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Is South Korea Pro-China and Anti-Japan? It’s Complicated.Sungtae (Jacky) Park is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. The history of Korea’s relations with China and Japan going back to ancient times shows that Koreans have always had a complicated, yet pragmatic relationship with their neighbors, and recent South Korean public opinion polls on China and Japan, too, have been fluctuating depending on circumstances. Current social and geopolitical trends also seem to forecast improvement in Japan-South Korea relations and deterioration in China-South Korea relations. Miscalculating South Korea’s geopolitical orientation could lead to lesser support on the part of Americans for the U.S.-South Korea alliance, less solidarity on the part of Japanese with their South Korean quasi-allies, and further emboldening on the part of Chinese in the attempt to pry South Korea away from the United States. As the Korean Peninsula has historically been the center of geopolitical competition in Northeast Asia, a nuanced understanding of Seoul’s position and perception toward Beijing and Tokyo would help all relevant parties contribute to long-term strategic stability in the region. Read more on The National Interest.
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Asia's Central Banks and Sovereign Funds Are BackEast Asia (China, Japan, and the NIEs) ran a $600 billion current account surplus in 2017. "Official" (central bank and sovereign fund) outflows accounted for about half of that. Asia's foreign exchange market intervention isn't as overt as it once was, but also hasn't entirely gone away.
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Episode 4: How Far is Japan Prepared to Go to Achieve Security?Professor Yuichi Hosoya discusses changing Japanese public opinion towards these reforms and what additional defense capabilities Japan is considering next.
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Episode 3: The Divide Between Japan and South KoreaProfessor Yoshihide Soeya describes how Japanese society has grappled with this complex bilateral relationship and how the new Korean administration might change the equation for Japan.
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Episode 2: The Competing Nationalisms of Japan and ChinaProfessor Akio Takahara explains how different strands of nationalism in the two countries have worsened tensions in recent years and how the U.S.-Japan alliance must adapt.
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A Korean View: Japan’s Constitutional Revision DebateThis blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Sheen Seong-ho is professor of international security and East Asia at Seoul National University. Most Koreans are against Japan’s constitutional reform and consider it a sign of Japan’s revert back to militarism. Personally, I do not agree with such an interpretation. I doubt that Japan has any desire to return to militarism, as its people feel that they are the greatest victims of such a past. Besides, it is unlikely that the current Japanese nation, with a super-aging population and a shrinking economy, has the capacity to become an expansionist power even if it wanted to. Moreover, Japan’s revision efforts are partly aimed at augmenting the U.S.-Japan alliance, as the Americans have long demanded for a more active role by the Japanese military to adjust what they regard as an unbalanced alliance. Considering the rapidly widening economic and military gap with China, Japan has to inevitably rely on the United States for its security protection. However, my understanding belongs to the minority opinion among both the educated intellectuals and the commoners in South Korea. The decision on whether to revise their constitution is ultimately up to the Japanese society and its political leadership. Yet, the potential deterioration in Japan’s relationship with China and South Korea—two of its closest and most powerful neighbors—that could result from the revision cannot be ignored. Angry protests on the streets of Beijing and Seoul are highly possible if the revision actually occurs. The Japanese leaders may feel futileness of trying to convince these two countries of Japan’s security interests, but should make sincere efforts in this regard. It is unclear, however, whether Japan would make such efforts, since its relations with China and South Korea have been aggravated over historical interpretations and territory issues. Japan should endeavor to improve its relations with its two neighbors, because its being perceived as a new emerging threat could destabilize East Asia. Either by misunderstanding or misled public opinion, most Koreans and Chinese consider Japan’s constitutional revision a march back to its military past. If the revision goes as planned, it could provoke or provide excuse for a new round of arms race in the region. Such a consequence will be against Japan’s national interest, so Japan should make it clear that its commitment to the spirit of the Peace Constitution remains steadfast. It should be obvious to everyone that the revision is a defensive