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Radicalization and Extremism

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  • Radicalization and Extremism
    Reporting on Extremist Activity
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    Dana Coester, editor-in-chief at 100 Days in Appalachia, shares best practices for reporting on extremist activity at the local level. Bruce Hoffman, Shelby Cullom and Kathryn W. Davis senior fellow on counterterrorism and homeland security at CFR, provides context and background on domestic terrorism and extremist groups. Carla Anne Robbins, adjunct senior fellow at CFR and former deputy editorial page editor at the New York Times, hosts the webinar.   FASKIANOS: Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Local Journalists webinar. Today we will discuss best practices for reporting on extremist activity with Dana Coester, Bruce Hoffman, and our host, Carla Anne Robbins. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach at the Council on Foreign Relations. As you may know, CFR is an independent, nonpartisan organization and think tank focusing on U.S. foreign policy. This webinar is part of CFR's Local Journalists initiative created to help you connect the local issues you cover in your communities to national and international dynamics. Our programming puts you in touch with CFR resources and expertise on issues of global interests and provides a forum for sharing best practices. So, thank you all for taking the time to join us. This webinar is on the record. The video and transcript will be posted on our website after the fact at CFR.org/localjournalists.   So now to introduce our speakers. Dana Coester is the editor in chief of 100 Days in Appalachia. She's also the creative director of West Virginia University's Media Innovation Center and leads the center's Innovators-in-Residence program. She is presently directing a documentary film, Raised by Wolves, about youth and online hate in Appalachia. Bruce Hoffman is a senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at CFR and a professor at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He was previously the corporate chair in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation, and he was appointed by Congress to serve as a commissioner on the FBI's 9/11 Review Commission and was lead author of the final report. And last but not least, Carla Anne Robbins. She's an adjunct senior fellow at CFR. She is faculty director of the master of international affairs program and clinical professor of national security studies at Baruch College's Marxe School of Public and International Affairs. Previously, she was deputy editorial page editor at the New York Times and chief diplomatic correspondent at the Wall Street Journal. So welcome to you all. I'm going to turn it over to Carla to have this conversation, and then we'll come back to all of you for your questions and comments. So Carla, over to you.   ROBBINS: Thank you, Irina, so much. Thank you, Dana and Bruce, for joining us. And thank you to everybody for joining us today. We know you have many choices of Zoom conversations as well as deadlines to deal with. This is a very important topic obviously for the survival of our democracy as well as the challenges of reporting. So I very much appreciate everybody being here and very much appreciate what my colleagues are doing out there in coverage every day under very challenging circumstances. So we watched Charlottesville and the January 6 attack on the Capitol unfold with horror, and I am eager to hear from Dana and all of our colleagues because this is going to be a conversation among all of us today about what's going on in our communities. But I'd like to start today's discussion with some sense of the national scale and the nature of the problem of domestic extremism—what we know and what we don't and why we don't know more.   So in March, FBI Director Chris Wray told the Senate committee that domestic terrorism was quote “metastasizing across the country,” and he said the number of domestic terrorism investigations at the FBI had risen to two thousand since 2017 when he took over the Bureau. But he didn't provide any more precision about it. The New York Times has reported that the Bureau opened more than four hundred domestic terrorism investigations in 2020 and forty cases into possible adherence of far-left groups that are known collectively as antifa. I can never say it without thinking about Trump going “an-ti-fa.” And another forty into the Boogaloo, a far-right movement seeking to incite a civil war. Meanwhile, in mid-May, Attorney General Merrick Garland and Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas told the Senate that the greatest domestic threat facing the United States came from what they called quote “racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, specifically those who advocate for the superiority of the white race.” So with that context, which I think is very important interpretively but sort of weak on data, Bruce, if I may begin with you, do we have any more granularity on the scale, location, strength, and threat posed by domestic extremist groups? And why isn't Wray telling us more?   HOFFMAN: The short answer is no. And I think one reason that Director Wray [inaudible] and one reason [inaudible] no more is that the federal government really doesn't collect statistics on what we naturally call domestic terrorism but also all sorts of other phrases and terms. We rely basically, or at least in my research, I rely on the Anti-Defamation League that has followed this for decades. I think it has very solid collection figures—Southern Poverty Law Center. There's any number of other research institutions in the Pacific Northwest, for example, that monitor this. And they all have different means of collection. They all have different definitions, so we have no clear picture. And that's, I find, very frustrating and, of course, very different compared to international terrorism where we often do have that precision.   ROBBINS: And scale? I mean, those two numbers that Wray used, I mean, and does scale perhaps not matter? I mean, you know, all those years of the Journal, I like numbers.   HOFFMAN: Well, the New York Times last September, I think authoritatively, put the figure of members of militias, which is only one dimension of this. And that's the other problem. Let me answer your first question. We're not talking about something that's either homogeneous or that's monolithic. We're talking about something that's very disparate and very diffused and often quite amorphous. And in an era of social media, it creeps behind the scenes. But the New York Times put the number of armed militiamen at twenty-five thousand. My colleague at American University who I think is one of the best researchers in this field, Cynthia Miller-Idriss, in a recent book, Hate in the Homeland, put the figure of white supremacists, militia members, anti-government extremists willing or at least expressing interest in committing violence at upwards of seventy-five thousand. We don't know. I'll throw one thing out that worries me, which is more anecdotal, and you've asked for hard evidence. But I have found in multiple states now, you know, in gun stores and sporting goods stores, they're cleaned out of assault rifles, semi-automatic pistols, and especially of factory-manufactured ammunition. This has been the case since March. But when I throw out numbers of militiamen or members of violent extremists, one has to assume that there's plenty of, unfortunately, weaponry and ammunition available that I think exceeds what might normally be associated with either hunting or sportsmen or home defense.   ROBBINS: So, that's scary. So, we'll come back to more about that. But why does the FBI not track the numbers?   HOFFMAN: Well, there's no domestic terrorism statute, and this is a source of controversy. You could have multiple terrorism experts and civil liberties advocates who's going to disagree profoundly about this and fear that a domestic terrorism statute might be used as past excesses of surveillance and monitoring of the civil rights movement of the anti-war protesters in the 1960s and '70s. It could be used to demonize and to target legitimate expressions of discontent or of opposition. It's a real problem. It's not to say that the FBI doesn't follow domestic terrorism. Certainly when I was a commissioner and we worked for fifteen months in the Hoover Building and back then everything was ISIS or al-Qaeda, but really ISIS all the time, every minute, I never once in any of my interactions saw anybody in the FBI in the counterterrorism division dismiss, denigrate, or ignore domestic terrorism whether right or left. It was a lower priority; they were focused on it. They probably have their own internal figures, but of course, you know, as Jill Sanborn, who was the former assistant director for counterterrorism, she's now an executive assistant for national security at the FBI, when she testified on the Hill back in January, she said quite rightly the FBI doesn't monitor social media—the First Amendment rights. So, you know, even if the FBI has figures on what they're investigating, that's when there's been a clear predicate and when the line has been crossed in terms of either the incitement to violence leading to conspiratorial planning for an actual act of violence or violence is being committed. So even they did provide the statistics it would only be, you know, one slice of what we see is a much larger movement with sometimes uncertain intentions. I mean, how much of it is boasting or hot-air rhetoric over social media? But we know and everybody who's listening to this or tuning into this webinar knows words matter, and words can be weaponized as we've seen in the wrong hands for nefarious purposes.   ROBBINS: Thanks. So Dana, you play a dual role as a researcher and reporter and editor and have a lot of experience on this topic for quite a while. But can you talk to us, you know, first about what you're seeing in your own community and how it has been evolving over the last year or so and, with that I suppose, what definition are you using? I mean, Bruce talked about a variety of different definitions and, you know, what's your baseline?   COESTER: Well, that one is a tough one to answer for all the reasons that he also said. But we actually from a scholarly perspective, as a media scholar and tech scholar, we were already starting to document, you know, back in the 2012-2014 era things that were happening in digital spaces and gaming spaces and really starting to think about the platform role in that. So that was a sort of digital landscape that we were looking at. But at the same time, we were aware of, as journalists and members of a community in Appalachia, how there was increasing populist rhetoric and groups beginning to be more vocal and organized in real-world spaces. Well, I actually don't want to say real world because obviously what's happening online is quite real as well. So really, it was looking at those spaces separately and then seeing how they started to increasingly overlap and collide. And I think we saw, you know, a sort of six- or seven-year collision in the making happen last summer when you started to really see the QAnon, Boogaloo militia groups organized globally, frankly, but that also have regional roots, organized white supremacist groups, really began to coalesce into a much more cohesive threat that we've been seeing the results of that since.   ROBBINS: So, in your own can you talk a little bit about your own community? You wrote a piece for Nieman Reports, I think, three or four years ago, which I recommend. We're going to push out to everybody a variety of different readings that we very much recommend. Dana has been educating me in the last thirty-six hours, which I very much appreciate. But can you talk a little bit more recently about what you're seeing and your reporting on that?   COESTER: Sure. And we've got several, sort of, active investigation so I'm a little bit careful. But historically, this area has actually been targeted by external groups such as Patriot Front, Patriots of Appalachia. There's a number of other groups that pretty early on were doing the, you know, sort of the papering of flyers in the region. And that's been, sort of, an intermittent thing that has happened, honestly, generationally. But what we saw was a more coordinated relationship between language that was being used and global networks and now language that was being used in local networks, which spoke to us of a more coordinated organization at scale for these groups. For example, in 2015, very early on in the Proud Boys movement, there was local Proud Boys activity here that was prevalent in some of the gym culture here. And then we also see a lot of things filter through local Facebook groups where it's, you know, trad-mom kinds of activities that, at first glance, don't seem to be of concern but you start to see the infiltration and manipulation of those groups by external actors—   ROBBINS: Trad mom? Can you explain trad mom?   