Politics, Power, and Preventive Action

"As soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me ’surgical,’ I head for the bunker." General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1992.   “It’s this surgical precision—the ability, with laser-like focus, to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qa’ida terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it—that makes [drones] so essential.” John Brennan, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, April 30, 2012.   Yesterday, Brennan acknowledged the obvious in a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center: “The United States Government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qa’ida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones.” For commentators and analysts, including myself, who have called for the Obama administration to abandon the eight-year absurdity of so-called “covert” targeted killings, Brennan’s comments are welcomed and long overdue. The Obama administration deserves credit for finally recognizing that its position of false secrecy was no longer defensible or sustainable, given the increase in targeted killings since President Obama entered the White House—roughly three hundred and counting—and their centrality to U.S. counterterrorism strategies. Brennan’s speech is the product of an ongoing debate within the Obama administration regarding its targeted killings policies. According to some U.S. officials, the primary concern is not revealing operational details, but that open debate over drones could lead to political pressure in the United States or host countries that could ultimately restrict the program. As a senior U.S. official noted recently: "The big mistake was the administration—I did try to warn them—that once you put [drone strikes] on the table, it will only get worse. Sure enough (Pakistan) grabbed it, and they’ve run with it and now it’s the centerpiece of their negotiations." An important indicator of the Obama administration’s commitment to transparency and accountability will be how U.S. officials address targeted killings in the near-term. Three months ago, the president “revealed” some targeted killings in a response to a question from “Evan from Brooklyn” during a Google+ “Hang Out:” “Obviously a lot of these strikes have been in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan] going after al-Qaeda suspects.” The next day, White House spokesperson Jay Carney spoke at length about U.S. counterterrorism uses of drones as “exceptionally precise, exceptionally surgical and exceptionally targeted.” However, when a reporter asked Carney to expand on whether the president’s statement was “purposeful,” he responded, “I’m not going to discuss broadly or specifically supposed covert programs.” And drones were swept back under the rug. As the “covert” designation persisted, U.S. officials continued to be nonresponsive or misleading when discussing targeted killings. In a few of the more egregious examples, this includes: the director of the FBI not responding to the question, “Does the federal government have the ability to kill a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil?”; the unwillingness of the attorney general to admit the existence of legal memoranda that provides the legal justification for targeting U.S. citizens; and the Senate minority leader’s professed faith in the due process involved in targeting U.S. citizens, after admitting that he was unaware of the process itself. Like previous speeches by Brennan, Attorney General Eric Holder, and the senior legal officials of the State Department, Pentagon, and CIA, which all elliptically referred to targeted killings, yesterday’s speech raised more questions than answers. Can children be targets? Since Brennan sidestepped a question on “signature strikes,” how do such anonymous attacks square with what he referred to as “individual members of al-Qa’ida?” If “it is our preference to capture suspected terrorists whenever feasible,” why are capture operations exceedingly rare and kill missions increasingly common? If “we’re not going to rest until al-Qaeda the organization is destroyed and eliminated from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Africa, and other areas,” how will targeted killings achieve that goal? Meanwhile, journalists should press policymakers to provide straight answers about targeted killings. Citizens should demand that their congressional representatives—particularly those who serve on the foreign relations or armed services committees—hold hearings with U.S. officials to explore the increasing use of armed drones. As targeted killing policies inch out of the shadows, we deserve answers that officials should now be authorized to provide.

