Boko Haram

Largely overlooked by the Western media, there is an escalating conflict between Nigeria’s Shia minority, some of whom are organized into the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), and Nigeria’s secular government. The current focus is eight charges of murder brought by Kaduna state against IMN leader Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, whom the government has detained for two years without charge. Complicating the issue is the Iranian government, which has periodically protested el-Zakzaky’s confinement. Beginning in April, there have been daily protests in Abuja and cities in the north against el-Zakzaky’s continued detention. According to the Nigerian media, some of these demonstrations have turned violent and the capital has occasionally been “shut down.” The demonstrations may have provoked the Kaduna state authorities to formally charge el-Zakzaky with murder; if convicted, he could face the death penalty. Federal, not state, authorities, are holding el-Zakzaky in custody, and federal spokesmen have said that he cannot be released until the Kaduna state judicial process is completed. The murder charges stem from an incident in Zaria in December 2015. Federal and military spokesmen say that a Shiite mob led by el-Zakzaky attempted to assassinate Nigeria's chief of army staff Tukur Buratai when they blocked his convoy. Buratai was not killed, but the formal charges against el-Zakzaky accuse him and his followers of killing at least one soldier by name. In the aftermath, the army attacked IMN facilities, killing hundreds of people, including members of el-Zakzaky’s family. El-Zakzaky and his wife were seriously wounded in the attack and subsequently arrested. IMN vociferously denies that there was any assassination attempt, and charges the army with attempting to disrupt a Shia religious event. The Zaria episode is in some ways similar to the 2009 clash between the army and followers of Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, which led to Yusuf’s death and to the emergence of Boko Haram in its present form. But unlike Mohammed Yusuf, el-Zakzaky has not been murdered by the police. Indeed, the Abuja government claims that he and his wife have received excellent medical attention. Further, Mohammed Yusuf advocated violence against the secular state, while el-Zakzaky has not. Advocacy of violence aside, there are striking ideological similarities between IMN and Boko Haram, at least for outside observers. Both see the secular state as evil, both want an Islamic state based on Islamic law, and both want the end to Western influence, including in education. Both also seek the end of northern Nigeria’s traditional political and religious elite. For IMN, the model appears to be the aspirations of the post-revolutionary Iranian Islamic state. Boko Haram’s vision appears more nebulous and less developed, but both try to function as a state-within-state. Despite their similarities, the two groups are anathema to each other. IMN is opposed to Boko Haram’s use of violence and el-Zakzaky has claimed, implausibly, that it is a creation of the “oil-hungry west.” Boko Haram is hostile to any Muslim group that does not share its theology or submit to its authority. As with other Sunni radical movements in the Middle East, Boko Haram is especially hostile to Shias. In the majority-Sunni north of Nigeria, the group likely has more support than do Shias, and the traditional Islamic establishment, which is Sunni, is viscerally hostile to Shias. It is therefore highly unlikely that its members have ever provided any support for the Shia and IMN. The extent of Iranian financial and other support for the Nigerian Shia in general and IMN in particular, however, is unknown. Nobody really knows the size of the Shiite population in Nigeria. International Crisis Group cites an estimate that it makes up between 2 and 3 percent of Nigeria’s population, which would amount to roughly four million Nigerian Shiites. El-Zakzaky has claimed to have followers ranging from a few hundred thousand to three million; it is worth noting that it is by no means true that all Shias are associated with IMN. Whatever IMN’s numbers, it has demonstrated the ability to shut down Abuja, if only for a few days at a time. Were el-Zakzaky to be tried, convicted, and executed—the worst-case scenario—Abuja could very well face the “black swan” of an insurrection.   

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 21 to April 27, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1525094593823'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 21: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and three others at a mosque in Bama, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. April 21: Ten were killed in a communal clash in Arochukwu, Abia. April 22: Bandits killed ten and lost six of their own in Bassa, Kogi. April 22: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram militants and lost three soldiers and two CJTF in Borno (LGA unknown). April 22: Nigerian troops killed "a number" (estimated at five) of Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno.  April 22: Boko Haram killed eighteen, and another three were killed by a mine planted by Boko Haram in Ngala, Borno. April 23: Three suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Bama, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. April 24: Herdsmen killed nineteen at a church in Gwer East, Benue. April 24: Herdsmen killed eight in Gwer West, Benue. April 25: Herdsmen killed thirty-nine in Guma, Benue. April 25: Herdsmen killed eleven in Makurdi, Benue. April 25: Herdsmen killed seven in Awe, Nasarawa.  April 26: Herdsmen killed seven at a church in Logo, Benue. April 26: 2 Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves, one CJTF, and two civilians in Maiduguri, Borno. April 27: The Nigerian military bombed a Boko Haram logistics base, killing "a number" (estimated at five) of militants in Kukawa, Borno (LGA estimated).    

