Korean War in 1950 (NSC)

Set in September 1950. At the conclusion of World War II, Korea—formerly under Japanese control—was divided at the thirty-eighth parallel into a U.S.-occupied south and a Soviet-occupied north. Although the division was meant to be temporary, by 1948 both countries had declared independence. North Korea became a Soviet-supported communist state; South Korea was supported by the United States. Two years later, North Korea invaded South Korea in an attempt to bring the entire peninsula under its control. After several weeks of fighting, U.S. and South Korean forces were defending an area called the Pusan perimeter, in the southernmost portion of the peninsula. General Douglas MacArthur, who was commanding U.S. and allied forces as part of a UN mission, was also making plans for a landing at Inchon, near the South Korean capital of Seoul, in order to surprise North Korean troops and recapture Seoul.  

Anticipating the possible success of the Inchon landing, President Truman has convened National Security Council members to advise him on whether to extend the U.S. military intervention north of the thirty-eighth parallel in an attempt to unify the Korean Peninsula. As the dividing lines of the emerging Cold War start to solidify, the United States will have to weigh whether intervention in North Korea is worth a potential conflict with another great power.

President Truman has convened National Security Council (NSC) members to advise him on whether to extend the U.S. military intervention north of the 38th parallel in an attempt to unify the Korean Peninsula. The president has made clear that this decision depends on the success of the Inchon landing and victory in South Korea. It is also clear that NSC members will need to consider a few critical questions. First, what is at stake in the conflict? Is it just a Korean national issue, fueled by North-South rivalry, each side seeking to lead a unified nation, or could the conflict become a major flash point in the Cold War? Second, what are the chances of Soviet or Chinese intervention if the United States invades North Korea? Finally, does reunifying Korea offer a better prospect of a durable peace than stopping at the thirty-eighth parallel would?

CFR Education extended simulations use a variety of pedagogical tools to create an effective, meaningful, and memorable learning experience for students that builds their global literacy. Students will develop crucial skills such as critical thinking, communication, collaboration, and creativity. Students will complete authentic assessments that feel relevant: instead of five-paragraph essays and book reports, students will write policy memos and participate in a role-play of a meeting of a foreign policy–making body. There are no right or wrong answers in actual policy deliberations, and there are none here, either; students will walk away from this experience with an appreciation for the complexity of policy questions.

In this simulation, students will learn about the National Security Council, as well as meeting these learning outcomes specific to this simulation:

Concepts

Issues

This section presents context, potential benefits and drawbacks, and other information about the policy options outlined in the case that you may find helpful as you guide the role-play and assess students. 

Inside the Truman administration, arguments over what the United States should aim to do in Korea began almost as soon as the North Koreans invaded the south. Perhaps the most critical question was whether and how China or the Soviet Union would intervene if the United States tried to reunify the Korean Peninsula. 

On the one hand, Truman was cautious. He sought to ensure that the United States would not overcommit to Korea or slip into conflict with Moscow. As he wrote in his memoir Year of Decisions, “Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This meant that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to the Soviets and plunge the free nations into full-scale all-out war.” On the other hand, administration officials recognized a potential opportunity to deal a devastating blow to global communism and reunify Korea under a democratic, U.S.-backed government. 

The initial U.S. goal, in the opening weeks of the conflict, was simply to drive the North Koreans back to their own territory. Truman agreed with an early suggestion by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace that U.S. military operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel should be strictly limited. He authorized military operations with the specific goal of restoring that parallel as the border. 

Many administration officials, though, advanced the view that U.S. aims should go further. John Allison, director of the State Department’s Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, was among them. In a July 1, 1950, memo to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk, Allison wrote, “I am convinced that there will be no permanent peace and stability in Korea as long as the artificial division at the 38th parallel continues.” Other major State Department figures, including advisor John Foster Dulles, generally shared a desire to pursue full unification of the peninsula. They were more cautious than Allison, however, and feared war with the Soviet Union or China. 

Military leaders, for their part, were eager to proceed north of the thirty-eighth parallel, though their foremost goal was not necessarily to reunify the peninsula. Instead, it was to devastate the North Korean military so that it could not invade South Korea again. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley wrote in his autobiography “A General’s Life” that this was the military’s “unanimous” position: “We believed that MacArthur should not be restrained at the 38th parallel.” 

This view certainly pleased MacArthur, who had ambitions of occupying and reunifying the entire peninsula. In mid-July, just weeks after the war began, MacArthur told other military leaders, “I intend to destroy and not to drive back the North Korean forces. I may need to occupy all of North Korea.” On August 8, W. Averell Harriman, special assistant to the president, met MacArthur in Tokyo. MacArthur, in Harriman’s telling, was confident that elections could be held in both North and South Korea following a military victory—and that MacArthur had “no doubt of an overwhelming victory for the non-Communist parties” in both the South and the North. 

