Interim Administration Imposes Curfew in Tigray Capital
- Tigray’s federally appointed interim government announced a nighttime curfew and ordered residents to surrender firearms in Mekelle, the regional capital (Addis Standard).
Published by CFR's Wachenheim Center for Peace and Security

Overview
The power struggle between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ethiopia’s federal government reignited following escalating clashes in the wake of the 2020–22 civil war. In September 2026, the TPLF joined the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Coalition for Survival (also called the Alliance for Survival), a bloc of opposition militias that aims to overthrow Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali. Eritrea’s alleged support for the rebel coalition, paired with the TPLF fighting alongside the Amhara Fano militia and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), has shattered the 2022 Pretoria peace deal and risks drawing the wider Horn of Africa into the conflict.
Ethiopia’s large, diverse population has long grappled with how to form a durable political settlement, experimenting with periods of empire, military dictatorship, authoritarian developmentalism, and ethnic federalism. Power struggles among ethnic groups and regions have culminated in a series of internal rebellions and civil wars, compromising the country’s stability and that of its neighbors in the Horn of Africa.
Contests for political power in the 1970s and 1980s gave rise to the TPLF—a paramilitary group formed to represent marginalized ethnic Tigrayans—which fought an insurgency against the military dictatorship known as the Derg. The TPLF eventually merged with other armed groups to form the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). After successfully deposing the Derg in 1991, the TPLF became the dominant political and military force in Ethiopia.
Between 1991 and his death in 2012, Tigrayan soldier-turned-politician Meles Zenawi governed Ethiopia as an autocracy with the EPRDF’s support. In 1994, the Meles government adopted a new constitution that established a system of federal ethnic power sharing. The constitution granted local autonomy to Ethiopia’s major ethnic groups within their designated territorial homelands, including the ability to maintain their own regional security forces. The Meles government oversaw rapid development and increased Ethiopia’s international standing, but it also marginalized ethnic groups, including two of the largest by population, the Oromo and the Amhara.
The TPLF retained significant influence in Ethiopian politics until protests, especially among the Oromo population, broke out in 2018, prompting the government to appoint Abiy Ahmed as the next prime minister. Born in the Oromia region, Abiy was heralded by international actors and Ethiopians as the country’s new hope for achieving peace and ethnic harmony. Early in his premiership, he promised to heal the broken trust among the country’s ethnic groups, pursued liberal economic reforms, and began to roll back restrictions on some political freedoms.
Abiy established the Prosperity Party, a more expansive ethnic political grouping and successor to the EPRDF. The TPLF refused to join the new party, wary of losing its dominance in the ruling coalition and of the Abiy government’s purges of TPLF officials. The government’s repeated delays of long-promised national elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the extension of Abiy’s first term further agitated the TPLF. The Tigray State Council proceeded to hold local elections in September 2020 in defiance of federal orders, solidifying the TPLF’s control over the northern region and setting the stage for an armed standoff with the central government.

On November 4, 2020, Abiy accused Tigrayan troops of attacking a federal military camp in the region’s capital, Mekelle, describing the event as “the last straw.” In response, he ordered Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops to move north and undertake air strikes against Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) positions, marking the beginning of a military campaign known as the Mekelle Offensive. The confrontation quickly escalated as the ENDF—with the support of Eritrean forces—advanced deeper into Tigray and the TDF ramped up their response.
As the Abiy government moved forward with national elections in June 2021, federal authority deteriorated across multiple regions. The TPLF boycotted the elections, and opposition parties in parliament accused the Abiy government of banning poll observers in some states. The conflict spread to the Afar and Amhara regions, which mobilized their own regional militias. In November 2021, Tigrayan troops and allied Oromo militants marched within roughly eighty-five miles of the capital, Addis Ababa, but were forced back by an ENDF air campaign.
