Strength Through Peace

In a new paper, Steven A. Cook, the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at CFR, discusses how great power competition is altering the prospects for managing conflicts in the Middle East, and how Washington should avoid the kind of strategic errors that have provided opportunities for other major powers, notably Russia and China, to undermine U.S. policy. These actors—and to a lesser extent India and the European Union—have sought greater influence in the region. While competition among major powers has not led to direct confrontation yet, powerful actors have still sought to establish, extend, and reinforce influence and prestige at each other's expense. Meanwhile, cooperation remains episodic and circumstantial. Although the United States remains an important—even the most important—external actor in the region, American leaders and the foreign policy community are debating whether Washington should be the primary provider of security in the region. This debate, coupled with actual American disengagement in certain places, has had three significant effects: regional powers have taken matters into their own hands, external actors have seized opportunities to exercise power, and major powers and their allies have either refused or failed to compel regional powers to resolve existing conflicts. Developments in places as far as Europe or the South China Sea could also sharpen competition or pave the way for greater cooperation. Given the unpredictability and uncertainty of events, however, one development is clear: the American moment of regional supremacy—when no state or combination of states could hope to challenge U.S. power and influence—is over. The Middle East is now up for grabs among a variety of regional powers and external actors, including the United States. This power vacuum has made the region less secure and competition has affected the trajectory of conflicts in the region. In this new paper—part of a larger series on managing global disorder—Cook takes a deep dive into how great power competition is affecting the prospects for regional peace. For all the challenges the United States faces in the Middle East, it remains the region's most important, powerful, and influential actor, so it is essential to understand how the trajectory of great power competition is shaping the potential for the United States to cooperate with other major powers and mitigate conflict.

Yun Sun is a senior fellow, codirector of the East Asia program, and director of the China program at the Stimson Center. 2020 witnessed tension across the Taiwan Strait unseen since the 1996 missile crisis. Feeling challenged by the popular Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government and the Trump administration’s measures to enhance ties with Taiwan, the mainland China escalated its military posturing and coercive approach significantly. “Unification by force” became a buzzword among the Chinese public, and the public sentiment strengthens Beijing’s justification for intensified military actions. Although China may not seek a preemptive military campaign for unification, it is increasingly tolerant, or even neutral toward the military risk over Taiwan.    While people appear to believe that the Biden administration will strive to avoid acute crisis with China over Taiwan, U.S. policy toward Taiwan only reflects half of the story. The other, and more important half is from China. At least three factors contribute to China’s increasingly destabilizing stance: the belief that DPP is seeking “Taiwan independence”; the indispensability of unification for China’s rise and for Xi’s glory. In this sense, the trajectory of China’s coercion will only intensify rather than subside.   China prefers peaceful unification over use of force. However, in the Chinese lexicon, coercion is not unpeaceful. China’s confidence in unification lies the belief that there will be a day that the United States is exhausted by the security commitment to an island so far away as power balance continues to tilt in China’s favor, therefore, for Beijing, when and only when the United States withdraws, will Taiwan’s political will to negotiate peaceful unification with China begin to emerge. The calculation dictates that China must respond militarily to Taiwan’s “moves” toward independence before that day comes. The growing confidence in the shifting power balance also fosters growing Chinese tolerance, or even neutrality toward military risk.   China’s calculations pose serious danger for miscalculation and inadvertent escalation of tension with the United States. Neither side seems to believe the other side wants a conflict, and consequently could put themselves in a game of chicken and collision course given the stakes at hand. Regardless of who prevails, both will suffer tremendous human and financial costs, and Taiwan will be the first to bear the dire result of such a war. To avoid such a scenario will require the United States to balance its adamant support of Taiwan with a clear strategy for conflict prevention and to find the optimal combination of military deterrence and smart diplomatic strategies. View the full results of the Preventive Priorities Survey to see which other contingencies were deemed top tier priorities for 2021.