The Talks in Oman: Round One Goes to Iran

Negotiations between Iran and the United States began on April 12, and round one clearly went to Iran.

Why?

First, the United States demanded direct negotiations while Iran wanted indirect talks. The talks in Oman were indirect, with the Omani foreign minister as go-between. It seems that there was a hello chat and handshake between U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Aragchi, but no more than that.

Second, the key critique of the JCPOA, the 2015 Obama-Iran agreement, noted that it dealt only with nuclear weapons and ignored both Iran’s support for terrorist proxies and Iran’s missile program. According to press reports, the talks in Oman dealt only with nuclear matters. That is exactly what Iran wants.

Third, the United States appears to be signaling weakness right from the start—abandoning the goal of ending Iran’s nuclear program. As The New York Times put it, “Mr. Trump and Mr. Witkoff indicated that their real bottom line is ensuring that Iran can never build a nuclear weapon—despite harsh demands from Trump officials before the talks that Iran dismantle its nuclear program entirely as well as abandon its missile program and its support for regional proxies.” (Let’s ignore for the moment that bit of Times editorializing in a news story, calling the demand that Iran stop supporting terror and building intercontinental ballistic missiles “harsh.”)

Mr. Witkoff’s negotiating practices are difficult to understand. He told The Wall Street Journal just before the talks that “I think our position begins with dismantlement of your program. That is our position today. That doesn’t mean, by the way, that at the margin we’re not going to find other ways to find compromise between our two countries. Where our red line will be, there can’t be weaponization of your nuclear capability.” This the definition of a pre-emptive concession: ‘Here’s my bottom line—but if you don’t like it, I’ll find another one.’

If Witkoff’s goal is an agreement that allows IAEA inspections of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, while Iran continues its support for proxies like Hamas, Hezballah, and the Houthis, and allows Iran to continue to develop longer- and longer-range missiles, he wants the JCPOA.

President Trump got out of the JCPOA in 2018, saying that “The Iran deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.” Why? Because, the administration said, “The JCPOA enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior, while at best delaying its ability to pursue nuclear weapons and allowing it to preserve nuclear research and development” and “The JCPOA failed to deal with the threat of Iran’s missile program….”

Here's what the Trump administration said in its fact sheet of May 18 May, 2018:

• President Trump is making clear that, in addition to never developing a nuclear weapon, the Iranian regime must:
  • Never have an ICBM, cease developing any nuclear-capable missiles, and stop proliferating ballistic missiles to others.
  • Cease its support for terrorists, extremists, and regional proxies, such as Hizballah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qa’ida.
  • End its publicly declared quest to destroy Israel.
  • Stop its threats to freedom of navigation, especially in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.
  • Cease escalating the Yemen conflict and destabilizing the region by proliferating weapons to the Houthis.
  • End its cyber-attacks against the United States and our allies, including Israel.
  • Stop its grievous human rights abuses, shown most recently in the regime’s crackdown against widespread protests by Iranian citizens.
  • Stop its unjust detention of foreigners, including United States citizens.

Oh well. It seems that those demands are on the way to being forgotten. If Mr. Trump wants a quick and dirty deal, Iran will be sure to oblige—in return for an end to some or most U.S. sanctions. Then, once again, there will be an agreement that “enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior, while at best delaying its ability to pursue nuclear weapons and allowing it to preserve nuclear research and development.”

With a very credible military threat to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the United States can demand a great deal more than Obama and his Secretary of State John Kerry did in 2015. But on the basis of the few shreds of information available today, Witkoff is going to give the Iranian regime just what it wants. The New York Times reported on April 11 that Iran’s “Supreme Leader” came around to talks with the United States because “senior officials” told him that “otherwise the Islamic Republic’s rule could be toppled.” They told him that there could be “an existential threat to the regime.” That means the United States has enormous leverage in the talks with Iran. Pre-emptive concessions are a reminder of the Obama/Kerry negotiations, which at the very inception agreed Iran could enrich uranium when previously the unanimous U.S., European, Russian, and Chinese position had been that Iran could not.

The United States has the leverage and should use it—to force Iranian concessions that go far beyond the JCPOA. Mr. Witkoff should take a look at what Mr. Trump said in 2018, and should understand that Iran is a great deal weaker now. Insiders in the regime know it. Why don’t U.S. negotiators?