measure and an attempt to fulfill its alliance duties with the United States. The efforts that Japan should make will undoubtedly be difficult. As for Japan’s relationship with South Korea, historical disputes on textbooks, territories, and comfort women have strained the relationship. Former President Park Geun-hye had refused to have a summit meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for more than three and half years since her inauguration in 2012. The two leaders finally met in Seoul in November 2015 which was followed by a historical agreement over the comfort women issue between the two governments in December. This was possible because Abe accepted South Korea’s longstanding demand to acknowledge Japan’s responsibility toward the Korean comfort women at the government level. Park also exercised pragmatic leadership to move on for the sake of bilateral partnership with Japan. Despite the breakthrough between the two governments, public opinions of the two countries toward each other largely remain negative, according to the most recent poll by EAI-Genron NPO for the fiftieth anniversary of Japan-Korea normalization in 2015. 72.5 percent of Koreans had negative images of Japan while only 15.7 percent had positive ones. This was mutually exhibited, as only 23.8 percent Japanese considered Koreans positively, while 52.4 percent expressed negative views. In addition, according to Yomiuri-Hankuk Daily polls, 85 percent of Koreans and 73 percent of Japanese did not trust each other. Nevertheless, both felt such an ice cold relations is undesirable, as 67.2 percent of Koreans and 67.8 percent of Japanese said that they are concerned with and want improvements to the situation. Fortunately, since the December 2015 agreement on the comfort women, the two governments have dealt with each other more prudently, avoiding provocations over historical issues. Also, despite widely shared criticism among civic groups, progressive liberals, and nationalist right wings of Korean society toward Japan’s allegedly half-hearted apology and compensation, there was no incident of mass protest or violence that was rampant during the previous government’s free trade agreement negotiations or beef imports agreement with the United States. Instead, North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and long range missile launch in early 2016 dominated news coverage of the South Korean media. During the commemoration ceremony of the March 1st mass protest against Japanese colonial rule, Park devoted most of her speech to denouncing Pyongyang for the nuclear provocation. Historical issues with Japan were barely mentioned. Since then the two countries have worked closely in their common objective to punish North Korea’s nuclear provocation with other international partners. Indeed, South Korea has enough incentives to endorse Japan’s revision in light of the aforementioned indications of positive change in the relationship between the two countries. It is ironic that Korea perceives Japan, with whom it shares same liberal democratic values, as a larger threat than China who has different values and a much larger defense budget. Although South Korea has a similar skepticism about the revision to that of China, the two countries have formed a vastly different relationship with the United States. The strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance could be a challenge to China’s national security but an insurance against Japanese militarism for Korea. In fact, Seoul wishes to seek partnership in the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system, of which Japan is already an important part, while China fiercely opposes the system. Consequently, Japan and South Korea might come eye to eye on what presents the real threat to their national security, opening up greater opportunities for collaborations to achieve regional peace and stability. Japan’s more forthcoming effort to deal with its troubled past with South Korea would greatly facilitate such a process.
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A Chinese View: The Risks of Changing Japan’s Peace ConstitutionThis blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Gui Yongtao is associate professor at the School of International Studies and assistant president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University. Japan’s constitution is facing unprecedented challenges in its seventy years of history as lawmakers supporting its revision have reached two thirds majority in both the Lower and the Upper Houses of the Diet, the threshold for proposing constitutional revision. Prime Minster Shinzo Abe has clearly stated that he would like to fulfil his longstanding goal of revising the constitution within his term. This could be the single most important legacy he wants to leave behind. Since his first term as a prime minister, Abe has been pushing forward his political agenda of “breaking away from the postwar regime,” which essentially means to break away from Article Nine of the constitution domestically and depart from the postwar world system internationally. Although he later toned down the slogan by emphasizing