The fighting further entrenched ethnic divisions. The OLA, the breakaway former military wing of the Oromo Liberation Front political party, allied itself with the TPLF, while militants from the Amhara and Afar regions, which border Tigray, sided with federal forces. Local militias carried out massacres on enclaves of rival ethnic groups in their territory. In 2021, the government declared a state of emergency in Amhara after a series of attacks committed against ethnic Oromos. Similar bouts of ethnic violence occurred in Oromia, where local militants began attacking Amhara-majority enclaves in March 2021.
The conflict was one of the deadliest in Ethiopia’s history and drew international attention to allegations of war crimes, widespread sexual violence, and ethnic cleansing. A communications blackout in Tigray at the outset of the conflict shuttered coverage of conditions on the ground, but by December 2020, media and UN officials began sounding the alarm about the treatment of civilians. In 2021, the United States characterized the war as an ethnic cleansing against Tigrayans, and several nongovernmental organizations raised concerns about the potential for genocide. Subsequent investigations by human rights groups accused Eritrean troops, aligned with the ENDF, of carrying out atrocities against Tigrayan civilians, including mass executions and rape. The combination of siege conditions and drought put millions at risk of starvation in northern Ethiopia. In 2021 alone, more than 5.1 million Ethiopians were displaced, a record at the time for the most people internally displaced in any country in a single year. In total, the Tigray war is estimated to have killed six hundred thousand people.
After a series of failed efforts, the TPLF and the Ethiopian central government signed a cessation of hostilities agreement in November 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa. The agreement, which was followed by implementation negotiations in Nairobi, Kenya, promised to disarm Tigrayan troops, hand control of Tigray to the Ethiopian federal government, end the Mekelle Offensive, and permit full humanitarian access to Tigray. Notably, the Pretoria Agreement did not explicitly mention Eritrea, and no Eritrean representatives were present at the negotiations.
Instability and violence persisted after the Pretoria Agreement was signed. Amhara forces occupied and claimed historic ownership of the Western Tigray area, leading to continued clashes with the TPLF. In April 2023, the central government announced that all regional security forces would be integrated into the national security services. The decision was largely seen as an attempt to undermine regional autonomy, and it sparked violent protests and militia activity across the country. The federal government invested heavily in expanding its arsenal of drones from China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey, which it increasingly used in response to insurgencies in Oromia and Amhara—with devastating consequences for civilians.
By 2025, escalating power struggles between the TPLF and the federal government threatened to collapse the Pretoria Agreement. In May, TPLF hardliners expelled several officials serving in the federally appointed Tigray Interim Administration from the party. Meanwhile, the federal government banned the TPLF from participating in elections scheduled for June 2026 and limited government subsidies to the Tigray region. The TPLF decried the government’s use of drone strikes against Tigrayan militias as “clear violations” of the Pretoria Agreement and accused federal authorities of undermining local authority by backing armed splinter groups, such as the Tigray Peace Force.
For three decades, Eritrean separatists fought Ethiopian forces in a war for independence, which concluded with the collapse of the Derg regime in 1991. Border skirmishes with Eritrea [PDF] led to another outbreak of war from 1998 to 2000, which was followed by a nearly twenty-year-long frozen conflict. Relations thawed in 2018 when Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki signed a peace treaty in Eritrea’s capital, Asmara, to restore diplomatic relations, earning Abiy a Nobel Peace Prize. During the 2020–22 Tigray war, Eritrea intervened militarily on the Ethiopian government’s side.
However, despite initially warm relations under Abiy, tensions between the two countries flared once again in 2023 when Ethiopia began signaling its intention to secure a Red Sea port. Ethiopia became landlocked when Eritrea gained independence, a condition Ethiopian leaders have described as a “geographic prison” that undermines the country’s sovereignty and economic security. Such comments have been met with widespread concern as a prelude to military action against Eritrea.
Amid renewed fighting between the TPLF and the ENDF in 2026, Eritrea switched allegiances to support the TPLF and the Alliance for Survival. In response, Ethiopia and Eritrea once again dissolved diplomatic relations and expelled diplomats from each other’s capitals. As of October 2026, Tigrayan civilians report the presence of Eritrean troops in Ethiopian territory, and ENDF drones have targeted Eritrean convoys.
