International Economic Policy

  • China
    China’s Current Economy: Implications for Investors and Supply Chains
      Chair Cleveland, Chair Glas, and members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to testify before the Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to testify about the distinctive features of China’s sovereign funds and their evolution in financing the global ambitions of the Communist Party of China (CPC) since President Xi came to power. Sovereign funds globally today collectively manage over $11.5 trillion in assets under management. These funds are predominantly based in commodity-exporting economies and capitalized by revenues from the monetization of natural resources, notably oil and gas. The world’s first sovereign fund was the Kuwait Investment Authority, established in 1953 from oil revenues. However, the largest of them in terms of assets under management is China Investment Corporation (CIC), based in China, the world’s leading commodity-importing country. In 2022, CIC surpassed the Government Pension Fund of Norway and became the largest sovereign fund in the world, having more than $1.35 trillion assets under management – exceeding the GDP of Mexico, the world’s 15th largest economy. The evolution of China’s sovereign funds has unfolded against the backdrop of China’s domestic financial reform and the globalization of Chinese capital. Once a backward country, China has caught up with Western powers on gross economic terms by relying upon its ability to mobilize capital. No other country in history has so rapidly transformed its economy from being among the world’s poorest and most isolated to one of the world’s largest economies, at the heart of the global supply chain, and a leading source of international investment capital. For the last two decades, China’s sovereign funds have played a significant role in China’s economy, mitigating financial crises and tempering exogenous shocks. They have supported China’s industrial policies by financing the state’s procurement of strategic overseas assets, bankrolling Chinese enterprises’ mergers and acquisitions abroad, and sponsoring the development of indigenous Chinese technology startups. As China’s state-owned capital has gone global, the scope of China’s geoeconomic influence has duly expanded. Let me explain how China’s sovereign funds fit into the state’s political economic system, why these funds are “leveraged” funds rather than “wealth” funds, and how they relate to China’s approach to managing its massive foreign exchange reserves. Unlike traditional commodity-based SWFs, China’s way of leveraging foreign exchange reserves to create sovereign funds does not rely upon natural resource revenues. China’s experience with sovereign funds demonstrates that a state without significant natural resource revenues can take on explicit or implicit leverage to source the seed capital for the founding of what I call sovereign leveraged funds (SLFs). China’s sovereign funds differ from commodity-based SWFs and constitute a distinct class. An inherent trait of SLFs is their funding scheme, which relies upon a series of complicated transactions, including debt issuances and other forms of implicit financial leverage. SLFs are a political-economic innovation because they are the product of the state leveraging its financial and political resources to make it possible to capitalize a fund without relying upon a high-profit revenue stream like the export of commodities. The way through which China created its sovereign funds is by using both explicit leverage and implicit leverage foreign exchange reserves. Explicit leverage means the issuance of debt and using the debt proceeds to capitalize SLFs. How the debts are structured and raised, who provide the debt proceeds, and who would control the newly established funds are not only financial issues but political issues. In other words, the decisions about how the newly issued debt will be underwritten and who will ultimately control the resultant SLF are the product of intensive political negotiation and aggressive bureaucratic competition. The establishment of CIC is an example of using explicit leverage. An alternative approach for the state to obtain investment capital is the use of implicit leverage to convert existing pools of low-risk capital, or state-owned assets like foreign exchange reserves, into high-risk-bearing capital that is subsequently transferred to the management of the SLF. How this process constitutes an increase in the state’s financial leverage can be understood by considering the typical investment made by a SLF. In general, the fund uses its capital to make an equity investment in a target company that is itself internally leveraged—that is, carrying debt on its own balance sheet. The sovereign fund’s equity interest is subordinate to the debt of the target company. The state is implicitly leveraged because the debt of the company stays off the balance sheet of the state, but the state still bears the risk of losing its entire equity stake if the company’s debt cannot be repaid. In other words, the leverage is external to the state’s balance sheet. In this way, the state itself does not issue any new debt or expand its balance sheet, but it still increases its financial leverage. China’s experiment with implicitly leveraging its reserves started with the transfer to Central Huijin of $66.4 billion in foreign exchange reserves in 2003 to recapitalize China’s failing banks and reform China’s nonbanking financial institutions. At that time Central Huijin was not created with the intention to be a sovereign fund but instead a special purpose vehicle for the sole purpose of restructuring China’s failing state-owned commercial banks. The success of Central Huijin’s restructuring of the banks ultimately led Central Huijin to outlive its original mission and take on new tasks of reforming China’s nonbanking financial institutions, such as the brokerage firms and capitalizing major Chinese policy-oriented financial institutions. While Central Huijin was China’s first attempt at leveraging foreign exchange reserves to solve an urgent domestic crisis, its proven track record has made it an indispensable part of the government’s crisis response toolbox. In May this year, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) reportedly proposed to restructure the state’s biggest bad-debt managers, or the so-called asset management companies, by moving MOF’s stakes in three asset management companies to Central Huijin. This proposal is in line with the government’s commitment to separate the government’s role as a regulator and shareholder, strengthening the role of Central Huijin as the “shareholder in chief” on behalf of the party-state while having the state’s regulators, including the newly-established National Administration of Financial Regulation, focus on financial risk prevention and mitigation. The creation of CIC can illustrate the explicit use of leverage over China’s foreign exchange reserves. The Ministry of Finance issued RMB1.55 trillion special purpose bonds and used the bond proceeds to purchase $200 billion foreign exchange reserves from the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), the central bank, and then capitalize CIC. The effect of these transactions was the transfer of $200 billion to CIC from the PBoC, but MOF remained as the sole shareholder of CIC. On September 29, 2007, CIC was officially incorporated as a wholly state-owned company under China’s Company Law. The key takeaway is that this process does not take any sophisticated financial engineering, but it does require a tremendous amount of political engineering and multi-agency political levering in order to move the foreign exchange reserves out of the PBoC for investment purposes without having to revise the PBoC Law, which prohibits the central bank from directly purchasing government bonds and financing fiscal expenditure. Economically, the use of either explicit (internal) or implicit (external) leverage over foreign exchange reserves decreases the stock of foreign exchange assets that can be counted towards foreign exchange reserves as defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A most important distinction between the two approaches is the accounting treatment and awareness among the general public of its existence. Regardless of which type of leverage the state chooses when raising capital, the political outcome is the same: it will inevitably precipitate a political conflict among those that aspire to control the resultant capital. Implicit leverage is usually the more politically expedient choice because the associated liabilities are usually not recorded in official accounts. Both Central Huijin and investment companies affiliated with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) serve as examples of how the state takes on implicit leverage and then political conflict ensues. Since 2007, CIC and SAFE-owned investment funds have become more sophisticated in overseas investment activities. They have become significant market participants in terms of assets under management and prestige. Each has developed its own distinct culture and approach to investing. CIC has taken pains to present itself to the global financial community as a traditional institutional investor by being relatively transparent and pledging to be impartial to politics. Soon after its founding, CIC signed on to the Santiago Principles, a set of guidelines on transparency and governance designed by the IMF and meant explicitly for government-owned investment funds. In CIC’s early days, Chairman Lou Jiwei made great efforts to present CIC as a market-oriented, stabilizing force in global markets. Not everyone shared this view of CIC, and Chairman Lou publicly expressed frustration that some Western countries used “national security” as an excuse to block CIC’s investments. After Lou left CIC and was succeeded as chairman by Ding Xuedong in 2013, CIC began to align its investment strategy much closer to China’s national economic strategy while still maintaining its previous transparency. Compared to CIC, SAFE remains an opaque institution that has largely been able to avoid public scrutiny. Neither SAFE nor its affiliated investment funds disclose their portfolio holdings or gains and losses. At times, this penchant for secrecy has protected SAFE from criticism. For example, CIC received heavy public criticism when its first investments made during the 2008 financial crisis turned out to be loss-making. By contrast, SAFE’s public reputation was unaffected even though its investment losses in 2008 were likely much greater than CIC’s. The Financial Times reported that while CIC was savaged domestically for losing more