Narendra Modi

The third term win for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was an unsurprising result, but the loss of Parliament seats means his party will need to work with a fragile coalition government to enact polices effectively.

The election date for the world’s largest democracy is set to begin April 19 and last six weeks. What would the results of a third term for Prime Minister Modi mean for India’s economy, democracy, and position in the Global South? 

India’s Muslim communities have faced decades of discrimination, which experts say has worsened under the Hindu nationalist BJP’s government.

Modi’s prime ministerial pet project to expand Internet connectivity to rural India is more of an election campaign tool than a substantive effort to improve technological connectivity in rural India.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement condemning Hamas and offering support for Israel amidst the recent crisis illustrates that ties between the two nations have changed dramatically in the last two decades.

The G20 Leaders’ Summit presents host India with a risk and an opportunity as it seeks to balance geopolitical tensions while trying to bolster its role as a voice for the Global South.

Modi’s state visit led to positive outcomes for both India and the United States, demonstrating how important the bilateral relationship has become to the two countries.

Biden’s invitation to Modi to conduct a state visit indicates that the U.S.-India partnership is critically important to the United States.

The Modi government aims to assert a modern Indian identity through the Central Vista redevelopment project. Critics contend it is a thin veneer for promoting Hindu nationalism.

China and India’s border dispute turned deadly for the first time in more than four decades. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s response will be critical to de-escalation.

On Tuesday, May 12, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered a primetime address to the nation on the coronavirus (Hindi text released here, and English here). With India in a national lockdown since March 25, many awaited his word on the country’s next steps. Modi announced a much-needed second relief package of around $266 billion, which he said would bring the government’s overall stimulus to around 10 percent of the country’s GDP, including the previously released package back in March, and central bank liquidity measures. This relief, with details to be announced later by the finance minister, represents a significant expansion over the first relief package of March 26 that allocated around $23 billion, or 0.8 percent of GDP, to cash transfers and food rations for the poor. In the intervening weeks it has become painfully clear how India’s safety net—even with technological advances like Aadhaar, the national biometric ID linked to bank accounts—has gaping holes. The stories of migrant laborers with no work and no way to pay rent in big cities, trudging hundreds of kilometers back to their villages, have brought attention to issues like interstate portability of ration cards, for example. And with the first relief tranche targeted at the poor, businesses—doing their best to stay afloat in an economy that had stopped moving—found themselves adrift. As a result, the Indian government has been preparing for weeks a second package that would address relief for business owners. In his May 12 speech Modi presented this new package as one that would address the needs of businesses as well as workers, and would furthermore enable India to become more self-reliant. This new program, dubbed “Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan” (Self-reliant India Scheme) would, according to Modi’s speech, cover five pillars: “economy, infrastructure, technology-driven system, vibrant demography and demand” and would involve “land, labor, liquidity, and laws.” He gave the example that India’s production of personal protective equipment (PPE) earlier in the pandemic was limited, but now more than 200,000 PPE kits and N95 masks are made in India daily. In the absence of further details—Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman is supposed to provide more clarity on May 13—it’s hard to assess what this plan will mean. Will it be a further boost to the Make in India scheme with more incentives? As I have written earlier, Make in India harnessed a standing Indian plan to increase the manufacturing sector’s contribution to the economy. Unfortunately, this laudable goal (one supported by successive Indian governments) has simply not resulted in significant change. In fact, manufacturing’s share has actually fallen. Modi spoke about better integration in global supply chains. This is a similarly laudable goal. Without further details, it too is hard to assess. In recent years, the Indian government’s approach to trade has become more—not less—protectionist, with tariff increases targeting imports that the Indian government sees as too competitive with domestic industry. Will the new self-reliance put up more barriers? In his speech, Modi appeared to say that was not the goal—that this version would not be “exclusionary or isolationist”—but the past six years have shown that the Modi economic philosophy is not premised on free-trade instincts. Coronavirus and the understandable lockdown that the Indian government has implemented have severely hurt the Indian economy—as lockdowns have done all over the world. With unemployment hovering around 23 percent (per Center for Monitoring Indian Economy), and banks and ratings firms revising their forecasts for the Indian economy at recession-level figures, the details of what the new self-reliance scheme will entail are eagerly awaited.

