Boko Haram

Since 2011, when Boko Haram (and its subsequent off-shoots) entered its current violent phase, kidnapping women and girls has been a defining characteristic. Boko Haram seeks women as wives for its fighters—who are often too poor to pay a bride price—as domestic or sexual slaves, and as suicide bombers. Boko Haram’s most notorious kidnapping, at least to those in the West, was the abduction of 276 school girls from Chibok in 2014, more than 100 of whom remain in captivity. The total number of Boko Haram kidnapping victims is unclear, but it is likely in the thousands.  As the military dislodged Boko Haram in 2015 from the territory it had captured and occupied earlier, victims of suicide bombers grew as a proportion of those the group killed through August 2018. Between June 2014, when Boko Haram reportedly deployed its first female suicide bomber, and February 2018, about 468 women and girls have been deployed or arrested in 240 suicide attacks, the most by any terrorist movement, killing roughly 1,200 and injuring some 3,000, according to a report [PDF] by the Counterterrorism Center. These numbers have no doubt climbed in the years since. The number of women and girls involved in suicide attacks, most likely through coercion but some voluntarily, is part of the reason why female victims that escape or are liberated are too often shunned by their communities. There is a popular fear that they remain Boko Haram at heart. Perhaps because of international compassion fatigue, perhaps because the horror is so great, women and girl kidnap victims have largely fallen off the Western media radar, all the more so in this time of coronavirus. Hence, the New York Times has done a service by telling the stories of some kidnap victims who escape and the challenges they have faced since, stories that are painful to read. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 14 to 20, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1584975857049'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 14: Bandits killed one and kidnapped four in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  March 14: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  March 15: Six Nigerian soldiers and three Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Bama, Borno.  March 15: Bandits killed three in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  March 15: Police killed three kidnappers in Jada, Adamawa.  March 16: Kidnappers abducted two in Ibadan, Oyo.  March 17: The Nigerian Air Force killed seventeen bandits in Giwa, Kaduna.   March 17: Bandits killed sixteen in Maru, Zamfara.  March 17: Bandits killed two in Birnin-Magaji, Zamfara.  March 18: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) ISWAP leaders in Abadam, Borno.  March 18: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Chikun, Kaduna.  March 19: Police killed four kidnappers in Dutsinma, Katsina.  March 19: Kidnappers abducted seven in Wukari, Taraba.  March 19: The Nigerian military killed twenty-four bandits in Jibia, Katsina.  March 19: The Nigerian military killed two bandits in Maru, Zamfara.

Alvin Young is a Rangel Fellow and master's candidate at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. On February 19, 2020, Senator Ibrahim Gaidam, the former governor of Yobe State, introduced legislation to create the National Agency for Deradicalization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration of Repentant Insurgents. Gaidam represents Yobe state, which borders Borno and has been affected by the insurgency. The bill’s purpose is to encourage and rehabilitate Boko Haram defectors and prevent violent extremism in Nigeria. Given the recent requests for additional military force to combat Boko Haram by Nigerian lawmakers, Senator Gaidam’s legislation is an important step toward incorporating deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DRR) programs into the overall strategy designed to defeat Boko Haram.  Currently, Nigeria has three deradicalization programs that support Boko Haram defectors. The Prison Program works with militants convicted of violent extremist offenses or those on or awaiting trial. During the program, Imams teach classes on non-violent interpretations of Islam, and other program staff provide vocational training so that, when inmates fulfill their prison terms, they can reenter society with less risk of reverting to terrorism. Second, the Yellow Ribbon Initiative supports women and children associated with Boko Haram by providing psychosocial therapy and reintegration programs. Finally, Operation Safe Corridor, launched by the Nigerian military in 2015, works with Boko Haram defectors by addressing extremist ideology and providing them with trauma counseling. Two thousand members of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) have defected through Operation Safe Corridor since its inception. Governor Babagana Zulum of Borno promised to complement security initiatives with programs that provide access to education and job opportunities. But, as military failures at the hands of Boko Haram’s have left much of Borno cut off from itself and the rest of the country, Governor Zulum has apparently—and understandably—prioritized military action by calling on the federal government to recruit 100,000 troops to counter the insurgency. Zulum promised an additional 50,000 "able-bodied" persons to combat the extremist group but did not request support for DRR programs. Instead, Babagana urged the Nigerian military to re-establish a military base in Borno. Other Northern leaders such as Yobe State governor, Malam Mai Mala Buni, are calling