Last week, the Obama campaign released a video starring Bill Clinton, in which he extolled the president’s decision to authorize the raid that killed Osama bin Laden one year ago. In the video, Clinton hypothesized: “Suppose the Navy Seals had gone in there, and it hadn’t been bin Laden. Suppose they’d been captured or killed. The downside would have been horrible for [Obama].” According to the former president, Obama’s decision was “the harder and more honorable path.” Obama’s authorization of the bin Laden raid was indeed risky: based on incomplete information (such as the lack of definitive proof that the Al Qaeda leader was in the Abbotabad compound) and objections from a split cabinet. Even if the operation had failed or cost American lives, many analysts and commentators—including Clinton—exaggerate the likely political costs to the president. Throughout recent history, U.S. presidents have authorized limited military operations that were mixed successes or outright failures. In most instances, the president neither suffered a noticeable decline in public support nor faced sustained criticism among elite observers for the decision. Policymakers and pundits generally refrain from criticizing presidents, military commanders, and the armed forces for failed operations. In perhaps the riskiest military misison authorized by a U.S. president, Jimmy Carter ordered the unsuccessful hostage rescue operation in Iran (Desert One) on April 24–25, 1980, which resulted in eight U.S. soldiers killed and no hostages freed. In the initial stages of planning, the Delta Force commander, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, admitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “the probability of success is zero and the risks are high.” According to a Newsweek article on June 30, 1980, the Pentagon estimated that as many as fifteen of the fifty-three hostages as well as thirty of the U.S. special operation forces would be killed or injured in a successful operation. There is no evidence, however, that Carter’s decision-making negatively impacted the mission. An internal review conducted by the Pentagon found that “the decision process during planning and the command and control organization during execution of the Iran hostage rescue mission afforded clear lines of authority from the President to the appropriate echelon,” and, “the command and control arrangements at the higher echelons from the NCA [the President and Secretary of Defense] through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to [Combined Joint Task Force] were ideal.” Although Carter was aware of the potential costs of the rescue attempt, he believed, according to a senior adviser, “Ending the crisis—once and for all—became the major factor in the president’s decision-making.” And the American public agreed: two-thirds approved of Carter’s decision to authorize the ill-fated mission. Republican presidential candidate George H.W. Bush was the most outspoken supporter: “I unequivocally support the president—no ifs, ands, or buts…He made a difficult, courageous decision.” Afterward, the president’s approval ratings, previously plummeting, actually stabilized—until he was easily defeated by Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan authorized the December 4, 1983, air raid on Syrian air defenses in Lebanon, which was both a military and political disaster. Two of the U.S. planes were shot down by either anti-aircraft rounds or surface-to-air missiles; one pilot was killed, another was captured by Syrian forces, and another parachuted safely into the Mediterranean Sea. (The hostage, Lieutenant Robert Goodman, Jr., was held and interrogated in a Syrian prison for thirty days.) Furthermore, although the Pentagon claimed the airstrikes were “very successful and achieved our objective, which was to prevent, through a measured response, repetition of the attacks on our reconnaissance aircraft,” Syrian forces continued to target U.S. reconnaissance flights. Many policymakers opposed the open-ended deployment of Marines to Lebanon, but Republicans and Democrats in Congress refrained from criticizing the botched air raid. Senator Charles Percy, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, warned, "We’re not going to be driven out by terrorism." Meanwhile, as the economy recovered, Reagan’s approval ratings improved fifteen points in 1984. George W. Bush authorized the February 16, 2001, airstrikes against five Iraqi air defense sites, located just north of the southern no-fly zone. The raid was a mixed success, as all but two of the twenty-eight Joint Stand-Off Weapons missed their targets due to a programming error. The intensity and scope of the strikes, revealed on CNN, caught President Bush off guard and upstaged his first international visit. The Joint Staff’s director of operations, Vice Admiral Scott Fry, later admitted to me that the bombing “was a mess and set the tone for much of the bad blood between Rumsfeld and the military.” Perhaps because the targets were considered part of the Iraqi no-fly zones—although they were not, and required explicit presidential authorization—the strikes went largely unnoticed by the mainstream media and Bush’s approval ratings jumped by five points. The most interesting aspect of Clinton’s campaign appearance is that he knows, from his own experience, that presidents are granted significant latitude in the use of limited force. Clinton authorized the August 20, 1998, cruise missile strikes against the El-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, and al-Qaeda’s Zhawar Kili complex in Khost, Afghanistan. Operation Infinite Reach was a failure: El-Shifa had no demonstrated connection to al-Qaeda, the CIA erroneously assumed that factory produced VX nerve gas; and bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders were not killed at Zhawar Kili. The unsuccessful operation received the Washington Post headline: “Tough Response Appeals to Clinton Critics.” Senate majority leader Trent Lott commented, "Our response appears to be appropriate and just," while House speaker Newt Gingrich declared, “I think the president did exactly the right thing.” Clinton’s approval ratings, already a high 65 percent, only improved over the next seven months. In the face of emerging or persistent foreign policy challenges, policymakers and pundits want presidents to “do something,” and support such decisiveness—even if, in retrospect, it was ill-advised or unsuccessful. If the special operations raid to kill Osama bin Laden had failed, history shows that Obama would not have faced personal attacks for the effort (unless there was clear evidence of micromanagement). And, of course, it would not be included in the campaign’s highlight reel.

