Grand Strategy

Neil Edwards is an Open Source African Media Analyst at Novetta. Media analysis for this piece was enabled by Novetta’s Tracker for Foreign Investment in Africa (TFIA). In the Central African Republic (CAR), outside the capital Bangui, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra exerts little to no authority. Armed rebel groups control two-thirds of the country, including access to mining sites. Political instability is deeply rooted: CAR has endured four successful coups and two failed coups since 1979, including the unsuccessful attempt ahead of the presidential election in December last year. MINUSCA, the UN peacekeeping mission deployed in CAR since 2014, has helped bolster security but remains overstretched and under-resourced. Amid insecurity and competition for power, Russia has positioned itself as a partner to the Touadéra regime—at a price to CAR. The opening for Russia’s entry into CAR came in December 2017, when the United Nations granted Russia an exemption to provide light arms to the Touadéra government in order to strengthen the military’s campaign to regain rebel-held territory. Ties between CAR and Russia quickly deepened. By March 2018, Valery Zakharov, a former official in GRU, the Russian military’s intelligence arm, became the national security advisor to President Touadéra. Months later, President Touadéra appeared in public with a personal protection detail that included “Russian Special Forces troops,” widely believed to be part of the Wagner Group, a shadowy band of mercenaries controlled by Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, a member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. President Touadéra’s decision to employ Wagner to train CAR’s army is an effort to “coup-proof” the regime. In exchange for protection, Lobaye Invest, a mining company also owned by Prigozhin, gained exploratory mining rights to seven gold and diamond mines approximately eighty miles from Wagner’s military training headquarters outside Bangui. The tradeoff reflects a Russian strategy of finding, securing, and extracting natural resources abroad. Russia’s economy relies heavily on natural resources, which have accounted for an increasingly large share of Russian output since 2016. Given the high cost of building infrastructure in the vast, far-flung corners of Siberia, Russia’s military expansion into CAR is likely part of a strategy to spur economic growth by securing access to resources beyond its own borders, including in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. Russian adventurism in CAR aims to replicate Wagner’s success in Syria. Since 2015, Wagner—just one arm of Russia’s military ground presence—has helped prop up the Bashar al-Assad regime by increasing its manpower and training the Syrian regime’s military personnel. Assad’s survival has benefited Russia's military, providing it with rights to operate Syria's Khmeimim Air Base on the Mediterranean Sea and explore potential offshore oil reserves. The resources-for-protection arrangement is also clearly at play in CAR. Novetta’s Tracker for Foreign Investment in Africa (TFIA), launched in 2020, dissects publicly available traditional media in all fifty-four African countries to identify, track, and trace Russian-linked energy and military investments across the continent. TFIA currently tracks sixty ongoing energy projects in thirty-three African countries and Wagner Group’s operations in fourteen African countries. One of TFIA’s primary objectives is to determine if Russia’s coup-proofing in CAR will be a blueprint for expanding the Kremlin’s military presence, by way of the Wagner Group, into providing protection for other African leaders—especially those with close ties to Russia and a history of military coups or insurgencies. Media analysis from Novetta’s TFIA uncovered that Wagner Group and Lobaye Invest have access to a variety of assets in CAR. Wagner Group, which has an estimated 1,500 troops in the country, along with Sewa Security Services, another Russian-linked military contractor, control three airfields near Berengo, N’Délé, and Birao—all strategically located to export natural resources extracted from mining sites and conflict minerals purchased on the black market. In addition to Lobaye’s receipt of exploratory rights in six mines following the initial deal with President Touadéra, in September 2018 the New York Times reported that “Russian contractors” were digging in diamond sites near Birao. Russian protection proved its worth—at least to Touadéra—in responding to the apparent attempted coup by former President François Bozizé in December 2020. After CAR’s constitutional court rejected Bozizé’s bid for the presidency due to his failure to fulfill the “good morality” candidacy requirement, Bozizé organized an alliance of six rebel groups—usually at arms with each other—to form the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC). The coalition quickly began a violent reign of terror across the country, with the aim of disrupting the presidential election. Russia was the first among an assortment of international actors to mount a military response; within days of President Touadéra’s call for international assistance, Russia sent an additional three hundred Wagner-linked “military instructors,” along with helicopters. These forces, joined by Rwandan troops, MINUSCA, and the country’s Russian-trained military, retook three towns and major roads near the capital, successfully repelling the coup and allowing the election to move forward. Touadéra won the election with just over 53 percent of the vote, despite CPC’s violent campaign, in which it burned ballot boxes, ransacked polling stations, and prevented the vote in fifteen percent of polling stations across the country. The violence displaced nearly 120,000 people, half of whom sought refuge in neighboring countries. The electoral victory granted Touadéra five more years in power and, for Russia, signaled a continuation of business as usual: military training, regime security, weapons shipments, and mining exploration—all through Kremlin-linked private companies. Wagner Group’s success in ensuring Touadéra’s safety suggests CAR, like Syria, has the potential to serve as a blueprint for Russia’s resource-intensive economic strategy. Russian efforts to expand and reinforce its presence in Africa through private contractors will likely focus on countries wracked by political instability and gifted with abundant natural resources. The TFIA lists five countries as the most likely targets for future Russian involvement: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Sudan’s December 2020 deal permitting Russia’s establishment of its first naval outpost on the continent—for twenty-five years—is a clear signal of Russian intentions to become a lasting presence on the continent and reinforces the need to understand how foreign investment is influencing Africa.