that it is merely about reforms of domestic systems and has nothing to do with foreign policies, he has already changed Japan’s international security posture by reinterpreting the constitution and ramming through security bills through the Diet so as to allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense. This move has effectively hollowed out Article Nine, the symbol of postwar Japan’s pacifism. Not surprisingly, many scholars and most opposition parties in Japan have been arguing the unconstitutionality of the new security laws, and a majority of the public opposes the laws. Despite such strong criticism, Abe is still determined to push ahead with his agenda on constitutional revision. Underlying Abe’s persistence is his belief that the current constitution was imposed upon Japan by the Americans during their occupation of his country and that Japan must draw up a constitution on its own. It is never a secret that Abe is a nationalist. In his first term from 2006 to 2007 his obsession with ideological campaign cost him popularity among the voters. He then learned a lesson and followed a pragmatic course after being reelected in 2012. Recognizing the difficulty to immediately revise the constitution, he shifted to the alternative of reinterpreting it. Yet he seems not content with the changes he has already made, and is pursuing the ultimate goal of drawing a new constitution for Japan. The question is what kind of new constitution Abe aims to draw. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced a new draft constitution in 2012 [PDF], which not only prescribes that Japan shall have its National Defense Forces, a full army, but also prioritizes the so-called public order or public interests over individual rights. In the same year Abe campaigned under the slogan “take back Japan” in the election that brought the LDP back to power. In this context it is not difficult to understand that what Abe wants to “take back” is the state and the army that he believes has been taken away by the American occupation forces and Japan’s liberals in the postwar years. This is really alarming because it challenges the very liberal order that the Japanese people have embraced for the past seven decades. Opinion polls indicate that a majority of Japanese people want to maintain the current constitution, worrying that revising it under the Abe administration could degenerate Japan’s pacifism. In a survey conducted by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun and TV Tokyo last May, views against constitutional revision reached 5o percent, the highest figure recorded since the survey started. In another poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun this month, 46 percent of the respondents think that Article Nine of the constitution should not be revised, while only 30 percent think it should be. Even within the LDP, many are not supportive of revising the constitution for the moment for fear that the move could further alienate a public that feels insecurity after the enforcement of the new laws that allow the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. Against such backdrop the LDP is trying to refocus the debate by placing emphasis on adding a national emergency article and environmental rights to the constitution so as to gain approvals from other parties and the public. Such tactics, however, will not blur the nature of the issue, which has always been whether Japan will maintain its pacifism. The future of Japan’s peace constitution also has significant implications for the China-Japan relationship. When the two governments mended their soured relations and committed themselves to promote a “strategic relationship of mutual benefit” in 2008, China made it clear in the joint statement that it “takes a positive view of Japan pursuing a path of a nation striving for peace and making contribution to world peace and stability through peaceful means over the past sixty years since the end of World War II.” This evaluation of Japan’s past connotes the Chinese hope that Japan continues to pursue the path of a peaceful country in the future. Such hope is indeed a critical element in determining China’s overall assessment of Japan, since average Chinese still have deeply rooted apprehensions about Japan repeating its militarist mistakes. As public opinion plays an increasingly larger role in shaping China’s foreign policy, Chinese people’s trust in Japan’s adherence to pacifism becomes essential for any improvement of the bilateral relationship. The risk is that Abe may be tempted to exaggerate China’s threat so as to justify his policy and prevail in domestic debates. In other words, he will have little incentive to improve relations with China as long as he focuses his political agenda on constitutional revision. This will deepen the mistrust between the two countries and create new obstacles to regional cooperation.
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Uncertainty Among U.S. Allies in Northeast AsiaAs tensions in Northeast Asia grow over Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuits, collective action is the only way to bring stability to the region.
