The Significance of the Putin-Kim Summit

With Russian President Vladmir Putin visiting Pyongyang on Tuesday for a summit with North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un, concerns are growing that the current rekindling of a military relationship between North Korea and Russia could lead to a deeper, mutually beneficial trade in weapons and technology. Today’s visit is the second time Putin and Kim will be meeting each other in less than a year (the two leaders last met in September in the Russian Far East), and this marks Putin’s first visit to Pyongyang since 2000, when he met with Kim Jong Un’s father and predecessor, Kim Jong Il.  

The key question is: Will Russia share its sensitive military technology with North Korea in return for North Korea shipping artillery shells and munitions (more than seven thousand containers of military supplies so far) to aid Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine? The answer to that question turns on whether the Russia-North Korea relationship is only a temporary marriage of convenience—or indicative of a deeper, more long-term alliance, akin to the relationship between the two countries during the Cold War?  

Opinion is divided on this crucial question among Korea watchers, and the Tuesday summit could help to provide some answers. If the Russia-North Korea relationship is only a temporary, wartime expedience, then Putin may think twice about providing North Korea with the means to substantially upgrade its already formidable weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program by transferring some of Russia’s most secret technologies. If it is a more lasting alliance, however, Putin may be more forthcoming with Russian military technology, no matter how many UN resolutions he violates with such transfers. And if that is the case, Russia could turbo-charge the threat that North Korea poses not only to South Korea but also to the United States and Japan. 

Indeed, Russia may already have provided a preview of what its assistance could do for North Korea. Pyongyang had been having trouble with missile launches due to a lack of advanced technologies, but after two failed attempts to launch a military satellite into orbit in May and August 2023, it finally succeeded in November, only two months after the last Kim-Putin summit. It is still unknown whether Russia provided technology that enabled the North Korean launch—there may not have been enough time for that—but at the very least it is likely that Russia provided analysis on previous failures and suggested ways that North Korea could fix the problems in the next launch. Russian assistance with space launch vehicles would aid the North’s intercontinental ballistic missile program; the technologies for lofting satellites and missiles are similar. Russia could also aid the North with its submarine and nascent submarine-launched ballistic missile programs, areas in which Russia has significant experience and expertise. 

Much depends on what happens in Ukraine. If the war continues for years to come, that will increase Russia’s dependence on North Korea for munitions production and make Putin more willing to share sensitive technologies. But if the war in Ukraine ends, Russia may have less need for North Korea. If that were to happen, Russia—whether ruled by Putin or a successor—may seek to repair relations with the West; it would find dealing with Western economic partners a lot more lucrative than dealing with an impoverished pariah state like North Korea. 

Unfortunately, the United States has extremely limited leverage to affect the Kim-Putin decision-making. The United States and its allies could, and should, ramp up sanctions on both countries, but they already face substantial Western sanctions, and it has not deterred them from continuing with the invasion of Ukraine (in Russia’s case) and an illegal WMD program (in North Korea’s case). Indeed, it makes sense for these two rogue states—which are so isolated internationally—to work together, in particular because both have close relationships with China. (China, however, may not be happy to see its client state, North Korea, drawing so close to Moscow, thereby lessening Beijing’s leverage on Kim. That may give Beijing and Washington some overlapping interests in limiting the Russia-North Korea relationship.) 

The best the United States can do in response is to strengthen the nascent U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship as a counterweight and deterrent to the growing China-Russia-North Korea axis. As I noted in the May Foreign Affairs article, “The Coming North Korean Crisis,” much has already been done, but more can still be done to strengthen the trilateral alliance, including enhanced cooperation on communication, data transfer, the exchange of intelligence, missile defense, and more robust military exercises.  

Unfortunately, all indications are that the dual threats from Russia and North Korea—now increasingly intertwined--will only continue to grow.