A Sino-American cold war, or even an actual one, is not inevitable, but either is more likely now than just months ago.

President Trump’s penchant for going it alone makes little sense in a world increasingly defined by global challenges that can best be met through collective action.

I had the opportunity earlier this week to take part in a fascinating webinar discussion, hosted by Brookings India, on India’s foreign policy strategy. The anchor for the conversation was a new paper by Ambassador Shivshankar Menon, who served as national security advisor (NSA) (and foreign secretary prior to that) in the previous Indian government. His paper, “India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy,” walks through a logical progression of Indian national interests and priorities on the path to get there. Foremost among these priorities, in Ambassador Menon’s view, has been and should remain “the transformation of India into a strong, prosperous, and modern country” (pp. 5). Menon also reaffirms the view that India can best protect its national interests through the pursuit of strategic autonomy, not through alliance relationships. This perspective has a long history in Indian foreign policy, and had its most recent expansive articulation in the 2012 publication NonAlignment 2.0 when Menon was serving as NSA. My own view is that the Modi government, while coming closer to the United States for its own reasons, has shown no interest in moving toward a formal alliance relationship with Washington, as some have advocated. It’s worth noting where Ambassador Menon places great emphasis: India’s economic linkages with the world. He underscores the importance of being open to the world to create economic growth, writing, “If India is to transform, it cannot be insular” (pp. 7). Menon sketches how India’s economic interests have become more deeply tied to the world beyond its immediate region, as its major trading partners are now beyond the “Suez to Malacca” neighborhood. Looking at the transformation of India’s trade, he observes that in 1991, goods trade accounted for 18% of India’s GDP, primarily to the west and through the Suez Canal. But by 2014 things looked quite different, with goods trade comprising almost 50% of India’s GDP and primarily traveling in large part via India’s east. This has elevated New Delhi’s interest in freedom of navigation in that direction, including in the South China Sea (pp. 17). There’s much to reflect upon in this thoughtful paper, which was written prior to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic and therefore not designed to address the global (or India’s) economic crisis. But the emphasis on deepening India’s economic relationships in order to realize faster economic growth, job creation, and prosperity for Indian citizens could not be more urgent. In this context, the Indian government’s recently announced goal of increasing “self-reliance” while also better embedding India within global supply chains calls for more scrutiny. Many of the reforms announced in the past week emphasized domestic market liberalization, such as in agriculture and coal. They included an increase in the foreign investment limit in defense production, to encourage more foreign investors to come “make in India.” But if the idea is to expand India’s role as a manufacturing power linked to global markets, someone will have to address the tariff hikes the Modi government has resorted to in recent years, which undermine its stated mission to place India in the midst of global supply chain flows. Someone will also need to address the fact that India remains outside regional trade blocs, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership grouping it bowed out of last fall. At the time, Indian leaders explained this decision in terms of protecting Indian farmers and Indian market access interests abroad. The idea appeared to be that India’s own economy remained insufficiently competitive to benefit from membership in a larger trade grouping, and that it needed more time to develop its domestic industries. How well the new reforms will spur the economy to growth and job creation—the need of the hour, and a sensible cornerstone of India’s foreign policy—remains anybody’s guess.

