Beijing has tightened its grip on Hong Kong in recent years, dimming hopes that the financial center will ever become a full democracy.
Mar 19, 2024
Beijing has tightened its grip on Hong Kong in recent years, dimming hopes that the financial center will ever become a full democracy.
Mar 19, 2024
  • Indonesia
    Prabowo Wins. Does Indonesian Democracy Lose?
    Prabowo Subianto has won Indonesia’s presidential election. What will his presidency bring? 
  • Ecuador
    Can Ecuador Avoid Becoming a Narco-State
    Criminal groups have captured parts of the state. A broad political coalition must fight corruption and root them out.
  • Nigeria
    Nagging Constraints to Democratic Stability and Economic Prosperity in Nigeria
    Nagging Constraints to Democratic Stability and Economic Prosperity in Nigeria  Prepared statement by Ebenezer Obadare Douglas Dillon Senior Fellow for Africa Studies  Council on Foreign Relations Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa  United States House of Representatives 2nd Session, 118th Congress Hearing on “The Future of Freedom in Nigeria” Chairman James, Ranking Member Jacobs, and members of the Subcommittee, I am grateful for the privilege of testifying before you on the subject of “The Future of Freedom in Nigeria.” Judging by mainstream and social media commentary in recent weeks, the mood among a section of the Nigerian public has turned decidedly foul. One does not have to search far and wide for the immediate trigger. As President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who took office last May following a deeply polarizing presidential election, attempts to push through a series of market-friendly measures—the most contentious being the withdrawal of official subsidy on petrol—a predictable rise in the cost of living has sent the public reeling, with newspaper headlines dominated by accounts of everyday Nigerians resorting to all manner of desperate survival measures. In one by no means atypical example, thirty-eight-year-old Chinyere Chukwu was apprehended after arranging to sell off her two sons “due to the economic hardship in the country.” The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that as many as twenty-five million Nigerians are “at high risk of food insecurity.” For the average Nigerian, economic pain is compounded by widespread insecurity, the latter highlighted by a protracted Islamist insurgency, bandit attacks on farming communities, regular law enforcement assaults on ordinary citizens, a palpable rise in the incidence of kidnapping for ransom, and vigilante justice. The Civil Society Joint Action Group, a collection of Nigerian civil society organizations, calculates that 2,423 people have been killed and another 1,872 abducted between June 2023 and January 2024. Many killings and abductions are undocumented. On the whole, a growing number of Nigerians appear to be souring on the Tinubu administration. The fact that protesters angered by the rising cost of living have taken to the streets in central Niger State and northwest Kano State, parts of the country not particularly renowned for their activism, would suggest that the feeling of frustration is anything but partisan. What exactly is going on in Nigeria? Why is the country, yet again, in a state of agitation and terror, and to whom or what should the accusing finger be pointed? It is only right that we start with the incumbent administration. Although it came into office needing to prove a point, particularly given persistent anger at the conduct and outcome of the vote that brought it into office, the Tinubu government started off on a bright note, appearing to win over a justly skeptical public with measures and pronouncements that seemed to indicate that it had a clear idea of what to do and how to go about it. For instance, while many may have had doubts about the inauguration day decision to remove the subsidy on petrol, the lifeblood of the Nigerian economy, the broad consensus among economists and public policy experts was that the measure was needed to curtail waste and save the government from an expenditure it could ill afford. Other measures, like the signing into law of a student loan bill, the approval of an infrastructure support fund, the declaration of a national emergency on food security, and the suspension of the excise tax on telecommunication services, signaled a refreshing boldness to put the welfare of ordinary Nigerians first. However, the honeymoon between the new administration and Nigerians has been short-lived. One reason, as already indicated, is the government’s failure to arrest the nationwide bloodletting, repeated assurances to “overhaul the security architecture” notwithstanding. Across sixty-odd years of independence, rarely has the average Nigerian, regardless of location, felt more insecure and vulnerable. A second reason is the persistent gloom on the economic front, prompting a growing number of multinationals to shut down manufacturing in the country. Furthermore, reports of political graft involving ministers and other appointees of the administration have convinced Nigerians that it is likely to be business as usual. If only because of this, the Tinubu administration deserves all the indignation and criticism directed at it. Not only has it failed to take advantage of abundant Nigerian expertise at home and across its far-flung diaspora, but increasingly, many of its decisions seem motivated by a desire for political gratification. Furthermore, for an administration always quick to remind Nigerians that the country is broke, it is puzzling that Tinubu approved a revised budget in which millions of dollars were appropriated for automobiles for members of the national assembly and “renovation” of the official residences of the president and vice president respectively. The disconnect between its rhetoric and its actions is another reason for public indignation at the Tinubu administration.  