Asia Unbound

Since 2011, when Myanmar’s political reforms began, launching a stuttering process of democratization, attacks on Muslim Rohingya in western Myanmar have become common. The violence often has been abetted by paramilitary groups, hard-line Buddhist monks, and Buddhist civilian groups affiliated with the hard-line monks. Since the violence worsened in 2012, neither the government nor the leaders of the National League for Democracy have taken any effective steps to stop anti-Rohingya discrimination, provide suitable accommodations for Rohingya who have left their homes, help Rohingya who were stripped of their Myanmar citizenship regain it, or halt the activities of paramilitary organizations. The anti-Rohingya violence is a major reason why, in the past five years, Rohingya have not only become internally displaced people in Myanmar but also have left the country in large numbers. Since 2012, at least 140,000 Rohingya have fled their homes. If they stay in Myanmar, Rohingya migrants often are shunted into what research and advocacy group Fortify Rights calls “dozens of internment camps.” Fortify Rights adds that these are “not typical internally displaced person camps. They are beginning to look more like permanent concentration camps, complete with barracks-style housing and barbed-wire fencing. Residents can’t leave.” Many Rohingya have tried desperately to leave Myanmar on rickety boats with little food and water on board; the boats often are managed by human trafficking networks, and boat captains sometimes have abandoned the ships when they feared being caught by a foreign naval patrol. Although the stream of migrants onto boats bound for Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia lessened this summer, after a spike in boat people last spring, aid workers in Myanmar who closely follow migration patterns expect the outflow of refugees to increase in the coming months once again. As summer monsoons die down and it becomes (slightly) easier to put out to sea, several aid workers say, levels of outmigration from Myanmar easily could approach the number of outflows last spring. Now, a new report by Yale Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic and Fortify Rights suggests that the violence in western Myanmar goes beyond brutal ethnic and religious attacks. Although the Clinic does not say for certain that genocide has occurred in western Myanmar, it concludes that there is “strong evidence that genocide is being committed against Rohingya.” The Rohingya comprise a protected group under the international Genocide Convention adopted in 1951, and acts committed against them rise to the level enumerated in the Genocide Convention, the report concludes. However, the report notes, it remains unclear whether the acts committed against the Rohingya are designed “with intent to destroy the group, in part or in whole,” the third component of the definition of genocide. (As the report notes, “the crime of genocide consists of three essential elements: the existence of a protected group, the commission of one or more prohibited acts, and the requisite intent.”) Thus, to analyze whether genocide has been, or is being, committed, one must consider whether all three of these components of definition are met. The only way to tell for certain whether the attacks and killings in western Myanmar are being conducted with intent to destroy the Rohingya in part or in whole, the Yale Clinic concludes, is for an independent institution (e.g. a United Nations commission of inquiry) to complete a full and free investigation into the events that have taken place in western Myanmar since 2012. Among the evidence that the report cites in suggesting that genocide is taking place, it notes that the Myanmar government has limited many Rohingyas’ freedom of movement, attempted to pass population control policies, and set up the dire camps in western Myanmar---camps that are essentially now functioning as internment centers and that lack basic amenities. The government may be attempting to reduce the Rohingya population and, potentially, to isolate and destroy portions of the Rohingya population, the report suggests. As Shawn Crispin notes in The Diplomat, if the violence in western Myanmar qualifies as genocide, it puts the United States, Japan, the European Union, and other democracies that have pursued rapprochement with Myanmar in a difficult position. If “the Yale Clinic and Fortify Rights’ findings have legal merit, then [Myanmar President] Thein Sein would be a prime candidate for prosecution,” notes Crispin. Yet Thein Sein has been hailed as one of the architects of Myanmar’s reforms, celebrated in the capitals of many democracies. A conclusion that Myanmar was suffering genocide also would undermine the portrayal of Myanmar’s reforms as a major success story of the Obama administration---and a success story for the current Democratic Party front-runner, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Gabriel Walker is a research associate in Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In