Macron Goes to China, Good Friday Agreement Turns 25, Iran’s ‘Nuclear Technology Day’, and More

ROBBINS:
In the coming week, Macron and von der Leyen wrap up their visit to Beijing. The Good Friday Agreement turns twenty-five. And, Iran holds its National Nuclear Technology Day. It's April 6th, 2023, and time for the World Next Week. 

 

I'm Carla Anne Robbins. Bob McMahon is off today. So we're lucky to be joined by Matthias Mattijs, the senior fellow for Europe at CFR and an associate professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in DC. Matthias has of course been on before, so welcome back.

 

MATTIJS:
Thank you, Carla. It's a pleasure to be back. Let's start with Europe-China relations. Tomorrow, French President Emmanuel Macron and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will finish their visit to Beijing, China. Although they were joined by French business leaders to talk trade, the focus has mainly been on the issue of Ukraine and China's close relationship with Russia. So what outcomes can we expect from this visit you think?

 

ROBBINS:
So, Matthias, as you know, Macron is just the latest in a line of European leaders to make this pilgrimage in recent months. Germany's Olaf Scholz met with Xi in November, and Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez was there just last week. And as you said, for Macron this visit is about both trade and Ukraine, and it's also a lot about Macron I suspect. He really could use some different visuals after weeks of protests and strikes at home against his pension reform. It's probably a great relief for him to be out of Paris right now.

 

So at the start of their first meetings today, Thursday, Macron told China's leader, Xi Jinping, that he expected him to "bring Russia back to reason and everyone back to the negotiating table in Ukraine." So here's the puzzle. Does he really believe that Xi's serious about negotiating a legitimate peace in Ukraine, or is Macron believing that he can persuade Xi to be serious about negotiating peace? We should remember that he tried to dissuade Putin from invading Ukraine and failed at that spectacularly. 

 

On trade macron is eager to do business with China. He brought more than fifty business leaders with him, and there's talk that China will announce a new order of Airbus planes during the visit. During his speech on Wednesday to expats, Macron said he did not want to believe in decoupling. That's an increasingly favored term in Washington as the U.S. pushes to cut off China's access to sensitive technology.

 

So what's really interesting about this is that Macron insisted on bringing Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission along for at least part of the visit. The Chinese really seemed less than thrilled about that, but one can see this as good alliance etiquette. I'd love to get your take on that Matthias. But having von der Leyen there also vaccinates Macron from looking too naive or too compliant. She's a real China hawk when it comes to trade in Ukraine. So we'll see if she tones that down while she's in China. 

 

As for Xi and what he wants, he seems really interested in his own decoupling. He went out of his way to say today that "China considers Europe to be an independent pole in a multipolar world," but he's really putting on the Ritz for Macron, at least. In addition to the trilateral meeting with von der Leyen, Macron is going to have hours of one-on-one boy time with Xi, a state dinner in Beijing, and then on Friday Xi is even flying Macron to Guangzhou for a very personal special dinner.

 

MATTIJS:
Yeah, we've definitely come a long way in just three years when you look at EU-Chinese relations, right? I mean, I think as all of us remember late 2020, early 2021 was the signing of the comprehensive agreement on investment between the EU and China that was hailed at the time as a great step forward in the relationship by Ursula von der Leyen. Three years later, a lot has happened, right? Sanctions from Chinese authorities vis-a-vis European members of parliament. And so this agreement has been put frankly in the deep freeze. Now, the EU doesn't talk so much about partnership anymore, but about the triumvirate or troika in its relationship, right? They indeed talk about China as a partner for cooperation and negotiation, and economic competitor, and a systemic rival.

 

And you're absolutely right, Macron as well as von der Leyen talk about de-risking rather than decoupling. It's a nuance difference, but it is a difference between how the Americans see the Chinese relationship in much more rival terms. Europeans want to do business, and as you mentioned, the EU is still figuring out what that strategy looks like, because different countries have different views. Indeed, Eastern European countries, Poland and the Baltics especially would like to see von der Leyen and the commission a lot tougher when it comes to dealing with China and bringing up other issues like human rights. But it seems like Macron will not bring up any tricky domestic issues for Xi. Is that right?