Nonetheless, we should resist the temptation to put all the blame for Nigeria’s woes on Tinubu’s shoulders. If anything, the Subcommittee must understand that the rot in Nigeria runs deep, going beyond the well documented malfeasances of a single administration. Indeed, the current administration is nothing more than a continuation of its predecessors, insofar as it exhibits traits that have largely defined Nigerian political culture since independence, becoming more entrenched during the military era. I am not alone in arguing that the most consequential among these traits, and one worth emphasizing if only because it is the hub of everything that ails Nigeria as a country, is rampant corruption. It is no exaggeration to say that no progress is possible regarding security or creating an attractive economic environment for (domestic or foreign) investment without a concerted effort at tackling corruption in Nigeria. Its corrosive effects on institutions and public morale are too well-known to be recapitulated here. For this reason, I would suggest the Subcommittee take seriously the nagging problem of corruption in Nigeria, with a view to increasing material and moral assistance to entities and agencies currently involved in the challenging task of rooting it out. As a corollary, the Subcommittee should take seriously ongoing agitation by Nigerians both within and outside the country for urgent judicial reforms. Following last year’s general election, the perception that “justice” is only available to the highest bidder and that the political game is rigged has intensified, leading to increased scrutiny of the judiciary. Since there is no rule of law, never mind freedom, without an impartial judiciary, it is crucially important that the Subcommittee recognize and respond to Nigerians’ yearning for a fair-minded judiciary. Beyond the judiciary, the Nigerian state is in dire need of reform. As it is, it is nothing more than a shell of a state, a vast prebendal network held hostage by a larcenous elite. As I have noted elsewhere, it is a state that has proved adept at what it should not do and utterly feckless at what it ought to. If the Nigerian situation is so daunting, why should you care? Despite its problems, Nigeria is a supremely vibrant country, one with the potential to become the United States’ most important African political ally and trading partner. In their imagination, Nigerians already see the United States as a model of what their country can become if only it can get out of its own way—a prosperous multi-ethnic state founded on the ethos of individual liberty. From this standpoint, the well-documented success of Nigerian immigrants in the United States is hardly surprising. Furthermore, Nigeria plays a key leadership role in the West African sub-region and on the African continent. In West Africa, it is the undoubted anchor of regional political stability and, accounting for 67 percent of its GDP, the sub-region’s economic engine. Across Africa, Nigeria is widely respected for its cultural clout and energy. At this critical juncture, Nigeria needs the help of the United States to keep its best talents from leaving, reform the state, make the environment safe for investment, improve security, and expand the horizons of individual liberty. Once again, I am grateful for the opportunity to address you today, and I look forward to answering your questions.  
  • Colombia
    Complications in Colombia’s AG Selection, Plus Milei’s Electoral Reform Failure and El Salvador’s Opposition Collapses
    Colombia’s process to select a new attorney general is not going smoothly; electoral reform an early failure in omnibus fiasco; and the collapse of El Salvador’s opposition is bad news for Bukele
  • Senegal
    Democracy Deferred in Senegal
    President Macky Sall’s decision to postpone Senegal’s elections threatens the country’s democratic identity.
  • Nigeria
    Life After Weber
    What if the solution to insecurity in Nigeria is beyond the capacity of the state?
  • Argentina
    Argentina’s Struggle for Stability
    Argentina has struggled with political dysfunction and financial crises for decades. What could firebrand President Javier Milei mean for Argentina’s economy and role in the world?
  • Mexico
    Proposed Judicial Reforms Hasten Democratic Erosion, Peruvian Guns Fuel Ecuador's Violence, and Arévalo's New Cabinet
    Judicial reforms look to erode—not consolidate—democracy; Peruvian guns fuel Ecuador’s violence; and Arévalo delivers a technocratic, centrist cabinet
  • Somalia
    Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State
    The would-be independent state strikes a contrast with Somalia as a place of relative stability, and despite its lack of international recognition, Somaliland continues to push its own foreign policy.
  • Technology and Innovation
    Cyber Week in Review: January 19, 2024
    OpenAI and TikTok announce election protection initiatives; Google will change products to comply with EU DMA; Turkey blocks VPNs; CISA releases water system cybersecurity guidance; Chinese hackers attack Ivanti VPNs.