late October, Global Witness released an important report that systematically explored Myanmar’s jade industry, calling it the “biggest natural resource heist in modern history.” The mining and trade of the gem have been catalogued by journalists, photographers, and authors in the past, but most accounts only mention China’s economic role in driving demand for jade. In reality, a wider range of Chinese actors are directly connected to Myanmar’s jade, some benefiting at the expense of miners and traders, and others suffering from the industry’s unintended consequences. Because of these close, but often overlooked, connections, China has a shared responsibility to take action and advocate for reform of Myanmar’s jade industry. The jade trade is rife with corruption, conflict, and disease. According to the report, jade production in Myanmar was worth nearly $31 billion in 2014, of which as much as 80 percent was smuggled directly into China, bypassing taxation and border controls in both countries. Companies in Myanmar linked to politically influential tycoons and senior government officials, including the former dictator Than Shwe, hold multiple mining concessions and reap millions as a result. Jade also funds both sides of the ongoing armed conflict in Kachin State, the center of jade production, underwriting the activities of both Myanmar’s military and the Kachin Independence Army/Kachin Independence Organization. An HIV/AIDS crisis also travels hand-in-hand with the gem: Myanmar’s illegally produced heroin flows freely into the main jade-mining town of Hpakant, a place to which tens of thousands of migrants flock hoping to find valuable stones on the margins of the mines. Drug use and prostitution are almost institutionalized there, with a heroin injection offered widely for the same price as a small piece of jade. Payoffs to authorities mean that both dealers and prostitutes operate with impunity. Unsafe practices result in an extraordinarily high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, with reportedly nine out of ten drug-using miners HIV positive. Chinese players participate on at least three levels of the jade trade: First, Chinese companies have underwritten the jade trade for decades, beginning with early investments in the 1980s. In Hpakant, it is an “open secret” that most of the twenty largest mining operators are owned by Chinese companies or their proxies, and one individual interviewed by Global Witness estimated that the biggest jade players received as much as 70 percent of their financing from Chinese sources. Although even an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative report may not reveal the true source of a jade company’s funding streams, it seems likely that certain individuals within China may be deeply integrated within jade’s shady payout structure. If transparency measures aim for complete disclosure, Chinese actors must be unmasked. Second, in recent years rising prices and growing demand by wealthy Chinese buyers for Myanmar’s jade, in addition to the record-breaking sale of a $27 million jade necklace, have increased the stone’s market value and entrenched its mystique in the popular imagination. Because the vast majority of Myanmar’s jade ends up in China, a policy like the JADE Act—a U.S. import ban on all jade products from Myanmar—becomes largely symbolic and essentially ineffective in fighting the rising tide of demand. If any country should take the lead in restricting the free movement of jade in the worldwide economy, it should be China. Third, China’s neighboring Yunnan province also struggles with HIV/AIDS. Ruili county, the “world’s biggest market for unfinished jade,” has one of the highest risk profiles for HIV/AIDS in Yunnan—making it and a neighboring county essentially the worst place for the disease in all of China. As one case study pointed out, Ruili is a clear example of how HIV epidemics “cannot be dealt with solely at a local level.” And CFR expert Laurie Garrett has written that Myanmar’s HIV contribution to the rest of Asia poses a “clear security threat to the region.” If China is truly committed to solving its own HIV/AIDS crisis in Yunnan, it must work towards a cooperative solution that addresses the unchecked practices that ravage the jade trade. Beijing is in a position to advance critical improvements in the jade industry by engaging with Chinese stakeholders on multiple levels. The Chinese government in fact has already released conflict-mineral guidelines for Chinese mining companies working abroad, suggesting that it can at least nominally encourage responsible practices on the world stage. But for Beijing to have a real impact in Myanmar, it must stanch illegal smuggling, uncover jade industry–related corruption, and push for greater financial and operational transparency. It would be an encouraging sign for China to step forward to reform the jade trade—if only for this one stone, a symbol of China’s own prosperity—and take responsibility for protecting the welfare of its ailing citizens and regional neighbors.