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 14 to April 20, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1524490157465'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week: date estimated as April 13: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Magumeri, Mafa, and Damboa LGAs in Borno.)  April 15: Suspected herdsmen killed four policemen in Logo, Benue. April 15: Boko Haram killed three Chadian soldiers in Abadam, Borno. April 15: Herdsmen killed seventy-eight in Awe, Keana, Obi, and Doma LGAs in Nasarawa (casualties not specified by LGA; majority in Obi). April 16: Kidnappers killed one policeman and abducted a German citizen in Kano Municipal, Kano. April 16: Seven were killed in a clash between Shiites and security agents in Abuja. April 16: Nigerian troops killed four militia members in Guma, Benue. April 18: Herdsmen killed four construction workers in Bassa, Plateau. April 18: Cultists killed four in Emuoha, Rivers. April 19: Nigerian troops killed one Boko Haram militant in Ngala, Borno. April 20: Bandits killed thirty in Maru, Zamfara. April 20: Herdsmen killed twenty-five in Guma, Benue.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 7 to April 13, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1523884600699'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 7: Suspected herdsmen killed four in Bali, Taraba. April 7: Nigerian troops rescued 149 and killed 3 Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  April 7: Nigerian troops killed two would-be suicide bombers in Konduga, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected.  April 7: Tiv farmers killed eleven herdsmen in Guma, Benue. April 8: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed himself but not others at the University of Maiduguri in Maiduguri, Borno. April 8: Herdsmen killed seven in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. April 8: Herdsmen killed five in Obi, Nasarawa.  April 8: Herdsmen killed four in Keana, Nasarawa.  April 8: A cult clash resulted in six deaths in Ijebu North, Ogun.  April 10: Suspected herdsmen killed eight in Ukum, Benue. April 10: Suspected herdsmen killed seven in Logo, Benue. April 11: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  April 11: Suspected herdsmen killed forty-eight and lost three of their own in Wukari, Taraba. April 11: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Logo, Benue. April 11: Bandits killed "scores" (est. at forty) in Anka, Zamfara.  April 12: Bandits killed two policemen and kidnapped twenty-one others in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 31 to April 6, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1523281371799'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 31: Kidnappers abducted a bride and ten others following a wedding in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna. April 1: During a Boko Haram attack on Maiduguri, Borno, thirteen Boko Haram militants, one soldier, and fourteen civilians were killed.  April 2: Boko Haram killed five Cameroonian soldiers in Sagme, Cameroon. April 3: Gunmen invaded a police station in Kogi, Kogi, killing two police officers.  April 4: Two soldiers and twenty-one bandits were killed during a clash in Anka, Zamfara.  April 4: Bandits killed six in Chikun, Kaduna. April 4: Suspected herdsmen killed four in Takum, Taraba. April 4: Herdsmen killed ten in Gwer West, Benue. April 5: Herdsmen killed five in Donga, Taraba. April 5: Suspected herdsmen killed thirty in Gwer West, Benue. April 5: A total of fifty (estimated split of nine policemen and forty-one civilians) were killed during a bank robbery in Offa, Kwara.  April 6: A communal clash led to five deaths in Yakuur, Cross River. April 6: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in Madagali, Adamawa; one civilian was also killed during the clash.   