than $4 billion in its misjudged investment in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley, the secretive SAFE hardly faced any criticism even though its losses were greater than those of CIC by an estimated twenty-fold. CIC may have learned a political lesson from SAFE that transparency is not always worthwhile. One long-time observer of CIC said the fund “has turned to stealth mode; it is doing transactions and is looking at lots of resource-related deals all over the world, but it is trying to hide its involvement.” Undoubtedly, there is some truth to these comments. CIC may be motivated by a desire to avoid potential domestic criticism of its actions and to head off reactionary protectionism in the countries in which it invests. Let me now turn to explain the Chinese government’s strategic use of foreign exchange reserves under President Xi. The bottom line is that the ascendance of Xi Jinping to China’s top leadership position in 2012 and the rollout of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has motivated the party to leverage China’s foreign exchange reserves as strategic financial power to advance China’s overseas interests. According to Li Hongyan, director of SAFE’s Central Foreign Exchange Business Center, since 2013, the party has used foreign exchange reserves to replenish China’s policy banks and establish several new sovereign funds. These new funds include the Silk Road Fund, China-Latin America Production Capacity Cooperation Investment Fund (CLAC Fund), China-Africa Industrial Capacity Cooperation Fund, and Guoxin International Investment Corporation Limited (commonly known as CNIC Corporation). Li Hongyan identified three areas where the diversified use of foreign exchange reserves serves China’s national strategies. First, she argued that creating policy banks and sovereign funds provides a sustainable mechanism to put China’s foreign exchange reserves to work in service of China’s national strategies. Such diversified reserve usage has informed the formation of a Chinese investment system featuring equity and debt in adherence to commercial principles that can provide stable financial support for the Belt and Road Initiative and other national strategies. Second, she stated that using China’s foreign exchange reserves for international investment and cooperation can advance China’s participation in global governance and create a favorable international environment for the Belt and Road Initiative. Third, she asserted that strengthening the party’s leadership and corporate governance can discipline equity investment institutions and drive convergence towards professional management standards that will ultimately serve China’s national strategies. Under President Xi, the party-state has gradually expanded the SLFs model, applying it to reform state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to update the state’s industrial policy. China’s SOEs are supervised by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), formed in 2003 to consolidate many industry-specific bureaucracies. SASAC’s purview does not include the financial sector overseen by Central Huijin, itself sometimes called the “Financial SASAC.” Unlike in the financial sector, SOEs in the other sectors haven’t benefited from a SLF like Central Huijin, which sits atop the whole industry and directs capital flow down to individual SOEs. However, this began to change in November 2013 after President Xi laid out his vision for China’s economy for the first time at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee. Xi led the working group that called for creating “state-owned capital investment companies” to invest in “key industries and fields that are vital to national security and are the lifeline of the national economy.” In effect, Xi’s proposed state-owned capital investment companies are SLFs mandated to focus on financing development in state-prioritized strategic industries like civil aviation, energy and mineral resources, nuclear power, and global shipping and logistics. Since July 2014, SASAC has begun reforming nineteen centrally administered SOEs in these strategic sectors and critical for the party’s military-civil fusion strategy to state-owned capital investment companies. Finance Minister Lou Jiwei, the founding chairman of CIC and its former CEO, was the person in charge of fleshing out the details of Xi’s vision. As the primary author of the State Council’s policy document “Opinions on Reforming and Improving the State-Owned Assets Management System,” Lou clearly drew upon his familiarity with the organizational models of CIC and Central Huijin while describing how a group of state-owned capital investment companies could exercise their shareholder’s rights in portfolio companies to “form a ‘separation zone’ between the government and the market.” Such a change in the mode of interactions between the state and the market does not represent the complete retreat of the state from the market but a retrenchment. The ongoing transformation of SASAC speaks to the continued centrality of the state in the market. In May 2017, the State Council approved SASAC’s plan to change its mandate from the administration of SOEs to the management of capital with the stated goals of pursuing long-term interests by channeling state capital into essential industries, critical infrastructure, and forward-looking strategic sectors of national security interest. Xi’s prioritization of capital management in China’s economic reform—and his use of SLFs as a tool to accomplish this—is not a complete departure from the path of his predecessors. Instead, it reflects the enduring influence on China’s economic policymaking of the dual successes of Central Huijin in stabilizing China’s financial system and CIC’s expansion into global financial markets. Like SLFs, the state-owned investment companies of SASAC allow the party-state to exercise control by leveraging capital instead of resorting to administrative directives. For Xi’s generation of CPC leadership, the SLFs model provides a ready playbook for expanding the influence of the party-state both at home and abroad. In recent years, Chinese sovereign leveraged funds have rarely been reported as involved in crass geoeconomic powerplays after SAFE was exposed for using its foreign exchange reserves to buy Costa Rica switching diplomatic relations to Beijing instead of Taipei in 2008. This is indicative of the considered steps taken to structure and obfuscate the funds’ activities in such a way that provides plausible deniability of their role in advancing the party-state’s strategic interests. Cultivating a sense of being detached from China’s geopolitical interests helps Chinese sovereign funds reduce market access barriers and transaction costs when they invest in Western markets, where China’s state-led investment bids have frequently been red-flagged as having geopolitical motives. As foreign animosity toward Chinese state-backed investments has risen, CIC has increasingly turned to joint ventures with influential institutional investors in host countries to shelter its assets from undue scrutiny by foreign governments or to sidestep administrative blocks on investing. CIC has seen some success with this method, as evidenced by the China-U.S. Industrial Cooperation Partnership, a private equity fund jointly launched by CIC and Goldman Sachs. The Partnership has bought several U.S. firms despite escalating U.S.-China trade tensions and intense scrutiny from Washington. The effectiveness of the joint venture strategy is most vividly illustrated by Goldman Sachs’s successful advocacy in front of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) that the joint venture’s plan to buy Boyd Corp., a manufacturer of rubber gaskets and seals, be allowed to proceed. With the evolution of China’s sovereign funds in mind, I would like to discuss the specific case of the Silk Road Fund (SRF) to illustrate how the party-state under President Xi has strategically used China’s foreign exchange reserves and sovereign funds. SRF is unique among China’s sovereign funds that leverage foreign exchange reserves for overseas investment and strategic asset acquisitions. President Xi Jinping created the SRF to finance his BRI global campaign. The fund has closely followed the priorities of the BRI, focusing on infrastructure, connectivity, resource development, and industrial capacity cooperation. SAFE is the majority shareholder of this signature BRI financing vehicle, owning a 65 percent interest in the fund. Former PBoC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan described the SRF as a “private equity investor with a longer investment return.” He compared SRF to the World Bank’s International Finance Corp, the African Development Bank’s Mutual Development Fund, and the China-Africa Development Fund. Apart from the initial $10 billion invested into SRF discussed earlier, President Xi committed an additional RMB100 billion in capital to SRF at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017. Notably, this capital injection was in China’s currency, the renminbi, not in foreign exchange. Deputy Governor of the PBoC Yi Gang endorsed the plan the day after President Xi’s announcement, calling it “quite necessary and timely to expand SRF’s capital.” Yi explained that abundant capital would help SRF mobilize additional resources in BRI countries and crowd-in investment from other financial institutions. With ample capital, SRF proceeded to finance projects under the BRI umbrella. Bloomberg data show that during SRF’s first three years of operating, it invested $10.5 billion in Europe, more than one-quarter of the $40 billion that President Xi promised when he announced the fund’s establishment. SRF Chairman Xie Duo disclosed that SRF had signed forty-seven projects and committed more than $17.8 billion in investment as of October 2020. SRF’s investment track record suggests that it indeed has an investment horizon similar to that of a medium-to-long-term private equity fund, just as Governor Zhou said it would at the fund’s inception. The fund’s average investment period is seven to ten years, with some investments projected to be fifteen years or longer. Chairwoman Jin Qi disclosed that more than 70 percent of SRF’s committed investments are in the form of equity, with the rest being debt investment and project financing. The infusion of an additional RMB100 billion in cash into SRF was motivated by more than just ensuring the fund had adequate capital; it also served to advance cross-border payment and settlement using renminbi within the framework of the BRI. In a People’s Daily article commemorating the fifth anniversary of the BRI and reviewing the achievements of SRF, Chairwoman Jin Qi said that