What Syria’s Revived Civil War Means for the Region

Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations.

How did opposition fighters gain control of Syria’s second-largest city eight years after they were routed? How significant is this?

During the height of the conflict in Syria nearly a decade ago, Aleppo was divided between government-controlled and rebel areas, but with the help of Russian airpower and the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah, the regime of President Bashar al-Assad was able to regain control over the entire city by the end of 2016.  Since about that time, conflict in Syria was static with the rebels largely confined to the Idlib governate, which is adjacent to the Aleppo governate.

Clearly, the armed opposition to Assad has taken advantage of the fact that Israel has done significant damage to Iran’s so-called axis of resistance, especially Hezbollah. A greatly weakened Hezbollah and a Russia distracted by its fight in Ukraine make it harder to defend the Assad regime. That does not mean that Hezbollah or the Russians will not help. Both are deeply invested in Syria, but they do not have the forces they had in 2015 and 2016 that were used to crush the insurgency. 

After Aleppo’s fall, Assad’s grip on power seems tenuous. A major question is what is happening in Damascus. There were unconfirmed reports not long after Aleppo fell that Assad and his family were in Moscow, that there were scuffles on the streets of the capital, that different units of the Syrian army were in conflict, and most dramatically, that the presidential palace was overrun. Most of these reports are likely the result of disinformation, but what is happening within the councils of power in Damascus will be critical for how this new phase of the Syrian conflict unfolds.

Are these fighters capable of holding control of Aleppo and expanding their military campaign against the regime?

No doubt the battle lines have changed and Syria is an active war zone again. But it is important to be cautious about gauging the prospects for the groups that have taken Aleppo and the city of Hama as well. There are no international journalists in Syria and the reports coming out of the country are likely to be rife with misinformation and disinformation.

So far, we know that the rebellion—an amalgam of extremist groups, Turkey-backed fighters, and Kurds (though not necessarily organized Kurdish forces)—has wrested control of Aleppo and Hama and is driving toward other cities. The primary group behind the offensive is believed to be Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham (known as HTS or Tahrir al-Sham), which emerged at the outset of the Syrian civil war. It is an offshoot of an Al Qaeda affiliate called Jabhat al Nusra. HTS is on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations.

In Aleppo, Syrian government forces melted away. Whether the rebel groups can consolidate their gains depends on the response from the regime, the Russians, Hezbollah, and any other groups the Iranians might deploy to help Assad. There are reports that Russian forces in Syria have undertaken airstrikes to support the regime. However, it remains to be seen whether the government and its allies can mount a significant defense.

What are the prospects for Russian forces coming to Assad’s aid like they did in 2016?

Russia is, of course, fully engaged in its fight in Ukraine, but it does have forces in Syria including warplanes and attack helicopters, military police, and soldiers that are spread across twenty bases. Much of the Russian military support for Assad came in the form of indiscriminate bombing of rebel areas from the air, while Hezbollah supported the regime on the ground. It is possible—indeed likely—that Russia will use the Hmeimim air base in northwestern Syria to do much of the same. Air power alone will not likely be sufficient to beat back the rebels. With government forces unable or unwilling to fight the insurgency and Hezbollah unable to muster the same forces it once did, the Russians find themselves in a difficult situation in Syria. There is no question that Moscow will want to defend its position in Syria, but it is unclear yet whether that includes defending Assad.

What is the response of other outside actors involved in Syria, including Turkey, Israel, Iran, and the United States?

Iran. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was supposed to meet with his Turkish counterpart in Ankara on Sunday but instead flew to Damascus to assess the situation in Syria. Before turning to Moscow, Bashar al-Assad sought support from Tehran after the 2011 Syrian uprising proved beyond his control. Iran is deeply invested in Syria with dozens of military bases and other facilities because the country is critical to Tehran’s support for Hezbollah—whether as a pipeline for weapons, a place to manufacture weapons, or a command post for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders who coordinate with the Lebanese militant group. Iran’s strategic position in the region was already deteriorating; the rebel attack on Aleppo and the apparent renewed threat to the Assad regime put it further in jeopardy.

Turkey. The Turkish government has in recent years sought to normalize ties with Syria. This is a major turnaround for Ankara, which demanded an end to the Assad regime after the 2011 civil war began and occupied territory in Syria’s northwest. It seems likely that the Turks are now reassessing their overtures to the regime. If President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his advisors believe that Assad is likely to fall, Turkey could renew its effort to be uniquely influential in a successor government in Damascus. Based on Erdoğan’s previous approach to the Arab uprisings more than a decade ago, this means support for Islamist groups. A considerable role for Turkey in a post-Assad Syrian would help the Turks manage the problem (for them) of Kurdish autonomy in Syria. It would also help facilitate the return of millions of mostly Kurdish refugees that have made their way to Turkey over the last dozen years seeking safety from the war.

If Turkey were to renew its push for regime change in Damascus, it would put Ankara once again in conflict with major Arab states such as Iraq and the United Arab Emirates who have already indicated support for Assad. Presumably, Egypt and Saudi Arabia also support the Syrian regime given their wariness of the Islamist political groups that have enjoyed Turkish support.

Israel. Breaking the Iran-Syria axis would not doubt benefit Israeli security by undermining the weapons pipeline to Hezbollah. At the same time, Assad’s possible fall poses significant challenges to Israel, especially if Turkish-backed Islamists were to come to power in Syria. Of course, much has to happen before Assad falls. For the moment, Assad’s problems in Syria are Iran’s problems in Syria and that is good for Israel.

United States. The are currently 900 U.S. military personnel in Syria clustered around a base in al Tanf. They are there to help what is known as the Syrian Democratic Forces contain the Islamic State. The rebel takeover of Aleppo and other areas does not change this mission; in fact, the extremist elements within the rebellion could make this mission more urgent.  It remains an open question whether those forces will remain after U.S. President-Elect Donald Trump is inaugurated on January 20. During his first term, he twice vowed to withdraw those forces, but instead under pressure from advisors opted to redeploy some of them. Consistent with his “America First” worldview, he may opt this time to withdraw them regardless of the situation in Syria, which currently does not pose a threat to Americans or the American homeland.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.