Media

China is believed to spend billions of dollars to boost its international image, but it has yet to see a marked return on its investment in soft power.

The recent spate of articles and books on rising Chinese influence in the Australian and New Zealand political systems has prompted U.S. officials, journalists, and others to take a harder look at how Beijing is shaping U.S. policy toward China. Already there have been articles in the press suggesting that university and think tank scholars are likely targets for Chinese influence. Yet before any steps are taken to counter this perceived influence, we need to spend time understanding the nature and implications of what the Chinese government is doing to ensure not only that we get the response right but also that we protect against a witch hunt in which American scholars and analysts are attacked with innuendo instead of real evidence. My personal observations suggest that there are some fairly straightforward challenges that Chinese influence presents to U.S. political integrity and, in some cases, equally straightforward measures that the United States government as well as private institutions and actors can undertake to respond. Market Access Some channels of Chinese influence over U.S. political and social discourse are obvious. Beijing has more than one hundred Confucius Institutes located throughout the United States. (The United States has only three somewhat equivalent American Centers in China.) The Chinese government sponsors a 24-hour English language news channel, radio stations, and multiple newspapers in the United States. No American media outlet has an equivalent opportunity to provide its content directly to the Chinese people. Rectifying this imbalance will likely require adopting reciprocity—doing to China what China does to the United States. There are many areas in which reciprocity could be initiated, but as a first step, the United States should consider prohibiting the establishment of additional Confucius Institutes unless Beijing reciprocates by permitting more American Corners. The Exchange Business The most potent weapon Beijing wields over American China analysts is the power to grant and deny visas for travel to China. Some U.S. scholars who are critical of China or tackle particularly sensitive political topics have been banned from the country for decades; others sometimes receive visas and sometimes do not; still others are made to wait until the last minute, are hauled in for discussions at the Embassy or local Consulate, or are granted a visa but denied meetings with Chinese officials. Visas allow the Chinese government to subject U.S. scholars to the same implicit threat that its own scholars face—if you cross the invisible line, you will face serious consequences, so best to remain far away from the line to begin with. Less frequently, but more intrusively, some Chinese authorities also try to influence the make-up of U.S. delegations by proposing specific U.S. participants. The objective here is to ensure that in any bilateral discussion there are voices on the American side sympathetic to the Chinese perspective. While the U.S. government can play a role in restricting visas for Chinese scholars and officials, the real power rests with American universities, think tanks, and scholars—acting both collectively and as individuals. No organization—whether a think tank, university, or other cultural institution—should agree to move forward with a project if one of its participants is denied entry to China. Beyond that, universities should ensure that all their faculty are permitted to travel to Beijing before agreeing to significant exchanges and partnerships or the establishment of centers and institutes in China. Universities have significant political leverage through these collaborative efforts: they should use their influence to ensure that all their scholars have access. In addition, organizations should not allow Chinese authorities to place specific U.S. scholars on U.S. delegations. Unless both sides are jointly determining the make-up of a conference or dialogue, there is no reason that the Chinese side should be allowed to influence the choice of who participates on the American side. The Censorship Dilemma The Chinese government also tries to shape the narrative provided by U.S. think tank and university scholars by censoring their appearances on Chinese television, interviews in Chinese newspapers, and books. In one case, a well-known Chinese publishing house not only eliminated significant sections of a book on American foreign policy but also placed its own content into the book—creating entirely new passages. Apparently the publisher believed that the American author would not check the Chinese translation. The opportunity to speak directly to one billion Chinese through interviews or books is a tempting one, and it is easy to think that “saying something is better than saying nothing.” But censorship is a slippery slope. At every juncture, an American scholar should decide whether to accept any censorship, and if the answer is yes, how much censorship is too much censorship. Unless an American scholar has a guarantee of an unadulterated view, a wiser course is to deny Chinese government media outlets the opportunity to feature opinions from American analysts. In any case, many Chinese are adept at circumventing Internet controls and accessing the ideas of western scholars through western media outlets and publications.   The Stranger in our Midst Beijing is now also actively supporting the establishment of Chinese think tanks in the United States. For example, in Washington, D.C., the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS) is supported by the Hainan Nanhai Research Foundation, which, in turn, is backed by the government-affiliated National Institute for South China Sea studies. A perusal of the website of this institute indicates that it presents unexceptional and largely unobjectionable reporting and analysis. Yet, its commentary is nonetheless skewed: while there is some critical analysis of U.S. policy, there is none on China. In this way, ICAS is not a think tank but a channel for propaganda. If such Chinese think tanks proliferate, it is plausible that more positive assessments of China will begin to shape the broader U.S.-China debate, lending more weight to the Chinese government position while attempting to maintain a veneer of independence. Given the restrictive nature of the recent Chinese law on the management of foreign NGOs, Beijing’s desire to support Chinese think tanks on U.S. soil should provide an opportunity for the U.S. government to push for greater leeway in activities for U.S. think tanks with operations in China. Otherwise, Washington could consider what types of reciprocal measures might be appropriate. Pay to Play Chinese money—tens of millions of dollars—is now entering into the world of U.S. think tanks and university centers and institutes through private Chinese foundations and individuals. Much of this money is dedicated to promoting work on U.S.-China relations. It is too early to determine the effect of such money on the substance of the research. However, even if the funding does not directly affect research findings, it may well affect the research agenda. For example, a research project funded by Chinese money is more likely to focus on “How the United States and China can cooperate” than “Challenges the United States faces from growing Chinese power.” U.S. money for China-related policy analysis is scarce, and there is significant competition for the funds provided by foundations such as Luce, Starr, Smith-Richardson, and the Carnegie Corporation, among others. If Chinese money is utilized, institutions and scholars should be transparent and ensure that there is no opportunity for the Chinese funder to affect the research agenda or outcome. In this regard, the decision by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies to accept money from a sitting Chinese official for a chair on China, with the proviso that this chair direct a program in conjunction with, and serve as liaison to, the funder’s own foundation/think tank, was clearly a mistake. The American Obligation While the United States seeks to understand and curtail opportunities for the Chinese government to influence U.S. political discourse through think tank and university scholars, it should ensure that facts trump rumors and avoid overreacting. In the current divisive and amped-up U.S. political environment, there is significant danger that educational institutions, think tanks, and scholars will be caught up in a rush to root out Chinese influence. There is an added danger, as well, that these investigations are merely the tip of the iceberg—that the United States will soon be embroiled in a witch hunt that will ensnare unsuspecting and innocent Chinese students and scholars, as well as the larger community of Chinese-Americans. The United States has experienced many waves of anti-foreign hysteria, only to be followed by a deep sense of shame once cooler heads prevail. We have seen this movie before and it does not end well; there is no need to play it again.     