COESTER: Oh, sorry. All right. Yes, so traditional mom, so trad mom is what that stands for. There's other—trad cap. There's some other sort of communities that are not, you know, I don't want to suggest that any individuals that are in or adjacent to those communities are on the cusp of becoming a violent extremist, but we do have enough data and longevity looking at sort of the evolution of these groups and the manipulation of these groups that the risk for extremist violence by even a few gets increasingly higher, which is why we have to pay attention to those.   ROBBINS: And I want to come back a little bit more about not just the [inaudible]—   COESTER: I'm sorry, because you're asking about the region that there's manipulation of values and concerns in the region that are also not on surface organized white supremacist activity but are rooted in that. And that's why it can very much be a hiding-in-plain-sight kind of manipulation. For example, one of the groups released a PDF about, you know, back to nature, healthy living that if you're not really aware of the coded language and sort of what's underneath that, you know, looks like pretty damn good advice for, you know, for healthy lifestyle, or it'll be something that's rooted in concern for the environment or to the working poor. And so there are values that are inherent to a region that are, especially a distressed region, that are quite ripe for manipulation but on surface may not seem to be what it is.   ROBBINS: So now you've completely intrigued me. Tell me about how healthy living is manipulated or is used as a cover for either recruitment or for promulgation of extremist or white supremacist views?   COESTER: Well, it may—   ROBBINS: I'm never eating granola again. I just wanted to [laughs]—   COESTER: Well, it's about self-reliance and resilience and growing your own food and organic food. I mean, now that all of these things get coalesced, now you'll have also anti-vax stuff that will come into there. It'll be things that are rooted in racial superiority, but that's like after you get ten layers deep. And at first, you're just reading recipes for canning, you know, your homegrown tomatoes. And so it's subtle in that kind of manipulation. And by the time you're sort of part of that community, if you're naive to that, which I think a lot of people are, then I mean, that's how the grooming works. That's how radicalization works. It starts to make sense to you. And that happens over a long period of time. It's not something that happens, you know, in one social media post or in one, you know, engagement.   ROBBINS: So, Bruce, can you assess—be a media critic for a minute. I mean, you pay your money for your subscriptions, so you get the right to be a media critic. Can you assess the quality of the coverage of domestic extremism that you're reading and the good and the bad? You know, are you getting the right information? Is it being shaped in the right way? You know, give us a read right now.   HOFFMAN: Well, it depends what media sources one consults. There are some media forces that—   ROBBINS: I can take it if you criticize my former employers.   HOFFMAN: Well, look, I mean, I'm a dinosaur. I get three hardcopy newspapers delivered every day: the New York Times, the Post, and the Wall Street Journal, and then whatever else I get from the internet. You know, I'll make a broader criticism about terrorism. I mean, generally, I find the coverage is incredibly important—and then I get to the criticism—and often very illuminating. Actually now more than ever, we depend on the media for this kind of information, especially depending which administration might be in office and maybe hearing the message or putting their thumb on the scale. So I find most of it has been illuminating and useful. I'd make a more general criticism about coverage of terrorism. There's a discomforting, I mean, for me, at least as a specialist, sensational element to it is that it seems where the media reporting I don't think is helpful, but I understand completely why it's done. It's more in the feature route, it's why persons have become extremists and then dissecting their background. I mean, firstly, I think there's a moral issue about giving attention to these people. And sometimes that information is posed to the victims, let's say, and sometimes that information, these people become heroes inadvertently. The media isn't setting them up as heroes, but just the attention on them.   In my view—I've studied terrorism now literally for forty-six years since I first went to graduate school. What we fail to realize is that terrorism doesn't occur in a vacuum. And it reflects the divisions and the polarizations and the political currents in society. And that is to say that the people who commit—this will sound very odd and I'm not lionizing or defending them, but it's easier for us and it's easier for them to be portrayed as monsters. And they're not. I mean, they've come out of society. They are a reflection, as I said, of the divisions. And I sometimes feel that some of the reporting is trying to find the holy grail of what was the trigger that led to this person committing these acts, which had inadvertently give so much attention to exactly what Dana was talking about the, sort of, you know, the progression of radicalization from very anodyne messages. I mean, this is something that has been prevalent especially in the white supremacist movement or far-right wing extremism for forty years now. It's what Leonard Zeskind many years ago called the “conveyor belt philosophy,” is you hook people on something that seems completely innocent and then pull them down that conveyor belt of progressive radicalization, which may be on one end religious dicta. And we've seen that in the “Identity Church” movement, for example, where Christianity and the New Testament becomes a justification. But we've also seen that as something, you know, both you and Dana have been talking about, this whole conceptualization, which is fascinating to me, that the New World Order is back. And the idea is that everything is glocal, that even local problems are now refracted through this global lens and it's the New World Order whether it's UN domination or control of the United States by elites. And by the way, these are the exact same elites that were invade against in the late 1970s, early 1980s. You could even, in fact, go back to the 1920s in the Ku Klux Klan. It was more of a Northern than a Southern phenomenon, although a few people know that. And there was this tremendous disdain for science, which, of course, we've seen in the past fifteen months, and also of any kind of East Coast elitism or expertise, which, of course, this is what people are campaigning on now.   ROBBINS: Yes, and that is a—although you go in, and I want to pair that thought with what Dana has shared with me a set of tips that underplays the seriousness of the recommendations about how you report on these people and report on this phenomenon. I want to throw this open to the group, so I'm going to ask Dana to go through questions about a few of these. But I also want you to listen to this and as a consumer, you know, please do not hesitate to jump in and ask questions as well of this. So we're going to share these, Dana, and I wanted to throw this open. So, everybody who's with us as well, please get your questions ready and your comments ready because it's enough of me asking questions. But you have sent a group of very interesting suggestions. I'm going to curate them, the ones that intrigued me the most, and we'll come back to other ones. Of course, you can answer any question you want with any way you want.   You talked about, you know, understanding the media manipulation lifecycle and particularly this question of amplification. You know, it seems to be of particular concern. You know, not reporting on the mindset of extremists, you know, if we don't report on the mindset of extremists, don't we run the danger of underestimating the political sources and of a potency of the threat? How do you balance that? One of your colleagues wrote that we have to understand that news outlets provide a vital bridge between fringe ideologies and the public that can intentionally or not normalize these views and allow them to influence public discourse and define the narrative surrounding political events. I understand that. That's the, you know, that's the amplification. But, you know, if we don't report on the mindset of extremists, there is this danger that we can both underestimate the potency of the threat but also not understand the society that created this, you know, and there are some problems that have to be fixed if this is so appealing. So how do you deal with this, you know, the manipulation lifecycle without, you know, underreporting the problem?   COESTER: Well, I don't think we need to report on the mindset at the point at which the extremists have taken action and tragic action over the last years. What we can report on and what we need to report on is the systems that gave rise to that, the messaging that gave rise to that, the actors in that space that gave rise to that. That's the sort of the unpacking and the education that we can do at the community level. Although I will say, I mean, so we have an internal policy, you know, we don't do lone-wolf reporting. We don't do feature pieces. We really are trying to focus on systems, watchdog roles, accountability roles, and I would say that we have to look at who are influential people in the network. So, for instance, you know, there is an elected official from West Virginia who participated in the January 6 insurrection. And so, locally, we need to understand that an elected official participated in this, but we also need to look at what are the formal and informal networks of this individual. So now I'm less focused on the individual, and I'm more focused on what are those networks of influence that gave rise to that because those are still threats. Those are still threats that are in the region. And so I don't struggle with that anymore. We don't do it, but we feel confident that the work that we are publishing is getting people information they need.   I will say broadcast news is really a sort of, local broadcast news, I will say—not national, I have my critics about that—but I think local broadcast news really has an important role to play in this as well. I don't want to just focus on local, digital, and news outlets. And there was an example of—and this is a simple thing. This was an example of something that was beneficial that never would have been meaningful at a national level but was meaningful at a local level where an individual had come into an apartment complex wearing, you know, the red, you know, MAGA hat, and was asking where local synagogues and mosques were. The person at the desk immediately started sharing that on social media, and broadcast did a very balanced, credible, non-inflammatory, just information to the community that helped put community members and targeted community members on alert. And that wasn't dramatic, and it also helps set some context for why in the, sort of, post-January 6, post-Tree of Life, post-Christ Church environment, that that was important local information. And it was just a simple piece, but I thought it was really well done and quite balanced. And that was just a local broadcast station. And another one was some flyers had been posted, I don't recommend doing anything about flyers or when people, you know, drop things in parking lots or people's driveways, but West Virginia Public Broadcasting, Dave Mistich, a reporter, who has also worked with us at 100 Days in Appalachia, did a sort of an explainer piece for the community about the rhetoric that the flyers were using. So it wasn't, you know, “far-right groups post flyers,” you know, which is just amplifying their message, and also you never sort of show websites or phone numbers or any of that, but it's saying, “Community members, they are targeting you. Here's the language they're using and why.” And that's useful, that's valuable.   ROBBINS: This, you know, the First Draft News you shared, the [inaudible] says that reporters should ask whether or not a story has extended beyond the community being discussed, and that that's a tipping point that, you know, that once it has extended further than it becomes newsworthy. But you don't want to amplify something that's just within the echo chamber itself. Now knowing that, how you know that is an interesting question. And then, I think, your examples are really good. You don't just write a straight news story that says, “The flyer said this.” You want to assess what the, you know, the language, you want to deconstruct it, you want to explain it. But you also open yourself up to the charge that you're censoring the views, don't you? You've made your peace with that.   