Social Issues

Radicalization and Extremism

  • Radicalization and Extremism
    Reporting on Extremism and Political Violence
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    Jacob Ware, research fellow at CFR, discusses how serious the threat of political violence in the United States is and what the Trump administration must do to ensure that such threats do not proliferate. Laura Esposito, public safety reporter at the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, speaks about her experience reporting on extremist events in Alleghany County, Pennsylvania. The host of the webinar is Carla Anne Robbins, senior fellow at CFR and former deputy editorial page editor at the New York Times.  TRANSCRIPT FASKIANOS: Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Local Journalists Webinar. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. CFR is an independent and nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher focused on U.S. foreign policy. CFR is also the publisher of Foreign Affairs magazine. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. This webinar is part of CFR’s Local Journalists Initiative, created to help you draw connections between the local issues you cover and national and international dynamics. Our programming puts you in touch with CFR resources and expertise on international issues and provides a forum for sharing best practices. We’re delighted to have nearly a hundred journalists from forty states and U.S. territories with us today. Thank you all for being with us. We will be sending the video and transcript from this on-the-record discussion out to all of you. And we will post it on our website at CFR.org/localjournalists. We are pleased to have Jacob Ware, Laura Esposito, and host Carla Anne Robbins with us today to discuss reporting on extremism and political violence. Jacob Ware is a research fellow at CFR, where he studies domestic and international terrorism and counterterrorism. He is the coauthor of the book God, Guns, and Sedition: Far-Right Terrorism in America, which was published in 2024. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and at DeSales University. Laura Esposito is a public safety reporter at the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, where she covers the people and the communities most affected by trauma, injustice, and public safety issues. She has reported extensively on the attempted assassination of Donald Trump, the 2024 presidential election, and on the ground in Jerusalem and the West Bank. And Carla Anne Robbins is a senior fellow here at CFR and cohost of the CFR podcast, The World Next Week. She also serves as faculty director of the Master of International Affairs Program and clinical professor of national security studies at Baruch College’s Marxe School of Public and International Affairs. Previously, she was deputy editorial page editor at the New York Times and chief diplomatic correspondent at the Wall Street Journal. So I am going to turn the conversation over to Carla to have the exchange with Jacob and Laura, and then we will turn to all of you for your questions. And we hope that you will use this forum to share your best practices and things that are working in your community as you’re doing your reporting. So, Carla, over to you. ROBBINS: Thank you, Irina. And thank you, everybody, for joining us. And thank you so much, Jacob and Laura, for being here today. There is an enormous amount to cover here about this. And just to give you a sense of how we’re going to do this, I’m going to pitch some questions to the two experts and then we’re going to open it up to you all. And you can—please more questions. And I always have questions, but you guys are—you guys are covering this daily. I mean, and we can all learn a lot from each other. So please don’t hesitate to—don’t wait for the, you know, time when I back up. Just jump in right now, anytime, with questions. It’ll help the conversation. So I’m not really even sure what the new normal is right now. You know, in the wake of January 6, and poll after poll after poll in which we see these shocking numbers of Americans from both parties who say that they—you know, they endorse the use of violence to—they say it’s to save the country. I mean, this really to me is just—I couldn’t even imagine this a few years ago. So, Laura, can we start with you? Pennsylvania was the site of an assassination attempt that we all saw. And it’s sort of extraordinary images here. And you’ve written about a whole bunch of other incidents in Pennsylvania, which obviously was an absolutely essential swing state there. How widespread were the problems in the run-up to the election? And did we hyperventilate about this, or was this really a serious problem? ESPOSITO: This was definitely a serious problem. And thank you for having me, again. But something that, you know, a lot of advocates and people doing all the on-the-ground work to mitigate political tensions just kept repeating is, you know, these problems have been prevalent in Pennsylvania in previous election cycles for a long time now. You know, Pennsylvania does have that divide. They have the two big cities on opposite ends of the state. And then there’s a lot of really rural areas. You know, Allegheny County, where I do primarily a lot of my reporting, you know, votes pretty blue most years. But then Butler County, the cite of the Donald Trump assassination attempt, is a very deep red state. So there is a lot of divisions. And they’ve really only broadened, you know, over the past few years. But there’s been more of a national spotlight on it this time around than ever before, which was the major difference. And, you know, having that large media presence from all corners of the globe, especially during the assassination attempt of president—or, President-elect Trump really, I think, does create even more political tension. You know, there’s a lot of these people in these rural communities who aren’t media trained, you know, aren’t really prepared to handle when, you know, international news organizations are, you know, set up outside of a volunteer fire department agency. And they also experience—you know, these people on the ground where a lot of this was happening—they experienced, you know, the threats that journalists often experience. Where if they spoke on the record with a journalist, suddenly the whole country is reading these stories now and they’re receiving death threats of their own. They’re receiving, you know, an influx of worrying messages. So that really also just put a lot of people at odds with each other. So this is definitely a—we’re not overhyping the issue, to say the least. ROBBINS: So I—you know, you have written about, other people have written about the Philadelphia man charge was threatening to skin alive a state party representative who was recruiting poll watchers, Nazi banners hanging from the city’s bridges, people who, you know, not willing to go, advocacy organizations pulling canvassers from the streets. I suppose, what I—are these sort of one-offs in different places? Or did you see this, as and law enforcement, see this as a more organized? Were there groups behind them? ESPOSITO: So I think there’s a little bit of discrepancy over the actual definition of political violence, which I think does prevent a lot of the time people from realizing that this is a chain reaction and an effect. So political violence, when people think of it, they think of, you know, a president assassination attempt. But political violence is defined by the Institute of Constitutional