Shinzo Abe

Abe personally strengthened India’s bilateral relationship with Japan by enticing India, a notoriously reluctant and cautious actor in global politics, to join his vision of the Indo-Pacific.

Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was assassinated on July 8.

Two years into the pandemic, Japan has proven more effective than the United States and European countries at managing outbreaks. Still, the Japanese public has criticized government efforts, and two prime ministers have stepped down. 

While many focus on the drama of President Donald J. Trump’s meeting with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un, a far more worrisome transformation in Northeast Asian geopolitics is underway. Washington’s two allies are in a downward spiral. Japan’s announcement this morning of export restrictions toward South Korea’s tech industry is only the latest blow in the two countries’ economic relationship over the past year. In this round of antipathy between Japan and South Korea, history has taken the blame as usual. But history is not the culprit. In the Asia that is emerging, leaders in Seoul and Tokyo seem far too tempted to privilege nationalism over realism. Much of this dispute has to do with the growing role of South Korea’s courts in adjudicating the grievances of those left out of the 1965 peace treaty between Japan and South Korea. The constitutional court first became involved in 2011 when it called on the Lee Myung-bak government to reopen talks with Japan over its responsibility for acknowledging the suffering of women who were compelled to work in Japanese wartime brothels—the so-called “comfort women.” Late last year, South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled against Japanese companies, ordering them to compensate Korean workers for forced labor during the period of Japanese colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.  The Abe cabinet, frustrated at what it sees as a constant reopening of past agreements reached with Seoul, lost patience with the Moon government when it abandoned the painfully negotiated “comfort women” agreement Japan had reached in 2015 with President Park Geun-hye. Tokyo responded to the more recent Supreme Court decision on forced labor by arguing that it violated the terms of the 1965 treaty, which had been accompanied by a host of side agreements designed to address such complaints over forced labor. Where Seoul saw the courts as acting independently from the executive branch, Tokyo saw a comprehensive effort to undermine bilateral relations.  But this round of antagonism over the past had a new twist. The militaries of both countries, long quiet during these political storms, became entangled in the growing animosity. Last December, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force alleged that a South Korean naval vessel targeted a Japanese surveillance aircraft with its fire-control radar as the aircraft approached a search and rescue exercise. Where in past disputes, diplomats might have stepped in to descry the misperception, repeated meetings between the two foreign ministers only resulted in a stalemate. South Korea denied the veracity of Japanese video of the incident; Japan refused to consider limiting its surveillance activities. In the past, senior military officers, cognizant of the operational necessity of military cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, had largely sought to avoid the nationalistic impulses of their politicians. Now they became just as sensitive to perceived slights and to the hardening attitudes of their publics. Prime Minister Abe and President Moon Jae-in barely spoke during the Group of Twenty summit in Osaka, coming together only for a requisite photo opportunity. Today's announcement by Japan of export restrictions on materials used in display and semiconductor production adds another layer of animosity. This is not the first time Japan has used economics means to show displeasure. In 2015, the Abe cabinet let a currency swap agreement with South Korea expire during a period of tension. But this antipathy can no longer be isolated from other arenas in which the Japan-South Korean relationship operates. During the Obama presidency, the United States played a critical role in facilitating diplomacy between its two allies. The president organized a trilateral meeting with Prime Minister Abe and then President Park at the Hague, which jump started bilateral efforts to end a particularly difficult episode of estrangement. Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken also initiated trilateral consultations on global areas for cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan.   No such effort exists today. Differences between Seoul and Tokyo over the North Korea problem have only deepened. Japan’s interests rarely overlap with South Korea’s when it comes to negotiating denuclearization. Only in the 1990s, when Secretary of Defense William Perry led a trilateral, alliances-first approach to negotiating with Pyongyang did Seoul and Tokyo seemed to find common ground. The Six-Party Talks a decade later revealed considerable angst in Tokyo over its interests in a regional solution.  