on the Nigerian military to expand their presence in the north. While an influx of troops may be important to addressing the immediate security situation caused by Boko Haram, the governors’ prioritization of security forces over investments into more DRR initiatives places their constituents in a revolving cycle of violence. Many Nigerians, including several lawmakers, oppose DRR programs. Some feel that their communities are not sufficiently consulted when these programs are developed and implemented. Perhaps more problematic, many communities, after enduring years of atrocities, remain skeptical of reconciliation with Boko Haram defectors. A senator from Ondo state said that there was “no justification” for the program proposed by senator Gaidam. “How can an enemy be rehabilitated? These are people who have done Nigeria so much harm." Current DRR efforts have had mixed results due to the Nigerian military’s limited expertise in deradicalization programs such as Operation Safe Corridor and reasonable fears that program participants will face violent retribution upon reintegration.  Vanda Felbab-Brown argues that community opposition to DRR efforts suggests that the Nigerian government “needs to invest more in open and comprehensive discussions with society about rehabilitation, reintegration, leniency, and victims’ rights.” To be effective, Nigerian lawmakers must ensure that DRR programs continue to work with those communities that will receive the rehabilitated fighters. A primarily military effort—still the current approach of the government—has not been successful; leaders owe it to their communities to explore the root causes of the insurgency and support non-military efforts, where possible, such as Senator Gaidam’s new legislation. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 7 to 13, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1584367334062'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 7: Boko Haram killed seven in Diffa, Niger.  March 8: Gunmen kidnapped three in Aniocha South, Delta.  March 8: Bandits killed eight in Bungudu, Zamfara.  March 8: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 9: Kidnappers abducted six and killed one in Shagari, Sokoto. March 9: Kidnappers abducted four students in Funtua, Katsina. March 10: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped four in Kaduna North, Kaduna.  March 10: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi.  March 10: Customs officers killed nine in Ibadan, Oyo.  March 11: Nigerian police killed six kidnappers in Faskari, Katsina.  March 11: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Agatu, Benue.  March 12: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 12: Bandits killed four in Gusau, Zamfara. March 12: Nigerian and Chadian soldiers killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram commanders in Kukawa, Borno.  March 13: Herdsmen killed seven in Guma, Benue.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 29 to March 6, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1583780666942'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 29: Boko Haram killed ten in Aksira/Uba, Borno.  March 1: Bandits killed fifty-one in Igabi, Kaduna.  March 1: Kidnappers abducted five students and one teacher in Mariga, Niger. March 3: Herdsmen killed four in Kwande, Benue.  March 4: Gunmen killed two policemen and two civilians in Udu, Delta. March 4: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Okigwe, Imo.  March 4: Three soldiers and nineteen Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack in Damboa, Borno.  March 4: Herdsmen killed three and kidnapped seven in Aniocha North, Delta.  March 4: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 4: Boko Haram killed six police officers and two civilians in Bursari, Yobe.  March 4: Kidnappers abducted three local government councillors in Gummi, Zamfara.  March 5: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 22 to 28, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1583163551729'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 23: Cult clashes resulted in three deaths in Ikorodu, Lagos. February 23: Herdsmen killed one and kidnapped one in Aniocha North, Delta  February 23: Police killed five crime suspects in Kankara, Katsina.   February 24: Police killed three protestors in Sagamu, Ogun.  February 24: Cultists killed five in Okpokwu, Benue.  February 26: Kidnappers abducted a Civilian JTF official among "others" (estimated at five total) in Chibok, Borno.  February 26: A Nigerian army corporal killed four of his colleagues and then himself in Abadam, Borno.  February 27: Police killed seventeen bandits and bandits killed four civilians in Kankara, Katsina.  February 27: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. February 27: Over the last two months, a combination of military offenses and infighting between ISWA and Boko Haram has led to the deaths of twenty-five militants in and around Kukawa, Borno (LGA estimated). 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 15 to 21, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1582558147228'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 16: Gunmen kidnapped six in Lokoja, Kogi. February 16: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Marte, Borno.  February 16: Gunmen killed four soldiers and two civilians in Ekeremor, Bayelsa.  February 16: Kidnappers abducted twelve in Ofu, Kogi.  February 16: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.  February 17: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Lokoja, Kogi.  February 17: Gunmen killed two policemen in Irele, Ondo.  