Advocacy and Protection at Georgetown University Law Center as ideologically driven threats, harassment, intimidation, or physical violence that makes people less comfortable engaging in core democratic processes. So that can mean, you know, being involved at town council meetings, or running for elected office, speaking their mind in a protest, or, you know, just being more open about their political beliefs and ideologies. And all of what you described are examples of political violence because of that reason. But many people don’t see it that way. So in Pennsylvania, you know, we—Pittsburgh is also the site of the deadliest act of antisemitism in United States history, the Tree of Life Synagogue shooting in 2018 that killed eleven people. So we have had issues with antisemitism for a number of years now. You know, before and after that. The community has really banded together in the day since, but, you know, the Israel-Hamas war has really exacerbated those issues. And we have seen a flare up since October 7 of last year. And on top of that, you know, those campus protests that have been happening all across the country, you know, they’re affecting Pitt and Carnegie Mellon all the same. And because of that added political and tension here, from, you know, past traumatic incidents this city has sustained, it has, you know, just been a little bit—a little bit deeper here, deeper felt here, and throughout. So these incidents are all connected. But I think people often neglect to call it as such, because of the—people tend to fear the idea of just classifying things as political violence. You know, they don’t want to overstep. They don’t want to make it sound like it’s something that it’s not. But it’s really important that in journalism coverage, as well as, you know, when politicians use this term, we know exactly what that definition is because these are all, you know, connected, yes. ROBBINS: Thanks. So, Jacob, Laura is describing a broader phenomenon, which is the profound polarization in our society, rise in hate crimes. We know that there are hate crime reports that exist. And whether it’s, you know, the great replacement theory—(laughs)—you know, lots of things that we’ve seen that have been going on for quite a while here. But you wrote that—you know, that the United States is in a heightened threat environment, that was before the election, heading into election day, with multiple extremist factions threatening to disrupt the electoral process. Nationally—and I understand it’s hard to separate out, you know, what is sort of the general polarized environment and what is specifically intended to disrupt the electoral process—do you have a sense of how many events, you know, the marginal difference, and were there actual disruptive things going to the election that you say were intended to disrupt the election process? WARE: Well, first of all, thank you so much, Carla, for having me. To answer that question, I think I’ll start by just uplifting something that my co-panelist, Laura, said about political violence, which doesn’t just include, to Laura’s point, those major incidents that we think of when we think of terrorism or assassinations. It also includes what you might call a daily drumbeat of low-level violence that really can be quite widespread and disruptive. I think in the lead up to the election most of us who were working on election violence were most concerned about January 6-type incidents, or further incidents from—similar to the assassination attempt on former President Trump. Those appear not to have happened. But absolutely we have seen that daily drumbeat continue. I wrote a piece for Lawfare magazine in September that wrote that election violence already start—had already started. And one of the incidents, for example, I pointed to was an attempted mass shooting that was going to target a concert in the Atlanta area in April, in order to start a race war before the election. That’s clearly an act of political violence that, fortunately, was stopped. And also clearly something that’s designed to upend the political process. To answer your question most directly, I would say that the incidents that occurred in Georgia, the bomb threats, to me, are most likely an act of attempted election disruption. And also to continue the game of kind of definitions here, most definitions of terrorism—which is the phenomenon I really work on—including the definition that was advanced before 9/11 by my coauthor and CFR Senior Fellow Bruce Hoffman, says that terrorism is violence or the threat of violence for political or ideological goals. The threat of violence matters too. And I think when factions have threatened to intimidate voters are polling places, when they are arriving at locations with firearms, when you have low-level threats against neighbors and family members based on who they’re voting for, that all contributes to this culture of violence, of fear, that most likely swung people, whether that’s enough to determine the election or not. So certainly, we had a—we had a heightened threat environment. Now, we were most concerned—those of us working on this topic—we were most concerned about the days after the election when there probably wasn’t going to be a result, and we were going to be in a kind of information vacuum that conspiracy theories were going to fill. And that that sense of uncertainty was going to really lead to radicalization and mobilization to violence. That uncertainty did not arise, as we all know. It did not—we did not have uncertainty for long after the election. And I think from a counterterrorism standpoint that really helped kind of tone down the tensions and the violence. You know, politically speaking that has other implications, of course. ROBBINS: So we didn’t hear a lot about, you know, who was behind these potential threats. And we certainly haven’t heard a lot about the alt-right groups. In fact, we don’t even hear the term alt-right very much anymore. You know, the Oath Keepers and, you know, the people who organized January 6. And certainly, we haven’t seen a January 6 level, in part because the election was called and in part because the people who stormed the Capitol won. (Laughs.) The people who supported—that’s—let me say that again. They didn’t win, but the candidate they supported won. So is—I suppose there are two questions. One is, have we not—did we not see it because of the simple fact that these people wanted President Trump to win and President Trump won? Or have we not seen it because there was—we were much more—law enforcement was much more conscious this time of the threat? President Biden’s administration had—you know, they declared domestic terrorism a serious threat. They had a domestic terrorism policy. How much—and the leaders of, you know, the alt-right groups are in jail. How much is it, you know, successful domestic counterterrorism policy, and how much is it just that we didn’t have the things that we were worried about, the context, the environment, and one team won? WARE: I would say the biggest—personally, I would say the biggest factor that stopped broader violence is we didn’t end up with a call to arms. That call to arms would have arrived if Trump had failed to win the election. Maybe that’s a partisan point. Maybe it’s overly political. But I don’t think that can really be questioned, after what happened in 2020. If they’d lost the election and the election had come down to places like Philadelphia, Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina, Michigan, Wisconsin, you would have had a call to arms. And that would have inspired violence. The other element, honestly, Carla is good police work and good luck. You know, the fact that the gunman in Butler missed his target is luck. The fact that that shooting in Atlanta was stopped is good police work. If those things don’t happen in tandem, you have more violence. And so I think we were—we were fortunate in that regard. Now, you mentioned the domestic terrorism strategy. This strategy was released in June 2021. I think the data would tell you it’s been somewhat successful. I mean, we did effectively roll back a lot of domestic terrorism during the Biden administration. Laura mentioned the 2018 Tree of Life shooting that occurred during the Trump administration. That was one of a number of far-right terrorist attacks are struck in the U.S. during those four years, from Charlottesville, to El Paso, to Poway, to January 6, of course. The only incident—major far-right incident that comes to the top of my head during the Biden years was Buffalo. Perhaps you could make an argument that the strategy is working. I would counter that by saying, you know, this drumbeat of violence shows—the drumbeat that both Laura and I have described—shows that, in fact, we’re not making great headway into this movement at a strategic level. We’re having a lot of tactical victories in stopping violence. We don’t appear to be making great gains. And I think that’s because we’re facing major headwinds. I mean, the number-one counterterrorism recommendation I would make today is rhetoric based. It would be having politicians tone down their rhetoric, both violent rhetoric and existential rhetoric. That isn’t happening. I would make recommendations for social media companies to try to moderate some content. In fact, we’re going in the opposite direction. And so the domestic terrorist strategy the Biden administration provided, that will almost certainly be rescinded now in January, might have made incremental gains. I’m not sure. I think the fight against this kind of violence and against this kind of polarization remains a generational struggle for our country at this moment in time. ROBBINS: Yeah. Laura, I want you to sort of pick up on that. And I want to ask this question about what you saw about local law enforcement and the state government. Your governor, you know, Shapiro, did have a task force, was determined to avoid a disruption of the election, raised an alarm consistently about it. Did the police do a good job? Did they break up rings? Were there—I mean, because, yes, I mean, certainly the sea in which the fish swim is pretty important, but there’s also—you know, there’s a fundamental law enforcement aspect of counterterrorism as well. Did the police do a good job? Did they—did they identify—you talk to these people—do they identify that there were—there were big groups? Or did they see this as lone actors that they were going after, that they were playing whack-a-mole? ESPOSITO: So, you know, state law enforcement, as well as, you know, local and city law enforcement had all been collaborating in the lead up to November for a long time. We also knew that there was an added layer of scrutiny because there was a bit of a lack of trust in law enforcement agencies, specifically in Pennsylvania, post what happened on July 13, where there was huge gaps, you know, within the Secret Service and other agencies and a chain of command, which led to a bullet grazing President-elect Trump’s ear. So there was a lot of, you know, meeting up. And also what I think is often neglected from this conversation are the grassroots organizations that have been working in the lead up to November for a very long time as well. Here in Pittsburgh, for example, we have the Black Political Empowerment Project, which is a nonpartisan group focused on, you know, safe and fair elections and mobilizing, you know, the Black voters. And they had been meeting in the interim with the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Department, Pittsburgh police. We actually had our police chief step down a couple of days prior to the election, which threw things a little bit into chaos. But we regained—I would say, the law enforcement did regain control quite well. And there was a lot of conversations across these lines. And there’s also these groups across Pennsylvania that are, you know, poll watchers. So there were poll watchers stationed at much of the places in the surrounding areas to Pittsburgh and in the southwest Pennsylvania region. And their jobs are essentially—you know, they work on a volunteer, nonpartisan basis to keep watch, to make sure that everybody is able to vote, and there is no voter intimidation happening. That being said though, on election day, for example, I did respond to reports of a man in Carrick, Pennsylvania coming in and—coming into a voting booth, reportedly inebriated and making a string of racist and disparaging comments that was intimidating poll workers and people who were voting. And definitely, I mean, who’s to say if he scared of people from actually voting? But the judge of elections said he definitely might as well have. And I would say the response—the police response to that, the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Department, appeared, I would say, right when I got there, so about fifteen minutes after the call was made, and did stay outside of the polling place for the remainder of the time it was open. The guy did eventually return about forty-five minutes later to explain his side of the story to police, while I watched that occur. And they—and he was not arrested because he did not approach the polling place again. But it struck fear into a lot of people who were there. And what was also sad about it was, in speaking to the judge of elections and the people in these—who vote at this polling place, at a(n) elementary school yearly, they said that this happens with this particular person every year. He shows up. He makes these comments. And eventually he has to be removed from the voting site. He was wearing, you know, a Trump shirt and was waving flags outside, and was also making a string of accusations that somebody voted under his son’s name—which was not true. (Laughs.) And so, like you said, it’s important to look at how the election results panned out. We knew pretty early on, on Tuesday night, the direction in which this was—this election was going. And earlier that day President-elect Trump was making comments about Philadelphia voting booths. Those comments were silenced when things started, you know, to look positive for him and his party. But he was making those comments in the beginning. And there were issues at hand because of that. And I do believe, you know, both sides have described each other as grave threats, but when, you know, a candidate routinely leans on false narratives it can incite, you know, a distrust in the system, and people to go to those playing locations and accuse polling workers of voter fraud that did not exist in that place. ROBBINS: So, Jacob, President Trump has called January 6 the day of love. He’s referred to jailed insurrectionists as political prisoners. And also suggested that he’s going to issue pardons for some, potentially all, of them. It’s not clear how many. According to USA Today, as of this week 200 people remain imprisoned on January 6-related charges. And that doesn’t include defendants who have been sentenced—sentenced to prison and assigned to a facility but have not yet reported. So there’s a considerable number of them. So here’s my question. And among the people who are still jailed are the head of the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers. And they’re looking at a lot of—a lot of years here. What impact would pardons, either blanket pardons or pardons of high-profile leaders, have on these groups, which we have not heard a lot from? Would it re-energize them? Would we have to worry about these groups again? Or would—you think they’re just going to—do you think they’ve been in some way intimidated, and they’re going to go back to their—wherever it is they came from? WARE: It’s a tremendous question. I’m not sure I have a confident answer on it. Part of the reason for that is I have felt that the January 6 deterrence factor that you think would be in place based on the—based on the charges involved, has already been eroded. Now, people were punished for the crimes they committed. And I think— ROBBINS: More than 660 of them, I think. WARE: Yeah. People were punished. And I think that’s important from a criminal justice standpoint. But the deterrence, the opprobrium that you—that you think that this case, right, the largest investigation in FBI history, would implement, I think, has been eroded by, as you say, four years of rhetoric calling them warriors, heroes, patriots, political prisoners, martyrs. And so a pardon would almost be more of a confirmation of that, as opposed to something drastic and different. Worth noting too, of course, that, you know, the overwhelming majority of January 6 defendants have already been released. They committed relatively minor crimes. The people who are left now are people who committed more serious crimes. The groups that you mentioned, the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys, they were effectively broken up, effectively destroyed by January 6 and the prosecutions. And the Proud Boys, at least, returned to more local-level activism. They were involved in, for example, protesting drag queen story hours. The Oath Keepers, I think, were effectively broken up without their leadership. Yeah, if those people are pardoned, I would expect them to reorganize, or at least to feel a seal of approval from the presidency. I felt at the time, when the leaders of those groups were prosecuted and convicted of seditious conspiracy, that it was a real watershed moment. What I mean by that is there’s a famous case from 1988 where the U.S. government tried fourteen White supremacists at Fort Smith, Arkansas on seditious conspiracy charges. They tried to prove that this movement is attempting to overthrow the government of the United States. And they failed. Those fourteen people were acquitted. And that sent a message to the movement that this activity is legitimate and it’s legal. January 6 was the opposite message. And that was a real achievement for the prosecutors, to prove that this movement, that these people, these groups, these leaders, they are attempting to overthrow the government. And that is unacceptable. And they’re going to pay a legal price for that. You know, unwinding that, beyond just the heartbreak of people who have worked really hard—patriots who have worked really hard for their country to ensure peaceful, secure elections, and ensure that people who try to disrupt that pay the price—beyond that, I do fear, of course, that it would—that it would send a message of support. And we’ve seen that over the years. I mean, you know, the Charlottesville impact is very strong in terms of these people believing that the president sees them as very fine people. This would—this would be another stamp of approval. ROBBINS: So we already have two questions in the Q&A. I’m going to call on people to voice their questions. And you can also raise your hand, and we can call you directly, depending on how you want to do this here. Robert Chaney, would you like to give voice to your question? Or would you—if so, can you identify yourself and speak? Or I can just read it for you. I do not hear from Robert Chaney. So the question is, “ideologically driven” assumes an ideology. Much of the political violence I’m tracking doesn’t seem to have a unifying central ideology to trace back to a leadership or central source. Do you think there’s a central source? If not, how do we probe a diffuse manifestation of violent frustration? Laura, do you feel like the people that you, you know, are doing this, that there’s a shared ideology? Or is this just frustration at work here? ESPOSITO: I think it’s a number of things. We can’t classify, you know, a certain group of people as a monolith. I think a lot of people are really unaware that they fit into, you know, categories where they are committing political violence. I will give you a great example. Right before the election Westmoreland County, about an hour outside of Pittsburgh, held their annual Halloween parade. And one of the floats—and this, you know, broke into national news a couple days later. One of the floats in the Halloween parade, held by the volunteer fire department, was secret service snipers on a golf cart, and someone who was depicting vice president Kamala Harris being led in chains behind this golf cart. So I would assume that a lot of people are aware, you know, the oppression that Black people have endured in the United States of America, and what that symbolizes by dragging a black woman in chains behind a golf cart. And in talking to the people, you know, the organization behind this float has not been publicly identified. But in the people that, you know, in videos seemed unfazed by, you know, this really horrific image, it seems as though they’re almost unaware of what this symbolizes. So the central source—it’s a hard question. I don’t believe that all these people fit into the same category. I think that a lot of people are, yeah, really just unaware of what political violence actually is, and what it can mean, and what kind of message that they’re sending to the rest of the world with different acts. I mean, a lot of it, I think, you know, comes from just finding community online, though. And it fosters and festers in that comment section. And that really is the common thread to everything else. These, you know, radical forms of media and radical forms of, you know, corners of the internet, a lot of the things that have turned violent in Pennsylvania have been, you know, formed on the internet, in online groups. So that is the common thread. But I wouldn’t say that there’s a shared common ideology. WARE: Robert, it’s a—it’s a fantastic question. Unfortunately, my answer for you is, it’s all of the above. And in fact, I think that is what’s making this such a chaotic and unpredictable and frightening moment. Certainly, we have organized far-right groups. Some of the militias we’ve mentioned. Those are the kind of people who gathered on January 6. We have an unorganized far right. Most of the violence that we see in this country from the far-right is lone actor violence. For example, the Pittsburgh shooting. We have organized far-left groups. We have an unorganized far-left, which might emerge on inauguration day, for example. We have state actor-inspired violence. Keep in mind, for example, the Springfield bomb threats. Those were clearly inspired—clearly orchestrated by a foreign government. You have Salafi jihadist groups like the Islamic State who attempted to bomb an election facility in, I think, Oklahoma, before they got caught. You have people who fit none of those above groups. You have people who are mixing and matching ideologies. This is why I think I described this as a heightened threat environment, because it’s not just—like, around 2019, for example. 