Moon Jae-in

The U.S.-South Korea Joint Statement between Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol from the recent summit in Seoul highlights shared worldview between leaders and cooperation based on common interests and priorities. 

The vote for South Korea’s next president is taking place in a fractious political environment and is likely to bring a foreign policy neophyte to power.

Can South Korea’s Moon Jae-in broker a process for North Korean denuclearization acceptable to both Washington and Pyongyang?

The rapid pace of North Korean diplomacy makes it crucial that Japan and South Korea coordinate more closely on potential changes to Northeast Asian security. But they must first overcome some deep-rooted grievances.

South Korea’s megaconglomerates have helped lift the country out of poverty, but their extraordinary influence could put the health of the Korean economy at risk.

Kim Jong-un walked across the line dividing the two Koreas at Panmunjom on cue into the international media spotlight and the warm welcome of South Korean President Moon Jae-in. They chit-chatted like good neighbors at a location that has been for decades the symbolic epicenter of inter-Korean confrontation. They planted a tree together and took a tea break when they were not declaring inter-Korean peace and unity in the Panmunjom declaration. The mood was evocative of the June 13-15, 2000, first-ever inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, which opened an era of inter-Korean cooperation but did not ultimately address military tensions between the two sides or halt the North’s nuclear weapons program. How will this opening be different, and why? The answer lies in the motives of the two Koreas and the circumstances they face. Kim Jong-un’s Coming Out Party As was the case with his father Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un has effectively utilized an opening with South Korea to present a human face to the world in contrast to the usual narrative of Kim defined by growing threats and ruthless demand for political loyalty from his population. Kim emphasized in his oral remarks with Moon national unity rather than unification and was surprisingly forthcoming on his country’s economic shortcomings in line with his priority on national economic development. Kim Jong-un presented a more flexible and pragmatic face than his father despite many shared motives. Motivations for Kim to dramatically ease tensions with South Korea are manifold: To evade the massive U.S.led pressure campaign To reopen economic flows that can assist North Korea’s economic development To use South Korea as a shield against possible escalation of a military conflict with the United States Moon Jae-in’s Bid for Peace Moon Jae-in has used the summit to hit restart on peace and reconciliation with North Korea. He has tried to draw out Kim Jong-un and to bind him to an institutional process for making progress on security. The Panmunjom declaration reaffirms the contents of all major prior inter-Korean declarations, including ambitious economic pledges contained in the October 4, 2007 inter-Korean declaration between Moon’s former boss, Roh Moo-hyun, and Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il. The Panmunjom meeting builds on prior declarations in seeking to bind North Korea by institutionalizing processes for improving inter-Korean relations. Through the Panmunjom declaration, South Korea has sought to regularize inter-Korean exchanges through resumption of family reunions and the establishment of an inter-Korean liaison office at Kaesong and to jumpstart implementation of an ambitious timetable toward establishment of a permanent peace. Although North Korea has traditionally reserved denuclearization as an issue for the United States, the Panmunjom declaration mentions denuclearization as a way of teeing up preparations for the Trump-Kim summit, which Moon desperately needs if his efforts to establish peace on the Korean peninsula are to succeed. Perhaps the most serious litmus test of whether Moon’s initiative will have immediate and lasting impact involves pledges of the two Koreas to reduce military tensions. Efforts to establish confidence-building measures through a maritime peace zone in the West Sea will turn on progress in inter-Korean military talks set for the coming weeks, which in turn will require support from the U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) to implement effectively. In addition, negotiations to replace the Korean armistice with a permanent peace regime will require close coordination with the United States and possibly also with China. Setting Up for Trump and Kim The Moon administration stressed in its pre-summit briefings the importance of simultaneous progress in inter-Korean relations and U.S.-DPRK relations. By setting the ambitious goal of declaring an early end to the war, Seoul has increased the pressure on North Korea and the United States to set an ambitious schedule for denuclearization. But the comprehensive inspections and verification process needed to assure North Korea’s denuclearization will likely take much longer than the Panmunjom declaration’s aspiration to conclude peace negotiations by the end of the year. There is a need to calibrate these two processes to ensure that they do not become a source of tension between Washington and Seoul. As attention shifts to preparations for the Trump-Kim meeting, there is considerably less experience and good will between the United States and North Korea that can be used to build atmospherics for such a meeting than exists between the two Koreas. Just as Kim Dae-jung found himself exposed by a dramatic shift in U.S. policy during the transition from the Clinton to Bush administrations in early 2001, no one can say for sure where Donald Trump may go. Although Trump and Kim will both be tempted to go along with sweeping statements that mark an historic moment in relations, the two sides will have little to work with in the absence of further dramatic commitments by Kim Jong-un to embrace a process that expeditiously leads to denuclearization. For North Korea, any such steps are tied to improvement of relations with the United States, which will involve far more than just a meet and greet with President Trump. U.S. skepticism about Kim and distrust of North Korea runs deep, and will only be reversed in the context of tangible and concrete steps toward denuclearization. Moreover, the human rights issue would also likely emerge as an obstacle in Congress to full normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations that might provide North Korea with a pretext to renege on denuclearization and create fissures within the U.S.-ROK alliance.