  • Democracy
    Political Hurdles on Ukraine’s Way to EU Membership
    After the 2013–14 Revolution of Dignity, which overthrew a deeply corrupt, Russian-backed regime, Ukraine declared its ambition to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community of free-market democracies. In 2019, Ukraine amended its constitution to state that its strategic objectives included membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO. Ukraine made little progress in realizing those ambitions before Russia’s massive invasion in February 2022. Since then, however, its path to the European Union has become clearer; in December, the EU agreed to start accession negotiations with Ukraine.  The process will likely prove long and arduous, and the outcome is uncertain, no matter what today’s rhetoric implies. The EU has never conducted negotiations with a country that is engaged in a war of national survival against an enemy like Russia, which looms so large in European security. Kyiv will need considerable time to bring its legislation in line with the acquis communautaire, the hundreds of rules and regulations that constitute EU law on a broad range of socioeconomic and political matters. As negotiations drag on, there is always the danger that some EU members will reconsider their support for Ukraine as they seek to form a durable security system that includes Russia. Particularly challenging for Ukraine will be meeting the criterion that calls for “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.” Despite its current self-image as a brave defender of the West’s freedom against Russia’s imperialist aggression, Ukraine has in fact made little progress in consolidating democratic rule since it gained independence in 1991: Freedom House has consistently rated it as only “partly free.”  The ongoing war will only deepen the challenge. As a rule, even well-established democracies restrict civil and political liberties during major wars, especially when national survival is at stake. National security takes precedence. During the Second World War, Franklin D. Roosevelt herded Japanese Americans into internment camps, and in 1940 the United Kingdom skipped parliamentary elections. It should then hardly be surprising that Ukraine, which is in the early stages of nation-building and has weak democratic fundamentals, has taken steps to enhance its security at the expense of democratic freedoms as the war against Russia rages. Two matters are critical markers of its democratic progress: elections and minority rights. Even before Russia’s invasion, Ukraine had passed legislation [in Ukrainian] that prohibited conducting elections in regions under martial law. Since then, the entire country has been subjected to martial law. Consequently, the parliamentary elections due in the fall of 2023 were canceled. Barring the unlikely end of martial law in coming months, the presidential elections, which should take place in March 2024, will suffer a similar fate, despite pressure from some Western supporters to hold them. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has ruled them out, arguing that they would be not only illegal but divisive, when the country needs to be united and focused on repelling Russian aggression. Polls indicate that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians agree. And no one denies the difficulties in holding elections when millions of Ukrainians are displaced, hundreds of thousands of soldiers are at the front, and Russia occupies one-fifth of the country. The absence of elections may not raise questions about the parliament’s and president’s legitimacy in the short term: Constitutional provisions stipulate that both continue to sit until their successors have been duly elected. Nevertheless, the longer the country goes without elections—which could be quite some time given that the war is currently at an impasse—the more questions about Ukraine’s commitment to democracy will mount, in both Ukraine and the West. Ukraine lacks a long-established set of democratic traditions that would instill greater confidence that at war’s end it will return to a democratic path. Rather, the risk is that the suspension of elections becomes self-perpetuating, with Zelenskyy or  future leaders pointing to a continuing massive Russian threat to justify their actions. The situation with minority rights is more complex, and fraught with even greater consequences for Ukraine’s EU membership. The largest, and most problematic, ethnic minority is the Russians, who accounted for about a sixth of Ukraine’s pre-war population and live mostly in regions now under Russian occupation. Even before Russia’s invasion, Kyiv was promoting Ukrainian language and culture as part of its nation-building process, while also restricting the avenues that Russia could exploit to interfere in Ukraine’s domestic affairs.  In February 2021, for example, Kyiv shut down the Russian-language TV stations of a Ukrainian oligarch, Viktor Medvedchuk, which espoused views that aligned with the Kremlin’s. In December 2018, with strong state support, the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) was created as a national church, with the aim of eroding the influence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which was under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The UOC enjoyed by far the greatest support of all religious communities among the Ukrainian population, but it was seen by the government as an insidious avenue for Russian influence inside Ukraine because of its close ties with the ROC and the Kremlin.   Since the invasion, pressure has only increased on Russian-language media and the UOC. Kyiv banned several political parties because of their allegedly pro-Russian sympathies. One of those parties, the Opposition Party for Life, enjoyed widespread support among ethnic Russians, especially in the country’s southern and eastern provinces, which elected forty-four of its members to the national parliament. Kyiv believed it had credible evidence that Moscow was using these institutions as cover for Russian agents, who assisted the Kremlin’s war effort with intelligence, propaganda, or other kinds of support. Pro-Russian entities were also a ready source of collaborators in occupied territories.    Because of the size of the ethnic Russian community, actions to constrain the influence of political and cultural entities embedded in it have far-reaching consequences for the overall state of political and civic freedoms in Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, Kyiv’s policies have raised concerns among Western observers about media, political, and  religious freedoms in Ukraine.    To be sure, Ukraine’s European ambitions and the EU accession process will create pressure and incentives for Kyiv to pull back from its most egregious infringements on civil and political rights—but only as long as Kyiv believes that it is making progress toward membership and the EU is not making unreasonable demands. This will require a delicate balancing act on the EU’s part. It must maintain its standards, while allowing Ukraine to taste some of the benefits of membership as negotiations progress, even if Ukraine will only get the full benefits after it formally joins.  Kyiv might otherwise lose interest and see little reason to check authoritarian impulses as it seeks to maintain national unity and squeeze out Russian influence as part of its nation-building project. Should EU negotiations drag on, it is not difficult to imagine Ukrainians asking why, while they are making such enormous sacrifices to defend their sovereignty against Russia, they should now delegate some of it to a distant Brussels, as EU membership requires, especially if doing so brings few tangible benefits and erodes barriers against Russian meddling. That would be a bad outcome for both the EU and Ukraine. Avoiding it will require flexibility and creativity in Brussels, and a genuine commitment to democracy as the foundation of nationhood in Kyiv. The effort is more than worthwhile. In the end, a free, democratic, and prosperous Ukraine anchored in the West would mark the final defeat of Russia’s aggression. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.