2019 was a year where we felt we finally had a pretty good feel of domestic terrorism and what the threat was. It was the kind of actors that struck Laura’s city. It was lone actors inspired by great replacement theory who were targeting soft targets, usually places of worship, using firearms. We saw it in Christchurch, New Zealand. We saw it in Poway, California. We saw it abroad. That was the model of violence that we were seeing. 2020, and the COVID pandemic, and the Black Lives Matter protests, it just blew everything up. And at this point, we’re dealing with an extremely chaotic threat landscape with all kinds of actors, with all kinds of grievances, sometimes without a clear ideology, as you describe, who are all kind of equally—not equally. I should not say equally. But all, to some extent, violently mobilized. And this is why—I mean, I say this as a counterterrorism researcher—this is why I think we face such headwinds in the U.S. from a counterterrorism standpoint, with our gun laws in this country. Because counterterrorism experts and criminologists, we look at threats as some kind of equation, some kind of factor of intent and capability. So when those things are both high, that’s when you see violence. Right now, intent to violence is clearly heightened in our country. That’s the story of the book that I wrote. That’s the story of everything that Laura is describing. That’s why we’re meeting here. The problem in this country is when intent is high people have the capability straight away. And that is a real, real challenge, from a threat prevention standpoint. It is a real uphill battle to try to prevent violence when you have such a capability-rich environment. ROBBINS: So, thank you for—both of that. We have a question from Lici Beveridge from the—who’s a social reporter from the Hattiesburg American. Lici, would you like to ask your question? Or I can do it. I mean, this is a—this is a question I very much want to know, as a journalist. Which is: How do we cover stories of political violence from the victims’ perspective, without putting them in the crosshairs? And she says, our organization rarely uses unidentified sources. And she fears that would create more harm to people who are already traumatized. ESPOSITO: I mean, I could start there. It’s the age-old question. And it’s a really difficult one to answer. I don’t think that, you know, as reporters we can guarantee exactly what’s going to happen when we publish a story. And we can’t really promise our sources anything of the sort, which is—which is difficult. You know, I think it really depends on the situation, on a case-by-case basis. We witnessed after the Trump assassination attempt, like I said earlier, you know, people within Butler County were receiving death threats after going on the record, even just as directors of emergency services or, you know, municipality figures. And at the same time we have a, you know, duty to our readership in our community, to allow them to hear from trusted sources, like people who are on the ground doing the work, of what’s happening in Butler County. So when it comes to protecting people I believe having those open conversations, first and foremost, with them about what they’re comfortable sharing, what they’re not comfortable sharing. Letting them know that the door is open to—when you’re—when you’re interviewing sources that have gone through traumatic incidents, I think that the entire demeanor shifts. And certain things that you wouldn’t do when interviewing someone who has not just been through a very traumatic incident you would employ here. You know, it’s very important to allow them to have a lot of—a sense of control and power in these interviews. You know, in safe environments and comfortable environments. You know, allowing them to, you know, maybe have somebody present with them that they trust and in those rooms when interviewing is—you know, a lot of it is really just allowing them to feel safe and feel like they can put their trust and respect into you as well. And then making it clear to them that you can’t promise them anything afterwards. That when this story goes live, you are not in control of the audience, because that’s something that, you know, as journalists, we need to be sure that they know what they’re agreeing to. And when it comes to unidentified sources, I mean, that’s a—it’s a difficult one, I think, in every newsroom. If this information gets released about this person, how will it affect their lives? That is absolutely a question we should be asking ourselves before we go and hit publish on something. And those are conversations that we should be having in the newsroom with our editors every single day. I’m lucky that I’m able to have those kinds of conversations and that we are really able to think about those things. But also we have a duty to the public to show them the kind of sourcing that we have, you know, rebuild their trust in us, as, you know, people reporting on the ground. If we just use purely unidentified sources all the time, I don’t really know how we can foster that connection with our community because why would they trust us? So it’s a fine line. And I fear that I haven’t given you a straight answer. But unfortunately, there is none. So I hope that helped, though. ROBBINS: That’s an extraordinary question for someone who’s been a foreign correspondent, which is where I started out, in scary places. And, you know, the idea that we’re asking this question in the United States. I mean, certainly when people covered the Civil Rights movement, which—I’m old, but I’m not that old—and that we’ve come back to that, I find that really—I remember working when I worked in Cuba, and there was a period of time when the government didn’t have as much control because it ran out of money in the early ’90s, and people were suddenly willing to talk on the record. And I remember saying to a couple people, you know, I work for the Wall Street Journal. And it’s—you know, this story is going to come out at, you know, 6:00 in the morning. And they didn’t have the internet in Cuba. And at 6:02, the Ministry of Interior is going to have this faxed back to them. (Laughs.) And I remember this reasonably famous economist who was central to this story, and incredibly, in the face of the government. And she said, we are not children. But most—I mean, she was a leader of the resistance. Most people are not—you know, most people can’t make choices like that. And but you have to give them—allow them to make the choices. And how you balance that is a really hard thing. So I think we have a responsibility to explain to them what it is. And even though you really want everyone to talk on the record, this is a really hard one. And it’s a great question. The other question that was—that Lici raised, which was how do you protect yourself when you’re doing this? Particularly after, you know, all the threats that have been issued against journalists, including most recently the president-elect saying that he wouldn’t mind reporters getting shot? ESPOSITO: You know, another hard question. (Laughs.) I think it’s really one of those case-by-case basis scenarios. As reporters, we—unfortunately, we should probably start doing more of this—but when the story happens you tend to just go without really thinking of yourself as an individual involved in the situation. But, you know, there—something that I’m really happy about in this media climate is there are a lot of organizations who are ready and willing to provide support, especially for, you know, women, nonbinary journalists, you know, different groups. The International Women’s Media Foundation, for example, does some phenomenal work. You know, I personally was a part of one of their one-week training sessions on reporting on the ground in the United States. You know, most of their—as you were saying, most of their workshop used to be based on when you’re reporting on the ground in different countries and, you know, war-torn areas. But we have those problems here now. And we need to, you know, rise to the challenge instead of just acting like it’s not happening here, because it is. So having those resources. And something that they, you know, really recommend is engaging in apps and things such as DeleteMe, looking up your own online footprint is so, so important as a journalist, especially because in this new age of media, you know, having our faces and explaining the stories, and people knowing that we’re real people and not AI, has really helped to regain a sense of trust with journalists in the communities that they’re covering. But then it also opens us up to scrutiny, and for people to know who we are, and potentially find out where we live. And, you know, these things happen. So, you know, DeleteMe is a really great resource in which you can see how big your digital footprint is, and, you know, the people that you love and how, you know, open they are on Facebook. I had to ask my mom to go private on Facebook. She was a little bit upset about that. (Laughs.) And so I had to explain to her why, using DeleteMe. So that digital footprint is really, really important. And also, just covering protests. I mean, a little—always being on the outskirts, being very, very aware of when things could potentially escalate, and not being in the middle of things but being on the sidelines. Always mapping out an exit route. You know, whenever I’m going to a protest, I have to make sure that, OK, if this were to happen, here’s where I will go after that. Keeping in close contact with your editor or, if you don’t have an editor, a buddy or the freelance photographer that you’re with. Just that open line of communication is so, so important. And really, just staying alert, you know, to your surroundings and what’s happening. And keeping a—keeping a go-bag at all times, something—your press badge, holding it at all times so in the event that police come that you’re able to quickly identify yourself as a member of the media. And just all the tools and resources that you need—extra chargers, things. It’s just being alert really. number one. ROBBINS: So Tiffany Zeno, who’s from WNBC-2 TV in New York, has a question. Tiffany, would you like to give voice to your question? And I think that Jacob’s done some really interesting work, not so much on the lived experience of a reporter, but how much racism played a role in this campaign. Oh, OK. OK, you’re right, this is not something that—I can read it for you, OK. But I’m a woman. I’ll—give me credit for that one. The one word/issue that I’ve not heard mentioned here is the R word, racism. The threat is heightened for those of us who are Black journalists, especially when we are in the field. Even though you can’t speak to lived Black experience, what advice would you give to those of us who face incredible challenges in this field? I mean, I think all the advice that Laura was talking about—and I will tell you that we here in Local Journalists did do one of these local journalists webinars with the International Women’s Media Foundation talking about this training. We can send out links to that. We can also send out links to their extraordinary workbooks that they do. And the training is an extraordinary thing. But, yeah, it’s even worse, I mean, for journalists and journalists who were identified as “other” by these groups of people. And, you know, you guys have got—I mean, this is a really hard thing to do. And, you know, this is—but training is a really big part of it. And having support from your newsroom is absolutely essential. Jacob, can you talk a little bit about how much racism played a role in this—in this campaign and in organizing the extremist response here? WARE: Sure. I can—I can give it a go. And then I’ll—I have a couple of thoughts on the last question as well, if I can do that briefly. Certainly, racism was a huge part of this campaign. In particular, a kind of a twinning with sexism that those of us in the field refer to as misogynoir. Kamala Harris faced sexist and racist backlash, but they really went in tandem. You saw that very clearly, I think, when—in the last few days of the campaign, when President Trump, I think, was in North Carolina, and there was a catcall about Kamala Harris being on the corner, or something like this. And he mentioned that he loved—he loved North Carolina. She was hypersexualized in a way that is unique, I think, to Black women throughout our history. The term that historians use, and I think it’s probably a term that is based on language that White supremacists would have used, is the Jezebel trope. She really faced that very, very prominently. And she handled it with a tremendous amount of grace, but I have a difficult time believing that it did not play a role in her failure to win over enough voters. Now, on the previous question, I’m going to use this to combine as well. I don’t know what the best practices are for reporting on victims but let me give you a couple of examples of what this looks like when it’s really well done. Those two examples are Charleston, South Carolina and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In 2015, we’re all familiar with the Mother Emanuel racist, White supremacist shooting at that—at that church in Charleston. After that incident there was a fascinating narrative that spread among our country about how the individual who committed that shooting, a neo-Nazi, a White supremacist, had wanted to start a race war. And that hadn’t happened because the Black community in Charleston had chosen to forgive him. And they’d chosen to show grace. One of the best articles I have ever read is—and I hope, Tiffany, I think it was, I hope this kind of—it could be an example for you of how to leverage your positionality. One of the best articles I’ve ever read is a profile of the gunman and his victims by a Black journalist called Rachel Kaadzi Ghansah, I think. The article is called The All-American Terrorist or an All-American terrorist. It’s in GQ. And in fact, that article won the Pulitzer Prize. And it is magnificent. And she is incredibly powerful at using her—the way that she looks, the way that she presents as a Black woman, as a tool. She weaponizes it in her reporting. And it is—it is marvelous. And one of the things that she finds is the Black community in Charleston never forgave him. That was something that was invented about them to make White people feel better about what had happened. And that’s a story we never would have known if a Black woman didn’t thrust herself into the story and tell the story that the victims wanted to hear. So it’s so important. And I think that’s a great example of it being done well. Another one is Pittsburgh, Laura’s hometown. The Tree of Life shooting happened in a neighborhood called Squirrel Hill, a neighborhood that prides itself on its diversity, its openness, its welcomeness. And they were beyond offended, horrified by what—the hate that visited that community. And they have taken that narrative into their own hands to try to build something stronger. I’m intimately involved with a nonprofit—an annual conference called Eradicate Hate, which happens in