The first inter-Korean summit in ten years could be stage-managed by Kim Jong-un, but look for South Korea’s leaders to assert a role shaping the process for denuclearization talks. Kim Jong-un will play the starring role in a self-orchestrated diplomatic drama when, on April 27, he becomes the first North Korean leader to cross into South Korean territory. The decision to go south, a bid to ease inter-Korean friction, followed the near total absence of North Korean outreach for more than seven years. Kim’s opening act came in the form of a 2018 New Year’s speech in which he proposed working with South Korean authorities to reduce peninsular tensions for the sake of a successful Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in February. The opening of inter-Korean dialogue was accompanied by Kim’s pledge to abstain from further nuclear and missile testing during negotiations. This shift from provocation to dialogue has been a hallmark of North Korean diplomacy, but so too will be a pivot back to provocation, if the North Korean leader decides to do so. Still, on the sidelines of the Olympics and in the weeks that followed, a flurry of informal talks between North and South Korean delegations allowed the countries to translate goodwill into diplomacy that moved faster than many anticipated. Kim Yo-jong hand delivered a personal invitation from her brother, Kim Jong-un, for a summit to South Korean President Moon Jae-in while attending the Olympics opening ceremony. Two South Korean special envoys, National Intelligence Service Director Suh Hoon and National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong, then visited Kim on March 5–6 in Pyongyang, where Kim pledged his willingness to pursue denuclearization and conveyed an invitation for a summit with U.S. President Donald J. Trump. On March 8, Suh and Chung announced in front of the White House that Trump had accepted Kim’s invitation to meet. The Third Inter-Korean Summit: Goals and Prospects Kim’s second act will be the upcoming inter-Korean summit, which will be the third: his father met in Pyongyang with South Korea’s Kim Dae-jung in 2000 and Roh Moo-hyun in 2007. This summit will set up the highly anticipated third act, a summit between Kim and Trump, now slated for June. In the meantime, Moon administration officials have been hard at work prepping for the Panmunjom meeting, including setting the conditions for a Trump-Kim meeting. The stakes are huge: failure could mean the return to a trajectory leading toward military conflict between the United States and North Korea (also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK).    The Moon administration hopes that Kim’s first visit to southern territory, even if only a day trip and a few dozen feet across the demilitarized zone, will generate South Korean public support for a warmer relationship with the North. Seoul will claim that this moment represents a rare, if limited, step toward reciprocity in inter-Korean relations. This is notable because inter-Korean relations under other liberal South Korean governments have been criticized as one-sided, occurring exclusively on North Korean terms and turf, and involving substantial economic subsidies just to secure North Korea’s participation. But with strict UN sanctions in place, Kim can expect no immediate economic reward for his presence at Panmunjom. A second objective of the Moon administration is to regularize inter-Korean summits and normalize peninsular dialogue. Establishing the first hotline for Korean leaders, which presumably will enable direct communication between Kim and Moon, was a symbolic move and could be particularly valuable to defuse crises. Third, Seoul is coordinating closely with Washington because it recognizes that improvements in inter-Korean relations are ultimately tied to progress in the U.S.-DPRK relationship. Moreover, North Korea has traditionally reserved denuclearization as an issue to be exclusively broached with the United States. This means that South Korea can support dialogue on denuclearization with North Korea but can never lead such a dialogue. It also means that if Moon achieves an inter-Korean summit but is unable to set the stage for a Trump-Kim summit, his efforts to reach out to North Korea will have been foiled. To achieve peaceful denuclearization, Moon needs Kim to accept a path in which the North will dismantle its nuclear program and hand over its nuclear weapons, and he needs Trump to pursue direct dialogue with Kim. A U.S.-DPRK summit will be high-risk, high-reward for both Kim and Trump, because failure could entrench their opposing stances on the nuclear issue and lead to confrontation, with no alternative pathways that could defuse it. The risk of confrontation is also the motivation for Moon’s exertions to bring Kim and Trump together, but in betting on such a summit, Moon proven to be the biggest gambler of all. The Panmunjom Agenda The agenda for the inter-Korean summit has been organized into three main areas: inter-Korean relations, denuclearization, and the establishment of a permanent peace between the two Koreas. The go-to areas for cooperation between North and South Korea involve family reunions, humanitarian work on communicable diseases, and the expansion of inter-Korean cultural and sporting exchanges, based on the model of recent inter-Korean pop concerts and sports exhibitions. However, the revival of past inter-Korean economic cooperation, including large-scale projects, such as the Kaesong Industrial Zone and the Mount Kumgang tourism project, has been blocked by UN Security Council resolutions and will remain off limits until there is tangible evidence of North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization. The Moon administration has sought to link denuclearization to the establishment of a permanent peace regime to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, which ended hostilities on the peninsula without ending the Korean War. More importantly, the Moon administration appears to have secured buy in from Trump, as demonstrated by recent statements by the president that the exploration of permanent peace arrangements has his blessing and that he intends to do something very big to solve the North Korea problem. At the same time, Seoul has been coaxing Kim toward denuclearization by insisting that a “step-by-step and comprehensive solution is required.” Moon’s goal will be to tee up a convergence of interests and a successful meeting between Kim and Trump. To achieve progress, Moon desires to institutionalize a process that reopens the pathway toward peaceful denuclearization that had been closed by escalatory rhetoric, military posturing, and rising risk of conflict in the waning months of 2017. More specifically, the Moon administration seeks to be the axle that keeps the wheels of inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK relations moving forward, quickly and in concert, toward a comprehensive settlement of peace and denuclearization. Or the wheels could hit a pothole or boulder and suffer a breakdown. How Historic Will the Summit Be? South Korean officials have played the roles of intermediary and supporting actor behind two larger-than-life personalities, one of whom is starring in his coming-out story as a nuclear-armed power, while the other wants to show his deal-making acumen by doing what no other U.S. president has done. Kim has used nuclear and missile development to expand his impoverished and isolated country’s strategic weight and meet his country’s long-standing adversary on equal footing. Trump has embraced Kim’s top-down approach by drawing him out and agreeing to meet with North Korea’s only consequential decision-maker, a first. Yet even if a huge deal, involving the resumption of steps toward denuclearization in exchange for moves toward a more normal U.S.-DPRK diplomatic relationship, is struck, there will remain many unanswered questions about how it will be implemented and how long it will take to do so. In addition, as recent U.S.-China and U.S.-Japan summits have shown, other actors and interests could either upend or abet Kim’s story line. A U.S.-DPRK deal of the sort that Trump and Moon have in mind would de-escalate future crises and avert a trajectory that leads toward military confrontation. With continued economic pressure and sustained diplomatic resolve, such a process could eventually bind Kim to a different formula for preserving security, replacing nuclear weapons with diplomatic assurances as the basis for the regime’s survival, though this would come at a high cost if it also sacrifices opportunities for North Korea’s citizens, who would remain hostages to Kim’s rule. There is also the possibility, however, that Kim will merely use this diplomatic initiative to buy time, outlast his democratic counterparts in the South, and wriggle his regime off the denuclearization hook once again, only to return in an even more costly and destabilizing form down the road. Since Kim has staged his turn toward diplomacy, this could be the ending he has in mind, but both Moon and Trump have an ending in mind in which North Korea’s nuclear threat is ultimately defanged.  The outcome will depend not only on how the well the game is played, but more importantly, on who is writing the script. This post originally appeared as a CFR expert brief here.