Ayobami Egunyomi is a Robina Franklin Williams intern for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She received her BA in International Relations from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis. She is a native of Nigeria. Since the beginning of 2018, at least eighty people from Benue State (in the middle belt of Nigeria) were killed, and thousands displaced as a result of attacks by Fulani herdsmen on their farmlands and homes. These attacks have caused an outcry among Nigerians, especially people living in the Southern region, many of whom consider the killings to be as dire as the Boko Haram insurgency. At the peak of the Boko Haram insurgency during the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan, now-President Buhari was a vocal critic, and rightly so, of Jonathan’s failure to handle quickly the insurgency until he faced international pressure. However, the inaction of President Buhari in a comparable situation, where the peace and security of a region is threatened, is similar to the behavior that he earlier criticized. The president’s apathetic response to the conflict in the middle belt encourages the perception of many southern Nigerians and even a few northerners that Muhammadu Buhari is the “President of the North,” rather than of Nigeria as a whole. Early into his presidency, he stated that the constituencies that accounted for 97 percent of his votes (all located in the north) cannot be treated the same as those who contributed only 5 percent (southeast and south-south). A news report from October 2017 revealed that 81 percent of Buhari’s political appointees are northerners. The Igbos in particular are angry that the administration arrested the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), which is a non-violent separatist movement, and deployed military troops to the region. The IPOB has not been linked to any deaths. The attacks by herdsmen, however, have killed over a thousand Nigerians but have not received anywhere near the same level of attention.  While it may be argued that the powers of the president are limited, in times past, President Buhari has proven capable of taking swift action and bringing down the full might of the government in the case of Boko Haram. It is therefore crucial that the government prioritizes the conflict in the middle belt as a threat to national security. Recently, the minister of Agriculture proposed the creation of cattle colonies in southern states. Nigerians in the south, however, have vehemently refused to consider seriously this proposal mainly because they do not trust northerners. The first step the presidency could take is to deploy law enforcement to affected areas to deter the herdsmen and to keep the peace. With the former minister for defense and military chief of staff, General Theophilus Danjuma, calling for Nigerians to defend themselves, this step is crucial to preventing anarchy. Also, the federal government could take concrete steps to encourage the herdsmen to remain in their region to avoid encroaching on farmlands in the South. A possibility would be the expansion of cattle grazing reserves to facilitate migratory cattle raising. Unless President Buhari takes some major form of action, he risks making the same mistake his predecessors made, being accused of tribalism, and bequeathing these problems to future generations as thousands continue to suffer.   

Jacob Zenn is an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a fellow on African and Eurasian affairs at the Jamestown Foundation. On March 22, the Islamic State-affiliated faction of Boko Haram released 105 of the 111 the girls they kidnapped from a school in Dapchi, Yobe State one month earlier back to their homes in Dapchi. The only girls who were not released were five girls who died during the kidnapping operation and one Christian girl. She will likely remain hostage until she converts to Islam (all of the girls who were kidnapped and released were Muslim).  Boko Haram has split into at least three factions. The Islamic State-affiliated faction, also known as the Islamic State West Africa Province, or ISWAP, was reportedly behind the kidnapping. There were initial uncorroborated reports that its leaders received a ransom or prisoners in exchange for returning the 105 girls. However, emerging evidence suggests that the faction released the girls only in exchange for a temporary cease-fire so they could bring the 105 girls safely back to their village. Why would the militants have conducted such a major kidnapping only to release them for no “compensation” one month later? I argue that the answer to this question lies in a one-hour leaked audio sermon in the Hausa language from August 2, 2016 by Mamman Nur. Nur, a former AQIM-aligned Boko Haram member and now a leader of the Islamic State-affiliated faction, said in the audio that he received guidance from the Islamic State to only kidnap, or “enslave,” Christians. Muslim men and women, however, could not be “enslaved;” they could only be killed if they were apostates and did not repent.  The then leader of the Islamic State-affiliated faction, Abubakar Shekau, rejected this guidance and did not release the Muslim girls who were taken in the infamous Chibok kidnapping in 2014 (some were released only in October 2016 and May 2017 as part of a ransom deal with the government, which I detail in my article). Shekau’s rigid stance on “slavery” was one of the reasons why he fell out of favor with the Islamic State. On August 3, 2016, the Islamic State elevated Nur and his protégé, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, to replace Shekau as the leaders of its affiliate group. Therefore, one theory I have developed is that the kidnappers in Dapchi were former Shekau loyalists based in his former stronghold in Yobe State who defected from him and sided with Nur and Abu Musab al-Barnawi in the Islamic State-affiliated faction after August 2016. This Yobe State-based faction, which operates somewhat far from the stronghold of Nur and al-Barnawi around Lake Chad, did not know about or ignored the guidance that kidnapping Muslim girls was unacceptable. When the kidnappers brought the girls from Dapchi to Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s base near Lake Chad, al-Barnawi then demanded their release (except for the one Christian girl who could be “enslaved” according to his ideology). Since the kidnapping itself was unacceptable, al-Barnawi did not demand ransom or prisoners in return for their release.  This episode shows how ideology and even guidance from Islamic State can have a practical impact on the ground in the insurgency in Nigeria. It not only underscores the split into factions of Boko Haram led by Shekau and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, respectively, but that even al-Barnawi’s faction itself is not monolithic. Indeed, it is conceivable that in the future these kidnappers in Dapchi could form their own faction aside from al-Barnawi, who they may believe squandered a chance at a big ransom in the Dapchi kidnapping. This would bring to four the main factions of “Boko Haram.” The other three are the Islamic State-affiliate faction of Abu Musab al-Barnawi; Shekau’s “non-aligned” faction; and the operationally dormant and al-Qaeda-loyal Ansaru faction.  Unfortunately, long-term peace negotiations with any of these factions seem dim considering that Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s faction may be the most “moderate” of the factions and he is, after all, still fully loyal to the Islamic State.   