February 17: One bandit and one vigilante member were killed during a clash in Kurfi, Katsina.  February 18: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Jos, Plateau.  February 18: Herdsmen killed two in Ovia North-East, Edo.  February 18: Four Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) officers were kidnapped in Ofu, Kogi.  February 19: Cultists killed six in Ikpoba-Okha, Edo.  February 19: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno.  February 19: Bandits kidnapped "many" (estimated at ten) in Rafi, Niger.  February 20: Nigerian police killed two Hausa traders in Abeokuta, Ogun.  February 20: Airstrikes killed "some key" (estimated at five) ISWA leaders in Abadam, Borno.  February 20: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Chikun, Kaduna.  February 20: A cult clash resulted in ten deaths in Oredo, Edo.  February 10–20: Troops killed thirteen bandits in Katsina and Zamfara; estimated at identified location of Shinkafi, Zamfara.  February 21: Police killed two robbers in Abuja, FCT. February 21: Boko Haram killed "some" (estimated at five) vigilantes in Damaturu, Yobe.  February 21: Thirteen children were kidnapped in Ilorin West, Kwara. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 8 to 14, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1582044380307'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 8: Bandits killed three in Shiroro, Niger.  February 8: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  February 8: Gunmen killed two in Dutse, Kaduna.  February 9: Herdsmen killed three in Riyom, Plateau.  February 9: Boko Haram killed thirty and abducted "many" (estimated at ten) in Konduga, Borno.  February 9: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno.  February 10: Two soldiers and one Boko Haram militant were killed in a clash in Konduga, Borno.  February 10: Boko Haram killed one soldier in Magumeri, Borno.  February 10: Three CJTF and "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants were killed in a clash in Kala/Balge, Borno.  February 11: Gunmen killed twenty-one in Giwa, Kaduna.  February 12: Gunmen killed seven in Kachia, Kaduna.  February 13: Herdsmen killed eight in Ughelli North, Delta.  February 13: Four people were killed during a riot in Orhionmwon, Edo.  February 14: Herdsmen killed one in Bokkos, Plateau.  February 14: Bandits killed thirty-three in Batsari, Katsina. 

The security situation around Borno’s capital, Maiduguri, appears to be going from bad to worse. On February 9, The Boko Haram faction Islamic State in West African (ISWA) shot or burned alive some thirty people sleeping in their cars and trucks that night outside the town of Auno, some ten miles from Maiduguri. They also kidnapped others. The victims had arrived in Auno after curfew, the gates to the town were closed, and the military had departed, presumably for their supercamp in Maiduguri, according to media.  The Nigerian army is following its own version of the “fortified hamlets” strategy, employed by the United States and its allies in the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan and generally regarded as a failure by counterterrorism experts. By consolidating their forces in highly fortified “super camps,” the Nigerian army reduces their own casualties, but in the evening, when soldiers withdraw back to these camps, ISWA appears to have close to free rein in the countryside and smaller towns. On February 12, ISWA killed five security personnel in three separate attacks near Maiduguri. That city, the capital of Borno state, has essentially been cut off from the rest of the country by ISWA and Boko Haram. The one remaining highway, to Damaturu, is subject to frequent attacks. The airport, however, remains open. The governor of Borno state is accusing the military of failing to protect civilians.  Military and security service failure is an old song. Though about 20 percent of the national budget goes for security, accountability for how the funds are spent is weak. Security service morale is widely reported to be low. Coordination among the agencies is bad. Trust of the security services among local people is low, and ISWA operatives appear to have better knowledge of the countryside than the security services. Though documentation is hard to find, security may be increasingly devolving from the central government to states and local communities. Local vigilante groups are active, in Yorubaland, for example, local governors have joined forces to organize a force to “assist” the security services.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 1 to 7, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1581350858423'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 1: ISWA (Boko Haram) killed three soldiers in Askira/Uba, Borno.  February 1: Bandits killed one and abducted twenty in Borgu, Niger.  February 2: Cult clashes led to seven deaths in Etche, Rivers. February 3: Three were killed during a clash between the police and protesters in Apapa, Lagos.  February 3: Bandits killed six vigilantes in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  February 3: Bandits killed five in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. February 3: Gunmen killed four in Etche, Rivers.  February 4: Herdsmen killed three policemen in Oshimili North, Delta.  February 4: Boko Haram killed two in Extreme-Nord, Cameroon. February 4: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Arochukwu, Abia.  February 4: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  February 4: Gunmen killed four in Eleme, Rivers.  February 5: Gunmen killed three in Kaura, Kaduna.  