Political Movements

Sudanese pro-democracy protesters have been more resolute in calling for an unconditional end to military rule than many Western democracies, which have been all too willing to condone a return to the status quo ante.

Far-right extremists are attempting to incite an insurrection to hasten the downfall of what they see as a deeply corrupt U.S. government. Some could resort to deadly acts of terrorism.

Tigrayan forces' withdrawal from regions beyond Tigray, framed as an olive branch to the Ethiopian state to end the warring parties' conflict, is unlikely to have any meaningful effect in incentivizing peace.

Ethiopia's outlook a year on from the start of the Tigray crisis is increasingly dire.

The coup in Sudan shows that the military members of the transitional government were never truly committed to implementing democracy in the manner sought by protesters who forced Omar al-Bashir from power in 2019.

The eventual succession to Paul Biya, Cameroon's president since 1982, will likely prove a critical moment for Cameroon and its overlapping political and security crises.

The world should not look away from Swazis' continuing fight for democracy.

Reports of a failed coup attempt in Sudan make clear the fragility of the transitional government, which is riven by civil-military tensions.

Widespread compliance with a stay-at-home order issued by the Indigenous People of Biafra could indicate either strong support for the separatist group or fear of going against it.

The trial of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra, could have important implications for the security of Nigeria.

On June 9, following a closed-door meeting, the Northern Elders Forum (NEF) issued a public statement that the Igbo-dominated southeast should be allowed to secede from the Federal Republic of Nigeria if it was necessary to avoid a civil war. NEF spokesman Hakeem Baba-Ahmed said “the Forum has arrived at the difficult conclusion that if support for secession among the Igbo is as widespread as it is being made to look, and Igbo leadership appears to be in support of it, then the country should be advised not to stand in the way.” His statement continued that secession was not in the best interest of the Igbos or of Nigerians. Rather, all should work to rebuild Nigeria. But, blocking secession “will not help a country already burdened with failures on its knees to fight another war to keep the Igbo in Nigeria.” The statement also suggested that northerners subject to harassment in the southeast should return to the north. There was no reference to secessionist sentiment in Yorubaland, in southwest Nigeria, to which former President Olusegun Obasanjo has referred. The former president said that Yoruba secession, too, would be unwise, but that maintaining unity should not come “at any cost.” Though there is no specific reference to it, clearly animating the NEF statement is the memory of Nigeria’s 1967-70 civil war, successfully fought by Nigerian nationalists to keep Igbo-dominated Biafra in the federation; it left up to two million dead. It, too, involved massive population movements, with Igbos fleeing to the south a northern pogrom and fewer northerners leaving the southeast. In the civil war, northern elites strongly supported the nationalists. Current Igbo disgruntlement has its roots in defeat in the civil war and the belief that they are marginalized from the upper reaches of the Nigerian state. (There has never been an Igbo president of Nigeria.) Such feelings of marginalization are exacerbated by Nigeria’s nationwide epidemic of violence and economic malaise. The NEF, for its part, has responded to rising insecurity in Nigeria by calling for President Buhari to resign or to be impeached. Resignation or impeachment is a reversal of the NEF’s support of Muhammadu Buhari’s presidential candidacy in 2015. It should be noted that the NEF statement in support of allowing secession had two caveats: that there be widespread support for it among the Igbo but also among their “leadership” (not further defined). While secessionist advocates will argue to the contrary, prima facie evidence for both either way is thin. Do the views of the NEF matter? How representative is it of northern elite opinion? Buhari’s Special Adviser on Media Femi Adesina responded to its June 9 statement by dismissing the NEF as “a mere irritant” that hardly exists beyond its convener, Ango Abdullahi—a distinguished, former vice chancellor (president) of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. According to Adesina, the former vice chancellor is a general with no troops. Indeed, the influence of the NEF is hard to judge. But, its public statements attract widespread media attention. As with former President Obasanjo’s comments on Yoruba separatism, at the very least the NEF statements is an indication that rising insecurity is leading at least some of Nigeria’s elites to rethink the basis of the Nigerian state—and of the consequences of its civil war.