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The Return of the East Asian Savings GlutOverview The combined savings of China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the two city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore is about 40 percent of their collective GDP, a thirty-five-year high. No other region of the world currently contributes more to the global glut in savings that has brought interest rates around the world down to record lows. Asia’s current account surplus—its excess of savings over investment—has increased significantly in the past two years and is now about as large, relative to the GDP of its trading partners, as it was prior to the global financial crisis. Without a policy push to bring down savings, East Asia’s excess savings will continue to give rise to new economic and financial risks, both inside the region and globally. Before the financial crisis, excess East Asian savings stoked the U.S. housing bubble and helped to create internal imbalances in the United States and the eurozone, which were sustained only through the accumulation of toxic risks in the U.S. and European banking systems. Since the crisis, the savings have contributed to bubbles and bad debts within the region, notably in China. Throughout, the need to rely on exports to offset the weakness in demand that often comes with high savings has put pressure on trade-exposed manufacturing communities in other regions, with political consequences that had been underappreciated until recently. East Asia’s surplus is all the more remarkable because it has reemerged despite two factors that act to reduce it. China’s investment remains at historically high levels and Japan’s budget deficit is around 5 percent of its GDP. Both high investment and large fiscal deficits usually absorb significant amounts of savings at home. These two surplus-reducing factors are overwhelmed, however, by East Asia’s extremely high rate of saving. To control its bad-debt problem, China may reduce credit creation and investment. To control its government-debt problem, Japan may opt for fiscal consolidation. In either case, policies that reduce domestic risks could give rise to new global risks. East Asia’s external surpluses are no longer maintained primarily through intervention in the foreign exchange market, with the result that moving toward floating currencies is no longer a sufficient policy response to the region’s trade surplus. The traditional U.S. economic agenda in East Asia—aimed at liberalizing trade, investment, and exchange rates—needs to be complemented with a push for the policies needed to bring East Asia’s savings down to a level that the region can more easily absorb internally. The adjustment should be centered on China, where exceptionally high levels of savings no longer serve the same purpose as during the country’s catch-up phase of economic development. A national savings rate that still approaches 50 percent of output increasingly implies either bubbles in credit domestically or large capital surpluses that have to be exported. Korea and Taiwan also have scope to reduce high levels of national savings by expanding their social safety nets and reducing government savings, and Japan can take steps to reduce its high level of corporate savings. Selected Figures From This Report
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U.S. Rebalance to AsiaIn her testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Sheila A. Smith discusses the roles in which the U.S. Congress can play in ensuring strong U.S. presence in the changing Asia-Pacific region.
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A Strategy for the U.S.-Japan AllianceOn January 5, President Barack Obama initiated the Defense Strategy Review, identifying Asia as a priority in future U.S. military strategy. North Korea's nuclear proliferation and China's growing military capabilities suggest new challenges for Washington. But the United States is now in an era of fiscal austerity. The debt ceiling deal worked out last August requires that nearly $500 billion be cut from projected defense spending over the next decade. To succeed, U.S. strategy in Asia will by necessity depend heavily on its allies. None will matter more than Japan. Yet U.S. strategic dialogue with Japan remains underdeveloped. Although the two governments produced a set of Common Strategic Objectives in 2005 and again in 2011, plans to realign U.S. and Japanese forces remain unfinished due to political tensions surrounding one base, Futenma Marine Air Station, in Okinawa. Political change in Tokyo not only exacerbated contention over Futenma but also delayed Japan's own national defense planning process. U.S.-Japan military cooperation after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan demonstrated the strength of this alliance. However, a sustained and serious conversation between security planners in Washington and Tokyo about the changing Asian security environment is long overdue. The United States and Japan should now look ahead to consider how to leverage their capabilities. It would be a grave mistake to allow budget cuts to devolve into the tensions over "burden sharing" that plagued the U.S.