to clarify or help draw out the differences between one policy option and another. Try not to get too deep in the weeds, though—that is what Round 2 will be for.

In Round 2, you can take a more active role. If you have concerns about a policy option, ask questions; if some policy options seem stronger than others, say so. If an element of the issue is not being discussed, raise it.

In Round 3, once you have heard all the policy options, it is all down to you. You should choose whichever policy option you think is best, or combine the strongest elements of several different options. Remember, the NSC is not democratic and is an advisory, not decision-making, body. There is no vote, and you do not need to choose the most popular option. Your decision must be made and announced before the wrap-up discussion, although the written presidential directive can come later.

Tips for Online Classes

We suggest conducting the role-play in three rounds, and that three-round structure is a helpful way to approach chunking the role-play for online learning as well. You can conduct each round synchronously or asynchronously.

In round one, participants present their positions.

In round two, participants debate the various policy options.

In round three, debate begins to coalesce around the policy options that the president favors.

To add spice or challenge to the role-play, partway through the discussion throw in one of the following flash points—additional hypothetical developments that fit within the case’s existing decision point—or create your own. 

After introducing a flash point, you can help students refocus their discussion by considering critical questions such as these:

Each CFR Education extended simulation involves writing assignments that help students think through policy options and reflect on their learning experience.

In NSC cases, there are three types of writing assignments.

Simulations (on the student-facing side) have instructions for written assignments, and samples for each of these writing exercises. You can also find sample rubrics below.

Samples:

Below are sample rubrics for your use in assessing the writing students will do as part of this extended simulation.

These are single-point rubrics. Jennifer Gonzalez, who writes the blog Cult of Pedagogy, has a great explainer, but the bottom line is that single-point rubrics are relatively easy for students to digest but still have all the advantages of giving structure to instructors’ feedback.

NSC Position Memo Rubric

NSC Presidential Directive Rubric

NSC Written Reflection Rubric

Downloadable rubrics are available here: