In Brief
What Georgia’s Foreign Agent Law Means for Its Democracy
Georgia’s new law reflects rising Russian influence in the country and has prompted backlash from the United States and the European Union, which fear it could harm the Caucasus state’s democratic development.
In May 2024, Georgia’s parliament voted to uphold a law labeling many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as foreign agents. Advocates of Georgian democracy fear that its implementation will bring the country closer to Russia and crush its hopes for future European Union (EU) accession, pushing it further down a path of illiberal reform.
What is Georgia’s foreign agent law?
Enacted on August 1, the law requires NGOs that receive 20 percent or more of their funding from abroad to officially register themselves as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power.” This would affect many of the roughly twenty-six thousand NGOs in Georgia; according to a 2020 report by the Asian Development Bank, Georgian civil society organizations receive more than 90 percent of their funding from abroad. Failure to register by September 1 could result in fines of up to $9,300.
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The law was reintroduced by the ruling Georgian Dream party in April 2024 after its first iteration failed to advance in parliament amid public outrage in 2023. On May 17, it passed Georgia’s 150-member parliament by an 84–4 vote, with almost all opposition lawmakers abstaining. Less than two weeks later, a parliamentary majority overruled a veto of the bill by President Salome Zourabichvili, who has no party affiliation. Hundreds of Georgian NGOs have since pledged to defy the law; opposition lawmakers have announced that they would challenge it in court.
Why was the law signed?
Analysts say requiring NGOs that receive funding from abroad to register as foreign agents is a way for the Georgian Dream party to eliminate dissenting voices ahead of national elections scheduled for October 26, potentially bringing Georgia closer to Russia.
Historically, NGOs have played a critical role in the revolutions that led to Georgia’s post-Soviet democratization and westward shift. CFR Fellow Liana Fix notes that Russia views these NGOs as puppets of the West that do not represent the interests of the population and threaten Georgian Dream’s rule. The law allows the government, she says, to “basically break the power of civil society.”
Since billionaire businessman and politician Bidzina Ivanishvili—whom experts say is the key figure behind the law—founded the party in 2012, it has pursued policies that seek to align Tbilisi closer with Moscow. Ivanishvili has strong economic and political ties to Russia, and he is currently honorary chairman of the Georgian Dream party, a capacity in which he serves as its de facto leader. Russia has expressed support for Georgia’s law, though Russian President Vladimir Putin says he did not influence its passage. However, Russia stands to benefit from Georgia’s increasing isolation from the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Are similar laws in place elsewhere?
Globally, laws regulating international funding to NGOs are not uncommon. The United States’ Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 was the first of its kind; more than sixty countries have implemented similar laws since 1994, though the character of such laws in Russia and other former Soviet republics is distinct in their use for repressive purposes. These stand out:
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Russia. Moscow’s legislation is especially restrictive—a third of all NGOs in Russia closed in the first two years that the 2012 law on foreign agents was enacted. In 2022, Russia passed an additional law mandating that NGOs and individuals branded as foreign agents identify themselves as such in any public or media appearance. The Russian government maintains a highly detailed registry list of individuals it claims to be affiliated with foreign agents, who are banned from aspects of public life, civil society, and education. In October 2023, Russia detained Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Alsu Kurmasheva under the law; she was freed in a prisoner swap eleven months later.
Post-Soviet states. Several former Soviet republics have instituted foreign agent laws that directly incorporate language from Russia’s. In April, Kyrgyzstan passed a law targeting foreign-funded NGOs; Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan also have such legislation in place.
Hungary. Hungary’s 2023 so-called sovereignty protection act has also been likened to Russia’s legislation; it created a government authority assisted by the Hungarian secret services that has the power to gather information on foreign-funded organizations. The European Commission has stated that Hungary’s act “violates several provisions” of EU law and threatens the fundamental human rights of EU citizens, such as freedom of expression.
What have been the international consequences of the law?
On July 9, the EU announced that Georgia’s bid for accession to the bloc would be halted and its membership candidate status suspended over concerns about the law. Although formal membership talks had not yet begun, the rejection was a blow to the roughly 80 percent [PDF] of Georgians who support EU membership, according to a 2023 poll by the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute. Protests of up to one hundred thousand people have surged through Georgia since the law was introduced amid fear of democratic backsliding. Analysts expect the role of international observers and foreign media will be heavily constricted [PDF], if not eliminated, in Georgia’s October elections.
Meanwhile, the United States has paused more than $95 million in aid to the Georgian government and imposed visa restrictions on dozens of Georgian Dream officials, and the EU has frozen $32 million in aid to Georgia’s defense ministry. And each have each warned of further consequences. “It’s quite a dilemma for policymakers,” Fix says. “There is sort of a balancing act where Western actors try to strengthen the population, but at the same time send a signal to the government that they can’t continue to pursue this clearly pro-Russian path.”
Marc Goedemans is an editorial intern at CFR. Will Merrow created the map for this In Brief.