Netanyahu’s High-Stakes Visit to Washington

Steven A. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and the author of the new book The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East.

What will Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu aim to achieve during his visit to the U.S. Capitol next week? Will talks on ending Israel’s war with Hamas see progress?

Netanyahu has two principal goals for this visit. First, he wants to demonstrate that he has not undermined Israel’s relationship with the United States, as his domestic critics have accused. His July 24 address to a joint session of Congress will be a good place to start. The prime minister will also want to demonstrate that his ties with the White House remain strong despite differences between him and U.S. President Joe Biden over the conduct of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip. Separate from his speech on Capitol Hill, Netanyahu will highlight for Israelis just how much support there is for Israel in the halls of Congress when he meets with the leadership of both the Democratic and Republican parties.

Second, Netanyahu will endeavor to shift the conversation away from the conflict in Gaza toward the threat that Iran and its proxies pose not just to Israel, but also to the United States. This is critically important for Netanyahu and Israel as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the country’s military, intends to wind down major operations in Gaza and turn its attention to southern Lebanon, home to the Iran-backed Hezbollah. Netanyahu clearly wants to elicit both military and diplomatic U.S. support should the Israelis decide to escalate their ongoing border conflict with the militant group. The Israeli government cannot tolerate Hezbollah’s presence on the border and the fact that Israel has had to evacuate eighty thousand residents in its northern communities. Meanwhile, the Biden administration remains hesitant to get further involved as fears mount over the potential for a broader regional conflict. Netanyahu’s visit, and the likely support he will receive from members of Congress, is intended to apply pressure on Biden during a tough presidential election.

Why was Netanyahu invited to address Congress? Is there historical precedent set by past Israeli leaders?

It seems clear that the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives wanted to demonstrate support for the Israeli government and Netanyahu. The move comes after a stretch during which the Biden administration paused a shipment of weapons to Israel; Senate Majority leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) called for Israeli elections in the hope that Netanyahu would be defeated; and other Democratic members of Congress intensified their criticism of Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip. Whether Republicans were hoping to capitalize politically on this tension is a conclusion that I will let others draw.

Before this visit, Netanyahu’s previous three addresses to a joint session of Congress tied him for the most by a world leader while in office, along with Winston Churchill. A variety of Israeli prime ministers have addressed joint sessions of Congress since the 1970s, but never before has the atmosphere been so fraught. The bipartisan consensus on support for Israel is breaking down even if congressional votes on this aid remain lopsided in Israel’s favor. It is conceivable that if Netanyahu, who is a lightning rod for many in Washington, is turned from office in a future election, the environment will improve. But on the most important issues of the day, concerning Gaza, the two-state solution, and security for Israel’s northern communities, the current prime minister is in broad alignment with those who would like to replace him.  

How is the U.S.-Israeli relationship faring nine months into the Israel-Hamas war?

There is clearly tension in the relationship, especially between the White House and the Israeli prime minister. There are also, as noted above, an increasing number of members of Congress—nearly all Democrats—who question the long-standing consensus on Capitol Hill in support of Israel. At the same time, the relationship remains strong institutionally. Intelligence cooperation is still steadfast and the military-to-military relationship is robust.  That was clear from the cooperation and interoperability that the U.S. military and IDF (along with a coalition of Western and Arab armed forces) demonstrated In April when Iran fired large numbers of missiles and drones at Israel.

What are the prospects for change in the Israeli political scene?

If it is possible to have political instability and stability at the same time, the Israelis have it.  There is fierce opposition to Netanyahu and his coalition concerning the cascade of failure that made Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, possible. Doubts are cast on his administration as well over the fate of the hostages, the lack of a clear plan for Gaza after Hamas is vanquished, the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews into the IDF, and a host of other issues. There are also significant political strains within the government coalition, forcing Netanyahu to appease different flanks that are often opposed to each other at different times. Meanwhile, Netanyahu and his coalition control 64 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. That is the largest margin for a government since Netanyahu’s third government, which was formed in early 2013. So long as Netanyahu manages to keep the coalition together, the government will not fall until its four-year term is complete in 2026.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy