Boko Haram

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 8 to 14, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1560776873920'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   June 8: Bandits killed fifty in Rabah and Isa LGAs of Sokoto. June 9: Bandits killed seventy in Shiroro, Niger. Some reports indicate that the death toll may be cumulative over a few days following the Sunday attack. June 9: The Nigerian army reported that it killed nine Boko Haram social media personalities. No date or location were provided (estimated in Borno).  June 10: Nigerian soldiers killed one Boko Haram militant in Kukawa, Borno.  June 10: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  June 11: During a Boko Haram attack in Darak, Cameroon, sixty-four Boko Haram militants, twenty-one soldiers, and sixteen civilians were killed.  June 11: Gunmen abducted four in Igabi, Kaduna. June 12: Herdsmen killed one in a highway attack in Irewole, Osun. June 12: Boko Haram killed twenty-one Nigerian soldiers in Mobbar, Borno.  June 13: Nigerian police killed one bandit in a gun duel in Kankara, Katsina. June 14: Bandits killed thirty-five in Shinkafi, Zamfara.

Bulama Bukarti is a sub-Saharan Africa analyst at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, based in London, and a PhD candidate at SOAS, University of London. Abdulbasit Kassim, a leading Boko Haram scholar, recently discovered a thirty-eight-minute recording of a purported Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) communique, which I translated from the original Kanuri. It provides a particular version and explanation of ISWA's immediate history, and sheds light on why the group executed Mamman Nur, one of the Boko Haram’s founding fathers and an influential ideologue, as well as ISWA's internal decision-making and relationship with the Islamic State (IS). Abubakar Shekau, then leader of Boko Haram, declared allegiance to IS in 2015, renaming his group ISWA. Soon after, Shekau was removed from leadership under murky circumstances and replaced by Abu Musab al-Barnawi as ISWA’s leader. (Al-Barnawi has since reportedly been replaced.) With those still loyal to him, Shekau created a separate faction, popularly called "Boko Haram."  Regarding the split in 2016, the audio indicates that several of the groups’ leaders, including Nur, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, and a significant number of rank-and-file members secretly defected from Boko Haram after becoming disenchanted with Shekau’s “deviations.” These included his interpretation of Islamic texts, “thirst” for power, alleged corruption, indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians, and cruelty toward members. However, Nur and al-Barnawi did not work together to defect at the same time, as some reports have indicated. The recording states that they separately decamped to different groups. Later, Nur joined the al-Barnawi contingent, which went on to become ISWA.  An initial ISWA shura meeting was summoned to nominate a leader following Shekau’s ouster, who would then be announced by IS. Nur insisted he was the best suited to lead. The meeting resolved to nominate al-Barnawi, citing Nur’s lust for power and lack of credibility in the eyes of some fighters. Nur vehemently opposed al-Barnawi’s nomination because of the latter’s young age, contending that “a little child’s leadership is unknown to the religion [Islam].” This version of events contradicts previous accounts that the Islamic State initially appointed Nur but that he stepped aside in favor of al-Barnawi.  This helps explain the context of Nur’s execution. There has been much debate around why it happened, and the communique lists three reasons. First, after he lost his leadership bid, Nur started sabotaging al-Barnawi by spreading rumors and conspiring to destroy ISWA. The audio called Nur “Shaykh al-Murjifin” and “Shaykh al-Munafiqin” (the chief of hypocrites, the chief of rumor spreaders). Second, Nur engaged in negotiations with the Nigerian government without the knowledge and consent of ISWA leadership. (It is believed that ISWA was particularly unhappy with Nur’s role in the release of the kidnapped Dapchi girls.) When ISWA got wind of what was going on, it arrested and detained Nur until it received the sum of money he had negotiated from the government (it is not clear what for). After “proving” his second offense with the ransom, Nur was exiled and transferred to a nearby settlement, where he committed his third offense. A day after his exile, Nur attempted to defect and turn himself in to the Nigerian authorities, but he was stopped by ISWA members before he could do so.  Nur was not punished for his first and second offenses, though both of which are punishable by death according to ISWA’s interpretation of Sharia. The audio explains that, as a senior founding member and ideologue, executing Nur would have been divisive, especially given that ISWA broke away from Shekau partly over his use of violence against members.  The audio also explains that the decision to execute Nur was ultimately passed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. After Nur’s third offense, ISWA reached out to IS seeking guidance. After some messages back and forth, al-Baghdadi opted to have Nur executed as punishment, forgoing the exile or solitary confinement sought by ISWA. The audio also provided ISWA’s justification for executing Nur. First, ISWA “had not any option” but to carry out the caliph’s decision. Then it cited Islamic textual authorities to justify killing rumor spreaders (murjifin). It also cited the opinions of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, Islamic scholars often used in Salafi-Jihadism, to buttress the decision. That ISWA produced audio providing an ideological justification is an indication of the importance of ideology, albeit flawed, for the way it operates.  The audio, assuming it is an accurate portrayal of the events described, could be evidence that ISWA sees IS as its umbrella body, seeking and taking its advice, at least with respect to major decisions. The relationship between the two therefore might not just be rhetorical. If so, such a relationship has serious implications for the Nigerian government’s planned talks with ISWA, aimed at ending all activities; in his video message, al-Baghdadi made clear that the fight should go on. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 1 to 7, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1560186320444'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   June 1: Boko Haram killed one and lost one militant in an attack on a mosque in Maiduguri, Borno.  June 1: Bandits killed eight in Gusau, Zamfara. June 1: Boko Haram killed one soldier and possibly kidnapped seven soldiers in Konduga, Borno.  June 1: Sectarian violence led to twelve deaths in Wukari, Taraba.  June 2: Boko Haram killed five soldiers in Marte, Borno.  June 3: The Multinational Joint Task Force killed twenty Islamic State West Africa (ISWA), or Boko Haram, militants in Abadam, Borno. June 4: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  June 5: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Abadam, Borno.  June 6: Bandits killed sixteen in Maru, Zamfara. June 6: Soldiers killed four protesters in Fufore, Adamawa. June 6: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Wukari, Taraba. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 25 to 31, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1559571242951'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 25: Boko Haram killed twenty-five Nigerian soldiers and three Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members in Sabon-Gari, Borno. May 25: The Nigerian Air Force killed "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) of bandits in Zurmi, Zamfara. May 25: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. May 25: A Boko Haram landmine killed four Chadian soldiers and one journalist in Ngounboua, Chad.  May 26: Sectarian violence led to thirteen deaths in Jos North, Plateau. May 26: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. May 27: Gunmen killed six family members in Riyom, Plateau. May 27: Boko Haram killed seven in Jere, Borno. May 28: Bandits killed twenty-three in Kaura-Namoda, Zamfara. May 28: Bandits kidnapped three in Danmusa, Katsina. May 29: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack in Maiduguri, Borno. No casualties were reported. May 30: Police killed two bandits in Safana, Katsina. May 31: Police shot into a crowd to disperse protesting Shiites in Kaduna North, Kaduna. No casualties were reported. May 31: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Jere, Borno.   

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 18 to 24, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1559051020810'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 18: Bandits killed seventeen in Birnin-Magaji, Zamfara. May 18: Herdsmen killed one and abducted seven in Ovia North, Edo. May 18: Bandits killed one and abducted six in Toto, Nassarawa.  May 18: Boko Haram killed twelve in Konduga, Borno.  May 18: Sectarian violence led to eleven deaths in Yagba West, Kogi. May 19: Cultists killed twenty in Khana, Rivers. May 19: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Igabi, Kaduna. May 19: Gunmen kidnapped ffiteen in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. May 20: Herdsmen killed one in Aniocha South, Delta. May 20: Gunmen killed one policeman and two others in Wukari, Taraba. May 20: Boko Haram killed twenty Nigerian troops in Gubio, Borno; five militants were also killed.  May 21: Bandits killed eighteen in Batsari, Katsina. May 21: Bandits killed five in Danmusa, Katsina. May 21: Bandits killed eleven in Faskari, Katsina. May 21: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Itu, Akwa Ibom.  May 24: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno. 

Jacob Zenn is an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University and is a senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) claimed a May 16 attack near Tongo Tongo, Niger, killing more than twenty soldiers not far from the Malian border. In March it issued a photo of its members in Burkina Faso and in April it claimed an attack on a militia in Mali. But, it is not clear that the ISWA group based primarily in Nigeria is behind those attacks.  In March 2015, Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and its “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leading to the rebranding of Boko Haram as ISWA. The group has since gone through two leadership transitions and is now split into at least two discernable factions. One is ISWA, which is still pledged to the Islamic State and whose third leader is Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi or “Ba Idrisa.” The other comprises members still loyal to Shekau who defected with him when the Islamic State rejected him as leader; it is referred to as Boko Haram, even though both are “Boko Haram factions.”  After an attack on a Shia procession in Kano in November 2015, which was claimed by ISWA, both factions have focused their attacks exclusively on northeastern Nigeria and the borderlands of Chad, Cameroon, and Niger around Lake Chad. Generally speaking, ISWA tends to focus on military targets and Shekau’s Boko Haram tends to pilfer from villages while also targeting the Nigerian military. ISWA has portrayed itself as a more “civilian-friendly” alternative to Boko Haram and, to an extent, it has lived up to this billing.  The recent claims of attacks by ISWA in the border regions of Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Mali, therefore seem out of character, geographically speaking. In fact, all indications suggest that those three attacks in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali were carried out by the group formerly known as Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), whose leader is Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi. Recall that in 2017, ISGS was blamed for and claimed an ambush of U.S. and Nigerien soldiers in Tongo Tongo that killed four U.S. Special Forces, which is the same location as the attack on May 16. Although al-Sahrawi has since been recognized by the Islamic State, including by name in Abubakar al-Baghdadi’s April 2019 video appearance, al-Sahrawi’s ISGS has not apparently earned “province” status.  What this suggests is that ISGS has, at least in name, been subsumed under the banner of the Ba Idrisa-led ISWA. This means that ISWA as we have up to now understood it—based in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin—is not conducting attacks in Niger, Burkina Faso, or Mali, but is merely claiming attacks that are instead carried out by ISGS. This is a new trend that is important for followers of ISWA and Boko Haram to recognize, especially those who keep track of attack data. They need to decide whether attacks claimed by ISWA were actually carried out by ISWA, or, in fact, carried out by ISGS, and whether this distinction is worth making at all. For now, this is fairly easy: almost any attack in Niger, Burkina Faso, or Mali can be said to be by ISGS, while those in and around the Lake Chad Basin can be said to be carried out by ISWA. What could complicate this clear geographical distinction, however, are reports of ISWA members, such as Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the ISWA leader who was deposed by Ba Idrisa, talking to jihadists in Mali and of ISWA relocating cells to northwestern Nigeria near where ISGS leader al-Sahrawi operates in Niger. Therefore, in the future the areas of operations between the “two ISWAs” could overlap.

The conventional wisdom is that the Boko Haram faction that calls itself the Islamic State in West African (ISWA) is less brutal than Abubakar Shekau’s rival faction, notorious for the Chibok school girl kidnapping and the targeting of civilians. There is some truth to this: ISWA has avoided using female and child suicide bombers and it does not seem to indiscriminately murder entire villages. Its rhetoric does not glory in murder like Shekau’s. In fact, it seems to cast itself as a Robin Hood-like group, taking food from the rich and distributing it to the poor (or so it says), standing in for an otherwise absent government. But being “less brutal” than Shekau is a very low bar. Members of the military and others working against ISWA have been subject to kidnapping and murder. On May 20, ISWA raided an army barracks in Borno State and reportedly killed twenty soldiers. Two days later, a video was released showing the execution of nine soldiers. Before being murdered, each soldier identified himself by name, unit, and service number. The video also showed ISWA fighters swearing an oath or pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State hiding somewhere in Iraq or Syria. Reuters had not been able to independently verify the video, but it has the hallmarks of ISWA. There are also reports of ISWA murdering members the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), an informal militia that assists the Nigerian army in its fight against Boko Haram, and, in 2018, of the abduction and murder of two Muslim nurses working for the Red Cross.  Shekau’s faction, too, kills military personnel, CJTF volunteers, and government officials whenever it can, though it seems to be less active than ISWA, and where the latter seems to avoid civilian targets, Shekau does not. ISWA’s use of brutal propaganda videos recalls similar ones Shekau produced in the early days of the Boko Haram insurrection, which can be dated to 2009 or 2011. There is anecdotal evidence that such videos are successful in undermining the morale of soldiers.  According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, deaths of military personnel have matched or surpassed military deaths during height of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2014 and 2015, while those of civilians and Boko Haram fighters remain much lower than their highs during that period. (In absolute terms, deaths of military personnel now appear to be comparable to those of civilians and Boko Haram members, which, historically, have been far higher.) Far from being defeated, Boko Haram has split and in some ways has become more deadly and dangerous. 

A new report from the Women and Foreign Policy program, launched this week, highlights the roles that women play in violent extremism—including as perpetrators, mitigators, and victims—and offers recommendations to better enlist their participation in efforts to combat radicalization.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 11 to 17, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1558363599144'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, May 10: Eleven Nigerian soldiers and four Boko Haram militants were killed during a fight in Magumeri, Borno.) May 11: Boko Haram killed four and kidnapped five in Maiduguri, Borno.  May 12: Bandits killed six in Shinkafi, Zamfara. May 12: Sectarian violence resulted in four deaths in Okpokwu, Benue. May 13: A Boko Haram bomb killed three Nigerian soldiers in Damboa, Borno.  May 13: Gunmen kidnapped five oil workers in Akukutor, Rivers. May 13: Bandits killed thirteen in Batsari, Katsina. May 14: The Islamic State (Boko Haram) killed twenty-eight Nigerien soldiers in Tillaberi, Niger. May 14: Bandits abducted eight and killed two in Maru, Zamfara. May 14: Gunmen killed twenty in Kankara, Katsina.  May 15: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Wukari, Taraba.  May 16: Boko Haram killed five in Madagali, Adamawa.  May 16: Boko Haram killed thirteen in Ceilia, Chad. May 16: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Donga, Taraba.  May 16: Bandits killed eleven in Kankara, Katsina. 

Islamist terrorist groups in northeast Burkina Faso are following a strategy of violence reminiscent in some ways of Boko Haram’s early days in Nigeria. The groups are attacking Protestant and Catholic churches, killing pastors, priests, and congregants, and also teachers in secular schools. In a May 12 attack on the town of Dablo in northern Burkina Faso, “gunmen” killed a Catholic priest and five congregants, burned the church and places serving alcohol, and looted other commercial establishments. The attackers numbered about twenty. On May 10, apparently in a separate incident, militants killed five teachers. Similarities to Boko Haram include targeting Christians and teachers in secular schools. The theological basis of both appears to be a similar, extremist variant of Salafist Islamic now thought to be associated with the Islamic State. Based on that theology is a similar hostility to all things western and secular. Like in Nigeria’s northeast, government authority in northern Burkina Faso has been weak following the 2014 ouster of long-time strongman Blaise Compaore. But unlike Boko Haram, the terrorists in Burkina Faso do not appear to have a charismatic leader with a media presence like Boko Haram’s Abubakar Shekau. Furthermore, Burkina Faso has in France a close ally that is prepared to intervene when needed, as it recently did to rescue four hostages. The extent and nature of the groups’ ties in both countries to outside terror networks in not completely clear. Boko Haram appears to be largely indigenous, with little or no tactical and strategic coordination with the Islamic State or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), despite similar rhetoric and apparent communication. Though in Burkina Faso there appear to be links with Islamist groups in Mali, details are sparse.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 4 to 10, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1557838214420'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 4: Bandits killed thirty-one in Maru, Zamfara.  May 5: Gunmen abducted the Taraba permanent secretary in Jalingo, Taraba. May 5: Sectarian violence resulted in three deaths in Wukari, Taraba. May 6: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Jama'are, Kaduna. May 6: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Ardo-Kola, Kaduna. May 7: Boko Haram killed four soldiers and seven others in Jere, Borno.  May 7: The Nigerian Air Force killed twenty bandits in Safana, Zamfara. May 8: Herdsmen killed five in Ardo-Kola, Taraba. May 8: Herdsmen killed six in Jalingo, Taraba. May 8: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. May 9: Nigerian troops killed five bandits in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. May 10: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Wukari, Taraba. May 10: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  May 10: Sectarian violence led to eight deaths in Jalingo, Taraba. May 10: Bandits killed one in Batsari, Katsina. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 27 to May 3, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1557242356227'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 27: Boko Haram killed one soldier and three others in Kofia, Cameroon.  April 27: Gunmen abducted three oil workers in Ahoada East, Rivers. April 29: Bandits abducted the board chairman of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UEBC) along with his daughter and killed the driver in Abuja.  April 29: Boko Haram killed thirty in Madagali, Adamawa. April 29: Sectarian violence resulted in three deaths in Bassa, Plateau.  April 30: Boko Haram killed fourteen loggers in Monguno, Borno.  April 30: Bandits killed seventeen in Safana, Katsina.  May 1: Bandits kidnapped six from an all-girls school in Zurmi, Zamfara.  May 1: A mob killed seven bandits in Birnin-Magai, Zamfara. May 2: Sectarian violence resulted in four deaths in Imeko-Afon, Ogun.  May 2: Herdsmen killed six in Girie, Adamawa. May 2: Nigerian troops killed "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) of Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno. May 3: Gunmen killed two in Akwanga, Nassarawa.  May 3: Boko Haram killed fifteen soldiers in Magumeri, Borno.   

Jack McCaslin is a research associate for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. An article from Fox News recently called attention to the killing of Christians in Nigeria by comparing it to the deadly Easter Sunday suicide bombings of churches and hotels in Sri Lanka. According to the article, the attacks “highlight the dangers that remain from asymmetric terrorism and violence against Christians in ethnically and religiously divided societies.” However, linking these tragedies to each other and to a perceived global trend of violence against Christians mischaracterizes the nature of the conflicts in Nigeria.  The appropriateness of a comparison between Sri Lanka and Nigeria is not clear. Their ethnic make-up, social statistics, and post-colonial experiences are vastly different. Not least, Christians and Muslims are a tiny minority in Sri Lanka, a predominately Buddhist country, while in Nigeria, Christians and Muslims each constitute about half of the population. Identifying the perpetrators of atrocities in both countries is difficult. Although the Islamic State has claimed responsibility, it is not clear what its role was in the Sri Lanka bombings or, for that matter, what its role is in northern Nigeria.  With respect to Nigeria, Fox cites the recent killing of eleven and the wounding of thirty in Gombe. A police officer got into an argument with a procession of children during Easter activities, which reportedly led him to drive into it. It is not clear what the police officer’s motives were; Boko Haram is active in Gombe but it seems that they were not involved. Boko Haram appears to be largely an indigenous movement, and there is little evidence of strategic or tactical cooperation between the Islamic State or al-Qaeda affiliates and Boko Haram, though they share a common belief system, are murderously hostile to Christians, and have exchanged various forms of communication, the significance of which remains unclear. The article also notes the killing of seventeen Christians and the wounding of eight in Nassarawa state early in April. No link is provided, but the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) documented