Today, Trump’s insistence on sidelining those who could reassure Tokyo and Seoul of a shared strategy has created a zero-sum outcome for U.S. allies in the region. While cabinet officials work hard to reassure allies that their interests are defended in the president’s meetings with Kim, Trump’s next steps are not always in step with what his aides predict. After the Singapore Summit last year, the U.S. president’s announcement that he was reducing U.S.-ROK military exercises—and in fact buying into Kim Jong-un’s position that they were “provocative”—may have been tolerable for the Moon administration, as South Koreans hoped for some give in the U.S. position. But the idea that allied defenses could be bargained away as part of a deal between Trump and Kim gave Tokyo chills. Similarly, Moon’s desire to relax sanctions on Pyongyang to move negotiations forward runs counter to Abe’s insistence on maintaining an international coalition to force Kim Jong-un to end his nuclear program. Tokyo has worked hard to persuade a coalition of UN members to support sanctions and work to ensure they are complied with. The United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Canada have all worked with Japan to monitor sanctions implementation through maritime patrols and surveillance. For Tokyo, abandoning this hard won international coalition would be tantamount to giving up on the UN’s role in international security—a premise of multilateral cooperation that is a pillar of Japan’s own national strategy. Seoul and Tokyo want different things from Washington when it comes to negotiating with North Korea, and unfortunately, how the United States engages with North Korea is inevitably perceived as privileging one ally’s security over another’s.   The larger difference that shapes Seoul and Tokyo’s relationship, however, is over China. On the surface, it might seem that both nations would want to double down on deterrence and on their alliances with the United States. And yet each sees the other as amplifying each other’s vulnerabilities in their long-term ability to manage China. When Seoul and Beijing join in their criticism of Tokyo’s prewar behavior, it grates deeply in Japan. To be sure, both Japan and South Korea depend on access to China’s market for their own economic success. Both also have suffered from Beijing’s use of economic pressure during critical national security decision-making processes. Seoul had to contend with direct pressure over its decision to deploy the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system, while Tokyo faced a ban on rare earth exports during its clash with Beijing over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2010. Nevertheless, Seoul and Tokyo see their long-term security differently when it comes to China. Japanese leaders can and will challenge China, but South Korean leaders see opportunity for peace in a less confrontational posture. Reunification of the Korean Peninsula, after all, will require Beijing’s acquiescence, if not approval.  Today’s deterioration in Japan-South Korea relations thus should not be seen solely through the prism of historical memory. Asia’s postwar settlements are all coming under considerable scrutiny as the balance of power shifts. Acrimony over historical legacies reflects a complex and growing array of interest groups in South Korea. Japan and South Korea seem to want to carve out separate futures.  Now that Washington’s grip on the alliances has loosened, Tokyo and Seoul seem destined to follow their own worst impulses. Bound in alliance with the United States for so long, diplomats and politicians in both capitals today seem less interested in relying on Washington to keep their differences in check, and the Trump administration has shown little interest in trying to build bridges.   Perhaps there are no bridges to be built. The desire to rewrite the postwar settlements largely dictated by the United States generations ago is palpable in Seoul and Tokyo. For so long, alliance management for officials in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul meant putting shared strategic purpose above nationalist politics. But what if our strategic interests are no longer shared?What, in fact, would happen if Seoul and Tokyo decided that their animosity was more meaningful than their affinity? What if all of our thinking about how the United States will manage deterrence and strategic change in Northeast Asia is premised on a relationship that can no longer be managed?   Perhaps this is the defining problem that will confound U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, and perhaps this presents the United States with a deeper dilemma than Kim Jong-un. It is time to confront the possibility that our allies in Asia can no longer be cajoled into friendship for the sake of strategic collaboration.  