COESTER: Well, I will also say, and I've said this in other conversations like this, reporting and publishing, I think, are two different acts. And we report information. I think that journalists get caught up in the idea that it has to be at an above-the-fold thing, and you're going to win an award or any of that kind of nonsense. Whereas journalists doing good investigative work and then reporting that information to communities that are targeted is a form of reporting without amplifying. For example, we've done briefings for teachers who are in positions where they're, you know, so that they can take actions when they see youth who are susceptible or who are participating in rhetoric or actual, you know, more dangerous activities. And we've talked to mental health, you know, professionals about, you know, cues and things that we're seeing like when we're seeing a sort of a trend happen in an online space. So, that's reporting. We're reporting data to community members that can take action. And other times it's publishing, but yes, I've made my peace with that.   ROBBINS: So I want to, Irina, I'm going to take the prerogative here just to read a question from the Q&A because I want to pair it because I want Bruce to respond on the amplification question. But there's a question here in the Q&A that's also, I think, quite relevant to both of you, but I'll start with Bruce because your specific experience with the commission. On the amplification question, how do we make a decision like that? How much do you worry about, you know, reporting amplifying this? And then the specific question in the Q&A, “How do we cover law enforcement agencies' role in shaping extremism? And how do you analyze the motives of the FBI?” And that is from Ashley Nerbovig who hasn't identified where she’s from? So—   FASKIANOS: Ashley is a freelance journalist reporting on extremism in Montana and Michigan.   ROBBINS: Okay, thank you, Ashley. You have a lot of work, I suspect, to do. So Bruce, over to you with both questions.   HOFFMAN: An answer to the first question, I think, [inaudible] I'm not a journalist. So maybe this is just a little simplistic but you report the news [inaudible]. And you always make sure that whatever you're reporting is not communicating—I mean, terrorism is an act of violent communication. And that's also something we forget. Terrorism always has a purpose, and the purpose is to attract attention to the perpetrators into their cause. So it's reporting on something but not giving them that platform, and that's what they're seeking from that violence. I mean, this may be, again, my naivete about how newsrooms work, but is why the editing function, I think, is so important. I mean, this is the great thing about journalists is that, as opposed to, let's say, social media is there is a screening process to make sure that it's objective or hopefully, at least my naivete, I assume this is what editors do—   ROBBINS: We try.   HOFFMAN: —so that it's not serving the purposes of the terrorists. I mean, this was something internationally that was very common in the '60s and '70s, and then, fortunately, is much, much better. Also, if I could just leverage off of something that Dana was saying that's so important, the one thing that I haven't seen a lot of coverage about, which I think is so important, and she was explicit about it but I just want to second it, is that these extremist movements are actively recruiting youth. And I haven't seen very much reported about that. There is a lot of reporting about the former [inaudible] people indicted on January 6, about the leaders of these groups that we recognize, but I don't see that much being done in these communities that, as Dana described, that have had faced severe economic issues that sometimes have been caught up in the opioid mess that we see now, you know, sort of litigated in courts in the national news but, in fact, has had such a profoundly corrosive impact on rural communities where, especially, youth become very targeted, become very susceptible. And there, it's not just flyers, but again, something I haven't seen a lot of report about. Stickers, I mean, this is a big thing with youth, sometimes t-shirts and clothing, too, but stickers that are put on the back of stop signs, that are put outside of synagogues, churches, and mosques, for example. I mean, that indicates, and it goes exactly to Dana's point about global things becoming local, I mean, that indicates that somehow a global dialectic has seeped into the local milieu and that it's usually kids that are manufacturing or ordering these stickers and putting them up and serving a group that they may have absolutely no contact with.   But one reason that this is important is that last year the leader of one of the SIEGE groups, and the SIEGE is one of the worst manifestations, at least in my view, of extremism. I mean, it's pretty horrific violence. They venerate Hitler and Charles Manson. But it turned out that the leader of a cell that was egging on—and this was in Lithuania and in Europe, basically, not the United States—but was egging on and sort of directing cells of people throughout Europe. Firstly, it was these very mundane things but then escalating to violence. It was a 13-year-old. And it's kind of like that famous New Yorker cartoon from the 1990s, you know, with a dog sitting in front of a computer and says, “On the internet, nobody knows you're a dog.” Well, no one knew that they're taking orders from a 13-year-old that was, you know, this was the worst kind of video gaming, in a sense, that had real-life consequences.   But the question, you know, this is, you know, the question about the FBI, I mean, this, I think, is a huge problem, law enforcement writ large because law enforcement is both far and away, year in, year out, government officials and law enforcement, not persons of color, not Jewish persons, not necessarily Muslims, not Asian Americans, when you look, at least at the ADL statistic going back a decade, it's often law enforcement and government officials that are targeted most by these extremists. At the same time, as we know from the January 6 events, members of law enforcement in the military, some active, some retired, have been involved in these kinds of activities. And I think it's very important, I mean, in theory, the FBI, because persons have security clearances and have security clearances at the highest levels. I mean, they've gone through lie detectors. They have to be completely forthcoming on their SF-86s, which is what you put down all your material to get access to classified material every five years. I mean, that should pick up a lot of it. But, of course, there aren't security clearances in many cases for local and state law enforcement, and it may be harder to identify people that may not only be sympathizers, but may indeed and there's, of course, an historical legacy, especially during the civil rights movement, of local law enforcement being in league with whether it's the Ku Klux Klan or other extremist groups. This is a very important question to ask.   In my experience, I also in previous years had spent two years at the CIA as a scholar in residence and that to me a completely different experience from the FBI because it was international orientation and basically you look for intelligence wherever you could get it. What impressed me the most at the FBI and it was something I was never aware of, it's just the role that lawyers for the Department of Justice play in almost everything that they do that there has to be a predicate, that there's oversight that, I suspect, again, I'm not a specialist in law enforcement, but there's more oversight, one would hope, at the federal level than there tends to be at the local or state just because of the different orientations, different levels of clearance. Although, I have to say one big change that is happening in the past year plus, more and more, of course, local and state law enforcement officers are wearing body cameras. And the attorney general has now released guidance that federal law enforcement agencies when they're arresting fugitives or any kind of operation have to wear those cameras, too, which hadn't been the case in the past.   ROBBINS: So, Irina, over to you.   FASKIANOS: I'm going to Phillip Martin, who wrote his question but also raised its hand. And, Phillip, if you want to just ask it, he's a senior investigative reporter at WGBH in Boston.   Q: Yes, thank you, both of you. Thank you for this illuminating panel discussion, Carla, Dana, and Bruce. I'm wondering if you can comment on the funding sources for right-wing extremists that include the Proud Boys, Boogaloo Boys, and Three Percenters, among others. And oftentimes, I found the concomitant funding source from certain Republican politicians. Marjorie, I know her name is used all the time. I can't remember right now—   COESTER: Taylor Greene.   Q: That's right. So I'm wondering if you could comment on those funding sources, which seem to be an extraordinary issue in the context of the proliferation of extremist groups in the United States? Thank you,   COESTER: Well, that's a great question because that's actually one of things I advocate for. That is the thing local journalism can and should do. I mean, old-fashioned, follow-the-money among these networks and really understanding how they're operating because I just wanted to add, you know, when we were talking about maybe complicity among law enforcement, that the thing that local news has to recognize is that there are individuals who are affiliated with or sympathetic to extremist ideology who are on college campuses, who are IT workers in major businesses, who are board members of influential institutions, who are, as we see, elected officials. That is a local problem that has to be—first responders. I mean, so that's where that sort of interception and understanding of those networks has to happen. I will say on the funding sources, we're actually working on something right now that's looking at some of that happening in—it's happening in cryptocurrency. It's harder actually to follow the funding sources unless you managed to become very close to or part of or have access to one of these groups. And so that's just to say, yes, that's a problem. It's even harder to follow but connecting all of those dots is exactly what local investigative and regional investigative reporting can and should do. Although, of course, we're all underresourced.   FASKIANOS: All right. Let's go next to Elise Schmelzer in Denver, “What are the best practices for covering extremism on a local level as a continuous problem as opposed to episodic coverage when there are highly public uprisings? What should local journalists be tracking and writing about between those movements?”   COESTER: So, the first thing that I would do is make—I mean, oftentimes, just the reality in our society and why we're having this problem is most local newsrooms are majority white newsrooms. Reporters and editors in those newsrooms are likely unaware of what local threats even are that have probably been generational because they're not engaging with targeted community members. So that's the first place to start is to build those relationships, to understand. You know, we know from our research on youth, youth aren't even reporting half the hate instances, most of the hate instances that they're experiencing. Muslim community members are not reporting. It's just sort of part of the backdrop of their life. And so, you know, if you're a reporter coming into that, you sort of have to make room for understanding what that generational activity is before you can really engage with it. And then I would say we don't want to do, I mean, we don't want to focus on the episodic incidences, we want to be in a position to see before there's a threat because we're already monitoring, following, and connecting the dots on those networks. I mean, last year, last summer, when we sort of saw the coalescing of a lot of these groups, we were immediately, you know, raising the alarm. And we were, as Bruce mentioned, you know, we were doing local reporting on what the, you know, sales of guns and ammunition. And so when you're already doing that work you see, and if you're already in, you know, you already have access to the Telegram group or now the group's left Telegram and they're, you know, meeting in, you know, the local Denny's and you have access to that, then you know before it's episodic, and that's where there's an opportunity for disruption, especially with our work on youth, you know, trying to disrupt that before, you know, we have another Dylann Roof or a horrible situation.   