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 24 to March 30, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1522675592041'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, March 23: Boko Haram killed five in Diffa, Niger.) March 24: Sectarian violence led to one death in Makurdi, Benue. March 25: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Guma, Benu March 25: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Agatu, Benu March 25: Boko Haram attacked a town in Konduga, Borno but soldiers responded, killing one Boko Haram militant.  March 28: Bandits killed thirty-six in Anka, Zamfara.  March 29: Suspected herdsmen killed six in Jema'a, Kaduna. March 30: Four suicide bombers killed themselves and one other in Maiduguri, Borno. March 30: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno.  

On March 25, Nigeria's Information Minister Lai Mohammed announced that the government is negotiating with Boko Haram about a possible ceasefire and ultimately a permanent end to the conflict. He said the talks have been underway for "some time," though his was the first public reference to them. If true, such talks provide a glimmer of hope for an end to the ongoing carnage in northeast Nigeria, but important questions still remain. Boko Haram appears to be divided into factions, one of which is led by Abubakar Shekau and another by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. (There may also be others.) Both factions aim to overthrow the secular Nigerian state and to establish an Islamic state with the strict enforcement of Islamic law. Where they differ is their treatment of other Muslims. The al-Barnawi faction sees Shekau as too ready to label Muslims as apostates and to kill them. Nigerian administrations have attempted to open negotiations with Boko Haram, but Shekau has refused and is credibly accused of having murdered those of his followers who sought to do so. Al-Barnawi, on the other hand, has apparently been open to negotiation. It is likely that the school girls from Dapchi were kidnapped by the al-Barnawi faction. The vast majority of the 110 or so girls taken (Mohammed referred to 111 girls in his statement) were returned, but five were reportedly killed and one girl, the lone Christian of the group, refused to convert to Islam and is still in captivity. Though the government denies it paid ransom, there are whispers that it paid $5 million and released some captive Boko Haram operatives. It is likely that any negotiations by the government would be with the al-Barnawi faction. But, if there are negotiations, what exactly are they over? Is any faction of Boko Haram prepared to set aside its ultimate goal of the destruction of the secular state and the establishment of an Islamic polity? Or, has a faction of Boko Haram determined that kidnap victims are a cash-cow, and there will be more of them, while negotiations will largely be about the size and nature of the ransom? 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 17 to March 23, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1522069066908'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 17: Nigerian troops killed four militiamen in Ningi, Bauchi. March 17: Herdsmen killed five in Ughelli North, Delta March 19: Suspected herdsmen killed ten in Omala, Kogi. March 20: Bandits killed twelve Nigerian soldiers in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna. March 20: Nigerian police killed six suspected kidnappers in Remo North, Ogun. March 22: Herdsmen killed two in Guma, Benue. March 22: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Jos South, Plateau. March 23: One Chadian soldier and twenty Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash on Tchoukou Hadje islet in Lake Chad. 