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe designed an elaborate visit for President Trump, complete with golf, a sumo championship, warship tours, and a meeting with the new emperor and empress. But the pageantry couldn’t paper over every crack between the two leaders. The big picture: Discussions of bilateral trade and North Korea’s missile program left Abe struggling to accommodate Trump. Yet he knows how much hinges on their alliance and will do all he can to ensure Japan and the United States remain steady partners. Details: After Trump railed against the trade deficit and the “advantage” given to Japanese firms by previous U.S. administrations, Abe countered with details of Japan’s investments over the past 2 years in the U.S. market and its creation of 45,000 new American jobs. Flashback: Last September Abe agreed to begin talks for a Trade Agreement in Goods, under which Japan would offer greater market access for U.S. agricultural products while the United States would continue to welcome imports of Japanese autos and auto parts. (Both issues had been part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump abandoned early in his presidency.) Reality check: Trump's priorities notwithstanding, Japan’s manufacturers and government doubt a new bilateral deal would do much to shift the trade deficit. Meanwhile, Abe also confronted dissembling on Kim Jong Un’s recent missile tests, which Trump dismissed as acts of "a man who wants to get attention" even after national security adviser John Bolton had called them a violation of UN sanctions. In response, Abe reiterated his desire to meet directly with Kim, with missiles and abductions at the top of his agenda. What to watch: At the end of June, Abe will play host to a more complex array of state leaders at the G-20 Summit in Osaka. Trump will return, alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Though most eyes will be on Xi and Trump, Abe did propose mediating U.S.–Iran talks, an offer Trump publicly welcomed. The bottom line: Abe’s skill at maneuvering these difficult foreign relations will likely help his party at the polls this summer. A less proven leader could be harder to entrust with Japan's interests in the current climate, especially its prized U.S. alliance. This piece originally appeared on Axios.

Yesterday the Washington Post reported that Japanese government officials who tracked the metrics of the Abe-Trump relationship tallied forty-two conversations, in person and on the phone. This is an unprecedented level of communication for the leaders of the United States and Japan. This weekend’s visit by the U.S. president to Tokyo will add even more opportunity for the allied leaders to cement their partnership.  The pomp and circumstance planned for this visit by President Donald J. Trump to Japan reveals just how important the leader-to-leader approach has been to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The Japanese government has been adept at drawing out the tempestuous U.S. leader, finding opportunities to show him the benefits of the American partnership with Japan but doing so with a heavily personal touch. Few can forget the photo of Prime Minister Abe in the golf cart with the president early on trying to woo him back to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. On this visit, Trump will visit Japan’s largest and soon to be even more lethal destroyer, the JS Izumo, a nod to Japan’s growing contribution to Asia’s military balance. This visit will be no exception. President Trump will be the first world leader to meet with Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako of Japan. It will showcase Japan’s fresh start in the new Reiwa era, with a young and cosmopolitan Imperial couple in the forefront. And the setting will be, well, Imperial. Red carpet and centuries of dynastic tradition will be mobilized in the service of cementing the primacy of U.S.-Japan relations. The president will also have some fun. Sports are in the mix. Golf, of course, will be an important setting for a more intimate discussion between Shinzo and Donald. Each visit between the two leaders, whether in the United States or in Japan, has included a golf outing. Last time in Tokyo, Prime Minister Abe impressed the social media world when a video of him slipping into a sand trap and somersaulting out with grace went viral. President Trump quipped, “I said, I will not ask if that’s you, but if it was, I’m very impressed because you’re better than any gymnast I’ve ever seen.” The president will also spend time with Japan’s famed sumo wrestlers on this trip. A “Trump cup” is in the works, the first time a U.S. president will award the winner of the seasonal tournament with the prize. Expect it to be large—and gold, and emblazoned with the Trump logo. Sumo fans at the event will need to temper their feelings, however. Throwing their zabuton (seat cushions) into the ring will not be allowed, apparently.  This summit will be policy-lite, designed to highlight the strengths of the U.S.-Japan partnership rather than the wrinkles. Those wrinkles are there, however. The Japanese government will likely want to correct the notion that Washington only cares about North Korea’s ICBMs and not its shorter-range missiles that can reach Japan and other U.S. allies. Both President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo downplayed the recent North Korean missile tests, suggesting a crack in the alliance's deterrent.  Bilateral trade talks perhaps seem closest to the surface for this visit. The announcement by the Trump administration that it is postponing for six months a decision on the imposition of punitive tariffs on autos and auto parts for national security reasons pushed back a critical influence on U.S.-Japan trade discussions. Undoubtedly, Japan’s upcoming summer election makes open friction between the United States and Japan on trade an unwelcome prospect for Abe. But all eyes in Japan will be on the decision-making in Washington on trade.  