-Japan alliance in the past. Washington and Tokyo cannot afford to sit back and allow fiscal constraints to dictate their alliance planning. In today's Asia, the strategic challenges are too compelling and complex. The time has come to set priorities for military missions and to invest in the capabilities needed to accomplish them. Given the repeated tensions in Northeast Asia, the United States and Japan should formalize mechanisms for crisis-management coordination. Finally, the alliance should have a long-term basing strategy that consolidates U.S. and Japanese facilities. A Mission-Oriented Assessment The United States and Japan should concentrate on recent defense and disaster threats as they consider alliance priorities. Last year, the U.S. and Japanese militaries deployed together for the first time in response to the earthquake and tsunami disasters. While the two forces performed well together, the opportunity for real-time mobilization revealed areas where greater integration of command and communications systems could benefit both allies. Even before last year's natural disaster struck, both countries recognized their defense readiness deserved greater attention in light of Northeast Asia's changing security environment. This region has had its share of crises of late, with the provocations on the Korean peninsula in 2010 and the tensions between Japan and China over the Chinese fishing trawler in waters close to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Japan's ability to manage the consequences of Pyongyang's missile and nuclear proliferation are again being tested with the upcoming missile launch. More broadly, the United States and Japan should have a better understanding of how China's maritime activities, especially in the East China Sea, affect the efficacy of alliance defense cooperation. Three alliance missions should be given priority in a U.S.-Japan strategic review. The first two derive from the changes ongoing in Northeast Asia and have direct consequences for Japan's defense: ballistic missile defense (BMD) and maritime security. Defense against North Korean provocations is already a priority for the alliance, and it should continue to be so. The BMD mission offers several benefits for better allied defense cooperation: it has realized the benefits of shared research and development, it has encouraged a considerable enhancement in Japan's capabilities, and it has prompted Japanese officials to seriously rethink their command requirements in the case of an attack. In 2005, Japan passed a law clarifying the civilian and uniformed roles in the command and control of BMD operations. In the spring of 2009, Japan's defense minister implemented these new rules of engagement by giving the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) commander final discretion to respond to the North Korean missile test. U.S. and Japanese militaries both performed well in this first BMD operation. April's satellite launch provides the opportunity for developing an alliance crisis response plan that could strengthen the performance of missile defense in the face of increasing North Korean conventional and nuclear capabilities. A second defense priority for the alliance is to clarify the division of labor for shared maritime security missions. China's growing maritime capabilities could ultimately deny the United States access to waters shared by Beijing and Tokyo, thereby impinging on Washington's ability to assist in Japan's defense. The East China Sea merits particular attention, and the September 2010 incident provides impetus for a deeper U.S.-Japan discussion of how military cooperation could be enhanced and respective missions clarified. Already, Japan's 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines identify intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as top priorities in response to conspicuous Chinese activities in Japan's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. But maritime cooperation between the United States and Japan extends far beyond the East China Sea. Maintaining open sea lanes is a critical need for Japan, and sea-lane defense out to one thousand nautical miles has long been a declared goal. China's expanding naval reach poses new challenges for Japan's Maritime SDF and other Asian nations. Tokyo and Washington should consider how they can work jointly with other partners in Southeast and South Asia to maintain freedom of navigation. Finally, as last year's SDF and U.S. military relief operations demonstrated, the U.S.-Japan alliance can offer the Asia-Pacific region significant humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) experience and capabilities. Asia suffers from a precarious ecology, and the SDF's disaster response expertise makes it a powerful regional asset. Likewise, the U.S. capacity to offer assistance quickly rests not only on its military capabilities, but also on its growing experience with HA/DR in the region. The December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami alerted many across the region of the need for greater attention to planning for these contingencies and developing coalitions that could work effectively. A "lessons learned" assessment of U.S.-Japan capabilities would enhance defense preparedness as well as identify opportunities for regional collaboration and cooperation. The experience of the 2004-2005 Core Group (United States, India, Japan, and Australia) in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami is a valuable reference. Base Integration as a Strategic Investment A future U.S.-Japan alliance strategy cannot stop at force posture adjustments. It should address the long-term sustainability of U.S. forces deployed in Japan. Protracted political tensions over U.S. military bases not only interfere with strategic cooperation; they are also costly. The alliance cannot afford another decade-and-a-half stalemate over relocating one base. Recent efforts to adjust the relocation plan for the U.S. Marines in Okinawa are a step in the right direction, but what is really needed is a plan that will fundamentally alter the basis of the U.S. military presence in Japan. The basing structure for U.S. forces in Japan no longer reflects contemporary political realities, and it is time to bring U.S. forward-deployed forces into twenty-first-century Asia. Almost sixty-seven years ago, U.S. forces arrived in Japan to occupy what were once Japanese Imperial military bases. Today, those American bases create an impression of extraterritoriality that weakens public support for the alliance. In Okinawa, especially, the public's tolerance for the concentrated presence of U.S. bases has declined visibly despite Tokyo's efforts to increase economic benefits to host communities. Dispersing U.S. forces to more locales on the main islands of Japan would go a long way to easing political pressures. The separation of U.S. and SDF forces no longer makes operational sense either. The U.S. government should explore with Japan how U.S. forces might collocate with their Japanese SDF partners, and how base consolidation for U.S. forces in Japan can be a process that includes consolidation options with SDF and when appropriate, civilian facilities. Japan's SDF today has broad public support and strong community relations, and the two militaries should become more integrated in order to work as partners in facing the new challenges of BMD and maritime cooperation. Three considerations should guide the U.S.