Beijing poses some real challenges, but the most formidable threats the U.S. now faces are transnational problems like pandemics, climate change, cyberattacks, and terrorism.

The most effective plan against the Islamic Republic has always been the most obvious—and the one nobody in Washington seems willing to try.

If he wishes to follow in Franklin Delano Roosevelt's footsteps, U.S. presidential candidate Bernie Sanders will need to clarify America's interests, role, and responsibilities in defending the global balance of power.

Achieving strategic autonomy will require Europeans to develop a coherent strategic culture, reach agreement on  priorities, and reassure U.S. leaders that greater autonomy is complementary to NATO.  

Amir Asmar is a Department of Defense analyst and CFR’s national intelligence fellow. Throughout his intelligence career, his primary area of focus has been the Middle East. He held a wide range of analytic, senior analytic, and leadership positions for the Department of the Army, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Intelligence Council. The statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this blog post are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. government. Review of the material does not imply DoD or U.S. government endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion. With its 2015 intervention in Syria’s civil war, Russia re-entered the fray in the Middle East for the first time since the end of the Cold War—and in a spectacular fashion. Now, with its recent departure from Syria, the United States is seemingly ceding that theater to Russian influence. While much has been written about Russia’s motives in the region, little focus has been given to the motivations of Arab leaders who are pursuing closer ties with Russia and may consider, at some future point, a strategic realignment away from the United States. Although long-standing irritants have not, by themselves, been relationship breakers, recent U.S. actions have troubled Arab leaders and created openings that Moscow can exploit. In an era of renewed great power competition, Arab leaders likely understand that they may stand to benefit more from cultivating ties with both the United States and Russia than was previously possible. Among the long-standing issues facing U.S.-Arab relations is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab leaders understand that Israel comes first for the United States, despite significant changes in the region since the 1967 June War when the U.S.-Israeli partnership was cemented. Though most Arab leaders care little about the Palestinians’ plight, they remain anxious about the emotive power of the issue and its ability to anger and mobilize their populations, particularly after the United States’ recent decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan. Similarly, the U.S. guarantee of Israel’s qualitative military edge over any combination of regional adversaries effectively restricts the sale of certain advanced weapons to Arab states. U.S. weapons sales also come with cumbersome end-user agreements that restrict their use—restrictions that Arab leaders suspect are not enforced for Israel. While U.S. officials and legislators continue to demonstrate strong commitments to Israel, Russia remains unencumbered and continues to export arms to Arab states. U.S. policy toward Iran should also confound Arab leaders. Fearful of Iran’s regional ambitions, use of terrorism, and nuclear program, Arab leaders looked to the United States to help contain Iranian adventurism. However, Washington conducted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that—whatever their justifications—resulted in the removal of two staunchly anti-Iran regimes, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, leaving Iran freer to pursue its regional schemes. The Iraq War, in particular, was a source of frustration for Arab leaders; it angered their publics because it confirmed the impression that Washington thought little of violating the sovereignty of an Arab state in pursuit of unconvincing objectives. Iran now has vast influence in Iraq, in addition to growing sway in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and others. With minimal consultation with its Arab partners, Washington also concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to limit Iran’s nuclear program and only a few years later rescinded the plan, with equally limited consultation. Given Russia’s proven ability to work with Iran in Syria, Arab leaders may now see Moscow as the intermediary with Iran that Washington is not. Washington’s tepid response to the September 2019 attack on Abqaiq, a critical Saudi oil installation, should  accentuate Arab leaders’ doubt. The United States joined Saudi Arabia in blaming Iran for the attack—U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo characterized it as “an act of war”—but did little beyond deploying troops and equipment to “help Saudi Arabia defend itself.” This response stands in marked contrast to the United States’ bold and immediate response in 1990 to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Moreover, Iranian proxies across the region have targeted U.S. allies and interests since the end of the territorial conflict against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also known as ISIS) and the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, both of which had served as brakes on Iran-sponsored