Mexican Journalist Killed in Oaxaca
- Mexican journalist Francisco Leyva was found dead in Oaxaca, the state’s Attorney General’s Office said, marking at least the fourth killing of a journalist in the country since June (Reuters).
Published by CFR's Wachenheim Center for Peace and Security

Updated August 3, 2026
Overview
Mexico’s narco trafficking organizations have waged a decades-long campaign of violence that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, destabilized governance across large swaths of the country, and strained the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Bilateral tensions have worsened under the Trump administration, which has designated major cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, publicly alleged government-cartel collusion, and pressured President Claudia Sheinbaum to adopt a more aggressive security posture.
In the 1980s, Mexico’s criminal groups and drug traffickers became organized [PDF], assigning distinct regional areas of control for each group and establishing networks and trafficking routes. However, as production and distribution increased, the groups began fighting for territorial control and access to markets, leading to an increase in violence across Mexico.
The Mexican government officially declared war on criminal organizations in 2006 when former President Felipe Calderon launched an initiative to combat cartels using military force. In 2012, President Enrique Peña Nieto revised the Calderon government’s strategy, shifting efforts away from violent exchanges and toward improving law enforcement capacity and supporting public safety.
However, after the Sinaloa Cartel’s Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman was arrested in 2014, re-arrested in 2016, and finally extradited to the United States in 2017, a power vacuum was created within the Sinaloa Cartel, resulting in an accompanying increase in violence between rival factions seeking new territory and influence. Despite an initial decrease in homicides following Peña Nieto’s reforms, Mexico continued to struggle with corruption and crime-related violence. By 2016, drug-related homicides had increased by 22 percent, with more than twenty thousand killed. In 2017, a mass grave containing the remains of more than 250 victims of crime-related violence was uncovered in Veracruz State. The violence rapidly intensified to a peak of 33,341 homicides in 2018. Additionally, from 2017 to 2020, a journalist was killed [PDF] every week on average.
Recognizing widespread assertions that the use of military force had only increased the level of crime-related violence in Mexico—and accusations that the military had committed human rights abuses and carried out extrajudicial killings—then-presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, popularly known as AMLO, promised on the campaign trail to revolutionize the fight against cartels and revert to a civilian-led police force. As part of his “hugs, not bullets” policy, AMLO emphasized poverty alleviation programs, the legalization of marijuana, and new sentencing guidelines for drug traffickers.
After winning the election and assuming office in December 2018, AMLO announced the creation of a new National Guard, a hybrid civilian police and military force, to fight cartels. In 2019, under a deal with the United States, AMLO deployed much of this force to the southern border with Guatemala to stem migration. However, AMLO’s tactics largely failed to curb violence. Though homicide rates dropped marginally, the country still reported over thirty thousand crime-related deaths per year.
Despite initially advocating a less securitized approach to reducing drug trafficking and violence, AMLO expanded the military’s role in policing. While the military’s involvement was intended as a temporary measure, Mexico’s Congress passed a reform in August 2022 that allows the military to carry out domestic law enforcement until 2028. AMLO also promised to bring the National Guard under the army’s command despite an April 2023 Supreme Court ruling that it must remain under civilian command.
Meanwhile, cartels consolidated their control, battling each other with heavy weaponry and drones and controlling an estimated one-third of Mexico’s territory by 2024, according to the U.S. military. Kidnappings, killings, and the targeting of journalists remain prevalent, and the state has struggled to deliver justice for past crimes, particularly those committed by the military.
President Claudia Sheinbaum, AMLO’s chosen successor, assumed office in October 2024, pledging to continue social programs to address the root causes of violence. But in practice, Sheinbaum has shifted away from AMLO’s non-confrontational posture toward a more assertive, intelligence-led approach, driven in part by pressure from the Trump administration to move more aggressively against the cartels. Security Minister Omar García Harfuch has framed the strategy around four pillars: National Guard consolidation, stronger intelligence and investigative capacity, poverty alleviation, and deeper coordination among federal, state, and local authorities. The government has reported a marked increase in arrests and in seizures of drugs and weapons, alongside expanded cooperation with U.S. agencies.
In February 2026, Mexican security forces killed Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes (“El Mencho”), the leader of Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), with the help of U.S. intelligence. The operation represented one of the most significant disruptions to drug trafficking since the trade gained a foothold in Mexico in the 1980s. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has designated CJNG as one of Mexico’s most powerful trafficking organizations, responsible for distributing vast amounts of cocaine, methamphetamine, and increasingly, fentanyl, into the United States.
In a retaliatory show of force, CJNG members instigated a coordinated wave of violence across Mexico, setting fire to vehicles, blocking roads and highways, and forcing civilian lockdowns across major cities—underscoring the reach and power cartel groups continue to wield throughout the country. Analysts warn that a CJNG leadership succession crisis could trigger internal power struggles and further destabilize Mexico’s security landscape.
Sheinbaum’s government points to falling homicides as evidence that its strategy is working, reporting that the daily murder rate dropped by 37 percent between September 2024 and the end of 2025. Critics, however, caution that the official figures may understate the true toll, and that forced disappearances have risen over the same period.
Violence remains acute in Colima, Guanajuato, Morelos, Baja California, and Quintana Roo, as well as against public officials. High-profile assassinations continued throughout 2025, including the November killing of Uruapan mayor Carlos Manzo, an outspoken critic of cartel violence and one of dozens of politicians murdered during the year. Manzo’s death helped trigger a wave of youth-led protests in Mexico City and other cities against cartel violence and government corruption.
Recommended Resources