Responding to China and Russia’s Influence on the Militarization of Global Politics

As I noted in a prior blog, in the past decade, militaries worldwide have become involved in domestic politics and public policy formulation at levels not seen since the Cold War. There are multiple reasons for this trend, but China and Russia have played a critical role in fomenting, enabling, and accelerating coups and other revivals of military power. China and Russia have enabled militaries to launch and sustain coups or have helped militaries become involved in domestic politics in other ways.

Geopolitical competition and a desire to create an alternative and autocratic global order to the existing one is a major, understudied cause and accelerant in this remilitarization. China and Russia are either directly promoting militaries’ returns or helping them consolidate their influence once armed forces have already gained greater power—in other words, pouring fuel on the fire of remilitarization and, in China’s case, definitively trying to create an alternative world order to that led by the United States.

Moscow had not been a player in Africa for decades after the Cold War. Still, via the Wagner mercenary group and regular Russian soldiers, it has recently involved itself deeply in a range of African states. According to the Brookings Institution, “between 2015 and 2019, Moscow signed nineteen military collaboration agreements with African governments.” The Tony Blair Institute notes that “Russia has deployed private military contractors [usually to bolster local militaries] in at least twenty-one countries since 2014, with the majority on the African continent.” Russia has been a direct cause of military takeovers in Africa, using the Wagner Group to help military dictators take or hold control of countries like Libya and Mali, as well as the Central African Republic, where an elected leader has now become a military-backed dictator supported by Russia. Vladimir Putin’s government has also tried to foment coups in Montenegro and Moldova to destabilize Eastern Europe.

Putin’s regime has also been opportunistic and acted as an accelerant when militaries gained domestic power. Russia has built its presence in Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo, and Guinea, among others. It is now proposing to play a role in Niger and possibly Gabon, accelerating military power there. Some Russian experts speculate that Moscow also is working to ingratiate itself with other Sahelian militaries. (Despite Wagner’s apparent demise in Russia after its rebellion, Wagner is still playing a role within Africa, and it also appears that regular Russian military forces will step into some places where Wagner played a significant role in Africa.)

China, meanwhile, has directly supported coups or acted as an accelerant for military regimes in a less direct but, in many respects, dangerous way than Russia/Wagner’s outright backing for coups. 

How should affected countries themselves and leading democracies respond to this new remilitarization? They need to focus on rolling back this trend and put the men in green back in the barracks within individual states. But more importantly, they need to neutralize China and Russia’s promotion of militarization in various regions of the world—particularly China’s efforts to create an alternative, authoritarian world order, which includes many military-dominated autocracies.

Among other possibilities that democracies should utilize would include: more aggressive U.S. interaction in and postures at the United Nations and UN organizations; calling out Chinese and Russian support for militarization, which is often unpopular with populations within countries; a significant increase in aid for countries endangered by the prospects of coups and politicians giving the military more power; aggressive highlighting of the many domestic problems caused by the coups and other types of military power sponsored by China and Russia; a more assertive effort to partner with the most important big emerging democracies—Indonesia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, the Philippines, and others; a reconsideration, at times, of whether the U.S. should necessarily cut off aid and most ties when military intervention occurs, especially given China’s growing desire to cultivate a range of autocracies and create an alternative world order; an effort to bolster  U.S. tools of soft power, which are increasingly important in combating China’s reach in countries trending toward militarization/authoritarianism.

Most importantly, democracies must exert a robust effort to ensure that democracy at home remains strong and vital, helping demonstrate democracy as an alternative to China’s authoritarianism.