-Japan base review: the degree of interoperability required for alliance missions, the amount of cost-cutting that can be accomplished, and how joint management of U.S.-SDF bases can be achieved. The U.S. experience in Europe, especially in Germany, and in domestic base consolidation plans that have emerged from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure effort offer a menu of precedent from which to consider more advantageous cost-sharing agreements. In addition to joint service management practices, civil-military use of airfields should be considered. The SDF already uses this model in Japan. Japan's regional airports are vastly underutilized, and could be beneficial as the two allies consider a more dispersed U.S. military presence. Japan in U.S.-Asia Strategy The U.S. emphasis on a renewed strategic commitment to Asia signals the opportunity to identify priorities and share resources with its allies. To succeed, U.S. strategy should do more than simply define the scope and size of forces deployed in the region. If the U.S.-Japan alliance is to play an effective role, Washington and Tokyo should have an honest dialogue on how to best develop alliance roles, missions, and capabilities. The SDF, along with other allied militaries, depend on the United States to assist in their nation's defense. Japan has much at stake, and thus should play an assertive role in the development of this new strategic vision. Washington and Tokyo need a practical, operational vision for their military cooperation. Tokyo will need to consider how it wants to organize its strategic planning to better incorporate the alliance, and Washington will need to articulate how Japan factors into its new Asia strategy. A more sophisticated strategic conversation between the United States and Japan is long overdue. The U.S.-Japan alliance should become a more effective instrument in shaping Asia's future.
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The East Asia Summit and the Difficulty of Establishing a Security Regime in Northeast AsiaThe United States' membership in the East Asian Summit (EAS) may mark a new step in U.S. involvement in East Asia. But East Asian regionalism does not currently provide an answer for how to institutionalize security cooperation in Northeast Asia. In that region, the global interests of the four major powers—the United States, China, Russia, and Japan—intersect in complicated ways with the divided Korean peninsula. The fourth trilateral summit between South Korea, Japan, and China was held in Tokyo last May, and since 1997 the three countries have regularly met on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit. These meetings demonstrate the need for a region-specific political dialogue and consultation, if not an independent institutional entity. The EAS and other ASEAN-led multilateral gatherings are mainly centered on Southeast Asia and pay less attention to Northeast Asian concerns, such as the Six Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. However, it is unlikely that South Korea, Japan, and China will be up to the task of effectively addressing the challenges unique to Northeast Asia. Northeast Asian leaders at the tripartite meeting have failed to prove that subregional multilateral initiatives are more effective in addressing their needs for enhanced cooperation in finance, trade, and environmental protection, not to mention the absence of agreement on North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship and its military provocations against South Korea. This lack of progress can be explained by several interrelated factors: persistent nationalism and mutual mistrust caused by colonial history and war, territorial disputes, ideological confrontation throughout the Cold War period, U.S. engagement in the region based on a bilateral "hub-and-spoke" system, and the lack of political will in facilitating multilateral cooperation. Political and security matters are still perceived as contentious rather than cooperative. Despite these impediments to regional cooperation, the evolution of institutional arrangements in Northeast Asia is an irreversible trend. To facilitate regional security regime-building efforts, four interlinked conditions, or the "four Is," should be considered: interest, idea/identity, image, and institution. First, leaders of Northeast Asian states should identify and draw consensus on strategic interests through close and frequent consultations. In addition, they should be willing to put the interests of the region ahead of their own national interests, particularly on issues that affect the region as a whole. The second requirement is a common identity, shaped and strengthened by shared values, ideas, norms, and experiences. The role of the "epistemic community," a network of professionals and opinion leaders, is essential in conceptualizing regional ideas and identity and helping decision-makers pursue value-oriented regionalism. Third, the manner in which one state's general populace views another's will be