Pittsburgh every year. Victims feature prominently at that conference in terms of using their own experiences to try to shed light and try to redefine Pittsburgh not as the city where hate visited, not as the city that’s the site of the deadliest antisemitic attack in our country’s history, but as the city that knew how to respond, as the city that was more resilient. And that is a victim-driven narrative. I’ll just tell you personally as well, real quick, I am a victim of gun violence. I’m a gun violence survivor. I wouldn’t tell you that if I wasn’t willing to share my story. So if people are willing, then they will reveal that to you. I think that’s a big tool. And I think you mentioned that, Carla. You have to give people the right to share their story if they want to. We can’t make that determination for them. So I hope that helps answering a couple of those questions. Thank you. ROBBINS: Thank you. I mean, this is—this is hard. It’s hard for everybody. And thank you. And these are really fabulous questions. And in the chat, there’s people who are—in the Q&A people are giving advice as well about, you know, the go-bag, and writing things on your arm. And this is a really interesting mixture of sort of moral dilemmas, and personal threat, and practical challenges, all of which you got to think about really quickly as things are happening. I remember our daughter when she was in college in St. Louis. And she said she wanted to—she wanted to go to Ferguson for the protests. And, you know, here I am as a mother and a foreign correspondent screaming, no! And, at the same time, going, I can’t stop her from doing this. And my husband, a long-time foreign correspondent, said—was giving her advice. Stay on the outside of crowds. Look for snipers on the top of buildings. (Laughs.) I mean, this is the sort of advice that Laura is giving. I mean, these are things that—these are survival things. And I certainly hope that everybody’s—you know, everybody’s office, is working with them. And one of the things that’s different from when I came up in journalism and now is how many—how many people don’t have the support because they’re freelancers. I mean, at least if you’re in an office you’ve got your colleagues who may be a little older, a little more experienced, or, if you’re lucky, someone has brought in the IWMF or some other group to do the training for this. So the sharing that’s going on here right now is—and, Tiffany, thank you for posting that article—you know, this is something. And so if you guys send us stuff, we’ll also—you know, we’ll distribute it to our whole—our whole email list as well, because it’s—you know, this—we definitely have to—I sound evangelical here now—(laughs)—we definitely have to share. So here’s a question that I have. And there’s also a question from Antonio Fins. So why don’t we—why don’t we go to that? Antonio, do you want to ask your question? Or I can do it. I might edit it a little bit. (Laughs.) I can—Antonio Fins from the Palm Beach Post, is asking you about the choice of Matt Gaetz as attorney general. And that, you know, there are concerns that that he would lead the vanguard of a retribution administration against prosecutors and others who have worked to prosecute and disrupt extremist groups. He’s asking whether you share that concern. I’m going to add to that, how much power does an attorney general have to hobble the efforts of the FBI, the efforts of law enforcement to go after extremist groups? I mean, how much—how much can they—how much can an attorney general mess with law enforcement? WARE: Well, I would—I would counter that by saying there’s going to be another loyalist as director of the FBI. So it will be a tandem job, I would imagine, if that’s the path they’re going to go. This was absolutely something that we saw in 2016, that there was a dismantling of our domestic terrorism infrastructure. I’m thinking particularly of the Department of Homeland Security, where much of our prevention work is funded, was really scaled back at that time. So, you know, from a real counterterrorism standpoint I do worry a lot about some of the steps that are being promised within the civil service. Listen, President Trump, he’s right about at least one thing. The deep state that he has spoken about all these years, I believe it’s a—it’s a real thing. Most of us refer to that as civil service. There are people in our country who have made a determination that they want to take lesser-paid jobs, work long hours, relocate to the nation’s capital, because they’re patriots and they want to help keep our country safe. They want to keep the train on the tracks. Those people are being demonized now. And I think it’s not just the Matt Gaetz appointment. It’s others too. It’s John Ratcliffe at CIA. It’s the Department of Government Efficiency that’s been promised. It’s the Environmental Protection Agency. It’s the promised dismantling of the secretary of—the Education Department. There is a broader assault on civil service, on government infrastructure. And that dismantling, I think, is very dangerous from a counterterrorism standpoint because we have designed and implemented failsafes at various levels of our government that makes it more difficult for people who wish Americans harm to fall through the cracks. And if you start dismantling those failsafes, then people are going to fall through the cracks. And so it’s very concerning, the idea that we have unqualified ideologues in these positions, whose priority is not maintaining the Department of Justice, and its resilience, and its work, but in fact undermining it. It is quite, quite frightening. ROBBINS: So with that happy thought, we have just a few minutes left. I wanted to—and, yes, as a long-time editorial writer, I’m with you on this. (Laughs.) A technical question for both of you. Where do you get your data on this? I know, you know, I’ve looked at the FBI, as long as there still is data, before the data disappears. You know, I’ve looked at the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Intelligent Project, you know, George Washington University’s Program on Extremism. Laura, where do you get your data on a state level, on local levels, on a national level? Where do you go, if you—if you want—if you want numbers? Because numbers are important. ESPOSITO: So unfortunately there’s still a huge gap in reporting data. And Pennsylvania is actually the—really on the low end of that one. So when the FBI changed the way that they tracked data in recent years, they gave a lot of time to let, you know, these local and state organizations and agencies know that. But still, I mean, a lot of places have not made that transition. So it’s still—there’s still a lot of lapses in crime data, violent crime data on a case-by-case basis. But, you know, a lot of it is having to go to cities and small municipalities themselves, getting the data from them, and then doing it yourself. So, you know, if you’re lucky enough to be in a news organization with data reporters, that’s typically how they spend a lot of their time. But outside of that, there’s also really great nonpartisan organizations that, you know, do that tracking and, you know, look into that data. And, you know, for example, a lot of nonprofit newsrooms do a lot of great work in tracking data. The Trace, for example, which is a nonprofit newsroom dedicated to covering gun violence and a place that I used to be a fellow at, just launched their Gun Violence Data Hub a few days ago. Which I anticipate they’re going to be expanding it. And they’ve been spending a lot of time on