Four More Things to Expect From a Prabowo Presidency
from Asia Unbound, Asia Program, and The New Global Authoritarianism: China and Russia's Strategic Support for Autocracies
from Asia Unbound, Asia Program, and The New Global Authoritarianism: China and Russia's Strategic Support for Autocracies

Four More Things to Expect From a Prabowo Presidency

Indonesia's front-runner presidential candidate gestures as he delivers his speech after the country's election commission announced last month's presidential election result, in Jakarta, Indonesia, on March 20, 2024.
Indonesia's front-runner presidential candidate gestures as he delivers his speech after the country's election commission announced last month's presidential election result, in Jakarta, Indonesia, on March 20, 2024. Willy Kurniawan/Reuters

An anticipated Prabowo presidency poses many questions about Indonesia’s democratic future and global role.

March 29, 2024 3:18 pm (EST)

Indonesia's front-runner presidential candidate gestures as he delivers his speech after the country's election commission announced last month's presidential election result, in Jakarta, Indonesia, on March 20, 2024.
Indonesia's front-runner presidential candidate gestures as he delivers his speech after the country's election commission announced last month's presidential election result, in Jakarta, Indonesia, on March 20, 2024. Willy Kurniawan/Reuters
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Indonesia’s Election Commission has confirmed Prabowo Subianto’s victory in the Indonesian presidential election’s first round, giving him a majority and avoiding any runoff. His challengers are contesting the results, but there is little chance of success, so Prabowo will be Indonesia’s next president.

Given his ascendance, I previously highlighted five major issues to watch in a Prabowo presidency. But he will be the leader of the dominant power in Southeast Asia, and an increasing force on the world stage—a position Prabowo relishes and intensely wants to bolster, putting Indonesia up among medium-sized powers like India, Mexico, South Korea, and others. So, I have added four more questions in this blog about Prabowo as president.

More on:

Indonesia

Southeast Asia

Elections and Voting

  1. To extrapolate on the point made by myself (and others), Prabowo has spent decades working against (and allegedly disappearing) democratic activists, the Indonesian democratic movement in general, and democracy itself. Will he seek to curtail local and regional elections? Local elections are ubiquitous and very popular. Over the course of 2024, the East Asia Forum notes that Indonesians will elect 20,462 national, regional, and, later, local officials. In the past, Prabowo (along with some other prominent politicians in Jakarta) wanted to eliminate most of these positions, even though Indonesia’s democratic decentralization has been a massive success. Will he do so? It will be a critical indicator of his commitment to democracy. If he kills local and regional elections, it will likely be very unpopular with Indonesians, who are just getting accustomed to holding their local and regional leaders accountable, a highly empowering idea.  
  2. Prabowo will shortly be making a trip to China, his first trip as president-elect. Prabowo historically has not had a great relationship with China. In the chaos of the post-Suharto era, there were intense riots in Jakarta and other cities against Indonesian Chinese, which Prabowo did not speak out against. He also whipped up anti-Indonesian Chinese sentiment in a race for governor (mayor) of Jakarta, against the incumbent (Indonesian Chinese) Ahok, who later was also sentenced to jail on blasphemy charges. Yet Prabowo is making his first visit as president-elect to China.
  3. Perhaps this is just a realization that Indonesia badly needs Chinese investment in its infrastructure development—its physical infrastructure remains horrible—and the United States and even Japan, a longtime donor to Indonesia, cannot afford to finance infrastructure like China can. Prabowo’s predecessor, Joko Widodo, also recognized he had to reach out closely to China, whatever the downsides, to try to arrange deals for infrastructure financing. Maybe Prabowo, who drew closer to the United States as defense minister, is just being practical. However, a significant shift in Indonesia’s outlook, balancing less between the United States and China, would be cataclysmic in Southeast Asia.
  4. Will Prabowo make good on his promise to make Indonesia a player on the world stage? Past Indonesian presidents made similar efforts; for example, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tried to play a role in Middle East politics. But he did not get far. Middle Eastern countries were icy toward any mediation by Indonesia. More importantly, it’s a truism, but it is true—Indonesia is the least-known big country in the world among developed states and even other developing countries outside of Southeast Asia. Will Prabowo conceive a plan to boost the world’s knowledge of Indonesia, setting aside significant funds, for instance, to have universities from developed states open many campuses in Indonesia? Will he spend lavishly on grants so more Indonesian students can study abroad? Will he engage in whirlwind diplomacy (he clearly cares more about foreign affairs than domestic policy) in his first year (or far beyond his first year, he could be president into the early 2030s if age was not an issue) to try to bolster Indonesia’s ties with a wider range of states, and also use those visits as a means of educating foreign publics about Indonesia?

More on:

Indonesia

Southeast Asia

Elections and Voting

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