Finally, and perhaps at the moment less conspicuous, is the question of Japan’s host nation support for U.S. forces stationed there. The U.S.-South Korea talks ended in acrimony earlier this year, with rumors of the Moon government rejecting absolutely a U.S. demand for a massive increase in South Korean spending. After ten rounds of talks failed, South Korea agreed to pay an additional eight percent to host U.S. troops under an interim one-year deal. Japan hosts 50,000 U.S. military personnel and provides the highest allied contribution to their forward deployment in Asia. Japan may be better positioned than South Korea going into these talks, but the timing of the talks beginning in a U.S. election year could complicate the discussion. Expect this weekend to be full of smiles, and celebration, however. Japan’s prime minister has pulled out all the stops for this visit, evidence of the continued importance of the United States to his country’s security. Abe will also show Trump the institutional benefits of centuries of Japanese tradition and history, suggesting perhaps that dignity and continuity—as opposed to disruption and unpredictability—have their merits. 

U.S. president struggling to squeeze tough deal out of Japan.

The abrupt halt to talks in Hanoi between President Donald J. Trump and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un has intensified criticism of the U.S. president’s diplomacy and its U.S. domestic implications. But there are larger regional ripples as well, and the interests of U.S. allies deserve closer scrutiny. While the failure in Hanoi to reach an agreement was a serious setback for Seoul, Japan’s immediate assessment was not terribly critical.   The initial media response in Tokyo largely reflected the U.S. reaction: was no deal better than a bad one? The answer was largely yes, and there were the inevitable questions about the diplomatic performance of the Trump administration. The government response was far more measured. Tokyo has always viewed the North Korea problem from a different vantage point. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has consistently advocated that President Trump not give in to relaxing sanctions imposed by the United Nations on North Korea (DPRK) for its nuclear and missile programs. The Japanese government has long worked with others in the United Nations to build a serious sanctions regime, and Abe worked hard to persuade the international community of the importance of unity in this effort.  Therefore, the announcement that the United States was not going compromise on sanctions must have been welcome news. Indeed, Abe, after a brief phone call with President Trump on his way home from Hanoi, announced his support for the president’s decision to end discussions over Pyongyang’s request for sanctions relief. Yet there are collateral concerns in Tokyo that will need to be considered in any future U.S.-DPRK negotiations. Three issues will shape Japanese thinking about their diplomacy going forward.  First, a negotiated denuclearization seems unlikely in the short term, and this conflicts with Tokyo’s strategic preferences. A bad outcome for Tokyo would be a deal that leaves North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities largely in place, or even worse, acknowledges North Korea’s nuclear status. Here we should expect Japan to continue to admonish the United States and others in the most strenuous terms possible the consequences of a bad deal for U.S. extended deterrence in Asia.  Second, Japan more than any other regional power must be relieved to no longer be on the receiving end of North Korean missile launches. While there was no indication in the run-up to the Hanoi meeting that the United States and North Korea had agreed to diminish or eradicate Pyongyang’s missile production facilities, the freeze on missile and nuclear testing must be welcome in Tokyo. A moratorium on missile testing was central to Japan’s own diplomacy with Kim Jong-un’s father almost two decades ago, and will likely continue to be should Japan-DPRK talks ever begin. But a moratorium on testing does nothing to diminish Pyongyang's missile arsenal, including not only ICBMs but also medium- and short-range missiles that can threaten Japan. Finally, the most difficult outcome for Prime Minister Abe from the breakdown in Hanoi may not be about Japan’s security but rather about the accountability of the Kim regime on human rights. The fate of the Japanese citizens abducted by Pyongyang remains a highly sensitive issue for political leaders in Tokyo, none more so than Prime Minister Abe. Repeatedly, President Trump and others in his cabinet have publicly committed the United States to advocate on behalf of Japanese citizens in North Korea. And yet, the president’s willingness to absolve Kim of responsibility for the death of Otto Warmbier, the American student detained and brutally beaten while in North Korean custody, must have given Tokyo pause. If the U.S. president is not going to hold Kim responsible for the fate of his own citizens, it is unlikely that he will stand firm on behalf of Japanese. Immediately following the president’s press statement in Hanoi, Prime Minister Abe held a press briefing of his own in which he said that he must now pursue directly Japan’s interests on the abductees with Kim Jong-un.  The failure of talks in Hanoi may not be a complete setback for diplomacy. It is too early to tell how this might evolve. U.S. allies will want to ensure that the Trump administration continues to consult as next steps are considered. No one wants a return to the uncertainty and danger of 2017, to be sure. But equally worrisome in the wake of the Hanoi summit is the possibility that President Trump might lose interest in trying to solve the North Korea problem.