Background Briefing on the U.S. Military Realignment in Japan, April 26, 2012. QUESTION: And then how this [US-Japan security agreement] fits into the emerging strategic view of this building that rotational, small forces are better than these colossal bases that have been historically our footprint? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, as you know, one of the goals of the administration in Asia is to create a—to build a presence in the Asia-Pacific that’s more geographically distributed.  And I think this agreement is part and parcel of that.  When you look at it in combination with our plans to build a rotational presence in Australia, what you have are sort of an ongoing ability for U.S. forces to be visible and present in multiple places across the region at any given time.  And we think that that presents advantages in building relations with partner countries; helping to respond to, for example, humanitarian emergencies; and as needed, respond to contingencies. “Khar: U.S. Not Listening to Our Drone Protests,” Dawn, April 26, 2012. “On drones, the language is clear: a clear cessation of drone strikes,” Pakistani foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar said. “I maintain the position that we’d told them categorically before. But they did not listen. I hope their listening will improve,” she said during an interview. General John Michael Loh (Ret.), “Stop Terrorists With More Airpower,” Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2012. The solution now should be to change the strategy from nation-building to relying on airpower to stop terrorists. President Barack Obama now recognizes that the precision, efficiency, low cost and near-zero casualties from an airpower strategy can allow withdrawal from Afghanistan soon while still attacking al Qaeda from wherever it chooses to operate globally. That is the unmistakable lesson from successful air attacks in Pakistan, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere using airpower, not thousands of ground forces. Airpower provides the capabilities and global range for success against terrorism at a small fraction of the cost without huge ground invasions and unwanted occupation forces. Reverend Franklin Graham, “Bombing Sudan’s Air Bases Only Way to Protect Innocents,” Washington Times, April 25, 2012. As a pilot with 40 years of experience, I can assure you that an airplane doesn’t do well with holes in the runway. I certainly am not asking the president to kill anyone, just to break up some concrete to prevent the bombers from taking off. I think that by destroying those runways, we can force Mr. Bashir to the negotiating table. Tony Capaccio, “Al-Qaeda Seeks Cyber-Attack Skills, U.S. Official Says,” Bloomberg News, April 25, 2012. Cox said the constant references in the media to “cyber attacks” may be immunizing the public against concern because the term doesn’t capture the different dimensions of hacking the U.S. faces. “In some respects, it’s been a little over-hyped” because “the likelihood that an adversary is going to take down the entire power grid of the U.S. or stop the Internet—there’s huge amounts of resiliency built into the system that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult,” he said. “But you could do more tailored, precise-type strikes” against the U.S. financial network “that results in an uncontrolled run on U.S. banks,” Cox said. Thanassis Cambanis, “You Can Stop Being Scared Now,” Boston Globe, April 22, 2012. (3PA: This is an assessment of the piece that Michael Cohen and I coauthored in the February/March issue of Foreign Affairs.) Global Immunization Data, World Health Organization, March 2012. Nearly 17 percent of all deaths in children under five are vaccine preventable. 29 percent of deaths in children between one and fifty-nine months of age are vaccine preventable. (3PA: For a fun depiction of the lifesaving power of vaccines, watch this short animated video in the 2011 annual letter from Bill and Melinda Gates.) Douglas Jehl, “Bahrain Rulers Say They’re Determined to End Village Unrest,” New York Times, January 28, 1996. "Yes, the Western countries and the people here talk about democracy," Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa said. "We are not afraid of democracy. We are afraid of the people who would misuse it." (3PA: Sheikh Khalifa is still the prime minister of Bahrain and is still afraid of democracy. As the latest State Department Human Rights Report stated in its chapter on Bahrain, “Citizens did not have the right to change their government.”)