attacks. The absence of a strong U.S. response to Abqaiq suggests that the United States is not only reluctant to stand by its Arab friends, but also by its commitment to the free-flow of oil—a critical interest for the energy producers of the Gulf and to U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere. Arab leaders have also seen Washington abandon leaders it purported to support. After three decades of partnering with former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on regional security, the Barack Obama administration  called for Mubarak to step down the instant he was in political trouble. Russia’s support for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad stands in stark contrast. Russia committed to combating Islamist extremism in Syria, not to promoting political mores. Arab leaders are also likely to see Washington’s de facto green light for Ankara to occupy parts of northern Syria as a betrayal of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces who had executed the U.S. campaign to defeat the Islamic State. The United States’ betrayal aside, the Turkish occupation of Arab territory, however limited, will also revive ghosts of the region’s Ottoman past and will not sit well with Arabs. Adding to the complexities that Arab leaders face in their relations with the United States, their publics tend to be ambivalent, if not hostile, toward Washington. It is important to note that most Arab leaders are autocrats and derive security from varying levels of domestic legitimacy. Therefore, they evaluate foreign partnerships based partially on domestic perceptions of the foreign partner in question. A 2017 Zogby poll for the Arab-American Institute showed that respondents in only two of seven surveyed Arab countries considered the U.S. role in Iraq and Syria to be positive or viewed the Donald J. Trump administration’s policies favorably. Iraqis were among those detractors of the United States’ activities in Iraq, despite the United States’ role in defeating the Islamic State. Moreover, according to a 2017 Pew Research poll, 35 percent of Egyptian and Saudi respondents (arguably the two closest U.S. partners) viewed Russia positively, while only 27 percent viewed the United States positively. Anecdotally, Arabs demonstrate even harsher attitudes and see the United States—often conspiratorially—as the cause of many regional problems. Some perceive the United States as a bully that uses Arab states to pursue its own regional objectives, leaving disarray in its wake. Others—unaffiliated with their governments—have argued that Washington provoked Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait to create a pretext to intervene and manipulate Iraq’s oil; created al-Qaeda and had a hand in the 9/11 attacks to justify a war against Islam; initiated the Iraq War to protect Israel from Saddam Hussein; placed the Muslim Brotherhood government in Cairo in 2012 as a political alternative to al-Qaeda and other extremists; and planned, with Muslim Brotherhood acquiescence, to set up a Palestinian state in Sinai. Although Arab leaders are far from ditching their relationships with Washington and embracing Moscow as their primary strategic partner, U.S.-Arab tensions are growing. Arab leaders understand that they have limited influence over U.S. policy, but they may be starting to perceive the United States as unpredictable or even unreliable. A variety of dynamics, including renewed Arab popular uprisings, an Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, or a significant Islamist terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland, could shake U.S.-Arab relations and deliver new openings to Moscow.  The United States should take note because a realignment toward Russia could cost the United States its ability to access the region quickly for military operations, to further influence the supply and price of oil, and to partner more effectively with regional players in promoting critical interests, such as combating terrorism, containing Iran, and fostering stability. A number of the United States’ Arab partners are developing cooperative arrangements with Russia on specific issues, and multilateral groupings like the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum are attracting a growing number of Arab ministers. If Washington is to maintain the benefits of relationships with Arab states, it should seek to be a predictable partner. U.S. policy should deviate from previous positions only when circumstances have dramatically changed to make it justifiable. Arab leaders should clearly understand under which circumstances they can rely on U.S. support and the lengths to which Washington will go to pursue specific objectives. This is particularly important for partners in a region as prone to shocks as the Middle East. If possible, consultation with partners should precede policy changes to explain the shift, its purpose, and the extent to which Washington’s position will change. This is not a call to abandon priorities or values, but merely to be consistent in balancing them. The appearance of external hyperlinks do not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) for the linked websites, the information, the products, or the services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find in these locations.

Proponents of restraint need to clarify what the term means, how to implement it, and its implications for U.S. national interests and world order.