pivotal in the establishing regional cooperation. Positive images will help reduce historical animosity and nationalist sentiment, and increase reciprocal regional communication, particularly when common interests diverge. Fourth, institutionalized cooperation is necessary to provide principles and rules for states to abide by to achieve regional objectives. However, institutional arrangements can only be meaningful if the first three conditions are satisfied. In addition to these requirements, current efforts to build a Northeast Asian security regime must grapple with two questions. How essential is ASEAN to East Asian regionalism? ASEAN states moved to an ASEAN+3 structure—bringing in Japan, China and Korea—to prove the credibility and relevance of the association, but they are anxious about their ability to remain in the driver's seat and control the future direction of the organization. To secure support for its centrality, ASEAN has sought to solidify its relationship with outside powers, particularly the United States. A second controversial question is how and to what extent the United States should be included in Asian regionalism. The current U.S. shift in policy from years of perceived indifference in Southeast Asia is related to the rising regional influence of China. Despite Beijing's eagerness for an "Asian-only" regional bloc, the inclusion of the United States in the upcoming 2011 EAS signals a shift of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis ASEAN's desire to remain central to the development of a regional architecture. While U.S. participation in the EAS is expected to balance growing Chinese influence in regional affairs, there is a risk that "smaller" regional states could be caught up in the divergence of interests between a possible future U.S.-China rivalry, as witnessed in China's expression of grave concern about the recent U.S.-led free trade pact, called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In this circumstance, making the EAS process relevant to Washington and accommodating Beijing will be a tall order; smaller states may have to choose sides. There is also the possibility that the EAS could come into a wasteful competition with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which would benefit the ASEAN+3 and the Northeast Asian community process. In this case, the question of U.S. participation could again become an issue. From a South Korean perspective, East Asian multilateral initiatives that exclude the United States would cause considerable apprehension. It is difficult for Seoul to discount its bilateral alliance with the United States, given that the success of South Korea's foreign policy relies heavily on what strategic choice North Korea makes and on regional dynamics that are mostly beyond its control. U.S. inclusion in the EAS is an important component of Seoul's regional strategic calculation. Thus, it would be difficult and undesirable to avert ASEAN centrality and U.S. involvement in the development of East Asian regionalism. But there is still a contradiction between the expanded EAS and efforts to establish a Northeast Asian security regime. Considering its geopolitical position among regional great powers, South Korea is not likely to play a balancer role. Even so, it could contribute by presenting a common regional vision and objectives and in developing strategic communications and mature negotiation skills. South Korea's initiatives and leadership in the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) ten years ago and the second EAVG launched last month are a testament to how well the country is poised to coordinate differing interests, to expand shared ideas and identity among regional states, and to play a role in the genesis of a regional institution based on open regionalism (i.e., the EAS). The newly launched Seoul-headquartered Office of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, which is composed of Japanese, Chinese, and South Korean officials, is expected to play a constructive role in managing regional affairs. Still, its success depends on whether to build a "bimultilateral cooperation framework," through which newly emerging multilateral mechanisms complement existing bilateral relations in the region. Success will also be determined by whether the character of a Northeast Asian security regime is open and acceptable to other regional groupings.
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East Asian Economic Regionalism
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Something new is happening across East Asia. A part of the world long noted for its lack of internal economic links is discussing regional cooperation on trade, investment, and exchange rates. Why has East Asia suddenly shifted from a global approach to economic issues to discussing a regional bloc? How fast and how far will the new regionalism progress? Will East Asia become a counterpart to the European Union, or something far less? What is the probable impact on American economic and strategic interests? Is East Asian regionalism something that the U.S. government should encourage or discourage? Edward J. Lincoln takes up these critical questions in this timely and important book and explores what is happening to regional trade and investment flows as he explains what sort of regional arrangements would be the most attractive for the United States, and for the world economy. An exclusively Asian form of regionalism could run counter to American economic interests, Lincoln says; the U.S. government has reacted negatively to similar proposals in the past. Instead, because trade and investment links between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and the United States remain strong, Lincoln argues that the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum remains the most appropriate institution for pursuing regional trade and investment issues.
