Politics, Power, and Preventive Action

This blog post was coauthored with my research associate, Jennifer Wilson.  Last week, the U.S. military announced an accomplishment that has come to define progress in the war on terrorism—the death of yet another senior terrorist leader. These now-routine reports are touted by officials as bringing “justice” to terrorists, delivering a “significant blow” to their ability to maneuver and operate, and even "eradicating" the threats they pose. On Friday, a spokesman for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Colonel John Thomas, told reporters that special operations forces had killed “a close associate” of the leader of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This announcement came fifteen days after the ground raid that killed him on April 6—coincidentally, the same day as President Donald Trump’s cruise missile strike on an airfield in Homs, Syria. As the United States ramps up its airstrikes and targeted raids against the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, there has been a corresponding increase in reported civilian casualties. Airwars estimates that at least 3,111 civilians have been killed in U.S.-led coalition airstrikes since the anti-Islamic State air campaign began in August 2014. However, CENTCOM implausibly assess that “at least 229 civilians have been unintentionally killed” in all 19,607 strikes. CENTCOM publishes a monthly civilian casualty report including reported non-combatant casualties found credible (meaning a strike more likely than not resulted in the death or injury of a civilian), those found non-credible (meaning there is not sufficient information to determine whether a civilian was harmed), and ongoing investigations. There are currently forty-three open investigations, one of which has been going on for over a year. On average, it has taken CENTCOM ninety-five days to announce whether a coalition strike resulted in a civilian casualty over the past six months. Meanwhile, on average, it has taken just eleven days for the Pentagon to announce that a strike has resulted in the death of a “key leader” of a terrorist organization over the past year. (We averaged the time elapsed between the alleged incident and the U.S. military announcement of 115 cases of civilian casualties and 19 announcements of killed terrorists, after removing the highest and lowest number of days passed for both to avoid distorting the mean.) We can only speculate why there is such a vast disparity between the time it takes to investigate the death of a civilian versus the death of a terrorist. However, what this inconsistency demonstrates is that publicizing the deaths of terrorists is a higher priority for the U.S. military than determining the deaths of civilians. For example, last week, a coalition spokesperson, Colonel Joe Scrocca, even acknowledged “we don’t have any means of going and searching out people and, honestly, we don’t have the manpower” to conduct rigorous investigations of reported civilian casualties. The Pentagon claims that it “takes all reports of civilian casualties seriously and assesses all reports as thoroughly as possible.” If this were the case, though, then there would be sufficient surveillance and analytical resources dedicated to thoroughly and more quickly investigate reported civilian casualties. As the former U.S. Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, Lieutenant General Bob Otto (ret.), observed in October 2015, “If you inadvertently—legally—kill innocent men, women, and children, then there’s a backlash from that. And so we might kill three and create ten terrorists.” If Otto’s concerns are to be believed, then investigating claims of civilian harm, holding those in the chain of command responsible to account, and assuring that past errors are not repeated should be as high a priority as is killing yet another in the seemingly inexhaustible supply of senior terrorist operatives. Unfortunately, the military is more committed to boasting about killing alleged terrorists than determining when non-combatants are harmed in the process.

Caroline O’Leary is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. On Wednesday, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim announced the end of Operation Euphrates Shield, deeming the military campaign, which began in August of 2016, a success. The operation brought an armored battalion and supporting ground forces across the border into Syria, the first direct Turkish military intervention into the country. The campaign had two declared objectives: to remove self-proclaimed Islamic State forces from towns along the Turkish-Syrian border towns and to prevent armed Kurdish groups from advancing. Achieving the former clearly helped bring the United States closer to its own goal to “demolish and destroy ISIS.” Turkey’s efforts to stunt Kurdish progress, however, significantly complicate U.S. interests in the region. The Kurdish groups that Euphrates Shield targeted are the United States’ most effective ground partner in combatting the Islamic State. But these forces also have ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which for decades has waged an insurgency against Turkey and is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Turkey, and the European Union. U.S. support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group of mostly-Kurdish forces, has been a sore spot for U.S.-Turkish relations throughout the United States’ involvement in the Syrian civil war. The SDF is made up mostly of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a PKK-affiliated group that is the dominant Kurdish group in Syria. Though Euphrates Shield is officially over—a development that came just one day before U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Ankara—tensions over U.S. support for Kurdish groups will remain. These challenges will need to be addressed as the U.S.-led coalition to counter the Islamic State as well as rebel and Kurdish forces move to take Raqqa, the Islamic State’s de facto capital in Syria. Just last week the United States military airlifted Kurdish fighters as part of a combat operation for the first time, indicating a coming increase in U.S. support for the fighters. Last month, the Center for Preventive Action released a discussion paper entitled “Reconciling U.S.-Turkish Interests in Northern Syria,” which details the competing interests in the region and offers recommendations for the Trump administration. Author Aaron Stein, resident senior fellow in the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, lays out the strategic options that policymakers have and the risks involved with each. Given the complexity of the situation, addressing only one aspect of the conflict could undermine long-term U.S. interests in the region. To both improve the U.S. relationship with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, Turkey, and to defeat the Islamic State, Stein recommends that the United States:                   Offer to mediate peace talks between the PKK and the Turkish government. Given the U.S. involvement with both Turkey and Kurdish groups, the United States can exercise leverage to negotiate a ceasefire and mediate peace talks. Quietly indicate support for a decentralized future Syrian state. While this is a politically difficult proposal, “absent a clear articulation of what it is that the United States wants in Syria—besides defeating the Islamic State—the United States will struggle to articulate a viable political solution.” Utilize any progress from PKK-Turkish talks to instigate ceasefires between the YPG and Arab/Turkmen insurgents. While the United States has little leverage among these groups now, Stein notes that this approach, “in tandem with renewed efforts to work with Russia to broker a Syria-wide cease-fire,” could lead to another round of negotiations. It would also require continued U.S. diplomatic involvement in the conflict.   While Stein acknowledges the competing interests of the actors involved in northern Syria, he advocates for an approach that addresses these conflicts in order to advance long-term U.S. interests in the region. Read “Reconciling U.S.-Turkish Interests in Northern Syria” for an in-depth analysis of U.S. options in northern Syria.