February 5: Nigerian police killed 250 members of the Ansaru terrorist group (Boko Haram faction) in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna and lost two officers.  February 5: Bank robbers killed four in Ile Oluji/Okeigbo, Ondo.  February 5: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) ISWA (Boko Haram) militants in Ngala, Borno.  February 6: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ibi, Taraba.  February 6: Nigerian police killed two more Ansaru (Boko Haram faction) commanders in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna and lost one police inspector.  February 7: Boko Haram killed six in Bosso, Diffa, Niger.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 25 to 31, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1580746166255'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   January 25: Bandits killed eleven and kidnapped four in Shiroro, Niger. January 25: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and three others in Gwoza, Borno.  January 25: Nigerian troops killed "many" (estimated at twenty) ISWA militants in Mobbar, Borno. January 25: Four herdsmen were killed in Nsukka, Enugu.  January 26: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Bali, Taraba.  January 26: Gunmen kidnapped three in Abaji, FCT. January 26: Herdsmen killed seventeen in Bokkos, Plateau.  January 27: Boko Haram killed six Chadian soldiers on Tetewa Island in Lake Chad.  January 28: Herdsmen killed one farmer and one policeman in Ovia North East, Edo.  January 28: Boko Haram killed three in Konduga, Borno.  January 29: Boko Haram killed five in Blangoua, Chad.  January 29: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Ankpa, Kogi.  January 30: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and three boys in Maiduguri, Borno.  January 30: Bandits killed two farmers in Wukari, Taraba.  January 30: Twenty-one Boko Haram militants, three soldiers, and one civilian were killed during an attack in Lake Chad. 

On January 29, the Nigerian House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on all of the military service chiefs to resign. If they do not, the resolution called on President Muhammadu Buhari to fire them. Earlier, the Senate had also expressed the view that the service chiefs had to go. The House motion appears to be more formal than the Senate’s action. However, both reflect frustration at the resurgence of Boko Haram in the northeast. The road to Damaturu is the only remaining operable road connecting the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri, to the rest of Nigeria. Maiduguri has an international airport, and air travel to other Nigerian cities continue. The service chiefs were appointed by President Buhari in 2015 after he was elected to his first presidential term. Under military regulations, their terms of service expired in 2017, but the President has kept them on. They are Defense Chief Abayomi Olonisakin, Army Chief Tukur Buratai, Navy Chief Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas, and Air Chief Sadique Abubakar. It is unlikely that President Buhari will move against the service chiefs because of the National Assembly. He might, indeed, replace some or all. But, should he do so, it would be for his own reasons. All are personally loyal to the President.  The inability of the security services to defeat Boko Haram is the result of complex factors, not the personal limitations of the service chiefs, whatever they might be. The House of Representatives resolution makes specific reference to Boko Haram and the northeast. However, the breakdown of security is nationwide, and it is becoming a major political issue. Earlier in January, the governors of the states of Yorubaland in the southwest moved to establish a security force to supplement and assist the national police force in the face of a kidnapping epidemic that the Federal government appears powerless to stop. In fact, according to one report, twenty-three states across the country have stood up local security organizations, ranging from neighborhood watches to armed police. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 18 to 24, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1580150322071'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, January 17: Thirteen soldiers and four Boko Haram militants were killed during a battle in Bama, Borno.) January 18: Bandits kidnapped thirty-two people in Shiroro, Niger.  January 18: Bandits kidnapped five in Bukkuyum, Zamfara.  January 18: One soldier and four Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack on an aid facility in Ngala, Borno.  January 18: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Igalamela-Odolu, Kogi.  January 18: Boko Haram killed four soldiers and kidnapped "scores" (estimated at forty) in Bama, Borno. January 19: A suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and nine others in Kaiga-Kindjiria, Chad. January 19: Vandals tampered with a pipeline, leading to an explosion that killed five in Alimosho, Lagos. January 21: Gunmen killed four in Keana, Nassarawa. January 21: Police killed one during a Shiite protest in Abuja, FCT. January 21: 8 soldiers and "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during a battle in Kaga, Borno.  January 21: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped fourteen in Batsari, Katsina.  January 22: "Several" (estimated at ten) were killed during a clash between Boko Haram and ISWA militants in Abadam, Borno.  January 23: Boko Haram killed ten loggers in Dikwa, Borno.  January 23: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ughelli North, Delta.   