the renminbi capital injection meant that SRF could “provide financial support to Belt and Road projects in multiple currencies.” She added this would allow SRF to “satisfy different needs of Belt and Road countries for cross-border payment and settlement.” According to her, SRF was “exploring and promoting effective ways of investment in renminbi” and was aiming to take advantage of more “renminbi-denominated investment.” Using SRF as a vehicle to promote the use of the renminbi in international finance has clear benefits for China. First, it decreases currency risks for Chinese investors. Second, the renminbi’s internationalization is essential if China ever develops a financial network independent of the U.S. dollar. Using the BRI to promote renminbi internationalization gives the CPC more control over the process. This allows the party to decide how and at what pace renminbi internationalization will proceed, providing confidence that financial instability can be avoided. SRF has supported leading Chinese SOEs in their overseas project financing. SRF’s debut was its commitment to cooperate with China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG) and to finance the Karot Hydropower Project. The Karot Hydropower Project is a high-profile piece of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor proposed by Premier Li Keqiang in May 2013. During President Xi’s visit to Islamabad in April 2015, SRF, CTG, and Pakistan Private Power and Infrastructure Board signed a memorandum of understanding to develop Pakistan’s hydropower project. According to SRF’s official statement, the total planned investment for the project is $1.65 billion. SRF’s financial support for this project took the form of both equity investment and debt participation. SRF bought an equity stake in CTG’s investment and operation platform for clean energy projects in South Asia, CTG South Asia Investment. SRF also agreed to participate in a consortium led by the Export-Import Bank of China to provide loans to the project. Besides the project in Pakistan, SRF also agreed to buy a 9.9 percent stake in Russia’s Yamal LNG project – of which China National Petroleum Corporation owns a 20 percent equity stake – and provide a fifteen-year loan of around €730 million (about $790 million). It also joined a consortium of four Chinese and international banks to invest $2.43 billion in the Hassyan Clean Coal Power Plant in Dubai, a project that China Harbin Electric International serves as the general contractor. Besides providing project financing using equity investment and loan provisions, SRF has financed major asset acquisitions by Chinese SOEs. In 2015, SRF provided financing to China National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina), China’s largest chemical company, to buy the Italian company Pirelli, the world’s fifth-largest tire maker, for $7.7 billion. The deal was structured in multiple steps, including a voluntary tender offer, mandatory tender offer, sell-out procedure, and squeeze-out procedure. To finance the purchase, SRF signed an equity investment agreement with ChemChina in June 2015, agreeing to purchase a 25 percent stake in CNRC International Holding (HK) Limited, a special purpose vehicle used to acquire the Pirelli ordinary shares owned by Camfin, an Italian holding company. ChemChina took out a syndicated loan from CDB, China Construction Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of China, all of which previously received cash injections from CIC at different times. The deal was completed in 2017, resulting in a combined entity with a 10 percent global market share in tire manufacturing. The Pirelli acquisition gave ChemChina access to technology to make premium tires that sold at higher margins and gave the Italian manufacturer preferential access to China, the world’s largest automotive market. At the time of ChemChina’s Pirelli acquisition, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi was uncharacteristically silent about the deal. The Italian government made no protectionist noise against ChemChina’s acquisition. The deal led some Italian business leaders, including Pirelli’s CEO Marco Tronchetti Provera, to lobby the Italian government and steer Italian foreign policy towards a pro-China direction. The lobbying may have influenced Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte to sign a preliminary accord for Italy to join the BRI during a visit by President Xi in March 2019. Italy was the first, and so far only, G7 country to sign on to support the BRI. Alongside this signing, Italy and China made about thirty deals that were cumulatively worth an initial €2.5 billion ($2.8 billion) but a potential total value of €20 billion. One of these deals was a memorandum of understanding to cooperate on international investments in China and BRI countries signed by SRF, Italian investment bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti SpA (83 percent owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance), and Snam, Italy’s leading natural gas company. Recently, as the Italian government has become more wary about undesired Chinese influence, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s administration has taken actions to block ChemChina from taking control over Pirelli and has been reviewing its options to exit BRI. In recent years, SRF has acquired strategic infrastructure assets like pipelines and ports in the countries along the BRI. SRF participated in a consortium that bought a 49 percent equity stake in Aramco Oil Pipelines for $12.4 billion in June 2021, one of the highest-value energy infrastructure transactions globally. Aramco Oil Pipelines is a new subsidiary of Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s national oil company and the world’s single largest oil producer. Aramco Oil Pipelines has the right to collect tariff payments for oil transported through Aramco’s crude oil pipeline network for twenty-five years. The consortium included Mubadala Investment Corporation (Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund), Samsung Asset Management, and Hassana Investment Company, a financial institution controlled by the Saudi government. SRF’s participation in such a large infrastructure deal shows that less than five years after its inception, it has already ascended to the ranks of the world’s largest and most respected sovereign funds and private institutional investors. SRF partnered with COSCO Shipping Ports (CSP), one of the world’s largest port terminal operators, to acquire port assets and advance China’s maritime strategies as part of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In July 2019, SRF and CSP launched Navigator Investco in Hong Kong as an investment platform for equity investment in port assets and related businesses upstream and downstream. SRF owns 49 percent of Navigator Investco through its wholly-owned subsidiary TRD Investco, and CSP holds the remaining 51 percent shares. In October 2021, Navigator Investco agreed to acquire 100 percent of the shares of COSCO Shipping Ports (Rotterdam) Limited (Rotterdam Company), a wholly-owned subsidiary of CSP that owns a 35 percent stake in the Netherlands’ Euromax Terminal. Navigator’s acquisition of CSP’s subsidiary Rotterdam Company has two direct effects. First, upon completing this transaction, Navigator—and SRF, by extension—will become an indirect shareholder of Euromax Terminal through its full ownership of Rotterdam Company. Holding a minority share in Euromax Terminal firmly fits SRF’s mission to support the BRI and contributes to SRF’s portfolio diversification. Second, CSP will replenish its capital base by selling its subsidiary to Navigator and receiving cash. In effect, SRF is providing a capital injection to CSP via Navigator. The essence of SRF’s partnership with CSP and their joint investment platform Navigator is to leverage SRF’s access to China’s foreign exchange reserves and support CSP’s endeavor to establish a global terminal network and advance China’s maritime strategic interests. Besides working alongside Chinese corporations and directly supporting their overseas investment, SRF has entered into many cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding to establish partnerships with foreign sovereign funds, state-owned asset management firms, and leading private institutional investors. A few of these agreements have already materialized into joint investment funds or cooperation funds. For example, SRF is the sole sponsor of the $2 billion China-Kazakhstan Production Capacity Cooperation Fund, with the Kazakhstan government agreeing to provide tax exemptions to the fund’s investments. This is the first such cooperation fund where SRF has participated as the sole sponsor structure. For its first investment, the fund bought common shares of stocks on the Astana International Exchange. Another example is the China-EU Co-Investment Fund, first proposed in June 2017 and launched in July 2018. The fund made its first investment in Cathay Midcap II, and it is committed to fostering synergies and advancing collaboration among businesses and enterprises in China and Europe. CIC has also adopted joint investment funds as a strategy to more expeditiously invest abroad amid heightened scrutiny of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in foreign countries. For CIC, the primary purpose of investing through joint funds is to mitigate the risk that a foreign government will block an overseas investment. While this is certainly applicable for SRF, SRF’s cooperation funds also have China’s broader strategic agenda in mind concerning acquiring assets overseas and developing China’s long-term geoeconomic capacity in the long run. The economic difficulties triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic have driven policymakers in many countries to strengthen FDI reviews in order to head off opportunistic acquisitions by geopolitically-motivated investors. The supply chain disruptions stemming from the pandemic have brought home to many in government the dependence of the domestic economy on international suppliers. As multinationals reconfigure their global industrial supply chains, it is imperative that the United States and its allies strengthen and coordinate their FDI screening measures to ensure that hostile foreign governments are not allowed to gain control over companies that are critical to the global supply chain. In this context, I would like to conclude with three recommendations for legislative action. First, the U.S. government should take the initiative to consider working with the EU and lead a concerted effort to protect companies in critical sectors from undesired foreign takeovers that may hurt the national interests of FDI recipient