ROBBINS: Irina, can I ask Bruce to address that because some of this is, you know, you talked about one measurement, which was purchases of guns, but this sort of, as law enforcement, you know, academics and journalists are all looking for different ways to look into what appears to be a classic community before something explodes. What are the indicators you think we should be following in local communities?   HOFFMAN: Well, all terrorism, not least with these groups, it's a constant search for new constituencies. They're trying to broaden their base and appeal to new recruits. I mean, they're kind of like the archetypal shark in the water that has to move forward to survive. So, I think it's all the sides. I mean, the stickering, for instance, is something that I don't think a lot of attention has necessarily been paid to. We drive by these things and don't notice them. But at least for young people, they become kind of a code that you look for them, and it gives a disproportionate impression that there may be more, let's say, a white supremacist in a community. There might be, but that's part of the ideas is to mainstream these kinds of beliefs and also constantly pull new people in. I think it's also monitoring of, you know, currents across the country that nongovernmental organizations like the Anti-Defamation League, for instance, which isn't only about anti-Semitism, but it's about all kinds of racism and hate crimes, which gives a window to what might be happening in one community because they're ADL regional reports. But usually, that's not confined to one community. These groups to survive have to learn from one another. And that's, in fact, they learn if there are going to survive, they learn faster, unfortunately, than often the government and law enforcement does. So I think it's monitoring the overall trends. And again, going back to my earlier point, I think at the risk of a truism is that all of this doesn't occur in a vacuum. I mean, it needs a context. We've seen the context, arguably, in the past year much more sharply. But, of course, that context you can go back further than Charlottesville in 2017. But that was a clear indication of where we were headed at. But how many people looked at that as just an aberration or a one-off?   ROBBINS: Irina, sorry. Thanks.   FASKIANOS: That's okay. I was just going to say Elise is with the Denver Post, just to give context to that question. So Maria Alvarez has raised her hand. So, please unmute yourself and say your affiliation, please.   Q: Thank you very much for this webinar. It's really informative and important. I teach journalism here at the Borough of Manhattan Community College in New York City and also a veteran New York City reporter for several decades. I covered 9/11, and I'm just interested in knowing has there been any research or data gathering about local police departments' protocol or policies in trying to ferret out or have applicants out themselves if they've been involved in any type of white supremacy group or have been involved in any type of racial conflict or been arrested for something like that in the past? Has anybody been researching that because it's very difficult to get a police department to talk about those policy or discussion of those policy changes because they're very secretive? And, of course, there was at least half a dozen police officers from the NYPD that were outed when they attended the January 6 insurrection. Thank you.   ROBBINS: It's a great question, and we can tag team that, Irina, with the Steve Walsh question from KPBS in San Diego. Steve Walsh writes, “I also covered military and veteran issues in collaboration with NPR. We've reported on the Department of Defense stand down on extremism. Now that they've highlighted the issue, the question we're trying to get at now is what does the DOD need to do to actually track and target extremism? They still seem quite reluctant to take concrete action.” So I think these are similar questions, which is how do you know when somebody is being recruited or applying and have in addition to having you root out people in your ranks? Is there any serious conversation about how to do that?   HOFFMAN: Well, certainly since January 6 there has been. [Inaudible] a long time before that but certainly both in terms of the U.S. military and also with police departments that has become much more of an issue. You know, this is the problem with terrorism generally is when terrorism is in the news there's a lot of interest and a lot of attention, and then there's a lot of governmental response to pressure from citizens and also the investigative reporting and illuminations that the news media does. But then when it's a period of quiescence, it completely dies down. I mean, in the 1980s and 1990s, law enforcement but even more so the military had to deal with this on a very serious basis. One was finding all sorts of military ordnance, things that you could not have gotten unless they were stolen from military stockpiles—anti-tank missiles, C-4 plastic explosives, bazookas, rocket-propelled grenades. All kinds of things like that were turning up in white supremacist survivalists' compounds and elsewhere during that period.   And the military crackdown very intently, in fact, Secretary Austin, the secretary of defense, has talked about when he was lieutenant colonel at Fort Bragg in 1995 and had to weed out the same types of elements. But yet in the reporting after Charlottesville in 2017, there were accounts of Marines from Camp Lejeune or from Parris Island coming up to Charlottesville. I think there were also people from Fort Bragg as well. So we're back to reinventing the wheel. From my observation, I know much less about the police than the Defense Department. I think the Defense Department is taking it very seriously. The change in administration has clearly helped. The new secretary of defense from the time he was confirmed has zeroed in on this issue, and it is one that he's familiar with. I think that, you know, Walsh's frustration is that DOD is, you know, moving very quickly to do things but is not really publicizing it, and I'm not sure has actually settled on—they know this is a problem. Let me point out, this is a problem for U.S. national security and defense because our enemies point to this and believe the United States, the military is being hollowed out by these searches for miscreants. I mean, I don't think that's true, but it's in the sense that they are that prevalent. But the point is I think that's another reason why the DOD is quiet on what they are doing. I think on the one hand it's relatively new that they're focusing on this since the change in administration. They're not quite entirely set on what practical measures they will take apart from the ones we've read about. But I know for a fact there's lots of discussion about this. I'm less clear about law enforcement. Certainly the chief of police in Houston has been the most outspoken, at least what I've read from media reports on this issue. I've heard similar things from NYPD, but as Maria Alvarez's question notes, I mean, this is a systemic problem that is not new. And it's not just recruits and people in the academy but what law enforcement agencies will do to, you know, basically monitor their own ranks. And this is why I think federal law enforcement will be immensely useful in helping them, but I don't know of any programs or implementation, you know, that sort of synergy yet.   ROBBINS: Thanks, Bruce. That's really helpful, and I want to talk to you about the DOD offline after this. Dana, what are you seeing where you are? I mean, is there anything of a conversation among local law enforcement of, you know, of goodwill to how they're grappling with this problem? Or are they just in denial?   COESTER: No, I mean, it's inconsistent. There have been some gestures, I will say, very locally here in Morgantown. There's been some vocal efforts. But again, I think sort of January 6 kind of drove people into, you know, either doubling down on ideology or saying, “Oh, shit, that's not what I thought I was getting into.” And especially we see this with some young people who are, which is the point where you can pull them back when they're starting to realize and get fully educated about what's happening. But I think, to Bruce's point, it's less being aware of what law enforcement or other people who have power and local communities are saying and more about what they're doing, what are their networks, and there's good digital forensic investigation that local journalists are doing that is helping uncover—and also veterans' groups and military. There are also some actually, right now I'm seeing a lot of really active and I'll send the link afterwards of veterans' groups and military groups who are sort of doing this work independently and trying to identify and disrupt that in their own ranks, too.   FASKIANOS: Okay, so we'll take the next question, it's a written question from Chris Joyner, who's with the Atlanta Journal Constitution, “Prior to January 6, there was a lot of in-network communication that showed an intent toward violence, including plans to assault the Capitol. Knowing that, at what point is there a journalistic responsibility to report on the rhetoric of extremism, rather than worrying about amplifying that message. The same might be asked about reporting on smaller accelerationist groups, which have a smaller reach by the nature of their organization?”   HOFFMAN: Well, as a nonjournalist, I mean, I think the element or the need to provide warning is not amplification. And I think that's where the media can play an immensely useful role. Everything we're reading about January 6, including an article that'll be in the hardcopy of the Washington Post tomorrow where, you know, the Senate investigation has concluded that this was being, this was a quote from one of the senators being planned in plain sight. I mean, that's very different from the impression we had on January 6, 7, 8, and so on. And that's why I think the warning is absolutely essential. I think the public good that that does outweighs the risk. And again, it has to be balanced and not alarmist, but this is why, at least, unlike social media, in traditional media, editors, you know, play a very important function.   COESTER: Yes, I mean, 100 percent agree with that. I mean, it's a clear distinction, and when you're in it, you know it. And we were in it last spring and last summer, and I actually had, I would preface, before we wrote something or oftentimes we were doing sort of closed-door briefings with different groups, you know, “I don't mean to be alarmist, but this is what we're seeing. And this is what we think may happen if there's not an intervention.” And so, yes, I think that that, and that is quite different from just sort of repeating what a particular group says. But if you're in a position and you have your hands around network and you're really understanding coded language and the rhetoric, then you see when something flares. That's reporting. That's intelligence that you bring to what's happening, and I don't see that as amplification at all.   ROBBINS: So I am going to, actually we've got a minute left, so we're going to do thirty-second responses—this is Final Jeopardy. Dana, I'm going to ask you very quickly, one of the tips from your people is prepare for harassment after reporting critically on far right and white nationalist extremism in your community. How do you prepare for harassment? How do you protect your people?   COESTER: Well, there are really, really good programs out there that help newsrooms do that, and I'll provide some links for that, too. I would say that's something that you have to take profoundly seriously. It's the job of an editor to protect not just the reporter, but their entire staff. When you're local, those risks are quite amplified because you're literally there and accessible. And also, you have to protect sources because they can be targeted as well. And I will say that in other conversations with folks when I let them know how serious and sharing, you know, some personal experiences, how serious those risks can be, they kind of back away like I'm exaggerating. I'm not exaggerating. So you have to just know that going into it.   