Over the last couple of weeks, Boko Haram has increased attacks on the road from Maiduguri to Kano, the only remaining safe highway of the six major roads that connect Maiduguri with the rest of the state and country, according to Nigeria media. A major report on the increasing isolation of Maiduguri closely follows Boko Haram attacks on transmission lines supplying the city with electricity. Destroyed bridges and frequent attacks on travelers have cut off not only Maiduguri residents, but many other residents of Borno state from accessing or travelling to Borno’s neighboring states. In response, the Nigerian army has evacuated many villages along the highway, causing hardship and anger among the residents and friction between the governor of Borno state and the army.  Borno state and its capital, Maiduguri, have been ground zero for Boko Haram. Mohammed Yussuf founded the movement in Maiduguri, the police murdered him there in 2009, and Boko Haram emerged there in 2011 as a deadly terrorist movement. By 2015, Boko Haram controlled a territory as large as Belgium in Borno and adjacent Yobe and Adamawa states. The Nigerian army, assisted by Chadian forces and South African mercenaries, pushed Boko Haram back. But, there has been a Boko Haram resurgence. Though it is unclear the extent to which either Boko Haram faction actually governs territory, it is now able to operate in three states, especially Borno, and in some places it even provides a modicum of governance. It has seemingly pushed the security services back into fortified super camps, particularly Maiduguri. Local resident fear that Boko Haram will, with the closing of the Maiduguri-Kano highway, completely cut off Maiduguri and Borno state from the rest of Nigeria. The faction that is most active appears to be the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), though Abubakar Shekau’s faction has also been active. Nominally, Borno has a population of more than four million, and Maiduguri has a population of more than two million. However, because of the flow of internally displaced persons, it is hard to know how many people are now living there. Traditionally the state has been a center of trade, agriculture, and fishing. Borno was a center of the cattle industry, and a transit point for fish caught in Lake Chad. These activities are all dependent on the roads. The security services have so far been able to repel frequent Boko Haram attempts to destroy the bridge along the Kano-Maiduguri highway. If that bridge is destroyed, or attacks on travelers renders the road inaccessible, as a practical matter the only way to get to Maiduguri will be by air. Maiduguri has an international airport which remains open, and the city remains the headquarters of the Nigerian army operating against Boko Haram. It remains to be seen whether the isolation of Borno is part of a larger Boko Haram strategy and whether is presages a return to occupying and governing territory. 

On January 20, the electric company serving Maiduguri, capital of Borno state, publicly stated that Boko Haram attacks on transmission lines and infrastructure had cut electricity service to the city on January 17, removing Maiduguri from the national grid. The electric company had promised to restore power soon.  Maiduguri nominally has a population of about two million, but it is likely now much greater because of the influx of persons displaced by fighting between Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram factions. In addition to being the capital of Borno state, the city is the residence of the Shehu of Borno, one of Nigeria’s most important Islamic traditional rulers. The city is on the main Hajj pilgrimage route stretching from Senegal on the Atlantic coast to Mecca. There is a modern university, an international airport, and it is on the national railway network, now being restored by Chinese companies. The city is a major trading center, especially for cattle. However, the poverty of the city’s residents is legendary in the region, where Maiduguri is sometimes called “the beggar maker.”  The city’s population is mostly Muslim in religion and Kanuri in ethnicity, and it has long been a center of radical Islamic thinking. There is a small Christian minority, mostly made up of ethnicities from elsewhere in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Harm in Maiduguri, and he was killed there by the police in 2009. Since its resurgence starting in 2011, Boko Haram has come close on occasion to occupying the city. More frequently, it has dominated certain neighborhoods, with Boko Haram’s black flag flying over certain buildings. However, the Nigerian army now has its northern command headquarters there. Many international relief agencies also have offices in Maiduguri. Even in the best of times (which these are not), many or most residents of Maiduguri would have little or no access to electricity. The well-to-do would have their own electric generators. So, it is difficult to know what the impact actually is of the detachment of Maiduguri from the national grid for most residents. That said, however, Boko Haram would appear to have scored some sort of victory. Boko Haram has split into factions, of which the two best known are one that has been led by Abubakar Shekau since the resumption of hostilities in 2011, and one called the Islamic State in West African (ISWA), associated with the Islamic State. Relations among the factions are murky; at times they cooperate, at other times they fight each other. Nigerian media is carrying reports of a recent gun battle between the two factions that left “several” fighters dead. At present, it is not known which faction carried out the attack on Maiduguri’s electricity infrastructure.