One of the world’s most-watched news networks is at the center of a geopolitical rift between a Saudi-led bloc and the broadcaster’s funder, Qatar.

Last week, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted the fifth annual Conference on Diversity in International Affairs in collaboration with the Global Access Pipeline (GAP) and the International Career Advancement Program (ICAP) and with the generous support of the Robina Foundation. The conference, which is part of CFR's broader and longstanding initiative to help make the American foreign policy community more representative of American society as a whole, aims to connect professionals and students from underrepresented backgrounds with career opportunities in international affairs. Like in past years, the discussion were lively and informative. The opening discussion featured Calvin Sims, president and chief executive officer of International House and a former reporter for the New York Times. Mira Patel, former senior advisor at the Small Business Administration and former advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Policy Planning Staff, facilitated a great conversation about how the lack of diversity in the news media and in the foreign policy community "means that you're not having a product that is as informative" as it should be. The conference featured two other on-the-record sessions. The first was a fascinating discussion about the changing role of the media with Margaret Talev, senior White House reporter at Bloomberg News, and Vivian Salama, White House reporter for the Associated Press. You can watch their conversation, which Beverly Kirk moderated below:  The other on-the-record discussion looked at today's global hotspots. My CFR colleagues Elliott Abrams and Sheila Smith shared their thoughts, as did Alina Polyakova of the Atlantic Council. Tiffany McGriff, a foreign service officer on leave from the State Department this year at CFR as an International Affairs Fellow, moderated that wide ranging discussion.   I highly recommend all three videos. And you can find links to videos from past Diversity in International Affairs conferences, which have featured speakers such as Susan Rice and Kalpen Modi, here. Corey Cooper assisted in the preparation of this post.                

Americans used to be just ignorant about Muslims and the Middle East. Now we're also fearful, stupid and wrong.

Information has long been falsified and weaponized in Turkey and the Arab world—and we're headed that way fast.

China’s central government has cracked down on press freedom as the country expands its international influence, but in the internet age, many of its citizens hunger for a free flow of information.

High profile visits to war or disaster zones have long been common and popular among senior U.S. officials, as has foreign travel in general. Hillary Clinton was proud that she had traveled to 112 countries as secretary of state. At the same time, security requirements have grown, seemingly exponentially, often causing indignation among local people because of the disruption in their daily lives. And sometimes tragedy happens, as in Cameroon, where U.S. ambassador to the UN Samantha Power’s speeding motorcade killed a child in April. But, U.S. officials welcome the U.S. media attention such visits provide, as do local elites and politicians who ae often disconnected from the people they ostensibly govern. Ambassador Power’s entourage included nine journalists, and a purpose of the visit was to call attention to refugees. But, Washington too often overlooks the downside among host populations, if not elites, to the security requirements of U.S. visitors. On December 16, The New York Times released a report documenting the April 18, 2016 accident when a vehicle in Ambassador Power’s motorcade struck and killed a six-year old child in a Cameroonian village. Power was on her way to a refugee camp that housed sixty thousand people forced from their homes by the radical Islamist movement Boko Haram. Her fourteen vehicle motorcade was traveling through the village at an estimated forty-five miles per hour. Following usual security procedures, the motorcade did not stop, though an ambulance, part of the motorcade, did. But the child was already dead. According to the New York Times, Ambassador Power was personally devastated when she heard the news. Against the advice of her security people, she returned to the village to offer condolences, where her reception was icy. The U.S. Department of State has paid compensation to the family of the child: $1,700 in cash, two cows, sacks of flour, rice, salt, sugar, onions, cartons of soap, and oil. The Times also reports that the U.S. government has built a well near the front of the family house. Ambassador Power has established an escrow account personally to pay the school fees of the victim’s siblings through high school. Ambassador Power’s security was tight: in addition to Cameroonian elite forces it included U.S. Navy SEALs. U.S security personnel dictated the size of the motorcade, its speed, and the fact that it did not stop. After all, Boko Haram had conducted recent operations only twenty miles away. With respect to the security of U.S. officials, as the Times observes, “Failure is unacceptable: Congressional panels spent two years and more than $7 million investigating why the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency were not able to prevent the deaths of four Americans, including the ambassador to Libya, when the United States diplomatic compound in Benghazi was stormed in 2012.”