Nigerian Minister of Justice Abubakar Malami announced yesterday that Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the separatist Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), was apprehended abroad on June 27 and has been returned to Nigeria for trial. Kanu poses a challenge to the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari and, indeed, to the unity of Nigeria. Separatist sentiment in the South East—the heart of the former Biafra—has been growing, and Kanu appears to have some degree of popular support. If the government botches Kanu's trial and the atmospherics around it, it risks further inflaming separatism. Initial signs are not good. The government has not announced where abroad or how Kanu was apprehended, except to say that it was with the assistance of Interpol. Kanu is a British citizen and his headquarters has been in London. One source says that he was apprehended in the United Kingdom, but British authorities deny it. It seems inevitable that social media will include claims that he was kidnapped. For his initial court appearance, the security services allegedly blindfolded him, handcuffed him, chained his legs, and smuggled him in through the back door. He made no statement. Kanu was arrested in 2015 on numerous charges, including treason; he was released on bail in 2017 and then fled abroad. Since then, he has been a thorn in the side of the Buhari government, and his Radio Biafra, based in the United Kingdom, continues to advocate for Biafran independence. He is the leader of the IPOB which the Nigerian government has designated a terrorist organization. He also helped establish IPOB's armed wing, the Eastern Security Network, which has attacked police stations. In addition to pushing for Biafran independence, Kanu's rhetoric is bitterly hostile to Hausa-Fulani Muslims, especially herders moving south in search of pasture. He and other Biafra separatists denounce the Buhari government as Muslim and Fulani dominated.  For its part, President Buhari's government has long reacted viscerally to Biafran separatism. Buhari and his generation fought in the 1967-70 civil war against Biafran separatism. They were successful, but up to two million died in the conflict, mostly of disease and starvation. Biafra was quickly reincorporated into Nigeria, but many Igbos retain a sense of grievance. In the face of current rampant insecurity in Nigeria and a stalled or declining economy, separatist sentiment has been growing in the South East (Biafra) but also in Yorubaland. Removing Kanu from the picture is unlikely to set back Biafran separatism, just as the death of warlord Abubakar Shekau does not appear to have set back jihadi terrorism in the North East. Indeed, Kanu's jailing could provide the space for other Biafran separatist leaders to emerge.