It shouldn’t really surprise that in the end, after seven long years of deliberation, India decided against joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The Narendra Modi government, despite a platform of economic growth that brought it to power in 2014, has revealed itself over the years to be skeptical about trade openness. A series of tariff increases, rumblings that current trade agreements have not benefited India, and concerns about the mounting trade deficit with China have all suggested that New Delhi would sign onto RCEP only reluctantly. And ultimately, the answer was no—at least for now. The Modi government apparently felt that it could not get enough of a reprieve on tariffs, nor enough of an opening for its services professionals, to join RCEP. This is precisely what India’s long-standing trade position has been: reluctance to reduce its own tariffs, while seeking greater services market access from other countries. I wrote about this negotiating posture in my book, citing a 2016 speech by former Minister of Commerce and Industry Nirmala Sitharaman (now finance minister) as the prime example: Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman unwittingly offered a good example. Sitharaman said that blame for delays in completing trade pacts with the EU, Australia, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership grouping should not fall on India, and other countries’ attempts to cast India as “obstructionist” was like trash-talk in sports. To the contrary, she said, India’s negotiating partners had rejected its “ambitious” proposals to ease restrictions on movement of persons. She added, apparently without irony, that trading partners sought for India to reduce tariffs on goods like wheat and autos—but that “India will not yield” to pressure. Indian officials will need to strategize for an economic world in which their concerns for market access abroad align with what they permit at home. As the saying goes, you can’t have it both ways. It is certainly true that China has become a trade powerhouse, and India’s concerns about its trade deficit with China and a desire to prevent further “flooding” of the Indian market with Chinese goods resemble those of the Trump administration toward trade with China. But it is hard to see where India is headed: the prime minister wants to increase manufacturing in India, yet by staying out of a regional trade pact, India runs the risk of missing out on trade with parties now inside the RCEP tent. In an era in which manufacturing requires the ability to become more—not less—integrated into global supply chains, this decision appears for the moment to make it harder to boost manufacturing in India. But more to the point, the central issue for the Indian government isn’t in the wording of a trade deal, but in the competitiveness of the Indian economy. Will Indian political leaders use this time outside the RCEP to take the tough decisions needed to make the Indian economy more globally competitive—and therefore an economy that does not need protection from its own region? Asia has become, according to the World Economic Forum (WEF)’s Global Competitiveness Report, the “most competitive [region] in the world.” Singapore tops the WEF list, and all of the RCEP countries except Laos and Cambodia beat India, at number sixty-eight (Myanmar does not appear). It’s understandable that with recent news of slowing growth and rising unemployment, the Modi government was unwilling to take steps that could result in further short-term economic pain and political backlash. Farmers are protesting, the anti-trade right-wingers never wanted trade openness anyway, and the Congress party has been making anti-RCEP noises. But for the current and future prosperity of the Indian economy, someone will have to explain why further reforms will be needed for India to become a more globally competitive economy. So far, it doesn’t look like anyone’s ready to stand up to make this case.

The Indian government announced today that Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit India later this week for an “informal summit” with Prime Minister Narendra Modi beginning October 11. The leader-level meeting occurs against a backdrop of geopolitical tensions between the two countries, although ties have improved since their tense military standoff at Doklam during the summer of 2017. This week’s Modi-Xi summit will take place in a location renowned for its cultural heritage: Mamallapuram (or Mahabalipuram), located on the southeast coast of India in the state of Tamil Nadu. The monuments at Mamallapuram date back to the seventh and eighth centuries, and have been recognized as a UNESCO World Heritage Site [UNESCO video]. The southeast coast of India faces the Bay of Bengal, Southeast Asia, and the larger Indian Ocean region—given the history of trade between south India and Southeast Asia, perhaps Modi intends to signal India’s long seafaring history and outward links to underscore his “Act East” ambition. Writing for The Hindu, Suhasini Haidar reported that Indian officials planning the summit sought to emphasize Tamil Nadu’s historic connections to China, including earlier links of Buddhism and maritime trade.    The formal visit announcement provided general guidelines for their meeting agenda: “discussions on overarching issues of bilateral, regional and global importance and to exchange views on deepening India-China Closer Development Partnership.” While this allows for virtually any topic under the sun, we can expect attention to the following issues of concern: Regional security and terrorism:  India has long-standing concerns about terrorism emanating from Pakistan. China has not been particularly supportive of India on this issue, and in light of the decades-long China-Pakistan friendship, is not likely to change. India’s August revocation of the traditional autonomy afforded to Jammu and Kashmir has prompted Pakistani outrage. China, too, called the conversion of Ladakh, until now a part of the erstwhile state, into a separate territory under Delhi’s direct oversight “unacceptable.” (China claims parts of Ladakh.) While Modi will not likely seek to open up the question of Kashmir’s autonomy, or its bifurcation into two federally administered territories, he very well could express concerns about Pakistan-based terrorism and its deleterious effects on regional security. Modi and Xi could also discuss stability in Afghanistan, given shared concerns about the fragile state. (India and China more recently began joint training programs in Afghanistan.) Bilateral concerns:  India and China fought a border war in 1962, and have yet to resolve their continued border issues. More than twenty rounds of negotiations have not resulted in clarity about the actual delimitation. Moreover, in the summer of 2017, Indian troops defended Bhutan’s border against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s expansion of a road in what grew into a three-month standoff between India and China. While the “informal summit” will not resolve these concerns, the leaders could discuss the issue. Trade ties will almost certainly figure into the conversation; China is India’s largest trade partner in goods alone, and India has consistently—for years now—been displeased with the trade deficit (now reportedly around $57 billion) and the composition of trade. Over the past few years, India has continued to raise tariffs on electronic goods in part due to its trade deficit. Global and multilateral cooperation:  Despite the known border and trade tensions, the China-Pakistan relationship, and the growing geopolitical competition for influence in the Indian Ocean region, India and China do have a cooperation sweet spot: multilateral organizations and global issues. India’s objections to China’s Belt and Road Initiative notwithstanding, New Delhi supported Beijing on the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (India is the number two capital contributor, holds a vice presidency, and is the largest borrower at this point), and they worked together to develop the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) forum and its related New Development Bank. India and China have had similar complaints about representation in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). China and India have also expressed similar concerns about climate change and historical responsibility for carbon emissions. This is not to say that China and India are in lockstep on all multilateral concerns; China remains a holdout, for example, on India’s quest for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and in August, China helped elevate the matter of Kashmir’s autonomy for a private UN Security Council discussion. But the existence of closer cooperation on matters like infrastructure development, regional connectivity, and global governance complicates a narrative of geopolitical competition. The “India-China Closer Development Partnership” specifically listed in the formal announcement of the informal summit falls squarely in this category. Not likely to feature on the agenda: Tibet. India hosts the Central Tibetan Administration, the Tibetan government-in-exile, and of course has been home to the Dalai Lama for decades. Indian papers reported that eight Tibetan community activists had been detained in Tamil Nadu ahead of the “informal summit” in order to prevent protests during Xi’s visit. It’s a pity, because a peaceful expression of political views would have reinforced India’s strength as a democracy—a strength China lacks.