countries. The launch of the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council in June 2021 is a step towards an integrated transatlantic approach to foreign investment. While high-level consultations are necessary, well-designed procedures for implementation are critical. An important first step is to identify hidden sources of state-owned or state-sponsored investors by enforcing the rule of “follow the money” in a multi-jurisdictional FDI reviewing process. China’s SLFs often operate through an offshore subsidy or joint investment fund, partnering with reputable Western investment brands to mask the source of capital for their investments and ultimately obscuring their connections to the Chinese state. This hidden state-owned capital requires that regulators conduct a forensic audit during the FDI review process. U.S. authorities have enforced the rule of “follow the money in the financial services sector and should consider integrating the practice into its FDI review process. There ought to be more formal cooperation between CFIUS and authorities from other countries going forward. Since the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) in 2018, the U.S. Treasury has engaged with dozens of countries on FDI screening. FIRRMA provisions make sharing information with national counterparts easier. Secondly, besides “follow the money,” an integrated transatlantic approach to FDI calls for creating a shared Entity List that identifies which foreign investors are unwelcome and a list of exempted foreign entities that are pre-approved, a so-called “white list.” This effort should include commonly adopted and enforced ground rules for determining which industries and segments of companies’ supply chains are off-limits to FDI. Implementing the shared Entity List will require not just support from government officials but also input from legal professionals specializing in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The governments of the West are bound by the rule of law, and foreign state-led investors have increasingly spared no expense in hiring top-flight legal representation to help navigate FDI screenings and bring to close their cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Thus, western governments must work with legal service professionals to develop and enforce industry-wide best practices to successfully fend off foreign investment from undesired foreign entities. The goal of an internationally coordinated FDI screening regime should not be to implement protectionist policies but to strengthen U.S. leadership in shaping the global FDI investment environment. Ultimately, the United States and its allies should aim to create a level playfield that can protect the national interests of FDI recipient countries while maintaining a fair and open global investment system. When appropriate, domestic capital markets or government support should meet the capital needs of strategically important companies. Finally, the experience of China’s SLFs shows that there is an effective role to be played by the state as a direct participant in the market so as to maximize the embeddedness of national interests in market operations. The advent of China’s SLFs speaks to the broader issue of the rise of state-led investment and finance globally. Western policymakers tend to discredit the idea of state-led investment institutions. This thinking requires some change. With proper design and supervision, Western liberal market economies can establish their own SLFs to work as white knights to fend off undesired foreign takeovers in defense of their strategic industries and national interests. In fact, France and Germany have been making progress along this line. Like China, Western countries can establish and use their SLFs to strengthen the international competitiveness of specific critical companies, defend those companies from foreign takeover, and support the development of strategic industries.
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  • China
    Academic Webinar: Global Economics
    Play
    Zongyuan Zoe Liu, fellow for international political economy at CFR, leads the conversation on global economics. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today’s session of the Fall 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today’s discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We’re delighted to have Zongyuan Zoe Liu with us to talk about global economics. Dr. Liu is a fellow for international political economy at CFR. She previously served as an instructional assistant professor at Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service in Washington, D.C. And before that, she completed postdoctoral fellowships at the Columbia-Harvard China and the World program and the Center for International Environment and Research Policy at Tufts University. She served as a research fellow and research associate at many institutions—the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, NYU’s Stern Center for Sustainable Business, and at the Institute for International Monetary Affairs in Tokyo. Dr. Liu is the author of Can BRICS De-dollarize the Global Financial System?, published by Cambridge University Press; and Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances its Global Ambitions, forthcoming in 2023 by Harvard University Press. So we will stay tuned for that. So, Dr. Liu, thank you very much for being with us. This is a very broad topic, but it would be great if you could give us your analysis of the state of the global economy today. LIU: Yeah, thank you very much, Irina, for inviting me to do this. I really, truly appreciate the opportunity to engage with our college and national universities, both the faculties and the students. This makes me feel I’m very much still part of the academia community. So thank you very much, Irina, and thank you, everybody, for tuning in today. So I wanted to begin by saying that as an economist one thing that I learned is that we are very bad at making forecasting. And, once that forecasting is already very bad, but—and forget about the long run. But that being said, I hope our conversation today can at least exchange some perspectives in terms of how we think about global economy and how we think about some policy-relevant natures. So the first—I will begin by saying two statement, and then I will delve into it. The first statement I would say that I’m afraid that geopolitics probably would make economic forecasting, which is already a very difficult business, but geopolitics would likely make this business even more difficult going forward. And this is because global economic prospect will be more influenced by geopolitics and geopolitical tensions, in addition to pure supply and demand. So that is to say, for our—all our college students and our graduate students, who are either pursuing a political science degree, international relations, or economics, or anybody who are vaguely interested in understanding global economics, now this is the time to realize, well, the models may not—the models had their limitations before, and their limitations are probably going to be even more pronounced going forward. The pure supply-demand dimensions—price is set in certain ways—probably are not necessarily going to go that way. One such example would be the European Union and the United States are considering putting a price cap on Russian oil. And what does that mean? That probably means, well, it almost feel like for a long period of time there was this global cartel called the OPEC or OPEC+. These are the so-called sellers’ cartel. And they have the power, the monopolistic power almost, in terms of setting the price of oil in the global market. But now we are probably going to see the other part of the story, which is what about a global buyers’ cartel? And that is essentially what a price cap means. So long story short, I think geopolitics would play a lot into our analysis of global economics forecasting going forward. And then my second sort of quick statement would be in terms of global economic status today. I would say the key—like, let me take a step back. When we think about economic development, we tend to think about factors of production. Like, for our—again, for our students who probably learned this at the beginning of the semester, this is the time to refresh your concept. But key factors of production—one is resource, the other is technology, and then the other is labor. In terms of resources, you can think about natural resources as well as capital. So these three fundamental factors of production, I would say, they are all going through a period of changes. And these changes are not necessarily in a good way. So that, long story short, a lot of the changes now in global economic conditions may not necessarily be good. And I’m happy to go into a detailed analysis of why resources are not necessarily changing in a good way, or technology, or in terms of labor and demographics. But I’m also happy to stop here and then sort of answer questions or explain further going forward as well. FASKIANOS: Great. We will go to all of you to ask your questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) So we already have a question. It’s from Fordham University. Raised hand. So you’re going to tell us—have to tell us who you are and unmute yourself, or accept the unmute prompt. There you go. Q: Can you hear me? FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: OK, great. Yes, so I’m a third-year student at Fordham University. My name is Valerie Bejjani. And my question for you, Dr. Liu, pertains to your paper—your Cambridge-published paper—about non-dollar alternatives, which I find very fascinating. And it made me think about something I read for an international political economy class about how Keynes first introduced a non-dollar alternative called the bancor during the Bretton Woods Conference, but the U.S. shot it down. So I was curious about your opinion on this, whether you think it was a mistake for the U.S. not to accept it, and what you think the implications—the historical implications are for BRICS countries today that are trying to devise their own non-dollar alternatives? LIU: Thank you very much, Valerie, for your great question. And I have to—since we’re on the record—I just have to say, this is not a planted question. (Laughs.) And I very much appreciate that you’ve given me the opportunity to talk about the research that I did before. So just a quick background about that research that I did, I finished the research last year—yeah, last year in the summer, in July. So when I submitted my manuscript, there was a review process, right? And then that was the moment when not everybody were interested in SWIFT, in SPFS, in China’s