ROBBINS: So we will share this TrollBusters training program about digital harassment, the Columbia Journalism School's Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma. So we're going to share this because we want you guys to be safe and to be aware of the need to be safe. So we'll push that out to you. Dana, thanks for sharing that. And Bruce, last question to you. So I was on a panel last week. This is what we all do, we do panels, and asking this question, why scientists blew it and journalists blew it in the reporting on the sources of the COVID pandemic. We all rushed to judgment saying hands down we absolutely knew that it was an animal-to-human transmission. There was no chance at all of a lab leak, and now we are reexamining this. We don't know what it was, but we did call the balls and strikes on that very quickly. And this raises a very interesting question, which is if you were reporting on and you have to get the message out at some point about the message of extremists, we're going to be calling balls and strikes. We're going to say, we know the election wasn't stolen. That's absolutely not true. We made the mistake in 2016 of not calling out disinformation. How do we find this balance out here or when it comes to extremism not even a problem?   HOFFMAN: No, I think it's a huge problem. There's a lot of parallels to COVID. I think, I've always believed this, and I've worked in government but you can't rely on just your government sources. And I think that's absolutely key is reaching out to people whether they're scholars or people in non-governmental organizations but who track things differently, who think about them differently, and have a different agenda. That's absolutely essential, and that can avoid the kind of, you know, the group thing because in the domestic terrorism realm, as with that Clint Eastwood film about Richard Jewell, and I remember very clearly that FBI was saying it's the quote unquote [inaudible], which sounded great. And many journalists who I knew were top journalists covering terrorism. I mean, the FBI was saying this. They went with it. And as we've seen with the film, it ruined someone's life. So I think it's going beyond the official sources. I mean, just an ordinary story and trying to get the much broader context and the depth.   And I'm going to say one other thing just to follow on what Dana said. I mean, this is a huge issue in covering especially for-right extremism but to an extent far-left extremism as well because they're the ones who invented doxxing. But this is, well, actually it's even worse. The far right was doing the doxxing first, but journalists and scholars, I mean, this is what's changed completely. In the past terrorists or extremists liked the media because we did tend to amplify their message or even if it was unintentional, it was giving them attention. We're in a very different era where last year, Atomwaffen, which is not a domestic extremist group, it's an international terrorist group, targeted six journalists. I mean for harassment but having been subject to that kind of harassment from the same types of people, it upends your life. So journalists really covering the story have to scrub their presence on the internet and all their personal details. And be very careful, especially if you're a woman because they will come after you.   ROBBINS: I will turn this back to Irina, but I just wanted to say thank you to Dana and thank you to Bruce for an extraordinary conversation. And thank you to all for the extraordinary questions. We're sorry we didn't get to all of them. But this has really been—and we're going to share more information. And we're going to push the questions that remain to Dana and Bruce, so we can share some of the answers as well. Back to Irina.   FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. And I just want to encourage you all to follow on Twitter, Carla's at @robbinscarla, Dana Coester's at @poetabook, and Bruce's is at @hoffman_bruce. So you can follow them there. Please visit CFR.org, ThinkGlobalHealth.org, and ForeignAffairs.com for the latest developments and analysis on international trends and events and how they're affecting the United States. And please do reach out to us to share suggestions for future webinars. You can email us at [email protected]. So thank you all again. And thanks to all of you for being with us today.   (END)
  • Nigeria
    Nigerian Government Threatens to Use the Hammer in the South East
    Following President Muhammadu Buhari's May 11 meeting with the military service chiefs and the inspector general of police, Nigerian military sources confirmed that some troops were being moved from Borno State, where they have been engaged with Boko Haram and other jihadis, to the South East, to counter "bandits" and the regional separatist organization, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), along with its security force, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). The army and police have sustained increased casualties in the South East, so aircraft—including combat helicopters—will be "deployed to conduct massive raids" on the hideouts of "criminals" from the IPOB and ESN. Another source suggested traditional rulers, community heads, and chiefs could be arrested to warn them against "conniving with the agitators." The police announced yesterday the launch of Operation Restore Peace to confront the IPOB and ESN. So, rather than a counterinsurgency approach to Igbo separatism with a political dimension, the federal government is resorting to military and police force. The use of helicopters and other aircraft is concerning in that it could—and likely will—result in growing civilian casualties, thereby feeding the very separatist movements that the government is seeking to contain. It will also likely exacerbate ethnic tensions. Military and police personnel are increasingly unwilling to serve in the South East and, if there, unwilling to wear their uniforms, especially if they are not Igbos, the ethnic majority in the region. For President Buhari and others of his generation, the central event of Nigeria's post-independence history was the 1967-70 civil war, in which the primarily Igbo separatists attempted to leave the federation and establish an independent state of Biafra. The federal forces defeated Biafra, and the territory was reincorporated into Nigeria; deaths from the fighting and associated disease and famine were up to two million. Hence, successive federal administrations have reacted strongly against any resurgence of Biafran separatism.
  • Nigeria
    Nigerian Government Minister's Jihadi Statements Cause Uproar
    Isa Pantami is minister of communications and digital economy in President Muhammadu Buhari's government. Some years ago, in sermons and other statements, he used rhetoric about Christians and the West that mimics that of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He also fulsomely praised Osama bin Laden. Some years later, he apologized. Recently, however, those statements surfaced on social media. One Nigerian newspaper claimed that Pantami was on a U.S. government watch list for terrorists—a claim with no U.S. confirmation. For the time being, Pantami has become a lightning rod for those deeply suspicious of Islam and also of the Buhari administration. The opposition even sought a debate in the National Assembly but was blocked by the ruling party. However, the debate appears to be centered on social media, with dueling hashtags: #PantamiMustGo versus #PantamiMustStay. President Buhari's spokesman, Garba Shehu, issued a balanced statement affirming continuing support for Pantami while at the same time denouncing the jihadi statements he once made. The spokesman pointed out that Pantami's rhetoric was years old and that he had apologized. Those opposed to Pantami, however, express concern that his ministerial position gives him access to personal information about, not least, foreign diplomats in Nigeria. Some have called on the United States to press Buhari to investigate Pantami. In principle, U.S. law enforcement organizations do not comment on the presence or absence of individuals on watchlists. It would also be highly unusual for the U.S. government to express a view on a minister in a friendly government. The significance of the episode would seem to be that it illustrates the polarization in Nigerian society and politics—and that past injudicious and harmful statements can catch up.
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    Islamic State and al-Qaeda Linked to African Insurgencies
    Violence attributed to Islamist groups has dramatically increased in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade, and continues to infect new venues where it has been absent. In the recent attacks on Palma in northern Mozambique, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is claiming responsibility. In other instances, say, in the Sahel and the Horn, al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups make the claim. Some analysts see a Faustian bargain between IS or al-Qaeda and insurgencies that are driven by local grievances associated with corrupt governments that have marginalized those far from the national capital. The essence of the bargain is that IS and al-Qaeda are able to demonstrate their prowess despite reverses in the Middle East—valuable for recruitment and fundraising. For locally based insurgencies, ties, no matter how tenuous, enhance their prestige and win international publicity. The extent to which these bargains translate into tactical, strategic, or financial partnerships with IS or al-Qaeda varies from one insurrection to another. However, for both sides of the bargain, incentives are to exaggerate its importance. Insofar as Western policy makers associate IS and al-Qaeda with the insurrection, the prestige and therefore the power of both grows. However, perceiving local insurgencies as primarily an aspect of international terrorism, rather than as a response to local grievances, can lead to policy mistakes recalling some made in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. After all, IS and al-Qaeda are core Western security concerns, while local African insurgencies are not.
  • Ivory Coast
    Concern Grows About Jihadi Activity in Ivory Coast
    In the early hours of March 29, an estimated sixty gunmen attacked two small military installations in Kafolo and Kolobougou, both located in Ivory Coast on the border with Burkina Faso. The assailants killed at least three soldiers and wounded others. While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, the media is speculating credibly that the perpetrators were jihadis based in nearby Burkina Faso, where Islamist groups have been increasingly active. There have been attacks before in the same area. In 2020, "jihadis" killed fourteen soldiers and gendarmes, also near Kafolo. Nevertheless, concerns are growing that the latest attack is a sign that jihadi insurgents are expanding their reach, as they have in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso. In some ways Ivory Coast is the largest and most important country in francophone West Africa. In the decades after independence in 1960, Ivory Coast was an economic powerhouse with wealth mostly based on agriculture, especially cocoa. It hosted the largest French expatriate community in West Africa. However, political instability after the death of long-time statesman/big man Félix Houphouët-Boigny resulted in coups and civil war, the latest round of which ended in 2011 and left the economy in shambles. Since then, under the technocratic President Alassane Ouattara, the country has largely recovered economically. (Ouattara was elected to a controversial third term in 2020.) Ivory Coast, linked by roads and railways with interior francophone countries, plays an outsized regional economic role. The country has long been an immigration magnet from the other West African francophone countries, which are much poorer. Nevertheless, even with renewed prosperity, remaining internal divisions provide an opening for jihadi groups. As elsewhere in West Africa, the south, centered on Abidjan, is predominantly Christian and much more prosperous than the north. In effect, the south dominates the country. The north is predominantly Islamic and many northern residents feel marginalized by a southern francophone elite that is predominantly Christian. Overlaying north-south differences are those between "indigenes" and immigrants from elsewhere in francophone West Africa, especially Burkina Faso. The indigenes are mostly Christian, the immigrants mostly Muslim. Hence, Ivory Coast in some ways resembles other African hotspots—such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, northern Nigeria, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and Niger—where a marginalized Islamic population provides an opening for radical jihadism. However, Ivory Coast is far larger and economically more important that the others, with the exception of Nigeria. If jihadi radicalism acquires a foothold, the consequences will be dire for the West African region beyond just Ivory Coast.