The rapid pace of North Korean diplomacy makes it crucial that Japan and South Korea coordinate more closely on potential changes to Northeast Asian security. But they must first overcome some deep-rooted grievances.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will return to Florida tomorrow to meet with President Donald J. Trump. Much has changed since Abe’s first visit in February 2017, just a month into the new Trump administration. The Abe-Trump relationship has blossomed over the president’s first year in office, largely at the prompting of a growing showdown with North Korea. The sensitive task of how to manage Trump’s desire to renegotiate the terms of U.S.-Japan economic ties remains incomplete, however. Both leaders have been hobbled by political scandals at home and will want to avoid a summit that highlights their difficulties. Many in Japan believe that the personal relationship that has anchored the U.S.-Japan alliance throughout the tumultuous transition into the Trump administration has frayed, and Japan’s media will be paying careful attention to how Trump treats Abe and whether the relationship is resilient enough to negotiate some of the harder issues where the interests of Tokyo and Washington may not align.  To be successful, this summit needs to accomplish three things. First and foremost, Abe and Trump will need to talk about Kim Jong-un. Japan’s prime minister will want the United States and Japan to be on the same page on North Korea, and he will want assurances that President Trump will represent Japan’s interests when he meets with Kim. The surprise announcement that Trump will meet with the North Korean leader was a bit of a body blow to the Abe cabinet. Tokyo had worked throughout 2017 to ensure the U.S.-Japan alliance was militarily prepared to respond to a missile attack, at times synchronizing exercises with those of the U.S. and South Korean militaries. Pyongyang’s relentless stream of missile launches in 2017 were all aimed in Japan’s direction, and they revealed Tokyo’s vulnerability to a missile attack. Deterrence and defense were bolstered as the alliance sought to respond. Now that Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump have agreed to meet, however, Tokyo must also consider its stake in any potential negotiations over the future of the Korean Peninsula. This is a more difficult task for Japan’s prime minister. While the United States focuses on denuclearization, Japan must also consider the missile threat emanating from North Korea. Today, Kim’s missile arsenal may be the greatest immediate threat to Japan and one that Tokyo is unprepared for should conflict break out. Ballistic missile defenses will need improving, and even then, it would be hard to claim that Japan is fully protected from North Korea’s missiles. As important to the Japanese public will be President Trump’s willingness to work on behalf of those Japanese abducted by the Kim regime. Abe has been one of the most outspoken advocates on the issue of Japanese abductees, critical of the inability of past governments to get Pyongyang to account for the missing. Already, President Trump met with the families of the abducted during his November visit to Japan. Earlier this month, after the Trump-Kim meeting was announced, U.S. Ambassador to Japan William Hagerty met with the families to promise that President Trump will raise the issue of the missing Japanese in his discussions with Kim Jong-un. Second, we should expect a statement on how Tokyo and Washington see the future of the economic relationship. This is perhaps the most difficult topic of the meeting. Washington and Tokyo have yet to find a way forward on their trade relationship, as President Trump and his advisors continue to focus in on the bilateral trade deficit. While in Tokyo last fall, Trump seemed to chastise Abe for his economic accomplishments and noted that Japan would be buying more American weapons to help fix the deficit and provide more jobs for American workers. In February, Vice President Mike Pence visited Tokyo on his way to the Pyeongchang Olympic Games, but he did not hold consultations with Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, his counterpart in the U.S.