 

ROBBINS:
Well, you know what the French were saying that "he's not going to talk about TikTok." He will likely bring up the Uyghurs, but maybe softly, softly. We'll see how much he does about that. He'll probably get a lot of criticism if he doesn't bring it up. I suppose what I'm puzzled by, is he invited von der Leyen, are they going to play good cop, bad cop? Was that really the idea there? The Americans aren't thrilled about this trip. The French went out of their way to say that Macron talked to Biden before he went, but also went out of their way to say that "all they discussed was Ukraine and how much the Chinese could potentially play a role in it." I don't think they discussed the trade relationship.

 

And this is an interesting game we're playing here. The Americans want to decouple Europe from China and the Chinese seem to want to decouple Europe from the United States, and Xi's a smart guy and he knows that if he's going to start anywhere, he's certainly going to start with the amour propre of the French who like to think of themselves as autonomous actors.

 

So where does von der Leyen fit into that? I suppose she's probably leaning more toward the Americans than toward anything else right now. Am I misreading that?

 

MATTIJS:
No, I don't think you are. She has to walk a fine balance though. In the end it's clear. There's different groups of European countries who have different approaches to China. I mean, she's German herself. The German government is torn itself, given its traffic light coalition with three different parties, where the greens are more hawkish, but the social Democrats and the liberals want to do more trade and more business with China because Germany's growth model depends on business with China. The French are too. The Spanish are too. Very different when you talk to the Dutch or the Scandinavians or indeed countries in Eastern Europe. But do we expect Macron to convince Xi to start talking directly to Zelensky? Because the Chinese are a lot of talk about being a broker for peace in Ukraine, but so far they've clearly sided with Russia on this and their 12-Point Peace Plan doesn't talk much about Russian troops leaving Ukraine, so...

 

ROBBINS:
Doesn't talk much about peace.

 

MATTIJS:
No, exactly.

 

ROBBINS:
Doesn't talk much about it.

 

MATTIJS:
What do you think will happen there?

 

ROBBINS:
Well, Sánchez, when he was there, made the pitch that Xi should talk to Zelensky and got nowhere. So far, and we still have a little bit of time there, Xi's made no mention at all of that. Macron's made his pitch and Xi's been really pretty bland about the whole thing. But China's been pushing a pretty big charm offensive in Europe, and quite interesting, China's new ambassador to the EU, went out of his way, told the New York Times that the no limits description of China's Russia relationship, the term that was proclaimed by Xi and Putin, just right before the invasion was "nothing but rhetoric." So I think Xi's got some choices he has to make here. I think Macron thinks he can play on those choices, but if I had to bet in the end of the day Xi's going to stick with the Russians, but we'll have to see. Hope springs eternal.

 

MATTIJS:
Right.

 

ROBBINS:
Matthias, let's move on to a place with I hope more hope, Northern Ireland. Next Monday the Good Friday Agreement, which ended three decades of violence, the so-called troubles will turn twenty-five years old. There's a whole generation of young people, thankfully, that have grown up in a peaceful Northern Ireland, but we saw in the Brexit negotiations, which are not completed, some of the fundamental disagreements are still there. How solid is the Good Friday Agreement and what does this all say about the future of Ireland?

 

MATTIJS:
Yes, the Good Friday Agreement signed on April 10th, 1998, it really was a historic compromise after, I mean a good thirty years of what they were known as the troubles, thousands of people being killed on both sides. So the Republic and pro-Irish unification with Ireland's side that tends to be disproportionately Catholic, and then the Anglican Protestant side, that's unionist that wants to be part of the United Kingdom that treasures that relationship with England, Scotland and Wales. Of course in the U.S. we always took a deep interest in this because when it's St Patrick's Day, it feels like one in four Americans have Irish roots. And Bill Clinton, who was president at the time, took a very active interest and active role in these negotiations, right? 

 

So it's been very successful in the sense is that there's been very little violence. There's been open borders between Northern Ireland and Ireland. And also the great compromise was that anybody born in Northern Ireland could choose. They could either be Irish citizens, they could be UK citizens, or they could be both. And the EU, the fact that both Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland were part of the European Union, hugely facilitated disagreement because they were both members of the single market, meant free movement of capital goods, labor, and services across borders. So the border controls that were heavily militarized on the North-South border in Ireland were removed. So that was the great achievement. And then of course, the power-sharing agreement that gave Belfast a parliament, Stormont, that could self-govern to some extent Northern Ireland, but insisted on both communities being represented. Being from Belgium, I'm very familiar with these arrangements, right, where Flemish and Walloons have to form a parity government, a federal government.