Against a backdrop of growing calls for ethnically based separatism, including in former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s native Yorubaland, the former president in a speech laid out the arguments for maintaining Nigeria’s unity—though not at any cost. Speaking June 9 in the Yoruba heartland city of Abeokuta, where he lives in retirement, Obasanjo argued that Nigerians will fare better staying together: “it is better for Nigeria to remain as one indivisible nation than for each tribe to go its separate way.” The summary of his argument: “I am a strong believer of one Nigeria, but not one Nigeria at any cost, but one Nigeria where every Nigerian can feel proud that he or she has a stake in this country.” Power—that of the Nigerian state and of individual Nigerians—is the heart of his argument. Disintegration would result in successor “weak republics.” In Yorubaland, advocates for separatism look to the creation of an independent, ethnically based Republic of Oduduwa. Obasanjo argues that “if all that we have is Republic of Oduduwa for those who say so, members of that country will be diminished compared to being citizens of Nigeria.” Arguments for separatism center on the big three ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani, predominant in the north; the Igbo in the southeast; and the Yoruba in the southwest. Together they are probably a majority—though small—of Nigeria’s population, and they are by no means contained exclusively in the region where they predominate. In addition to the big three, some three hundred other ethnic groups together approach being half of the population, and they are to be found across the country. How to balance the big three and the minorities has been an issue in Nigeria’s governance since the colonial period. The consensus has been that this diversity can best be managed within a federal republic, of which only the form, not the substance, has ever been achieved. Nevertheless, Obasanjo asks what the future would be for the minorities if Nigeria were to break up into three republics dominated respectively by one of the big three. Obasanjo also reminds his audience of the chaos and bloodshed that resulted elsewhere when the genie of ethnic rivalry escaped from the bottle because of the disintegration of a larger state. He cited specific bloody conflicts: India and Pakistan, Sudan and South Sudan, and the civil wars and other conflicts among the successor states of Yugoslavia. In his speech, Obasanjo acknowledged that Nigeria is severely challenged: “any Nigerian who does not feel concerned about the challenges of this country is a human being without being human.” And, “the fact that we are not making Nigeria what God wants it to be is not the fault of God but our fault, particularly the leaders.” But, for Obasanjo, the solution is to work for a united Nigeria, not its disintegration. Obasanjo has presented the central, credible arguments for the unity of Nigeria. Some of his arguments, especially with respect to the decline of state and elite power, are reminiscent of those advanced in other parts of the world by opponents of secession, such as in Catalonia or Scotland or even among those opposed to the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union. (Often separatism is a popular movement opposed by entrenched elites.) However, Obasanjo’s focus on the dangers of ethnicity and his invoking of God is more characteristic of Nigeria than elsewhere. Throughout his career, Obasanjo has been a Nigerian nationalist. He played a prominent role in the 1967-70 civil war in which the nationalists—for whom he fought—defeated predominantly Igbo efforts to establish an independent Biafra. He was military ruler of Nigeria from 1976 to 1979 and subsequently an ostensibly civilian president from 1999 to 2007 after the nominal restoration of civilian, democratic government. During his civilian presidency, Nigeria played a highly positive role in Africa, promoting a democratic trajectory and ending conflicts. After he left office in 2007, his ambitions to remain president having been thwarted, he retained political influence, especially with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). But, that party is now in opposition, and Obasanjo’s relationship with the PDP since departing office has been fractious. He left the party in 2015 and started a new political coalition, though it has been a bit-part player in Nigerian politics. Nevertheless, he retains some political influence, and many Nigerians will listen to what he has to say. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

The Nigerian government has launched Operation Restore Peace, designed to destroy the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist group in support of independence for the former breakaway Republic of Biafra, and its security wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). According to Acting Inspector General of Police (IGP) Usman Baba, the security services are not to be constrained by human rights considerations. In comments reported in the Nigerian media, he said: "Don’t mind the media shout; do the job I command you. If anyone accuses you of human rights violation, the report will come to my table and you know what I will do. So, take the battle to them wherever they are and kill them all. Don’t wait for an order." "What another order are you waiting for when Mr. President had ordered you to shoot anybody carrying AK-47 rifle? Quote me, even a dead policeman can be tried and dismissed from the force and his family will not get his benefits." "So, don’t sit and wait for them to come; take attack to them and don’t lose your arms to criminals." So, the IGP is not only giving the green light to human rights violations, but also promising his protection for those who commit them. In addition, he is threatening those who might hang back with the loss of pension benefits! Usman is implying that he has the full support of President Muhammadu Buhari. Other reporting alleges that security services are conducting house-to-house searches in Ebonyi, Imo, and Rivers states, all with large Igbo populations. Local people are saying that the security services are rounding up young men and their family members and taking them away for questioning. IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu has dubbed the police initiative "Operation Massacre Biafrans." Usman Baba is a northern Muslim from Yobe State—long a Boko Haram stronghold. He is a career police officer. There is nothing in his background that would suggest an understanding of southern and eastern grievances and fears of the "establishment of a Fulani Caliphate." Operation Restore Peace and Baba's rhetoric would seem tailor-made to feed the revived Biafra secessionist movement and general southern and Christian fears of a Fulani-Muslim onslaught against Christians. It should be anticipated that local people will fight back viciously and the security services—as directed by Usman Baba—will respond in kind. It is to be hoped that President Buhari will repudiate Baba's rhetoric and methods, not least for the sake of the unity of Nigeria.