The first inter-Korean summit in ten years could be stage-managed by Kim Jong-un, but look for South Korea’s leaders to assert a role shaping the process for denuclearization talks.

For much of its recent history, Korea has been caught in conflicts between powerful neighbors—an experience that provides sobering lessons for South Korean leaders grappling with their country’s vulnerabilities today. Since its independence following World War II, South Korea has recovered from war, overcome poverty, democratized, and developed into the 11th-largest economy in the world. Yet sitting astride Northeast Asia’s major geopolitical fault lines, it remains existentially vulnerable: the North Korean nuclear threat continues to grow, and the war of words between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un continues to escalate. There is no ready historical template to help South Korean leaders sidestep tragedy should words turn into military action. It is no wonder, then, that South Korean President Moon Jae-in so eagerly grasped Kim’s New Year’s olive branch and invited North Korean athletes to participate in the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang as an insurance policy against disruption during the games—and with the hope that the Olympic goodwill generated would avert a return to confrontation. But with the Olympic flame extinguished at the end of the February 25 closing ceremony and the Paralympics to follow, the question is whether Moon can extend the spirit of inter-Korean reconciliation beyond a limited-time-only easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Making his gambit succeed, and forestalling a return to dangerous escalation, will require more than just diplomacy between the two Koreas. Moon must find a way to bridge the divide between Washington and Pyongyang. MISSED CONNECTION For Moon, brokering the Olympic truce proved surprisingly easy with a big assist from Kim. He failed, however, to connect his North Korean and American guests. The perceived overeagerness of his administration to roll out the red carpet for the North Koreans generated pushback domestically and internationally. Moon’s domestic critics charged that he had turned the Pyeongchang Olympics into the Pyongyang Olympics by allowing not only North Korean athletes and officials but also an orchestra, a cheering squad, and a tae kwon do demonstration team to come for the games. Those feelings were reinforced by the novelty of hosting Kim’s sister both at the opening ceremonies and at the Blue House, South Korea’s presidential headquarters. The symbolism of the fielding of a unified women’s hockey team also proved controversial among South Koreans: they could accept athletes marching together under a unified flag but were reluctant to sacrifice South Korean competitiveness on the altar of political symbolism. Read more on ForeignAffairs.com.

South Korea branded the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics as the “Peace Olympics” as part of its campaign to win rights to host the games. Just months ago, the phrase seemed empty as Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un engaged in a war of words, and the United States and North Korea appeared set to careen toward military confrontation. But Kim Jong-un has launched a momentary charm offensive with his New Year’s offer to join the Olympics and lower tensions on the peninsula for the duration of the games. The immediate challenge for South Korea's Moon administration is how to be a good host to the world, navigate fierce domestic political divisions over how to deal with North Korea, and identify an exit ramp for the U.S.-North Korean nuclear confrontation. Read more on The Hill.

South Korea hopes to solidify its image as modern and efficient as host of the winter games, but its success relies heavily on cooperation from the North.

The war of words between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in recent months has virtually drowned out the voice of South Korea, which has an existential stake in the avoidance of full-blown conflict on the Korean peninsula. But the opening inter-Korean peace talks in advance of South Korea’s hosting of the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang next month have provided South Korean President Moon Jae In with a rare opportunity. To take full advantage, Moon must overcome his country’s geographically and geopolitically precarious position in between not only the United States and North Korea, but also constrained by regional rivalries between China on the one hand, and Japan and the United States on the other. Read more on The Hill.

With about five weeks to go until the Winter Olympics in South Korea, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un suddenly appeared to reverse course. Having focused on nuclear and missile testing while rejecting conciliatory calls from the South to open dialogue, Kim in a New Year’s speech made his own offer for talks on how to create a peaceful environment for the Olympics and the 70th anniversary of North Korea’s founding. The South quickly accepted, proposing to hold talks next week. But it may not be an unalloyed success for South Korea’s progressive President Moon Jae-in, who has staked his political future on improving relations in the North. In reality, it is an attempt to put him in an impossible bind. Read more in The Atlantic.