an attack in Numa Kochu, resulting in the death of a pregnant woman and several children. This seems to fit the description in the article. According to reports, Numa Kochu is a predominantly Christian community comprised of those of the Mada ethnic group. The victims’ funeral services were led by local leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria, a prominent religious organization. As is often the case, the affiliation and motive of the perpetrators are not clear. They have been described as “gunmen” and “herdsmen” by various Nigerian media outlets, and reference is made to the farmer-herder conflict in Nassarawa, which has been intense and deadly. It is worth noting that in some statements made by community leaders and the security services, no reference is made to religion.  Christians are certainly murdered in Nigeria, and in some cases, they are murdered because they are Christian. But, despite Boko Haram’s murderous hostility to Christians, most of its victims have always been Muslim, not least because the insurgency takes place in a predominantly Muslim part of the country. (Boko Haram’s killing of such great numbers of Muslims, based on a wide definition of apostasy, is understood to be one of the reasons that the group split in 2016.) For what it is worth, data from the NST shows a decline in Boko Haram attacks on churches and an increase in attacks on mosques over time. Indeed, the smaller number of Christian deaths at the hands of Boko Haram likely reflects the fact that most of them have fled.  Today, most Christian deaths are occurring in the Middle Belt, where there are overlapping quarrels over land and water use, ethnicity, and religion—and where Christians are numerous. But when Christians or Muslims are killed in the Middle Belt, it is not clear exactly why. Is it because they are a farmer or a herder? Or because they are ethnically Fulani, many of whom are herders, or of a small ethnic group, who are often farmers? Or is it because they are Muslim, which most Fulani are, or Christian, which those of many small ethnic groups are? These questions are not easily answered. Ethnicity can often correspond to a particular religion, both of which can sometimes correspond to a distinct way of life. Or not. In Zamfara, where the violence is particularly bad, both herders and farmers are mostly Muslim and mostly Fulani. There is also an important criminal element involving bandits and cattle rustlers. Another way to think about it: violence may fall along ethnic and religious lines, but it is not necessarily driven by those distinctions.  Religious polarization is a real challenge in Nigeria, and it has likely increased. The government has been unable to destroy Boko Haram or end the local conflicts in the Middle Belt. Further, the economy remains in the doldrums, and the country now has the most people living in extreme poverty in the world. But linking Nigerian tragedies to the tragedy that occurred in Sri Lanka and a global trend of violence against Christians overlooks important nuances in Nigeria’s multiple ongoing conflicts. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 20 to 26, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1556549281507'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, April 19: A British woman and one other were killed while four people were kidnapped in Kajuru, Kaduna.) April 20: Bandits killed eleven in Katsina-Ala, Benue. April 20: Gunmen abducted three cattle merchants in Donga, Taraba. April 20: Nigerian troops killed six bandits in Anka, Zamfara.  April 20: Approximately twenty people were abducted in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. April 21: Bandits killed seventeen and abducted two in Kankara, Katsina. April 21: Gunmen killed two in Sanga, Kaduna. April 21: A Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) official deliberately drove his car into an Easter procession in Gombe, Gombe, killing eight members of the Gombe Boys' Brigade; the crowd then killed the NSCDC official and the driver in retaliation. April 22: Sectarian violence resulted in five deaths in Katsina-Ala, Benue. April 22: The Nigerian Air Force killed ten bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara. April 22: Nigerian troops killed five sectarian mercenaries in Katsina-Ala, Benue. April 22: Four personnel of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) were abducted in Abua/Odual, Rivers.  April 22: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno. April 24: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. April 24: Gunmen killed three policemen and one community chief in Oyigbo, Rivers; two of the assailants were also killed  April 25: Two Chinese construction workers were kidnapped in Ohaozara, Ebonyi. April 25: Gunmen kidnapped two Shell workers and killed their two police escorts in Emuoha, Rivers. April 25: Gunmen killed a bus driver and kidnapped all approximately, thirty passengers, in Emuoha, Rivers.   April 25: Nigerian troops killed four bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara. April 26: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 26: Boko Haram attacked a Nigerian military base in Biu, Borno; no casualties have been reported yet.