  • Nigeria
    Security Deteriorating in Nigeria’s Former “Biafra”
    Nolan Quinn contributed to this post. Fighting between government forces and an Igbo separatist group risks adding yet another challenge for the Buhari administration. The emergence of an Igbo paramilitary force highlights the growing breakdown of any federal government monopoly on the use of force in the face of multiple security challenges. Even in good times, security is fragile in the former Biafra. Insecurity has multiple dimensions. The Igbo people are Nigeria's third largest ethnic group. They were the losers in the 1967–70 civil war in which they tried to establish a separate, Igbo-dominated state, Biafra. Many Igbo continue to believe that they are disadvantaged in Nigeria, and there continues to be residual support for Biafran independence, though not among the Igbo "establishment." Conflict over land and water, once largely restricted to the Middle Belt, is spreading to the south, where it frequently acquires ethnic and religious overtones. Many Igbo—mostly Christian—believe they are targeted by the Muslim Fulani herdsmen bringing their flocks south in search of better pastures. Criminal activity is widespread and often the Igbo attribute it to the Fulani. Many residents of the former Biafra are alienated from the federal government and see the Buhari administration as Muslim-dominated and as enabling Fulani atrocities. Added to this mix is Nnamdi Kanu's Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist movement that reflects and facilitates popular discontent. The federal government, recalling the civil war, is bitterly opposed to Igbo separatism, as is most of the Igbo establishment. The government has long sought to defang the IPOB and silence Kanu, sometimes through illegal or quasi-legal methods. He, in turn, has used alleged Fulani depredations as a means of attacking the Buhari administration. Starting in August 2020, violence between IPOB and the federal police and the army has escalated. In that month, the Nigerian police killed up to twenty-one civilians at an IPOB meeting in Enugu State. In response, the IPOB promised retaliation and urged its members to practice self-defense. In December, Kanu announced the establishment of a paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), allegedly to protect the Igbo against the Fulani. For the federal government, a non-state sanctioned, paramilitary organization in the old Biafran heartland was unacceptable, and it moved against ESN camps. In late January 2021, serious fighting broke out in the town of Orlu in Imo State, leading to significant numbers of displaced persons. Fighting stopped when Kanu declared a cease-fire, saying that he was redirecting ESN efforts against "Fulani raiders." (He also claimed that the federal forces had withdrawn from Orlu.) Supporters of the ESN, including in the Igbo diaspora, justify it as being like Miyetti Allah in the north and Amotekun in Yorubaland in the west. Both are paramilitary operations outside the federal government's legal purview but with some ambiguous level of government approval. The north and the west were on the winning side in the civil war, and that may help account for the federal government's greater tolerance for their paramilitary organizations than for one associated with the Igbo. The escalating fighting in IPOB strongholds carries the risk of radicalizing the population and building support for the IPOB. Credible evidence suggests police assaulted residents in Orlu, and some police perpetrators have been arrested. The commissioner of police for Imo State has apologized. But as recently as December 2020, IPOB was saying that ESN forces were merely a "vigilante" group protecting the Igbo against the Fulani. Now Kanu has an organized wing, the ESN, and believes he has the authority to order a cease-fire in a fight with federal forces. Violence is escalating, and the outcome is unpredictable.
  • Radicalization and Extremism
    From Separatism to Salafism: Militancy on the Swahili Coast
    Nolan Quinn is a research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations’ Africa Program. The revelation that a Kenyan member of al-Shabab was charged with planning a 9/11-style attack on the United States has served to underline the Somali terror group’s enduring presence in East Africa and the region’s continuing relevance to U.S. national security. Shabab has terrorized the northern reaches of the Swahili Coast, which runs from southern Somalia to northern Mozambique, for well over a decade. More recently, a brutal jihadi insurgency has emerged on the Swahili Coast’s southern tip. Ansar al-Sunna (ASWJ), known among other names as Swahili Sunna, ramped up its violent activities in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province in 2017 before spreading more recently into Tanzania. The risk of a further rise in jihadism along the Swahili Coast is serious—and growing. The Swahili Coast has long been recognized as having a rich, eclectic culture shaped by interactions with predominantly Arab traders. (Much of the coast once fell under the rule of the Sultan of Oman.) The region has been strongly influenced by Islam, in contrast to the Great Lakes region further west, which is predominantly Christian. Additionally, much of the mainland is dominated by Bantu ethnic groups, while many coastal residents maintain an identity distinct from their continental peers. As in much of Africa, arbitrary borders drawn during the period of European colonialism separate the region, lumping coastal and mainland residents together across several states. The separation of the Swahili Coast laid the foundations for a re-emergence of pre-independence feelings of marginalization. Many coastal residents, who chafe at government institutions and economic policies seen as favoring Christians and wabara (“people of the mainland”), have called for decentralization of power and even secession from their respective states. Separatist fervor—particularly strong in the Mombasa-Zanzibar corridor—has been stoked by groups such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and Uamsho (“awakening” in Kiswahili). While both have been defunct or dormant following crackdowns on their leadership, a purported effort to reinvigorate the MRC—already met with a spate of arrests by Kenyan police—illustrates that discontent is still very much present along the coast. In this context, the growing popularity of Salafist ideology in East Africa is worrying. The trend, facilitated by the historical exchange of people and ideas with other littoral states in Africa and the Middle East, has resulted in the displacement of the tolerant, Sufi-inspired Islam that has long been predominant on the Swahili Coast. Salafis’ strict textualist approach raises several objections to Sufism that have been used to motivate attacks by ASWJ in northern Mozambique [PDF] and al-Shabab in Somalia. Less violent—but still occasionally violent—Sufi-Salafi competition has also been on the rise in Tanzania. Several factors suggest that disgruntled wapwani (“people of the coast”), especially youth, are at increased risk of Salafi radicalization. To start, unemployment is widespread on the coast. Joblessness is concentrated among youth and the well-educated—the demographics that have most enthusiastically subscribed to Salafist teachings globally. In Cabo Delgado, ASWJ fighters have clashed with Sufi elders seen as heretical by the Salafi-jihadi group. Yet financial rewards [PDF], such as small loans to start a business or pay bride prices, also appear to be important recruitment incentives. While al-Shabab and ASWJ have gained international notoriety for their insurgent activities, allied groups focusing on youth recruitment in East Africa play a sinister role in enabling their success. Islamist groups such as the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC)—later renamed al-Hijra—in Kenya and the Ansaar Muslim Youth Center (AMYC) in Tanzania have both sent fighters to Somalia and offered refuge [PDF] to returning jihadis. And in Tanga—the coastal region of Tanzania where AMYC was founded and reports [PDF] of small-scale attacks by Islamists have occasionally surfaced—police have in the past uncovered Shabab-linked child indoctrination camps. Swahili’s function as a lingua franca in East Africa is also helping Islamist groups grow in the region. MYC leader Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a radical Kenyan imam who was sanctioned by the United Nations for his support of al-Shabab, targeted Swahili speakers with his repeated calls for the formation of a caliphate in East Africa. Tapes of Rogo preaching in Swahili allowed disaffected youth in Cabo Delgado—many of whom speak Swahili but have a weak or no understanding of Arabic—to access extremist viewpoints, accelerating their radicalization. The jihadis now take advantage of Cabo Delgado’s linguistic, cultural, and business links to coastal communities—in Tanzania in particular—to recruit and expand ASWJ’s operations. Meanwhile, al-Shabab and the Islamic State group, to which ASWJ has been formally aligned since June 2019, utilize Swahili in original and translated media publications. Many of the responses to such activities have been counterproductive. Between 2012 and 2014, Rogo and two of his successors were killed in three separate, extrajudicial shootings blamed on Kenyan police. The killings caused riots in Mombasa, and Rogo’s posthumous influence points to the futility of a “whack-a-mole” approach that tries to silence firebrands. Several mosques and homes in Mombasa were also controversially raided, with hundreds arrested. Yet according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), a shift in strategy since 2015 from heavy-handed policing to community outreach has successfully reduced jihadi recruitment along the Kenyan coast. Tanzania and Mozambique, however, appear to be repeating Kenyan mistakes. The overly militarized response to ASWJ has failed to quell a fast-intensifying insurgency. And in Zanzibar, where some researchers have argued electoral competition has forestalled Salafis’ embrace of jihadism—despite Uamsho’s evolution from religious charity to secessionist movement to nascent militant Islamist group—worsening repression and the ongoing detention of Uamsho leaders ensure the situation remains volatile. Even mainland Tanzania, seen as more pacific than Zanzibar, has seen a recent uptick [PDF] in terrorist violence; Tanzanian security forces, according to ICG, have responded with arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances of coastal Muslims. The threat of rising support for Islamist militancy in East Africa should not take away from efforts to address calls for secession: separatist movements can, of course, turn violent. However, in areas where separatism is rife, ham-fisted clampdowns on Muslim preachers and their followers risk strengthening radicals’ hand. As UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres—speaking in Nairobi—warned, the “final tipping point” to radicalism is often state-led violence and abuse of power. A shift from separatism to endemic radical Salafism would re-frame narratives of coastal exclusion along more explicitly religious lines, causing new problems for governments. While calls for autonomy and independence draw strongly on questions of identity, they remain political—and therefore open to conversation and compromise. A growing Islamist movement, meanwhile, would recast such debates in rigid, ideological terms, thus giving rise to a zero-sum scenario in which dialogue is nigh on impossible.
  • Nigeria
    Darkness in Northern Nigeria
    There are signs that as the Nigerian army and the police continue to fail to meet the security needs of the Nigerian people, they will turn toward repression. In November, Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai called on all troops to put themselves in a “war mode.” An internal army communication obtained by the media exhorted Nigerian soldiers to treat all individuals in the region where Boko Haram is active as suspected jihadis until they are “properly identified.” The door is opening to yet more human rights abuses by the security services. Fears that the Buhari government may revive shelved legislation that would seek greater control over social media—including the death penalty for spreading “fake news,” as defined by the government—are also surfacing. Meanwhile, the Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG), a civil society organization that focuses on the welfare of northern Nigerians, is calling on local communities to defend themselves against Boko Haram and “bandits” because the Buhari government is failing to protect them. Last week, before the resolution of the kidnapping of hundreds of schoolboys at Kankara, CNG’s national coordinator said “northern Nigeria has been abandoned at the mercy of various insurgents, bandits, kidnappers, armed robbers, rapists, and an assortment of hardened criminals,” with a “huge vacuum in the political will and capacity of government to challenge” such violent actors. Around the country, numerous state governors are organizing and supporting more-or-less informal militias, ostensibly in support of the army and the police. In the current climate, such groups are likely now acting independently more often than in conjunction with security forces. Some evidence suggests that security service abuses contribute to the alienation of the population from the government, helping drive jihadi recruitment. With the growth of militias, the Nigerian state is losing an attribute of sovereignty: a monopoly on the legal use of violence. The government is also failing to fulfill its obligation to provide security for its people.