cross-border banking—Cross-Border Payment System, or CIPS. So a lot of these alphabetic soups that everybody here are familiar with now, last year before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nobody was even interested. And one of the reviewers was even telling—had a comment there saying that, well, you know, don’t necessarily think that these are good examples that deserve to—so many real estate. (Laughs.) But and then my publisher somehow engineered it such that my—that Cambridge publication came out right on the day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was—that was—as a researcher, you probably can never hope the timing in that way. So going back to your question, Valerie, I would say I highly appreciate that you raised the question. And I respect that—highly respect that you are already getting yourself familiarized with Keynesian and all the other historically speaking alternative monetary system or monetary concept as well. So that’s all good. So keep doing what you are doing now and I look forward to continuing our conversation going forward. So your question, if I understand it correctly, so is it a good idea for the United States to shut it down, right? So I mean, if I were—I was obviously not in the policymaking room in those days, but I can certainly understand why the United States would want to maintain the dollar’s dominant currency status in the global financial system. That’s because if you are able to—if the dollar were the dominant currency, in the existing dollar—in the existing global financial system, that basically means on the one hand we can issue debt cheaply. And that literally means the U.S. Treasury is the proxy for risk re-asset. That has huge implications not just for our government debt and our physical expenditure. It also has a tremendous amount of stabilizing factor for our domestic financial institutions and the expansion of our banks in the international market. So from both public perspective and the international perspective, those are good. And the United States has, from a policymaking perspective, all our financial policymakers had their right to shut it down. Now, but if you ask this question from an alternative perspective—say, if you ask the question for—to, let’s say, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney—former governor. If you ask him, he would probably tell you, well, this is a terrible idea that the United States would shut it off, because he specifically said in 2019 at the Jackson Hole symposium, when all the major central bankers were gathered in the big hall and talking about monetary policies, he was the one standing in front of everybody saying that, well, it’s a terrible idea to have one single currency, which is the U.S. dollar, to dominate the global financial and monetary system. That is the reason why the system is not stable, hence we need to have an alternative system. Like a basket currency or something like that. So, if you ask people like him, he would be—like, be in favor of the diversity—of a more diversified global monetary system. And again, if you ask the countries like China or, for that matter, Russia or Iran, they would be way much more in favor of a much more diversified monetary system as well. And that may not necessarily, from, exchange rate perspective, exchange rate risk is an important aspect, but the more important aspect probably is from the geopolitical hegemonic power of the U.S. dollar. Which means, the U.S. sanctioning power really resides in the dollar being the dominant currency. So right now, we hear about U.S. can sanction Russia, sanction other countries. How that is being executed, it is literally being executed by our banks no longer processing the bank transactions of all the Russian banks. Hence, when people talk about kicking Russia off the SWIFT system, it’s not just that the transaction cannot go out. It literally means in practice nobody can send a message with Russian banks. Like, there was no communication. So the entire dollar system is based upon the SWIFT system, which 90 percent of the messaging to process the transactions are using dollar. And then, because the expansive power of our U.S. banks, it literally means all international trade literally has to be settled—the settlement has to be done by U.S. bank, who has U.S. dollars. And in order to access that transaction mechanism, only SWIFT can get the job done. You also have to literally tap into either the Fedwire System or the CHIPS system, which is the clearinghouse system based here in New York. So in order for this whole system—in order to have this whole system to make your dollar payment work, you literally have to maintain on the one hand a connection, on the other hand have connections with the dollar settlement system. And that’s why when Russia was kicked out of SWIFT, a lot of other countries who are not necessarily on the good side of the United States started to get worried because people used to think, well, kicking somebody—kicking some banks off the SWIFT system is almost the financial version of a nuclear bomb. It’s the nuclear option of cutting somebody from the international financial system, of which the U.S. dollar is the dominant currency, the primary invoicing currency as well. And then on the other hand, lesson learned from this sanction experience, especially from the perspective of China, is that, well, previously we’ve already laid out a lot of this planning system—meaning the infrastructure used to internationalize the renminbi, such as the China—the China’s CIPS system. Policymakers inside China started to wonder, well, since the planning is already there, it’s not too much to ask just to add additional function. So the previously, from a functional-wise, China’s renminbi payment infrastructure is really not about bypassing sanctions, because in my research I realized when—I interviewed people who actually participated in the designing of the system. And I remember talking to three people on three different occasions, and they all mentioned one point, which is without the CIPS system, the international using of renminbi, really—the user experience was really, really terrible. And the reason it was terrible was simply because there are more than two thousand of small and medium-size banks in China. You are familiar with the big four—ICBC, Bank of China and all that—but those are the major banks. More Chinese bank—more than two thousand of the smaller Chinese banks, they don’t have a direct connection with the SWIFT system. Which basically means in order to make transactions across border, it really takes time and the cost of transactions are extremely high. Therefore, in order to improve user experience, they literally had to design a system that can facilitate this cross-border transaction. But when geopolitics plays into it, especially since 2018 when U.S.-China trade war started to get really escalated to a higher level, a lot of those conversations started domestically. And then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine really accelerated this whole process. So I hope that sort of give you a broader—it’s a long answer, but I hope that gives you a deeper understanding of what has been going on, and what are the—what are the instrument—the functions of the instrument. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. I’m going to take a written question from Abraham—he goes by Abe—Borum. Dr. Liu, you mentioned OPEC within the context of NATO and the U.S. efforts to limit Russia energy policy. What are the second- to third-order effects on other sectors of global markets? And Abe is a graduate student at the National Intelligence University. LIU: Abe, that’s a great question, I have to say. And I would strongly encourage everybody here, especially our undergrad and graduate students—to think not just the first-order or direct impact, but also the second-order effect. So I appreciate this question, because then you give me a little bit opportunity to elaborate on why I think on the natural resource aspect our global economy is not necessarily heading towards the right direction. So just tie back into Abe’s question to begin with, right now since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the hydrocarbon prices, and more specifically oil prices, oil prices have been increasing. Although in recent—in recent weeks, it has relatively been stabilized a little bit, but it’s still way much higher than pre-pandemic, that would be 2019, right, Irina? 2019, right? (Laughs.) My timeline is all blurred. So I checked this morning, price might have changed slightly. But when I checked it this morning Brent today, this morning when I checked, it was trading about $88 per barrel. And remember in 2019 what the price was? That was something around—the average price in 2019, that was $64. So we are literally talking about more than $20 per barrel more expensive. And then WTI, that is, what, U.S. benchmark, right? WTI was trading at $96 per barrel – close to 96 (dollars). Like 95.99, something like that. And in 2019, Brent was trading on average $57 per barrel. So close to double. So higher energy prices, that basically would directly translate into higher production costs across the board for energy—because every sector need energy, whether it is electricity, whether it is other types of energy. So it directly translate into higher electricity prices. This is important for the United States. This is very relevant for the European Union as well. So higher production costs would literally raise the price of the output. And that is going to further exacerbate the inflationary pressure. And that is going to make the Federal Reserve, and the ECB, and the Bank of England measures to curb inflation even more difficult. And then on the other hand, I also wanted to mention that right now the added layer of geopolitics making this even more difficult. We already see this happening, which is, Biden made his trip to Saudi Arabia, but it did not get the intended consequence or intended result, which is trying to get Saudi Arabia and OPEC in general to stabilize the global oil market. And OPEC+, about a week ago, decided that they are going to cut their production by about two million barrels per day. That is about the daily consumption of, I believe it’s China, or something like that. So from that perspective, by limiting production, that is going to further—that is from a pure supply/demand perspective, right? If we hold supply—we hold demand constant and if you reduce the supply, that is going to further raise the upward pressure for the prices. So geopolitics is probably going to further put upward pressure for the prices as well. And then finally, the final point I would want to make there is that right now OPEC countries—OPEC+ countries in particular—they might be—have this existential threat, which is the net zero transition. Right now, what is most valuable for Russia, or for Iran, for UAE, for Saudi Arabia—their most valuable export comes from hydrocarbon. It could be oil. It could be natural gas. So in the long run, when the entire global economy moved to zero dependence on hydrocarbon, that basically means for Russia—that’s probably more close to 70 percent of their GDP and government revenue. That is going to be gone. Think about how the Russian economy can make up that much amount of revenue in the short run? That’s very difficult to think about, especially these days. And this can be applied for countries like Saudi Arabia as well. Therefore, these countries—these hydrocarbon-exporting countries—they have this existential threat. Which is their most valuable export might become no longer valuable in the long run. So that’s why they are—they are inherently very interested in carving a closer relationship and, more importantly, a relatively stable relationship with their stable buyers. And the buyers these days are going to not necessarily be the United States because, you’ve heard all these stories about the U.S. are energy independent and so on and so forth. But, you know, we can—that’s a different story. And when people say U.S. is very largely energy independent, there are so many reasons that argument can be rebutted. But let me just say, U.S. does not necessarily consume a lot of energy from—exported by Saudi Arabia. But who does? China and India. So right now, China’s largest energy—in terms of volume—largest energy supplier is Russia. But in terms of pure monetary value that China actually pays, and the largest receiver of Chinese money for energy, that is Saudi Arabia. Therefore, earlier this year you probably read the news about Saudi Arabia might consider allowing renminbi to pay for Saudi oil. There might be more opportunity in there, because they might be very interested, especially MBS, because of all his behaviors, might expose a lot of the Saudis individuals under U.S. sanctions. And on the other hand, China already established a renminbi denominated oil futures market. And that—although, the volume today is relatively—the volume today is relatively low, but the growth is very rapidly. So if all these major oil-exporting countries hypothetically—if they decided to suddenly switch their—the pricing of their oil overnight into renminbi instead of the dollar, we could potentially see the dollar’s pricing power and invoicing power in global trade would be diminished. And that is because the infrastructure, the facility is already there. Although the volume of renminbi-denominated oil futures is still relatively low, the plumbing is there. And once you have the plumbing there, there is no way to go back. So now what the United States should do is to make sure that everybody is still very much interested in maintaining the existing dollar-based system and maintaining the pricing of commodity using U.S. dollar. And that brings in the discussion about putting an oil price to Russian oil instead of just a wholesale sanction of Russian oil. As long as we are putting a price cap to it, that basically means we are—yes, we are hurting Russian export, but still we are allowing Russian oil flowing into the international market. That still makes the dollar’s pricing power in global commodities relevant. So from that perspective, I think it’s the right move to preserve the dollar system. But on the other hand, those countries that are not—again, not necessarily on the geopolitical good side of the United States, they do have the intention to hedge against the risk of being sanctioned. And they need the—they need buyers to buy whatever that they have are valuable today. I hope that makes sense to you. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. I’m going to take the next question, a spoken question, from Dr. Seebal Aboudounya, an associate lecturer at the University of College London. You can correct me on the pronunciation of your name. Q: Yes. Hi. The pronunciation is perfect. Thank you very much. So I have two students here from the international public policy program. And they would like to ask questions. So I will just hand over to them. Thank you. Q: Hi, professor. I’m Cici and I’m a graduate student from UCL. I’m really glad you can give me a speech and answer my questions. And I want to ask questions about Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As we all know, that Belt and Road Initiative has employment more than ten years, since 2013. And it seems as the most important foreign policy for China and their President Xi. And it has already achieved many success. So I want to ask, what’s the core purpose of Belt and Road Initiative, and how can we evaluate it? And do the countries in BRI view it in a positive or a negative way? Thank you. Q: Thank you very much. And the second student will now ask a question. Q: Hi, Doctor. My question is, what’s the future of global economy under the impact of Ukraine war, China-U.S. competition, and COVID-19? Thank you. Q: Thank you very much. LIU: All right. Thank you very much, Professor Aboudounya. And let me just being with the first question from Cici, right? Thank you very much, Cici, for asking this important question. And I’m so glad that you are asking something about BRI, because I do think it’s important for people to understand this whole Chinese initiative. You are absolutely right that the BRI is a very important Chinese foreign policy initiative. And I would even say that the BRI is—or, the Belt and Road Initiative—is Chinese President Xi Jinping, his signature foreign policy initiative during his first two terms. Now he just recently got his—as the general secretary of the party—he just got this third term. So we’ll see how BRI being played out going forward. But at least during his first term as the president of China and as the party general of the Chinese Communist Party, that was his signature foreign policy initiative, or grand strategy, if you will. So in terms of what it is and how we think about it, those are great questions. So there are very simple answer to say—to describe what BRI is. You can think about it as a global-spanning infrastructure project. So that’s what it looks like. If you just put—if you just—if we have an Excel spreadsheet and we just look at, at least all the—every single project that BRI has been doing, it’s really about infrastructure. And more specifically, more than 70 percent of BRI infrastructure projects are related to energy, are energy-related infrastructure projects. Therefore, you can also think about BRI as infrastructure orientated and combined with the idea of establishing China’s access to global energy resources. And then, if you think about it from China’s domestic perspective, why Xi Jinping decided to start this BRI initiative and what are the connections of the BRI with previous Chinese policies? I would say the reason—fundamental reason why Xi Jinping started this BRI was because of the fundamental domestic problem which is the overcapacity in China’s production sector, especially steel, concrete, and a lot of these infrastructure-related sectors. And that takes place after global financial crisis, and then China’s spending four trillion—four trillion yuan to stimulate its economy, and it created the major overcapacity issue at home. And the international economy—or international demand or demand from outside of China was not enough—or especially the Western market like United States or European market, they were not growing as fast to be able to absorb China’s overcapacity. Therefore China really have to think about how to distribute in a broader global market to solve its overcapacity issue. So Xi Jinping, in one of his meetings, he had this saying—and I think it’s very revealing, so I quote him. So he did say this, and I translate it, obviously, into English. So he said: Our overcapacity problem might be other countries—might be beneficial to other countries. In other word, we are producing a lot of this stuff that we do not use, and we are losing money. But if we are able to sell it to other countries, that might be good for them and good for us, as well. So that was—could we—if we give him the benefit of the doubt, is that a good way—is that a good intent? Sure. If we give him the benefit of the doubt, if everything he implemented perfectly, that could be mutually beneficial. And indeed, if you look at all these BRI forums or BRI summit, a lot of these are related to improve their connectedness, solve overcapacity issue, and even BR specific government-to-government level industrial production coordination fund. In other word, if government are establishing lots of money to coordinate—so much you are going to produce, how much I am supposed to produce. The idea is really to tackle the problem of overcapacity. But again, reality when you are looking at how this is being implemented, nowadays it varies. There’s a very good Rhodium Group report that you probably—if you just google Rhodium Group BRI, they have this report analyzing the BRI lending. And that’s where BRI really come into—really encountered a lot of problem. So you are probably familiar with the whole narrative of the data trap, so depending upon who you are talking to—so if you talk with—if you talk to Chinese project managers, or if you talk to Professor Deborah Bräutigam at SAIS/Johns Hopkins who runs the China Africa Research Initiative—if you talk to folks like them, they might tell you, well, you know, it’s really not about the data trap but really speaks to the fact that China is really, really inexperienced in terms of the development finance and in terms of lending, and that the reason is that they really have a limited capacity to do, on the one hand, the environmental impact assessment. Many of these—you will be shocked. Many of these projects they do not even have a real environmental impact assessment. And on the other hand, because a lot of these lendings are directly being lent out by Chinese policy banks—and more specifically, if you look at Africa, that would be China import and export bank, they have a limited capacity to evaluate all these business plans. And I remember talking to a project manager in Mali, so I asked him, have you interacted with all those folks on how you do your—how you do your bidding in order to get the money. So this person, he was very frank with me, and he said, well, I understand how the—I understand how they want the number to look like in order to give me the loan, so I just cook the numbers so that I can get the loan. In other word, there is not necessarily an internally robust risk management process in getting out of these loans. Therefore, am I surprised to see that so much of Chinese—so much of China’s BRI loan now are in trouble, like in countries like Zambia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and a couple of others.   