 

So as you mentioned, Brexit complicated matters because of course it meant if you take the UK, the whole of the UK out of the single market and the customs union, you have to create a new physical border, a customs border on the island of Ireland. And so it was very clear from day one after the referendum that both Europe, Ireland and the UK wanted to avoid this, but it was always as part of a trilemma, right? You have to put a border somewhere. And so the choice that Boris Johnson finally took was to put that border in the Irish Sea, basically creating a customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of Great Britain, which created new tensions of trade between the two communities. So this was stuck for a long time, and the recent Windsor Framework agreement between Sunak and von der Leyen kind of smoothed over a lot of these frictions, these tensions; created a green lane for all the goods that had to go between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, and vice versa; and basically got rid of 90 percent of the paperwork and the regulation. 

 

So the UK seems ready to turn the page with the EU. That said, who's not happy about this Windsor Framework, of course is the DUP, the Democratic Unionist Party who represent the staunchest supporters of the union with the UK in Northern Ireland. So there's no government yet in Northern Ireland, even though there is optimism that after the local elections in a few weeks, months, this will happen. So this is the context in which President Joe Biden is flying to Belfast on late Monday evening I think.

 

ROBBINS:
There's lots of Americans going over there. And you said it on St. Patrick's Day, everybody's Irish, not just one in four Americans. So it's not just Joe Biden who's going I think for five days, which is a pretty extraordinary thing for Ireland. And Queens University in Belfast has a three-day conference which President Bill Clinton is going to be at and Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton is going to be at. Is this ethnic politics run wild or deserve victory lap for the Democrats? It can't possibly be an unrelenting passion for soda bread.

 

MATTIJS:
It's definitely a bit of a victory lap. I mean, Joe Biden is probably the most Irish American president we've ever had. I mean, we've had them before, but he is intimately aware of Irish politics.

 

ROBBINS:
More than Jack Kennedy?

 

MATTIJS:
He's definitely more aware of Irish history and his Irish ancestry than Jack Kennedy was. You're right. Five day visit the president has Irish roots on both sides. And so he will actually travel by motorcade from Belfast to the Republic of Ireland after going there. And I don't think he'll be there himself for the big conference in Queens University that you mentioned where Hillary Clinton is also the chancellor, right? And so it does feel a little bit like a 1990s reunion, right? You'll have Tony Blair there who was prime minister of the UK at the time, Bertie Ahern, who was the taoiseach for Ireland at the time, and so many American negotiators that were present at the time that are going to discuss what's the state of twenty-five years later? It's worked reasonably well, but can this Good Friday Agreement provide a kind of framework for the next twenty-five years, right, now that the post-Brexit framework and that remains to be seen, whether unionists the DUP can come back to the table.

 

Because what's extraordinary for the first time in those twenty-five years is now of course that Sinn Féin is the biggest party in Northern Ireland that had never happened before. There is of course a bit of a demographic shift that's ongoing, but so will the DUP allow Sinn Féin, their old rivals, to deliver the first minister of the next government? And how is that going to play out? We're definitely not there yet.

 

ROBBINS:
And I'm fascinated by this because when it looked like it was uncertain how they were going to resolve the whole Brexit issue, I think there were a reasonable number of people in Northern Ireland who had almost gotten past the troubles. It was all very historic, and who were sort of thinking about this, I'd rather be in the EU. I mean, how seriously do you take that sentiment, and people who are more interested in thinking 21st century terms than in nineteenth century terms?

 

MATTIJS:
Oh, absolutely. 56 percent of Northern Irish voters voted to remain in the EU, right? As of course in Scotland, 62 percent did. So this was in a way forced on them against their better wishes or their democratic wishes. That said, there is a silver lining of Northern Ireland being in its peculiar situation, because of its geography and because of history, and they agreed not to have a customs border between the north and south. Northern Ireland is in the unique position, is that it's a full part of the UK single market and a full part of the EU single market for goods. And that's one thing I think President Biden when he goes there will want to stress is this is a very appealing place to invest in, right? Belfast and Northern Ireland traditionally were lagging behind a bit, especially when you compare it to London that had attracted most of the growth. But now there is potentially, in theory at least, a great future for Northern Ireland in attracting foreign direct investment, especially from American companies given historical links between the two places.

