Rwanda

The Rwandan President’s attempt to regulate faith-based organizations raises more questions than answers.

The peacebuilding challenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo is daunting, to be sure. But the alternative is, and has been, a catastrophe.

Leaders devalue democracy under the guise of standing up to the West.

When it comes to civil liberties in Africa, Western governments and institutions must put their monies where their mouths are.

The resurgence of the M23 rebel group in Eastern Congo increases suffering for civilians and heightens international tensions.    

Support for immigration in the West must be balanced with concern about governance in African countries. 

On May 17, twenty-six years after the Rwandan genocide, Félicien Kabuga was finally arrested outside of Paris. A wanted man for decades, he was the most notorious architect of the 1994 atrocities still at large. Kabuga bankrolled the massacre, financing the Interahamwe militias and importing to Rwanda an astounding number of the machetes that were then used to slaughter men, women, and children. He co-founded and co-owned the hate-radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, which repeatedly and expressly urged listeners to participate in mass murder. Kabuga then devoted the same resources and connections he had used to fuel the genocide to protecting himself and evading justice. Although he was indicted in 1997 by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, he found safe harbor in various African and European countries over the years, purchasing enough complicity to ensure he would not be held accountable for his actions. Of course, no arrest or prosecution can erase the trauma of the genocide. But the apprehension of Kabuga does bring a measure of relief to some survivors and to those who worked for years to bring him to justice. It should also strike some fear in the hearts of those responsible for atrocities; clearly justice does not simply give up over time. But the Kabuga saga also raises important questions. Who helped him live in freedom for so many years? Who facilitated his movements across borders and his financial transactions? Who tipped him off when the law got too close? Will those complicit parties be held accountable? Kabuga’s story also sheds some light on the pathologies of the Rwandan government today. Critics of the government—and its problematic human rights record—are by no means all sympathetic to the perpetrators of the genocide. Some of those critics were victims of the genocide themselves, while others came to care passionately about Rwanda because they were so horrified by what unfolded in the spring of 1994. When these critics are smeared as enemies of peace, genocide deniers, or worse, it is a grotesque distortion of reality. Yet for years some small and twisted circles of humanity continued to protect the likes of Félicien Kabuga, which helped feed the conflation of honest dissent with the darkest of motives. It’s easier, after all, to imagine that all opponents are part of a vast and evil conspiracy when there is evidence that a conspiracy somewhere—even one with the reduced aims of simply evading arrest—is still afoot. Leaving no stone unturned in pursuit of those who perpetrated the genocide, and those who protected them, remains essential for Rwanda’s future.

Neil Edwards is an intern for the Atlantic Council's Africa Center in Washington, DC. He is a master's candidate at the School of International Service at American University. This April marks the twenty-six-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and twenty years since Paul Kagame took the reins as president. For much of that time, Kagame imposed limits on the political process, democratic debate, and opposition figures. He justified these limits by saying that the country was too fragile, the wounds too fresh, and the competitive aspects of democracy too divisive for a country emerging out of a genocide. Many Rwandans, and much of the world, accepted that logic, including the United States, which was likely constrained by its failure to act during the genocide and also its decision to block the United Nations from doing so. But when does that grace period end? Although the wounds of the genocide still persist, Rwanda is young: two-thirds of the country are under the age of thirty. In other words, a vast majority of the nation was born after or were infants during the genocide. While most of this generation does not have memories of the atrocities and certainly, none were perpetrators, they still must endure the strict policies of the Kagame regime. Rwanda’s institutions are staunchly loyal to President Kagame. Members of parliament—63 percent of whom are women, three times the world average—are necessarily loyal to the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front party, rather than to the constituents who elected them. The judiciary is not independent and has aided the regime’s political imperative by filing spurious charges, jailing, and in some cases carrying out extrajudicial executions. The military, which patrols the country and is accused of unlawfully detaining and torturing people in military camps, often targets those with dissenting opinions. These institutions have enacted and helped enforce limitations on freedoms and expressions. Fierce critics of the Kagame regime, many of whom were initially Kagame’s allies, have all faced spurious charges, extended jail time, and even death. In 2017, prior to the presidential election, Diane Rwigara, a female candidate, was arrested alongside her family for tax evasion and inciting an insurrection. She spent over a year in prison. Similarly, Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, a female presidential candidate in the 2010 election, was arrested and served eight years of a fifteen-year sentence on charges of terrorism and threatening national security. These charges are also widely understood to have been ginned-up for political purposes. In February 2020, Kizito Mihigo, a popular gospel singer was found dead in his prison cell. Kigali police claim that he hanged himself, although critics believe he was murdered. Mihigo had released a music video in 2014 that challenged the official government narrative of the genocide, which led to his arrest. The stories of Rwigara, Umuhoza, and Mihigo are merely the most high profile examples of the fact that the country is not healing; rather, there is increasing impatience with the constraints on democracy. Instead of seeing the Kagame administration’s oppressive approach to opposition as a mark of strength, young Rwandans may increasingly see this as a sign of political fragility. Kagame presents himself as an indispensable ally of the United States—crucial for the security of the Great Lakes. But what happens when Kagame steps down, as he promises to do in 2024, or at a later date? His departure will likely leave a gaping power vacuum. Hence, institutions must be strengthened and reformed to prepare the country for his eventual departure. Kagame has not groomed a successor and Rwanda’s popular political elites have been systemically sidelined via exile, targeted assassinations, or jail. So, who will be the future leaders of Rwanda? It is time for inclusive institutional reforms to promote civil society and encourage the younger generation to voice their visions for the future. With support from the Rwandan government, this would result in the natural, non-threatening emergence of political parties and a new wave of candidates running for the office of the presidency. This would also engage and unite the country in selecting the next president—assisting Rwanda in its long-held goal of fostering social cohesion in the process. If these institutional reforms are not adopted, Rwanda may face the same fate of Zimbabwe, where, despite a 2017 military coup, the subsequent death of Robert Mugabe, and the transition of power to President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the institutional legacies of repression live on. The United States and other friends of Rwanda should set a clear and unified policy that encourages the Rwandan government to adopt inclusive institutions and permit the growth of civil society in order to prepare it for life after Kagame. This would promote the enduring stability and security of Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. 