So am I—am I surprised about that? I’m not surprised because if you followed this and if you realized that there is a lack of the internal risk management process, that’s the result you are going to get. And it is also because of the debt, combined with the contract term, which is when you are signing a contract like—it’s like, I go to the bank and I say, I am Zoe, and I bank with Charles Schwab or Bank of America. Hey, I’m going to buy a house, so how about you lend me the money. This is literally the way how contract negotiating works. And then, guess what? The banks are going to say, hey, Zoe, I do not know who you are, although you look like a good person. I do not want to lend you the money at this rate. I’m going to lend you the money, and you have to put down a collateral. So collateral is the idea that, in case I, Zoe, can no longer pay back my loan, I literally have to give up some sort of tangible asset to the bank. Now in the case of Sri Lanka, that was what happened to Hambantota. So long story short, is that combined with the collateralization of this BRI debt really feeds this debt trap narrative because, well, if it looks like you are setting the countries up to debt, and you are collateralizing their critical infrastructures, this looks like debt trap to many observers. So I can’t—I have a lot of sympathy to this debt trap narrative, but really, when we think about BRI debt and how BRI is being implemented, we really need to think about two sides: on the one hand, the policy side; and the other side is really about implementation, because without implementation the policies are only a piece of paper, isn’t it? So, I really encourage you to look more specifically into the details, and if you are interested in learning more about BRI, there are a lot of data set that are available. On the one hand, William & Mary—William & Mary have the aid data. If you just google William & Mary and google aid data, you will see their entire data related to BRI. And then the other website that—I would have to say, my colleague and I here at the Council, we have this BRI tracker. My colleague Benn Steil, he run—he had this BRI tracker. So you can take a look at that. And then the Council also published a BRI report last year—last year, right, Irina? We have a BRI Task Force report, so definitely check that out. And then finally there is also Boston University has the global policy institute. They have this China—they have a specific China-oriented research team, and they have—they also run seminars occasionally, and webinars—you can sign up for it and you can have access to their research. We also have this BRI data, so make sure that you check those out so that you can look at all the contract, you can look at what are the—where exactly—at what level project are being implemented. I hope that sort of covered the ground for that with BRI. And then go back to the other question—the other question about the future of global economy, especially the impact on Ukraine. I really appreciate this question as well because it’s—it’s really dear to my heart, too, and the research in itself is dear to my heart and to many of my colleagues here at the Council. And then, on the other hand, we also—everybody are surprised about how fast and how coherent the sanctions on Russia were able to take place. It used to be like—I myself included—like when the Europeans decided—the European Union decided, basically the next day after—following the U.S. sanctions, they basically decided that they are going to do the same. I was like, oh, gee, looking across the Atlantic, I don’t think I understand you guys. It almost feel like you guys could never agree on anything anytime soon, but now, it’s like overnight there is this agreement on sanction of Russia. I feel like, oh, this is unprecedented. So from that perspective, I do think the—Russia’s war on Ukraine, it reunited the U.S. alliance system, and from economic perspective, I think it’s very important in the sense that a lot of the economic differences that we used to have—for example, the Eurozone or, in particular, the ECB might have interest in letting the euro play a bigger role in the global system and all that. So a lot of these are—a lot of these disagreement are going to be surpassed by the priority, which is to address Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. And then on the other hand, we are also seeing that, yes, European Union, despite of their heavy dependence on Russian oil and gas—and Russian gas in particular, they are willing to participate in setting a deadline to say by this—by the end of this year we are going to phase out Russia’s—our dependence on Russian energy. And in that context, it is good for American energy industry in the sense that we can—here in the United States we can—in the context of making sure that our domestic energy security is secured, right, or we can’t export our LNG to our—to meet the need of our European allies. So that is another good aspect of it, and then in terms of—and then finally, I would—along the line of energy I would also say this probably is also going to accelerate the transition to net zero in terms of technology and putting more resources into this technology related to energy transition. That might be related to hydrogen. Canada is already exporting its hydrogen energy to Germany and German trains are now—some German trains are now run on hydrogen power. It would be cool to check it out—how it looks, right? So that means, from energy perspective at least we are seeing the realignment of this energy supply, energy demand dynamic. And because energy is so important for production and for energy growth, that is sort of a stabilizing factor. But that being said, still we are not—I am not saying that the Europeans aren’t going to—are no longer having problems. And the Europeans are still going to have problems and the IMF revised downward European growth prospect next year. They downgraded to—even further to a lower point. I believe it’s point—it used to be—it used to be about 1.3 in the energy outlook earlier in July, but I think this time—a few days ago when I checked again, there are new economic outlook. They’ve revised it down for EU—European advanced economies that it was revised down to .06 percent growth. From that perspective combined with high inflation, literally we are seeing that Europe—the advanced European economies—or broadly speaking, Eurozone as a whole—probably are going to head towards, maybe recession is a very, very harsh word, but it definitely going to run into serious economic troubles. So in the long run, this is not a good—this is not good looking. And in the short run, at least, this is not good looking, right, and in the—if we broaden the horizon back, focusing on the economy. Another factor that constrained European growth are, in particular, let’s say, the major powerhouses like Germany. A critical part of that is, they are suffering from two issues. One is their cost of electricity is simply too high, and I’m talking about this relative to—it’s much higher than the United States for sure, but they are not—they are much higher than China, as well. So China energy per kilowatt is in the magnitude of 0.002 or 0.003 magnitude. And where is Germany? Germany is something like ten times of that. We are talking about .38 per kilowatt. So that basically means if your fundamental electricity cost is high, and when energy price goes up higher, electricity price is also going to go up high, and then your entire manufacture industry is going to face a higher cost. And that, combined with demographic challenges, refugee challenges, it simply means that the government are going to have a whole lot of difficult time to deal with their expenditures. So again, both from energy perspective, from cost-of-production perspective, from the demographic perspective—aging population, refugee problem—and on top of that you probably would also have to think of—take care of the aging population, meaning added social welfare costs and pension costs, so those are—those mean slowing economy, especially on advanced economies, are not necessarily looking nice. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Isaac Alston-Voyticky, who has written a question but also said, happy to ask it, so why don’t you unmute yourself, please, and give us your affiliation. Q: Hello, my name is Isaac Alston-Voyticky. I am at CUNY School of Law and CCNY’s Colin Powell School. I am actually graduating this semester, so—(laughs)—anyway, so my question is you posed the three classic core components of economics. Would you think in the modern day, given the immaterial nature of so much of our global market and marketplace, that knowledge as the foundation of neoclassical economics, plays an equal role as a component of modern economics? And I mean that obviously in the concept that knowledge is known, unknown, real, surreal, and unreal, of course. But also, to your first kind of opening point when you said that, you know, it’s really hard for economists to model out and do predictions. When we talk about improving data sets and analysis across like IPE, international affairs, you know, implementation of international law, one of the issues we have is a lot of our economic models are still too variable-based, and that we haven’t really gone past that. So if we think about it from the quantum computing, we have X, Y, Z, and T, and that’s just your bare, you know, next level. And I would imagine we can do that if we find the right components so, hopefully—and, I mean, I don’t know what kind of answer you have, but I’m very interested to hear. LIU: Yeah, Isaac, first of all, congratulations for getting—you are in CUNY, right? And so you are right here in the neighborhood, so you know—right? So feel free to—feel free to, on the one hand definitely check out our award-winning website, and then if me or our colleagues could be of help, just feel free to stop by. And so these are two great questions obviously, and you touch upon a lot of the complaints and the frustrations that I have with modeling—(laughs)—right? So the first question, knowledge, I fully agree with you that so far our economic models have not been able to fully appreciate, or fully absorb, or fully model the role of knowledge; for that matter, even finance. Finance, at least has this term called the intangible asset when you are evaluating a firm, and therefore your mergers and acquisitions, you pay the so-called goodwill based upon how much you value the intangible asset; meaning like knowledge, expertise, and