At the time Boko Haram kidnapped almost three hundred girls from a school in Chibok in 2014, reports surfaced that the Nigerian security forces had advance intelligence, but that they failed to take the necessary preventive action. In February 2018, Boko Haram kidnapped 110 girls from the Government Girls Science and Technical College at Dapchi in Yobe state. Amnesty International released a report of the February kidnapping, concluding that the Nigerian security forces again ignored advanced warnings of an impending Boko Haram kidnapping operation up to four hours before the attack. The nearest government forces, Amnesty says, were an hour away. Amnesty is calling on the Nigerian government to investigate “the inexcusable security lapses” and “as an even greater priority, the government must use all lawful means at its disposal to ensure that these girls are rescued.” To that end, Boko Haram released most of the kidnap victims on March 21. Though the numbers vary between reports, it appears that at least 101 were returned and five died while the lone Christian remains in captivity. The girls were presumably returned for a quid pro quo from the Nigerian government that is not publicly known, though there are allegations of a payment and prisoner swap of up to five million euros and five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram is embedded in northeast Nigeria. It is therefore likely that local Boko Haram members or supporters alerted the kidnappers to the absence of security forces in Dapchi. The episode also illustrates an uncomfortable reality: Boko Haram is able to operate largely at will in northeast Nigeria, even if it no longer controls territory. Under those circumstances, the Nigerian security services do appear to be strapped for the resources necessary to protect Nigerian citizens. Dapchi is further evidence that Boko Haram is far from defeated, even if it appears unable or uninterested in carrying out operations outside of the Lake Chad basin.  Throughout the nine-year Boko Haram insurrection, government spokesmen lied about or greatly exaggerated their success. In a familiar pattern, the military is aggressively attacking the Amnesty report. A military spokesman has accused Amnesty of being “economical with the truth” and undermining “our military and our institutions.” Another spokesman has said, “Most of [Amnesty’s] narratives are outright falsehoods and a calculated attempt to whip up sentiments and mislead unsuspecting Nigerians.”  The Nigerian military fails to recognize that Amnesty International has immense credibility. Attacks on the organization, far from damaging Amnesty, undercut the credibility of military spokesmen. Indeed, a lack of candor and transparency on the part of government spokesmen is common across Africa and erodes trust between citizens and their governments. The Wall Street Journal has identified the kidnappers as members of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. I see the ISWAP, despite its name, as more a faction of Boko Haram than an extension of the Islamic State. The relationship between these factions, the other ostensibly led by Abubakar Shekau, is obscure, as are their connections with outside groups. There is certainly evidence of ties between al-Barnawi and the Islamic State, but it is by no means clear how important they are, and it is unlikely that the Islamic State is dictating the strategy or tactics of al-Barnawi.   

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 10 to March 16, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1521467433537'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 10: A communal clash led to eleven deaths in Boki, Cross River. March 11: An IED killed four soldiers in Monguno, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. March 12: Sectarian violence led to twenty-sx deaths in Bassa, Plateau. March 12: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Izzi, Ebonyi. March 12: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Bassa, Plateau. March 14: Herdsmen killed twenty in Dekina, Kogi. March 14: Herdsmen killed twelve in Omala, Kogi. March 14: Two suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected.  March 14: Herdsmen killed four soldiers in Bassa, Plateau. March 15: Boko Haram kidnapped eight in Oyo, Oyo. March 15: Herdsmen killed five in Takum, Taraba. March 16: Herdsmen killed three in Esan-South East and two in Ovia North-East in Edo.  

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 3 to March 9, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1520947038392'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 4: Sectarian violence led to twenty deaths in Sardauna, Taraba. March 5: Herdsmen killed five in Guma, Benue. March 5: Herdsmen killed twenty-six in Okpokwu, Benue. March 5: A suicide bomber killed himself and three CJTF members in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. March 5: Boko Haram killed three loggers in Dikwa, Borno. March 6: Pirates killed three in Ogbia, Bayelsa. March 6: A Boko Haram landmine killed four loggers in Dikwa, Borno. March 6: Boko Haram killed three in Ngala, Borno. March 7: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Takum, Taraba. March 8: Herdsmen killed five in Bassa, Plateau. March 9: Herdsmen killed ten in Bokkos, Plateau.  

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 24 to March 2, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1520260307432'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 25: An IED killed a Nigerian Army Captain in Kaga, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. February 26: Sectarian violence led to twelve deaths in Kajuru, Kaduna. February 26: Boko Haram killed two Nigerian soldiers, and six others are missing in Damboa, Borno. February 26: Nigerian and Cameroonian troops killed thirty-five Boko Haram militants; two Nigerian soldiers were also killed during the fight in Bama, Borno.  February 27: Herdsmen killed twenty, and Nigerian soldiers killed ten of the attackers in Demsa, Adamawa. February 28: Kidnappers abducted a journalist's wife and child, and killed an FRSC officer in Igabi, Kaduna. February 28: 5 Boko Haram militants and two Nigerian soldiers were killed during a battle in Gwoza, Borno. March 1: Boko Haram killed four policemen, four soldiers, and four aid workers, also abducting one aid worker in Kala/Balge, Borno. March 1: Sectarian violence led to ffiteen deaths in Sardauna, Taraba. March 1: Boko Haram abducted three and lost one militant in Madagali, Adamawa. March 2: A suicide bomber killed herself but no others in Gubja, Yobe. Boko Haram was suspected.  

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering February 18 to February 27, was compiled with support from Alexandra Bro and Anne Connell.