 

ROBBINS:
So it's not all about soda bread.

 

MATTIJS:
It's not all about soda bread for sure. But let's shift to Iran, Carla. On Sunday, Iran will mark its National Day of Nuclear Technology. This is the government's chance to showcase Iran's latest nuclear achievements. The West is always alarmed by a more nuclear Iran. However, with the continuing protests over Mahsa Amini's death back in September, negotiations over the JCPOA have long been left in the dust. What can be done to handle Iran's nuclear proliferation?

 

ROBBINS:
Ah, sigh. A question for which there is no answer right now. So this marks the day in 2006 when Iran announced that it had mastered the uranium enrichment cycle, and that's the process that allows states to produce fuel for a power plant or with just a little bit more effort fuel for a nuclear weapon. And I think the Iranians will probably be the only ones who are going to be celebrating this day. And this is a really good time to talk about all the progress Iran has been making with its nuclear program while our attention has been elsewhere. U.S. Defense Department now predicts it would take Iran about twelve days to make enough fissile material for a bomb. And you'll recall this is the so-called breakout time that was the centerpiece of the 2015 nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama Administration. That was supposed to ensure that even if Iran walked away, it was going to take them a year to have enough fuel for a nuclear weapon.

 

The IAEA and the UN inspectors, which have nowhere near the full picture they're supposed to have, the Iranians shut off all their cameras and blocked access after Trump pulled out of the deal and are only now beginning to turn them on, estimated that in their most recent report that Iran now has 87.5 kilos of uranium enriched to 60 percent. The JCPOA capped it at 20 percent. And if they get up to 90 percent, and it really doesn't take a lot more effort there, that would be enough to produce potentially two nuclear weapons. So they're really hurdling ahead. The Biden Administration came in vowing to improve upon the nuclear deal. It came clear pretty quickly that they couldn't do that. Then they tried to revive it, looked like they could have a deal. Then the Iranians walked away over disagreements, over inspections. After Iran's brutal crackdown, as you said, and the fact that the Iranians were selling missiles and drones to Russia, the whole things have been in the deep freeze.

 

So what's next? There's a lot of discussions in Washington about a plan B that are rather quiet because mainly people don't know. Are we going to go back to even more cyber attacks or covert efforts to disrupt the Iranian program? Go to the Europeans and say it's time to really snap back on sanctions? Say to the Israelis, who would love to do this, go ahead with even more of their assassinations? There's always a huge risk of further escalation if you do this. And this week, Axios reported that the Biden administration has been telling allies that it's thinking about trying to revive negotiations with an offer of a freeze-for-freeze, let up a little bit on sanctions if the Iranians will freeze the program where it is. I haven't heard a lot more people say that that's what's going on, but they're certainly flailing.

 

MATTIJS:
Yeah. I wonder what you think of this. It seems like the situation in the Middle East was moving heavily in favor of Israel in this kind of Israel-Iran rivalry is that countries were lining up, the Abraham Accords were a big part of this, and then yet recently, Israel seems to have taken a turn for the worst when it comes to democratic backsliding and upholding independent judiciary and things like this, making the Israeli-U.S. relationship more complicated. And then of course, there was this deal nobody had seen coming that the Chinese brokered between Saudi Arabia and Iran, that seemed to normalize to some extent, or at least thaw difficult diplomatic relations. So what do you make of the current situation?

 

ROBBINS:
Well, I think that the Iranians and the Saudis are meeting as we speak in China today right now, and talking about reopening embassies. So that seems to be moving ahead. And you're right, the Israelis are isolating themselves, isolating themselves from Americans, isolating themselves from countries that were very eager to do business with the Israelis and to shore up the alliance against Iran. So things are not going in Israel's way, and that in turn hurts us if we see this as a rivalry with Iran. That said, nobody wants the Iranians to get a nuclear weapon. So if the United States could come up with a way to revive this nuclear program, or a way to put more economic pressure on that doesn't make it look like it's our fault, because keep in mind, the reason why this whole thing collapsed was Donald Trump, I think that they'd have a lot of adherence.