so on, so forth—so patent and all that. So from that perspective, I think the knowledge is definitely going—knowledge is definitely going to be extremely more important going forward, and I say that both—from three aspects. The first is knowledge can improve the quality of your human resources, which touch upon basically the labor force which reverts back to one of our three factors of production. And then knowledge also is necessary for technology, and that is another factor of production. And then finally the other would be knowledge, technology, and other resources. So resources, there is capital and non-capital, meaning natural resource and all that. And there are—then the confounding factor of knowledge is being played more here because better financial expertise—well, obviously, depending upon how you use it, but sometimes, financial expertise tend to run itself in trouble. It outsmart itself; it’s not necessarily good. But if we are able to—if we have better knowledge about financial market, about our debt—I go back to your second question—better data about financial market and better knowledge to improve our use of natural resources or the efficiency—improve the efficiency. Or the next day, if we all have a battery and move toward renewables—these are going to be extremely—go back to the Schumacher model—these are going to be extremely disruptive, but in a very good way. But the reason I am cautious about, you know, we may not necessarily going there overnight is because, on the one hand—technology R&D takes some time, it’s expensive, but then on the other hand, it’s just in the processing, the implementation part. It’s really—a lot of geopolitical factors plays into it because when we think about knowledge, knowledge and the technology, those are the things that we tend to think they tend to diffuse themselves, like knowledge—you exchange knowledge, and that’s the foundation of new knowledge being created. You stand on the giant’s shoulders, right? Knowledge and technology tend to diffuse itself, and right now what we are observing is, on the one hand, there are a lot of—there are a lot of export controls towards certain countries, and then on the other hand, countries like China are also—are trying very hard to lower the cost of the relatively cheaper technology, right, or the less advanced technology. And that basically means if a country can or—especially a country like China can quickly achieve economies of the scale, are able to find an alternative that is cheaper but at a lesser technology, but will still get the job done, then probably that—in the short term, it can service China and also service a lot of developing economies. But for a country like China, that is not necessarily good in the long run. And then on top of that, because of export controls, because of a lot of geopolitical tensions between China and the rest of the world, but the long-run trajectory over China’s indigenous development capacity is still there; China’s people—there are still U.S.-trained Chinese scientists going back to China, but it is going to tremendously slow China down and making it very difficult and very costly. So if we think that, for the past forty years or so—or for the past twenty years since China joined WTO, if we believe that cheap Chinese goods tend to be—tend to benefited the rest of the world in many ways, then a slowed-down Chinese economy is bad news for the global economy, probably more true than not. China is the largest trading partner for more than 120 countries in the world, so if Chinese economy slow down, that have major ramifications for the rest. And then go back to your second question with regard to, you improve the database and in terms of modeling the limitations—that’s a frustration that I have nowadays. Yes, the model themselves—oftentimes I go into a meeting, listen to a talk—especially in the econ papers, the econ paper would begin with—it’s very sterilized. You begin with assumptions, and then you talk about your independent variables, your dependent variables. Right now we are really in a world where your independent variables can be—your independent variables might be suddenly changed because of geopolitics, or because of some disruptive technology, or simply because supply chain means you used to be able to get rare earth, but then if you are Japan in 2007, you were no longer able to get rare earth reliably from China. So those are going to significantly shift your calculation. Therefore I would say, I really don’t have a good answer in terms of how to improve at researcher perspective, but hopefully, as you said, quantum computing, artificial intelligence might help us to get as much better information as possible. But that being said, quantum—a lot of these quantum computing and artificial intelligence is—it used to be the case that a lot of statistics are garbage in, garbage out. Hopefully, our AI and the quantum computing, as we train themselves, they can learn better than the human beings. I’m not exactly comfortable about saying that, but that’s my hope. FASKIANOS: I have some—a written question from Todd Barry, adjunct professor at Hudson County Community College in New Jersey. Is it possible that China would turn inwards and switch an economy to import substitution industrialization, producing all goods domestically, without imports, like Latin America tried to in the 1970's? LIU: Right, that’s a great question, and when you were asking that I was immediately thinking about the Chile and its car industry. And that was a disaster. The East Asian model, in terms of the import substitution—that’s the East Asian miracle, especially applicable to, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea to a certain extent, as well. In the case of China I would say I would be really hesitant to—in retrospect if we have this conversation twenty years down the road, I would be really, really—I would be really sad to realize that this year is the moment—or October is the—October 2022 is the moment when China started to turn inward because that is going to be disastrous for China’s long-term growth. China’s decade-long of double-digit growth benefitted from an open economy, benefitted from being able to trade with the rest of the world, and the United States actually welcomed China into the global system. Therefore I would be very, very sad to see this is the moment. Now is there a—is there the risk? I do see the risk, and I do see the narrative there, especially with President Xi Jinping’s emphasis on domestic circulation. If you think—I would argue—in my latest publication with the CFR.org, I made this argument to say the important—the dual circulation, especially the domestic circulation, it is a departure from previous going-on strategy because going out is starting from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. These are really the idea of prioritizing the international market. It’s really about using international market to develop the Chinese economy. And dual circulation is a departure from that. It’s not to totally abandon globally—the global market, but it really is—it prioritizes domestic market: domestic demand, domestic supply, domestic technology and—domestic technological innovation capacity, and making international market relatively supplementary. And if even—and Xi Jinping even—if Xi Jinping even intend to make the international market more dependent on China’s domestic market, meaning making the rest dependent more on China. So there is the narrative there. However, in practice, I don’t—I don’t see how Chinese companies are able to do this because the Chinese company—a lot of Chinese companies, especially multinational Chinese companies, they still need to have access to global capital, global technology. And although it becomes—especially on the technology side has become increasingly difficult. But it is to the benefit of the Chinese company, Chinese people, and China’s long-term growth potential to maintain an open economy. But there is the chance that might not happen, and if we think—if we do believe that Xi Jinping has a timeline with reference to Taiwan, then he—obviously, if there is a war breaking out, then obviously there will be consequences, and we can imagine Western sanctions, and that basically means the Chinese economy is going to be severely isolated from the global system. So from that perspective, right now a lot of these zero-COVID policies are very much—the way that I think about it is it could be interpreted as it’s a drill, or it’s a preparation to make sure that China is developing internal capacity to be able to absorb as much sanction shock as possible. But I don’t think that—I do not think Xi Jinping is going to make up a decision and going to make a move to Taiwan, say, tomorrow. As long as we can kick the can down the road, I think that’s good. FASKIANOS: Out of time, and I am sorry to say that we couldn’t get to all the questions, but we appreciate it. Zoe did mention a few resources that our task force on the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the Belt and Road tracker—we dropped the link in the chat, but we’ll also send a follow-up note with links to some of those things. She also does a lot of writing on CFR.org In Briefs and articles, so you should go to CFR.org. And you can follow her on Twitter at @zongyuanzoeliu. So I encourage you all to do that. This has been a terrific hour, so thank you again, Zoe. We appreciate it. LIU: Thank you, Irina, for having me. And I really do appreciate this opportunity to engage with every participant here. If I did not get a chance to answer your questions, or if you have other questions, just feel free to reach out to Irina or feel free to reach out to me. We are here, and the Council really appreciate and the—really appreciate the colleges and student, and the Council actually—we do a lot of stuff related to education, you know—not just at a college level. We also do at high-school level— FASKIANOS: High school— LIU: —middle-school level, and even—we also even have games for kids. So if you haven’t tried those out yet, just try it out. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Zoe. So our next academic webinar will be on Wednesday, November 9, at 1:00 p.m. (EST) with Lauren Kahn, who is here at the Council, on military innovation and U.S. defense strategy. And again, I just wanted to shout out. We have our CFR fellowships application deadline for educators is available. You can check it out at CFR.org/fellowships. The deadline is October 31 so it’s right around the corner. Follow us at @CFR_Academic. And again, go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org. So thank you all for being with us. Have a great rest of your day. (END)
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