  • Mozambique
    The Military-First Approach in Northern Mozambique is Bound to Fail
    Nolan Quinn is a research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations’ Africa Program. On October 14, the Islamist insurgency focused in northern Mozambique spilled over into Tanzania, with an estimated three hundred militants carrying out an attack on Kitaya village in the region of Mtwara. Since then, Ansar al-Sunna (ASWJ)—the Mozambican jihadi group with apparent links to the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS)—has claimed at least three more attacks in Mtwara. This comes despite Tanzania sending troops to the region earlier this year to tighten border security and its military’s security operations in areas near the Mozambican border. The widening scope of ASWJ’s attacks is indicative of the shortcomings of the current approach to combating the group. The response to the Islamist insurgency has, thus far, been primarily military in focus. In September 2019, the Wagner Group—a private military contractor with links to the Kremlin—was deployed to Cabo Delgado, Mozambique’s worst-afflicted province and site of the largest private investment in Africa. By November the same year, the mercenaries were evacuated after sustaining losses; another security contractor, the South African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), remains in Cabo Delgado but has been unable to subdue the insurgency. An (unlikely) intervention by South African government forces has been considered, and Zimbabwe’s ruling party has argued the Southern African Development Community should invoke its mutual defense pact and enter the conflict. The European Union, meanwhile, agreed last month to provide training as well as logistical and medical support to Mozambican forces. The military response has been hampered by its unprofessionalism. Tensions between Tanzanian and Mozambican forces were already high before the former allegedly fired rockets into the latter’s territory, injuring civilians. Mozambican forces were implicated in a horrific extrajudicial killing last year and have been credibly accused of various other abuses. DAG helicopters have, on multiple occasions, killed Mozambican civilians in counterinsurgency operations. Amid the climate of insecurity, Mozambique’s government has begun arming militia groups, which have publicly tortured and beheaded suspected insurgents. Government forces and militia groups have accidentally attacked one another several times, highlighting a lack of coordination. Concerted efforts to improve governance and economic opportunity in Cabo Delgado have been largely absent from any existing counterinsurgency strategy. Instead, in a peripheral region blighted by persistent poverty and inequality [PDF], government officials have prioritized the interests of multinational energy companies, large-scale ruby miners, and heroin smugglers [PDF] at the expense of local workers—all while enriching themselves [PDF] through corrupt practices. In Tanzania, President John Magufuli has shown slightly more concern for Mtwara’s economic fortunes by promising government purchases of cashews, a local staple. This, however, has not stopped residents of the region—an opposition stronghold—from crossing into Cabo Delgado to join the insurgency. Government corruption and economic stagnation, coupled with security forces’ penchant for human rights violations, help strengthen ASWJ. While the Islamist group is notorious for gruesome killings, it also employs tactics to win local support. The group has warned civilians to flee before attacks, distributed food in areas under its control, and offered loans to potential recruits. This “hearts and minds” approach bears the imprint of IS, which advocated a similar tactical shift in the Lake Chad Basin, where the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) began providing services and split from Boko Haram due to the latter’s more indiscriminate targeting of civilians. It appears that ASWJ, which has been formally aligned with IS since June 2019, has increased cooperation [PDF] with foreign jihadis. By implementing some of their operational practices, ASWJ is finding success in undermining the Mozambican government’s already tenuous claims to legitimacy. A first step in improving the counterinsurgency effort should be to formalize militia groups’ participation. A major impediment to the military response has been the makeup of troops deployed to Cabo Delgado: most soldiers do not speak the local languages and, being underpaid with little personal attachment to the area, often retreat when attacked. Both the military and militia groups need training in human rights—from the European Union or a regional body—and a clear indication that violations will be punished. To date, Mozambique’s government has not taken any steps to investigate abuses. This makes it difficult for government forces to win local cooperation in fighting ASWJ. Better regional partnerships—especially with the Tanzanian government, with whom joint police operations are set to begin—are needed to push back on ASWJ’s expansion, particularly its growing maritime prowess. A military-first approach cannot cure a failing state. The government and its partners should equally focus on restoring—or, in some areas, establishing for the first time—provision of basic services. Encouragingly, after years of delay, the government appears to have recognized the need for a development strategy. As renowned Mozambique scholar Joseph Hanlon recently documented [PDF], President Filipe Nyusi has put one of his most trusted, effective officials in charge of development agencies—with a remit focused in the country’s north—controlling more than $2.8 billion. The World Bank, meanwhile, has set aside $700 million for initiatives “to address the underlying causes of fragility and conflict.” Hanlon also points to a cash transfer program, starting in Cabo Delgado but later scaling up to the entire country, as a plausible way to share resource wealth. These measures are not preordained for success: hollow institutions and rampant corruption are at the core of Mozambique’s problems and will complicate the rollout of economic stimulus programs. Building a more effective state will amplify military and economic approaches to counterinsurgency and improve the chances of achieving lasting peace. The process of doing so will be long and arduous. But after years of neglecting—even actively harming—many of its citizens, Mozambique’s government has no alternative.
  • Nigeria
    Nigerian Security Forces and the Dangers of a Violence-First Approach
    Nkasi Wodu is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. On October 20, 2020, Nigerians watched in horror on social media as men suspected to be members of the military opened fire on peaceful #EndSARS protesters—a movement responding to a litany of abuses by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a special police unit—in Lagos, Nigeria’s largest city. For more than a decade, Nigerian civil society groups have trained members of public security forces regarding the inviolability of human rights. Despite such training, Nigerian security agencies still follow the all-too-familiar path of perpetrating violence against the very people they have sworn to protect. Nigeria has had a complex existence since its independence from British colonial rule in 1960—a complexity perhaps more pronounced than in other countries considering the country’s highly diverse population of over two hundred million. Consequently, governing the strikingly heterogeneous country—and addressing the deep-seated grievances of its many groups—can be difficult. Unfortunately, a recurring theme throughout Nigeria’s postcolonial history has been security forces’ propensity to use force to suppress unrest. Deployment of security forces to deescalate potential or actual violent situations is not in itself a wrong practice; preventing the destruction of lives and properties is a prerequisite for a functioning state. In the case of Nigeria, however, security forces routinely use disproportionate force on civilians in gross violations of human rights, such as in Odi, Gbaramatu, Zaria, Zaki Biam, and other instances. This “shoot first, ask questions later” approach poses various dangers to the Nigerian state. First, it does not address the initial cause of escalating violence and is ultimately counterproductive. In many instances, it reinforces the positions of aggrieved groups and improves public perceptions of those groups.  This pattern is currently playing out across Nigeria, as many conflicts have persisted despite—or perhaps because of—the deployment of security officials. For example, Biafran separatist groups, such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), continue to command a large following in the South East region after the civil war fought more than fifty years ago. Various military exercises and the Nigerian government’s designation of IPOB as a terrorist group have done little to diminish its influence. Another danger of the violence-first approach is that it encourages a violent response from already aggrieved groups, especially in the absence of platforms for peaceful, constructive dialogue. This has led to increasing radicalization of individuals and groups who see violence as the only means to get the government’s attention. For example, in the Niger Delta, years of nonviolent agitations led by prominent activists such as Ken Saro-Wiwa were met with repression from the Nigerian military. This pushed many young men in the region toward a violent insurgency featuring attacks on oil and gas facilities, resulting in billions of dollars in lost revenue for the government. To stop the violence, the federal government declared an amnesty program, offering stipends to repentant militants in exchange for peace. Similarly, many scholars focused on Boko Haram agree that the group’s radicalization—it previously proselytized through largely non-violent means—followed a government clampdown in 2009, in which some eight hundred of its members were killed. The group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was later killed in police custody. Returning to a familiar playbook, the government has commenced a controversial amnesty program for repentant Boko Haram members, effectively sending a message that violence pays. The Nigerian government needs to change its approach of immediately responding to conflict with military might. One fundamental shift should be to understand conflict as the evidence of a struggle against systemic oppression. When viewed from this lens, conflict becomes an opportunity for the government to understand the myriad structural issues bedeviling its people and work together with aggrieved groups to address those issues. This sort of understanding also lessens the temptation to escalate tensions each and every time grievances arise, or to resort to paying for peace without addressing the origins of unrest. The Nigerian government should also set a standard of accountability for security officials and use it to pursue those involved in human rights violations. To date, no one has been held responsible for atrocities committed in Odi, Zaria, and Gbaramatu; with the Nigerian army denying much of what unfolded at Lekki Toll Gate on October 20, it appears this pattern of impunity is set to continue. As long as security officials involved in human rights violations are not held accountable, they will continue to perpetrate violence on those they are called to protect.