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering February 24 to March 6, was compiled by Maleeha Coleburn and Rebecca Turkington.

Neil Edwards is the volunteer intern for CFR's Africa Program in Washington, DC. He is a master's candidate at the School of International Service at American University and a returned Peace Corps Rwanda volunteer. In an open letter published on December 4, the former coach of Team Rwanda cycling accused the Rwanda Cycling Federation president, Aimable Bayingana, of corruption and ignoring sexual misconduct against female riders. On December 7, Bayingana, along with some executive members of the federation, resigned. Their resignations occurred alongside an investigation by the Rwanda Investigation Bureau and a promise by the Rwandan Sports Ministry to impose a new policy against sexual abuse that will apply to sports nationwide. Cycling is one of the most popular sports in Rwanda. The nation has hosted the Tour du Rwanda every year since 1998, drawing huge crowds in the process. Team Rwanda Cycling was founded as part of an effort to rebuild the country and restore relations among its people after the genocide. One of its founders, Adrien Niyonshuti, qualified for the 2012 and 2016 Olympic Games in London and Rio, bearing the flag at the opening ceremony for Rwanda at both events. The former coach who wrote the open letter is cyclist Jonathan Boyer. The first American to participate in the Tour de France, he played a pivotal role in developing the cycling program in Rwanda.  Rwanda prides itself on its measures toward gender equality, including having the world’s leading female representation in the legislature at 62 percent—three times the world average. Additionally, women make up half of the cabinet and supreme court. However, according to a survey by Transparency International, around half of respondents believe that gender-based corruption, which includes but is not limited to gender bias and sexual harassment, exists in the workplace. Five percent of respondents reported personally experiencing gender-based corruption, and 85 percent of those who reported personally experiencing gender-based corruption were women. Still the resignations of senior members of the Rwandan Cycling Federation and the possibility of a new policy rollout by the Sports Ministry are positive steps toward correcting gender-based corruption in Rwanda. Continued pressure for reform coupled with policy initiatives from the Rwandan government set a standard of inclusion in the workplace and an expansion of the country’s already impressive anti-corruption measures. 

Neil Edwards is the volunteer intern for CFR's Africa Program in Washington, DC. He is a master's candidate at the School of International Service at American University and a returned Peace Corps Rwanda volunteer. On November 10, Rwandan security forces shot dead two Ugandan nationals accused of smuggling tobacco across the border. Smuggling has become more common after Rwanda closed its border with Uganda in late February amid a dispute between Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. The deterioration of Kagame’s and Museveni’s relationship has led to job losses among traders, higher commodity prices, and has left communities with few option other than to turn to the risky business of smuggling. For decades, Kagame and Museveni fought side by side, toppling Ugandan dictator Milton Obote via military coup in 1986 and overthrowing Mobutu Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997. Kagame, who trained in Tanzania as a spy, became Museveni’s head of military intelligence and close confidant. In return, Museveni aided Kagame’s rise to power, incubating Rwandan refugees that eventually formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front. With the backing of Museveni, Kagame invaded Rwanda, ending the 1994 genocide.  A quarter century later, the relationship between these erstwhile allies has deteriorated. In October 2017, the Ugandan government initiated a crackdown on Ugandan police officials, accusing them of being Rwandan spies. The latest spat is driven by Kagame, who has accused Uganda of arresting and torturing Rwandan nationals. Kagame also asserts that Museveni is supporting the Rwandan National Congress and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, whom Kagame perceives are intent on overthrowing his regime. If the relationship does not improve, analysts fear that this feud could result in proxy conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has sprung up previously as a result of private disagreements.  Though the two leaders agreed to reopen their borders in August, Rwanda has effectively kept it closed, citing construction work. Further, the Rwandan government has issued a travel advisory strongly recommended that Rwandan nations not travel to Uganda. Reports suggest that that licit trade is nearly non-existent, and Uganda has accused Rwanda of implementing a trade embargo.  The border closure has compromised tens of millions of dollars in trade between the two countries. The immediate victims are small-scale and wholesale traders, who rely on buying items at cheaper prices on one side of the border and making a profit by selling them at a higher price on the other. Without these intermediaries, the comparative advantage of each country’s product pricing is lost, hurting both the national economies and the consumers who rely on those price points.  According to each country’s Consumer Price Index reports, prices in Rwanda, especially in rural areas, have risen more than in Uganda. They have risen about 1.5 percent each month in Rwanda, totaling over seven percent since February, when the border was closed. In rural areas, prices have risen ten percent over that period. These rising prices have taken a toll, especially for those living in rural poverty. In contrast, food prices in Uganda have only increased by four percent and overall prices by only two percent. Rwanda’s decision to close its border has hurt its own people more than Ugandans. Kagame’s leadership has resulted in remarkable development feats since the 1994 genocide. However, his current decision to keep the borders closed is a blemish on his development record—costing the country jobs and inflating prices. If Kagame’s and Museveni’s relationship continues to deteriorate, prices will continue to rise, further hurting the purchasing power of Rwandans.