Thailand’s Draconian 112 Lèse-majesté Law: Any Hope for Change?

The number of prosecutions for people accused of insulting the Thai monarchy has recently surged. Even Thaksin Shinawatra, the most powerful civilian politician in Thailand, could find himself facing lèse-majesté charges, as a previous post written by Professor Pavin Chachavalpongpun of Kyoto University and myself spells out. This brief primer sketches out the background of this regressive and cruel law and whether it can be amended or repealed in the future.

The law, referred to as 112 because of its position in the Thai criminal code, makes it an offense to: “defame, insult or threaten members of the royal family.” The law is so sweeping that almost anyone who threatens political elites can be prosecuted under it, striking fear into opposition politicians, civil society, all manner of activists, and ordinary Thais.

The law, which carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years in prison for each offense, has been liberally used by the junta-turned-government to target activists such as Rung and other perceived critics, from politicians to pensioners. According to an analysis by David Hopkins of the Lowy Institute, many of those facing charges could serve “decades-long sentences.” It is also unclear whether the law should only be applied to the king and his closest family, or if it applies broadly to any royals, as Thai royalists favor. Some royalist advocates are trying to bring 112 cases against Thais who supposedly “defame” monarchs who died hundreds of years ago.

Even though lèse-majesté charges are part of the criminal code, any Thai citizen can bring a lèse-majesté case against another Thai citizen. This makes it particularly easy for arch-royalists to use the draconian law to try to stifle any discussion of the monarchy and the law itself, which does not exist in other constitutional monarchies. By Thai law, the police have to investigate every lèse-majesté charge made by citizens. Thus, members of law enforcement spend vast amounts of time investigating these cases despite the fact that Thailand has other serious criminal problems, like serving as a drug and human trafficking hub. (In theory, Thailand is a constitutional monarchy like the United Kingdom. But in reality, the monarch wields enormous political and economic power behind the scenes, including controlling vast portions of Thai real estate and shares in Thai companies. Further, the judiciary also essentially issues rulings according to what best serves the monarch.)

Indeed, while the law was in place under the reign of the current king’s father, King Bhumibol, it was used far less often. King Bhumibol enjoyed much more popular support than the current King Vajiralongkorn, indicating that he should not be above criticism. And, as the rights group FIDH notes [PDF], between 2018 and 2020, there was a pause in the extensive use of lèse-majesté 112 cases.

Since then, however, the number of lèse-majesté cases has skyrocketed again. It is not a coincidence that the increase in lèse-majesté cases has occurred as younger Thais have increasingly voiced their opposition to the law on social media, at rallies, and in the voting booth. In 2023, many young Thais voted for the progressive Move Forward Party, which sought to amend the law if it controlled parliament. The opposition generally argues that the law itself, along with the near-absolute character of the Thai monarchy, now held by a person who does not enjoy the respect and almost god-like stature his father accrued over decades, is outdated and should be changed. Disaffected Thais are calling for Thailand to become more like a “normal” kingdom, with the monarch resembling King Charles III of the United Kingdom more than King Salman of Saudi Arabia. (Thailand is the only major non-oil economy to have a monarch with such powers.)

And yet the ruling elite’s response to those who protested the 112 law and voted for the Move Forward Party was to stonewall. Move Forward was prevented from forming a coalition to control the lower house of parliament because of dubious laws put in place by a former junta. The party is facing dissolution, and its leader is facing jail time for—unsurprisingly—defaming the monarch by merely discussing the amendment of Section 112. Eventually, however, this dam cannot hold, especially given the demographics of Thailand’s population, the lack of popularity of the current monarch, and the long-term direction of Thai political parties.

This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.