The opposite view—that the United States should limit itself to pushing the North Koreans back—was less widespread during the summer of 1950. Some officials, though, did counsel restraint. This perspective came most notably from the State Department’s policy planning staff, a unit intended to provide analysis that goes beyond day-to-day issues. George Kennan, who had established the staff and served as its first director, was one of the loudest voices warning of the potential risks of intervention north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Kennan’s successor as director of the policy planning staff, Paul Nitze, and other members of the unit shared Kennan’s skeptical view. A July 22 draft memo prepared by the one staff argued: “The disadvantages of a failure to attain the complete independence and unity of Korea after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel must be weighed against the risk of a major conflict with the USSR or Communist China that such a settlement might well involve.” In other words, stopping U.S. action at the thirty-eighth parallel would be bad, but war with the Soviets or Chinese could be worse.

CFR Education extended simulations are project-based learning activities. Project-based learning (PBL) leads to better learning outcomes and improves skills, and is more fun than traditional instructional methods. The website that students will navigate throughout the simulation is divided into several parts:

In the NSC Guide, students will learn about the National Security Council, the body they will be simulating. Included are details on its history, how it works, who its major players are, and more. There is also a video interview with experts who have served on the body.

In the Case Notes, students dive into the actual situation they will be trying to solve in their simulation. At the beginning is a clear decision point: the question that students will debate during the role-play. This is followed by detailed background material and a discussion of the role that the United States plays.

Preparation and Role-Play includes details on the various roles students could take on, guidelines for the memorandum they will write (the student playing the role of president has a slightly different task), as well as an outline of how the discussion will flow during the role-play.

The Wrap-Up is an important part of the project and includes reflection questions and guidelines for reflecting in a class discussion and in a second memorandum. For historical cases, this section also includes a short description of how the decision point was addressed by policymakers in real life.

The simulation also includes Student Resources, which include a reading list to support research, additional directions and exemplars for writing assignments, and other tips students may find helpful.

Once students have read the simulation and prepared their position memos, here is how we recommend structuring the role-play:

Tips for the National Security Advisor
In Round 1, call on everyone for their opening statements, keeping to a strict time limit—if students have more to say, they can say it in Round 2. The president doesn’t have a specific time limit, but you should keep things moving by not letting the president get bogged down on one issue or policy option.

In Round 2, students do not need to follow a prescribed speaking order; you can call on them as they raise their placards. Work to include everyone and prevent anyone from dominating. As debate goes on, remind students they can change their minds. If it will help move things along, help students see when they are agreeing with each other without realizing it. Feel free to pose questions or propose discussion topics if you feel that certain issues are not receiving adequate consideration. Ultimately, it’s up to you to judge when Round 2 has run its course and it is time to move on to Round 3. You will want to move on when all policy options have been discussed and all of the president’s questions have been answered. The room does not need to come to a consensus—every option just needs to have a fair airing.

In Round 3, ask students to make a final case for their positions. If, during the course of the discussion, some students seem to have coalesced into blocs, you could ask one student to present on behalf of the bloc. If consensus seems possible, you could work toward it; if not, just make sure each option has been clearly presented to the president. Remember, the NSC is not democratic and is an advisory, not decision-making, body. There is no vote, and the president does not need to choose the most popular option.

Tips for the President
Before Round 1, review all the position memos, if you can. During Round 1, as students are presenting their opening statements, you can ask questions to clarify or help draw out the differences between one policy option and another. Try not to get too deep in the weeds, though—that is what Round 2 will be for.

In Round 2, you can take a more active role. If you have concerns about a policy option, ask questions; if some policy options seem stronger than others, say so. If an element of the issue is not being discussed, raise it.

In Round 3, once you have heard all the policy options, it is all down to you. You should choose whichever policy option you think is best, or combine the strongest elements of several different options. Remember, the NSC is not democratic and is an advisory, not decision-making, body. There is no vote, and you do not need to choose the most popular option. Your decision must be made and announced before the wrap-up discussion, although the written presidential directive can come later.

Tips for Online Classes

We suggest conducting the role-play in three rounds, and that three-round structure is a helpful way to approach chunking the role-play for online learning as well. You can conduct each round synchronously or asynchronously.

In round one, participants present their positions.

In round two, participants debate the various policy options.

In round three, debate begins to coalesce around the policy options that the president favors.

This case offers no suggested flashpoints.

Each CFR Education extended simulation involves writing assignments that help students think through policy options and reflect on their learning experience.

In NSC cases, there are three types of writing assignments.

Simulations (on the student-facing side) have instructions for written assignments, and samples for each of these writing exercises. You can also find sample rubrics below.

Samples:

Below are sample rubrics for your use in assessing the writing students will do as part of this extended simulation.

These are single-point rubrics. Jennifer Gonzalez, who writes the blog Cult of Pedagogy, has a great explainer, but the bottom line is that single-point rubrics are relatively easy for students to digest but still have all the advantages of giving structure to instructors’ feedback.

NSC Position Memo Rubric

NSC Presidential Directive Rubric

NSC Written Reflection Rubric

Downloadable rubrics are available here: