Has the King of Thailand Split With Thaksin?

Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime minister of Thailand and still the most influential figure in civilian politics and the ruling Pheu Thai Party, has been indicted on lèse-majesté charges, revealing the latest twist in the country’s fragile political landscape. Lèse-majesté charges were filed against Thaksin in 2016, and he recently returned to the country—and probably thought himself immune to the past charges—but in May, the authorities decided to prosecute Thaksin for lèse-majesté on the charges dating back eight years. Article 112 of the Criminal Code of Thailand, known as the lèse-majesté law, forbids anyone from defaming or insulting the Thai monarchy. This is one of the harshest lèse-majesté laws in the world and one that Thaksin’s party has defended while other political parties have pushed for its reform. The crime is punishable by up to fifteen years in prison. Thaksin has denied the charges and has repeatedly pledged his loyalty to the monarchy.

After over a decade in exile following a 2006 coup against his government and another coup in 2014, Thaksin was finally allowed to return to Thailand in August last year. This occurred amid growing insecurity within the monarchy, which is enormously powerful but led by a king who is generally believed to be unpopular among many Thais. The king has made a series of political moves on his own that have been largely unpopular. The May 2023 election delivered a poor result for the Thai monarchy. The pro-reform Move Forward Party won the most votes but was denied control of parliament because of constitutional provisions created by the former junta. These provisions worked against a pro-reform party and preserved a conservative parliamentary coalition. Move Forward has been perceived by some royalists as hostile toward the monarchy because of its proposed reform of Article 112, aiming to reduce the power of the lèse-majesté laws that Thais intensely fear.

Thus, Thaksin’s re-entry into Thailand, and eventually Thai politics, could be seen as a strategic move by pro-monarchy elites to exploit the Pheu Thai Party, which came second in the election, to sideline the Move Forward Party. Even in exile, Thaksin remained the true leader of the Pheu Thai Party. After Move Forward was effectively blocked from forming a parliamentary coalition, Pheu Thai ended its informal alliance with Move Forward and formed a government with many pro-military and royalist parties that had often targeted Pheu Thai in the past. Not only did Pheu Thai manage to form a government, but Thaksin also apparently reconciled with the monarchy, returning to the country and receiving a pardon for many of his past alleged crimes.

Upon returning to Thailand, Thaksin was taken into custody and sentenced by the Supreme Court to eight years in prison for conflict of interest, abuse of power, and corruption during his time in power. He was found guilty of these charges in absentia during his exile. However, as part of a possible deal with the monarchy to secure parliamentary power for Pheu Thai, Thaksin received a royal pardon, reducing his sentence to one year. He spent the majority of his jail term in a luxurious hospital, citing an unknown illness. In February, he was released from the hospital and became a free man after being given home release by the Ministry of Justice to complete his sentence.

Once out of prison, Thaksin slowly re-entered formal politics, traveling to several provinces to visit his supporters. Some Thai experts believe he has been manipulating the government, controlling Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin and his own daughter, Paetongtarn “Ung Ing” Shinawatra, who is now the leader of the Pheu Thai Party. Thaksin’s political resurgence has been evident to Thais.

Yet, the recent lèse-majesté charges against Thaksin indicate that his deal with the royalist establishment might not be final, and he may not be a free man after all. The growing insecurity of the monarchy is no longer caused only by the Move Forward Party. Thaksin’s political resurgence is now reminding the royal establishment that he, once back in Thailand, is charismatic and potentially popular enough to challenge the monarchy’s power, as he did at the height of his popularity in the early 2000s. Therefore, it seems possible that pro-monarchy elites, and possibly the king, are using their judicial power to block Thaksin’s political resurgence. Lèse-majesté continues to serve as a vital political weapon for the Thai political elite.

Thaksin is not the only one being controlled by the judicial power of the Thai political elites. Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin is at risk of being removed from office following the Constitutional Court’s acceptance of a petition filed by forty senators who accused him of unconstitutionally appointing a minister. Sretta is now awaiting the constitutional court’s verdict, while Thaksin awaits trial in criminal court under Article 112, the lèse-majesté article of the criminal code. In Thailand, the judiciary almost always allegedly serves as the protector of the monarchy’s interests. The politicized judiciary has indeed become a power that strengthens the position of the palace.

The use of lèse-majesté against Thaksin is strategic because it continues to trap the Pheu Thai Party and Thaksin himself. To alienate the Move Forward Party, gain control of parliament, and please the royal establishment, Pheu Thai agreed to abandon previous demands for the reform of Article 112. Today, Thaksin’s own stance is entrapping him, making it impossible to reverse his position on the lèse-majesté law, while the king remains the ultimate power despite Thaksin being charged under the same law.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun is a professor at Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies. His recent book is Rama X: The Thai Monarchy under King Vajiralongkorn (Yale Southeast Asia Studies, January 2024).

This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.