 

The Iranians are really close to having enough fuel for a weapon. The question is how long would it take them to build a weapon? Israeli and American Intelligence were always saying it would take them another couple of years, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was on the Hill last week, and he was saying a very much shorter period of time. He said, "Only takes several more months." Whether he misspoke or whether he knows something that the rest of us haven't known, that's itself even more frightening, potentially a way to put more pressure for more sanctions. I don't know.

 

MATTIJS:
So doesn't sound like there's much hope for revival of the JCPOA, as the Biden administration started out a few years ago. Is there a sense of urgency here? Because there's a lot going on, right? There's Russia, there's China. It seems like this is an administration who's desperate to be less involved in the Middle East, and yet when you hear those assessments of a breakout period that's getting shorter and shorter towards a nuclear weapon, it sounds like every time the U.S. wants to pull away, they're being sucked back in.

 

ROBBINS:
Well, that's the Middle East by very definition. The Obama Administration found that everyone finds that with the Middle East. The Biden Administration would love not to think about Iran, but twelve days to get to weapons grade fuel, a few months potentially to build a weapon. If these numbers are real, they can't afford to ignore it. So we'll have to watch and see what they decide.

 

MATTIJS:
Yes.

 

ROBBINS:
Well, Matthias, I think it's time to pivot and discuss our audience figure of the week, which our listeners can vote on every Tuesday and Wednesday at CFR_org's Instagram story. And this week they selected a more upbeat than usual topic, and we could certainly use upbeat, "Finland Officially Enters NATO." I'm sure the Finns are very relieved, and the Swedes are pretty frustrated to still be on the outside, and it probably makes Putin even crazier. So how does this affect the balance of power in Europe?

 

MATTIJS:
Yeah, it was definitely a good day for NATO. It was significant because it happened. Finland joined on the day of the seventy-fourth anniversary of NATO, of course, founded in 1949. I mean, I'm not the first one who will say that Vladimir Putin has been the best recruiter for new NATO countries in Europe. Right? I mean, what the geopolitical balance shifts is that NATO now has doubled its land border with Russia, right? Finland has an enormous border with Russia, and clearly it also underlines the fact that Russia is not really scared of NATO aggression on its territory because there's barely any Russian military presence at that border, right? Nobody in Russia seriously thinks Finland is about to invade. That said, the Finns now... invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, made them realize that they could no longer afford being neutral. And of course, you're already hinted at it. It creates a problem for Sweden because Sweden's application is being held up by Erdogan in Turkey. 

 

Of course, Finland has also been in the news because they had an election last Sunday, Sanna Marin, very popular, both I guess domestically as well as abroad; prime minister; young; very outspoken and very tough on Russia, said very clearly, "The war in Ukraine will end when Russia leaves Ukraine." Right? That's simple. That's the way to end it. So she narrowly lost the election at actually two parties, roughly about 21 percent of the vote. So that was in the news, but clearly her legacy internationally will live on because Finland joining NATO and being tough on Russia's aggression in Ukraine will continue.

 

So when it comes to Sweden, we'll have to wait, right? I mean, I think we'll probably have to wait until after the Turkish elections, which are also coming up this spring, and what happens there? If Erdogan stays, will he be able to be convinced to let them in? We'll have to see. 

 

But anyway, that's our look at the world next week. So here are some other stories that we are keeping an eye on and that you should keep an eye on. The World Health Organization, who's on everybody's radar again since Covid-19, celebrates its seventy-fifth anniversary. Myanmar and Thailand celebrate their new year with water festivals. And of course, worldwide Christians will observe Easter on Sunday, and the Jewish community is observing Passover this weekend.

 

ROBBINS:
Please subscribe to The World Next Week on Apple Podcast, Google Podcast, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts, and leave us a review while you're at it. We really do appreciate the feedback. The publications mentioned in this episode, as well as a transcript of our conversation are listed on the podcast page for The World Next Week on cfr.org. Please note that opinions expressed on The World Next Week are solely those of the hosts or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. 

 

Today's program was produced by Ester Fang, with Director of Podcasting Gabrielle Sierra. And special thanks to Sinet Adous and Rebecca Rottenberg for their research assistance. Our theme music is provided by Miguel Herrero and licensed under Creative Commons. This is Carla Robbins saying so long, and Matthias, thank you so much for coming on.

 

MATTIJS:
This is me saying goodbye. Pleasure to be here.