  • Nigeria
    Northwest Nigeria Potential Jihadi Linchpin in West Africa
    Up to now, radical jihadi activity in West Africa has been centered in Mali—with spillover to adjacent parts of Burkina Faso and Niger—and the Lake Chad Basin. The two locales are now increasingly bridged by jihadi activity in northwest Nigeria, where resurgent struggles over land and water with a cast of ethnically aligned fighters and flourishing criminality provide them with new space. Jihadi movements in all three regions are fractious, subject to bloody internal rivalries, and overlap with criminal elements. They do share a declared goal of establishing polities based on Islamic law—sharia—and the destruction of the fragile, postcolonial secular states in the region. (National borders, established by the former colonial powers, are largely meaningless for most local people, as well as for criminals and jihadis.) Were they to be successful, however, it is by no means clear that they could establish coherent territorial governance much above the village level. No charismatic leader such as Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Osama bin Laden, or even Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has emerged to impose unity on the various jihadi groups now active from the Lake Chad Basin to the western Sahel. More likely would be decentralized regimes of warlordism led by Islamist and criminal opportunists. Criminally inflected chaos and a humanitarian disaster are more likely than a resurrected, unified Islamic State. France has the most modern military force countering the jihadis—Operation Barkhane numbers some 4,500 soldiers—and supports most of the weak militaries of francophone West Africa. The United States provides France with limited logistical and intelligence support from its drone base in Niger. It also trains small numbers of soldiers drawn from local militaries. Jihadi forces at present are resurgent throughout the region. Were the French to leave, jihadis would likely overrun Mali and adjacent territories even if they could not govern them. In the Lake Chad Basin—mostly in Nigeria but also in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger—the jihadis are primarily factions of Boko Haram, some with links to the Islamic State, others to al-Qaeda. (Observers are divided as to the tactical or strategic significance of those links.) Nigeria has taken the lead in attempting to coordinate its efforts with those of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Other than in Niger, the United States has no significant security presence in the Lake Chad region or the western Sahel. Across the region, the jihadis, far from defeated, appear to be strengthening. Northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin have a much larger population and, accordingly, the humanitarian disaster associated with fighting is much greater than in the western Sahel. (The United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and other international donors already provide significant humanitarian assistance right across West Africa, including the Sahel.) These two centers of jihadism are separated by northwest Nigeria. That region is increasingly plagued by conflicts over water and land use, exacerbated by human and cattle population growth, climate change, and poor governance. A borderland between the Sahara, the Sahel, and better-watered lands to the south, the region has long been a center of smuggling as well as trading. With a harsh and variable climate—as in the rest of the Sahel—population movements have been a constant. So, too, have been waves of Islamic religious revival, which influence present-day jihadi activity. Jihadi groups are taking advantage of a general societal breakdown in certain areas. The Nigerian government has responded by seeking to crush the jihadis and the bandits through military and police methods, so far to no avail. Government-sponsored proposals, some fanciful, prescribe reorganization of the cattle industry. None address the huge population increase, climate change, and poor governance that provide jihadis and criminals with oxygen. A different strategy is possible. Much of northwest Nigeria is included in the domains of the Sultan of Sokoto and his subordinate emirs. (The sultan is the preeminent Muslim traditional ruler in Nigeria, and his domains stretch into neighboring countries.) Muslim rulers provide traditional justice that often commands greater popular confidence than that handed down by the government in far-off Abuja. Their agents sometimes have a good understanding of what is happening on the ground—the local drivers of conflict. Jihadis despise these traditional rulers as heretics and seek to kill them whenever possible. In the northeast, for example, Boko Haram was nearly successful in killing the Shehu of Borno, generally regarded as second only to the sultan in the traditional hierarchy that jihadis seek to destroy. Were Abuja to cooperate more closely with traditional rulers that command popular confidence, its confrontation with the jihadis could be more successful.
  • South Africa
    Transnational White Supremacist Militancy Thriving in South Africa
    Jacob Ware is a research associate for counterterrorism and the Studies program at the Council on Foreign Relations. His research focuses on global far-right terrorism and countering violent extremism, and his work has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, CNN, War on the Rocks, and in the academic journal Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. As white supremacist militancy has raced across the Western world, it has not spared South Africa from being swept up in the chaos. Domestic South African white supremacist movements both inform white supremacist movements elsewhere, and at the same time are influenced by global trends on the extreme right. South Africa, of course, has its own long—and painful—history of white supremacism. The formal apartheid system, which governed the country for over 40 years, institutionally oppressed the Black population, concentrating political, economic, and judicial power exclusively in white hands. Since the 1990s, when apartheid finally collapsed, race relations have remained raw, and the white population still holds much of the economic capital. The country remains one of the world's premier examples of the postcolonial challenges in managing racial tensions and promoting a sustainable national identity in a democratic context with the rule of law. Accordingly, South Africa still inflames the passions of white supremacists around the world. Dylann Roof, murderer of nine African Americans at Bible study at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina in June 2015, was in no small part inspired by white supremacism in southern Africa—his Facebook profile picture showed him in a jacket emblazoned with the flags of Rhodesia, a bastion of white supremacy before it achieved independence as Zimbabwe, and apartheid-era South Africa, and his manifesto was published on a personal website titled “The Last Rhodesian.” The centrality of South Africa to the white supremacist struggle around the world has been summarized by the radical website American Renaissance in March 2018: “the fate of white people around the world is linked to that of the Afrikaners.” Within South Africa, there are periodic reminders of the enduring threat of white supremacist violence. In 2019, for instance, four members of the “Crusaders,” a white supremacist group, were arrested for plotting attacks against Black targets. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), founded in 1973 by noted white supremacist Eugène Terre'Blanche, also remains active today. The group apparently boasts around 5,000 members, and in 2010, members of the group were arrested for plans to attack Black townships in the wake of the murder of Terre'Blanche—which some claimed was racially motivated. The plotters, based in Pretoria, had also threatened foreigners and players traveling to the country for the 2010 World Cup. And in 2002, a far-right group calling itself the “Warriors of the Boer Nation” claimed responsibility for a series of blasts targeting the township of Soweto, in which one woman was killed. The transnational white supremacist threat has manifested itself in devastating attacks in the U.S., Europe (especially Norway and Germany), and New Zealand, where an extremist murdered 51 in twin attacks at two mosques in Christchurch in March 2019. And the same networks responsible for violence elsewhere have reached Africa's southernmost state. The Base, a neo-Nazi organization whose members have been arrested for major plots in Maryland and Georgia, had recruited in South Africa. And Simon Roche, a senior figure in the Suidlanders, an Afrikaner survivalist group, marched with other white supremacists at the Charlottesville Unite the Right rally in August 2017—an event at which a young woman was killed in a far-right car ramming attack. One is always tempted to dismiss such activism if it hasn't yet manifested in violence—but as one Cape Town-based journalist recently wrote, “We laugh at the far right because it makes them seem less frightening, but it doesn't make them any less dangerous.” After all, in the age of social media radicalization and lone actor terrorism, all it takes is one. As the threat remains contained, South Africa's counterterrorism measures should surgically target more extreme fringes. Confronting race-based conspiracy theories—such as the false claim that Black South Africans were killing white farmers that was infamously tweeted by President Trump in August 2018—is essential. It can be pursed both through promoting truthfulness online and marginalizing proponents of hate speech. South Africa's intelligence agencies, meanwhile, should be aware of international networks' and groups' efforts to recruit and radicalize within the country, while continuing to maintain vigilance over groups active in South Africa itself. 
  • United States
    Virtual Meeting: CFR Master Class Series With Bruce Hoffman
    Play
    Bruce Hoffman discusses domestic terrorism in the United States. The CFR Master Class Series is a weekly 45-minute session hosted by Vice President and Deputy Director for Studies Shannon O’Neil in which a CFR fellow will take a step back from the news and discuss the fundamentals essential to understanding a given country, region of the world, or issue pertaining to U.S. foreign policy or international relations.
  • Local and Traditional Leadership
    Nigeria Considers National DRR Agency Amid Boko Haram Setbacks
    Alvin Young is a Rangel Fellow and master's candidate at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. On February 19, 2020, Senator Ibrahim Gaidam, the former governor of Yobe State, introduced legislation to create the National Agency for Deradicalization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration of Repentant Insurgents. Gaidam represents Yobe state, which borders Borno and has been affected by the insurgency. The bill’s purpose is to encourage and rehabilitate Boko Haram defectors and prevent violent extremism in Nigeria. Given the recent requests for additional military force to combat Boko Haram by Nigerian lawmakers, Senator Gaidam’s legislation is an important step toward incorporating deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DRR) programs into the overall strategy designed to defeat Boko Haram.  Currently, Nigeria has three deradicalization programs that support Boko Haram defectors. The Prison Program works with militants convicted of violent extremist offenses or those on or awaiting trial. During the program, Imams teach classes on non-violent interpretations of Islam, and other program staff provide vocational training so that, when inmates fulfill their prison terms, they can reenter society with less risk of reverting to terrorism. Second, the Yellow Ribbon Initiative supports women and children associated with Boko Haram by providing psychosocial therapy and reintegration programs. Finally, Operation Safe Corridor, launched by the Nigerian military in 2015, works with Boko Haram defectors by addressing extremist ideology and providing them with trauma counseling. Two thousand members of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) have defected through Operation Safe Corridor since its inception. Governor Babagana Zulum of Borno promised to complement security initiatives with programs that provide access to education and job opportunities. But, as military failures at the hands of Boko Haram’s have left much of Borno cut off from itself and the rest of the country, Governor Zulum has apparently—and understandably—prioritized military action by calling on the federal government to recruit 100,000 troops to counter the insurgency. Zulum promised an additional 50,000 "able-bodied" persons to combat the extremist group but did not request support for DRR programs. Instead, Babagana urged the Nigerian military to re-establish a military base in Borno. Other Northern leaders such as Yobe State governor, Malam Mai Mala Buni, are calling on the Nigerian military to expand their presence in the north. While an influx of troops may be important to addressing the immediate security situation caused by Boko Haram, the governors’ prioritization of security forces over investments into more DRR initiatives places their constituents in a revolving cycle of violence. Many Nigerians, including several lawmakers, oppose DRR programs. Some feel that their communities are not sufficiently consulted when these programs are developed and implemented. Perhaps more problematic, many communities, after enduring years of atrocities, remain skeptical of reconciliation with Boko Haram defectors. A senator from Ondo state said that there was “no justification” for the program proposed by senator Gaidam. “How can an enemy be rehabilitated? These are people who have done Nigeria so much harm." Current DRR efforts have had mixed results due to the Nigerian military’s limited expertise in deradicalization programs such as Operation Safe Corridor and reasonable fears that program participants will face violent retribution upon reintegration.  Vanda Felbab-Brown argues that community opposition to DRR efforts suggests that the Nigerian government “needs to invest more in open and comprehensive discussions with society about rehabilitation, reintegration, leniency, and victims’ rights.” To be effective, Nigerian lawmakers must ensure that DRR programs continue to work with those communities that will receive the rehabilitated fighters. A primarily military effort—still the current approach of the government—has not been successful; leaders owe it to their communities to explore the root causes of the insurgency and support non-military efforts, where possible, such as Senator Gaidam’s new legislation.