Armed clashes between the ENDF and TPLF continued into early 2026, but the fighting escalated to total war in late September, when seven rebel groups joined together to form the Alliance for Survival. The grouping includes the Amhara Fano National Movement, OLA, TPLF, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement, and Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement. The alliance has called for the overthrow of Abiy’s government and has sought to “bring about the establishment of an inclusive transitional government guided by a transitional charter.”
Eritrea is reportedly backing the Alliance for Survival, with troops crossing into northern Ethiopia in early October. The ENDF and government-aligned forces have advanced deep into Tigray, seized control of the regional capital Mekelle, imposed a telecommunications blackout in the region, and conducted air strikes on Eritrean and TPLF positions. Although fighting continues in central Tigray as of early November, the federal government has installed an interim government in the region, which called on TPLF fighters to disarm.
Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have gone to the UN Security Council to accuse the other of illegal acts of aggression. Ethiopia has declared it is taking “self-defense measures” in response to Eritrean incursions into its territory, while Eritrea has charged Ethiopia with using the conflict as cover to seize a Red Sea port. As of mid-October 2026, Eritrean forces reportedly crossed the border into Ethiopia and later retreated amid rapid ENDF advances into northern Tigray.
Ethiopia’s destabilization has significant security implications for the Horn of Africa, a region facing armed conflict in Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Reports that Ethiopia is hosting a training facility for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group could escalate to direct confrontations with Sudan, particularly if the rival Sudanese Armed Forces extend reciprocal support to the Alliance for Survival. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have also been locked in a political dispute since 2011 over Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a hydroelectric dam on the Nile River that restricts the northern flow of freshwater.
In early October, Egypt hosted a quadrilateral summit with the leaders of Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan to discuss “common challenges” in the Horn of Africa—a group that some analysts have characterized as an anti-Ethiopia bloc. Already, Ethiopian military leadership has accused Egypt, Sudan, and other “external forces” of backing the Alliance for Survival, raising tensions in an already fraught region.
Updated November 13, 2026
Key Actors
The ruling authority led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, whose Prosperity Party won a large parliamentary majority in June 2026, but whose government faces simultaneous armed challenges from the TPLF in Tigray, Fano militias in Amhara, and residual insurgency in Oromia
Ethiopia’s national military, currently engaged on multiple fronts against the TPLF and its Tigray Defense Forces, Fano militias in Amhara, and remnants of the OLA in Oromia
The dominant Tigrayan political and armed movement that controlled Ethiopia for decades before 2018, which has reasserted control over Tigray after ousting the federally-backed Tigray Interim Administration and clashing with the ENDF in early 2026, while reportedly forcing an alliance of convenience with Eritrea
The federally appointed governing body for Tigray established under the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, whose mandate has been repeatedly extended amid the TPLF’s efforts to displace it and the federal government’s inability to organize regional elections
An Amhara militia and its newly formed umbrella organization that has fought the ENDF since refusing to disband in 2023, and is now reportedly receiving weapons and support from Eritrea through the TPLF
An Oromo insurgent group operating in Oromia whose breakaway faction signed a limited peace deal with the government in December 2024, while the main OLA command structure rejected the deal, continues armed operations, and is allied with the TPLF
A destabilizing external actor under President Isaias Afwerki that, despite once allying with Ethiopia against the TPLF during the Tigray war from 2020 to 2022, has since shifted to backing the TPLF and reportedly supplying Fano militias with weapons, raising fears of a direct Ethiopia-Eritrea war
A hostile external actor whose long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has led Cairo to reportedly back Ethiopia’s adversaries, including by providing support to Eritrea and the TPLF, in an effort to pressure Addis Ababa over Nile water rights
An engaged external actor that has imposed visa restrictions on hardline TPLF figures and has pressed for a peaceful resolution, while monitoring the risk of broader regional escalation in the Horn of Africa
A coalition of seven rebel groups in Ethiopia, including the TPLF, Fano, and OLA, that is fighting the ENDF with the reported backing of Eritrea, and has called for the overthrow of Abiy Ahmed
Recommended Resources