-Japan Economic Dialogue. Rumor has it that the Trump administration was growing increasingly frustrated with meetings that had no outcomes. In March, Japan was conspicuously not given an exemption from the United States’ Section 232 sanctions on steel and aluminum, unlike other close partners, such as Canada, Mexico, and South Korea. This struck another blow to the idea of a special Trump-Abe relationship.  Coming into the summit, therefore, Abe will need to find a way to address these economic irritations, yet there is little evidence that Tokyo is interested in a bilateral free trade agreement. Instead, Abe is likely to offer a framework for the United States and Japan that looks a lot like what was negotiated in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Only this year, the TPP has evolved, largely because of Abe’s leadership, to become a Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)—otherwise known as the TPP-11—agreed upon without the United States. Intriguing in the run up to this week’s summit was the president’s instruction to Lighthizer and the new director of the National Economic Council, Larry Kudlow, to review the U.S. interests in the TPP, although Trump continued to tweet about the need for an agreement on trade with Japan. Finally, both Abe and Trump need a political boost. The Abe cabinet’s approval rating percentages have dipped precariously into the thirties after new discoveries about the government’s handling of two suspicious cases of favorable treatment involving the prime minister and his wife. One scandal has it that a rightist kindergarten was given a discounted rate in a government land deal. The school claims political backing from Abe’s wife, who has denied knowledge of the details of the land sale. In the other, a friend of the prime minister’s was supposedly given preferential treatment to open a veterinary school in Ehime Prefecture. Neither of these cases has produced evidence of direct involvement by Abe, but both have exposed corrupt practices by bureaucrats trying to court favor with the prime minister’s staff. The Ministry of Finance doctored documents once the scandal broke in the land sale to the kindergarten, and the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology was responsible for the alleged favoritism displayed in the veterinary school case. The prime minister has repeatedly stated that he will take full responsibility should it be proven that his office was involved. President Trump, on the other hand, has his own ongoing political tempest, and his own approval ratings at about 40 percent are only marginally better than Abe’s. Coinciding with the release of former FBI Director James Comey’s new book and the President’s Twitter response to it, the summit will likely be overshadowed by Trump’s distractions at home. There are also other foreign policy priorities for Washington. The air strike in Syria has set off a round of questioning of the Trump administration’s strategy in Syria, particularly its increasingly confrontational approach to Russia. Simmering in the background, of course, is the administration’s rising threat of a trade war with China. Abe will want to talk about these foreign policy challenges and will have thoughts of his own on how Japan sees both the Syrian civil war and the possibility of a trade war with Beijing. Worsening U.S. relations with Moscow also limit Abe’s ability to negotiate a peace treaty with Russian leader Vladimir Putin—a project that has stalled as Russia’s relations with Europe and the United States have worsened. Once again, the golf course beckons. Abe will want a success story at Mar-A-Lago to bolster his approval rating back home and to ensure that the alliance with the United States is still Japan’s best bet for security. He will urge caution with Kim Jong-un and a broad-minded approach to regional trade. President Trump too might like a bit of positive news. He will need to listen carefully to Abe’s worries about the summit with Kim, and he will need to find a good approach to claiming victory on trade with Japan. Both will want to spend time away from cameras, trying to resolve their differences and putting a strong statesman-like face on as they struggle through this increasingly fraught era.  

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has introduced an audacious set of economic policies designed to spur the country out of its decades-long deflationary slump. The results have so far been mixed.