that. And, you know, the Marshall Project has, you know, several of these—you know, their nonprofit news explorer, nonprofit agencies explorer. And a lot of these, you know, nonprofit newsrooms that have cropped up, they can—they’re, they’re very, very helpful for accessing data. And, you know, the Southern Poverty Law Center. There’s a lot of really great—you know, you mentioned Georgetown. There’s a lot of really great, you know, think tanks, and within these universities, and Common Ground USA. You know, it really varies. But something I also think is really important—and I just, you know, recently had this talk—is right now, as we’ve all been citing a lot of polling data and data throughout this election cycle. I think a mistake as journalists we often make is neglecting to be very transparent with where we’re getting said data. It’s how we can build trust with our communities. If we’re reporting—you know, Reuters, for example, does a really great job of reporting exactly, you know, when they’re doing polling, if it’s from a left-leaning law center or from a right-leaning organization. You know, the Anti-Defamation League is a place that is often cited, but not a lot of people know what the Anti-Defamation League actually is. And I think it’s really critical that we make more of an effort to show our readers that—exactly where we are getting this data, and acknowledge and be transparent about the fact that there are often gaps. And, you know, we’ve run into a lot of that throughout the Israel-Hamas war and in the lead up to this election, when polling said one thing and then the results said a completely different thing. And, you know, being just transparent about data is really, I think, a way that we can try to bridge this divide between communities and journalism. ROBBINS: Thank you for that. And, Jacob, last word to you. Where do you get your research—you’re called a researcher, which I—what a cool job. Where do you get your data on which you base your analysis? WARE: Basically, I would just uplift everything that Laura said. I think that was the right response. The government data tends to be not very good. And there are reasons for that. One is we don’t really have uniform definitions in our governments of hate crimes and terrorism. Another reason is some law enforcement jurisdictions don’t report. We know that that kind of data is underreported anyway, because minority communities in a lot of cases don’t self-report hate crimes because they are fearful of government. So often, frankly, government data can be—if not dismissed, then needs to be taken with a heavy grain of salt. The best data, I think, comes from—comes from nonprofits and university research centers. And I’ll just double down on what Laura already said. The ADL has an annual report called hate in numbers, or the year in hate, something like that. Southern Poverty Law Center, of course. George Washington University Program on Extremism. The START Program at the University of Maryland. A group called NCITE at the University of Nebraska, Omaha. New America, a think tank here in D.C. All of those groups take data. And there are little differences in all of those data sets. And so what I try to do is, you know, collate them and see what the gaps are. Fortunately, you know, at least in terms of lethal violence, the numbers are low enough that you can kind of go through individual cases and determine what you want to include and what you don’t. To summarize, the data is going to tell you that we’re in a heightened threat environment. We have more incidents this year than usual. The University of Nebraska, Omaha reports that we have a record this year of threats to public officials. And most of that violence is going to be perpetrated by actors on the violent far-right, White supremacists, and antigovernment extremists conducting racist, anti-immigrant, misogynistic, antisemitic hate crimes. That is the story of extremism today in our country. And I think those are the organizations that are best placed to tell that story. ROBBINS: Well, I want to thank everybody for—I want to thank Laura, and I want to thank Jacob, and I want to thank all the—everyone who joined us, for great questions. Please send us your articles that you write about these things. We will share information with you. And I’m going to turn this back to Irina. And I am going to run out because I have to go teach a class now. Those pesky students of mine. (Laughs.) WARE: Thank you, Carla. ROBBINS: Thank you so much for this great, great conversation, and great questions from everybody. And great sharing of best practices in the Q&A. FASKIANOS: Absolutely. And just to—I second all of that. We will send the link to the video and audio and transcript, along with links to all the wonderful resources that were mentioned. I also want to just highlight Jacob Ware’s work here at CFR, and Bruce Hoffman. We are nonpartisan, so you will find a lot of information, and blog posts, and whatnot on our website. So do come back to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for the latest developments and analysis on international trends and how they’re affecting the U.S. And, of course, please do share your suggestions for future webinars and how we can be a resource for you and what you’re doing in your communities. You can email us at [email protected]. So thank you all. And happy teaching, Carla. ROBBINS: Thank you. Thank you, guys. FASKIANOS: Jacob might be running off to a class too, who knows? (Laughter.) ROBBINS: Be safe. Be safe, everybody. FASKIANOS: Yes, please. Thank you. (END)
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We are delighted to have Farah Pandith and Cynthia Miller-Idriss with us today to talk about the changing landscape of terrorism in the United States. We shared their bios, so I will just go through and give a few highlights. Farah Pandith is an adjunct senior fellow at CFR, a foreign policy strategist, and a former diplomat. She is a pioneer in the field of countering violent extremism, or CVE, and served as a political appointee in both Bush administrations, and the Obama administration. She served on the secretary of homeland security’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, where she chaired the Subcommittee on Countering Violent Extremism. And she was the first special representative to Muslim communities, appointed in June 2009 by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. She’s the author of the book How We Win: How Cutting-Edge Entrepreneurs, Political Visionaries, Enlightened Business Leaders, and Social Media Mavens Can Defeat the Extremist Threat. Cynthia Miller-Idriss is a professor at American University’s School of Public Affairs and School of Education, and runs a polarization and extremism research and innovation lab in the Center for University Excellence. She has testified before Congress and regularly briefs different agencies in the U.S., the United Nations, and other countries on trends in domestic violent extremism, and strategies for prevention and disengagement. She serves on the International Advisory Board of the Center for Research on Extremism in Oslo, Norway. She’s also a member of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Tracking Hate and Extremism Advisory Committee. She is the author of several books, including Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right. She has also authored a recent piece in Foreign Affairs entitled “From 9/11 to 1/6: The War on Terror Supercharged the Far Right.” So thank you both for being with us today. This is a huge topic to cover. A lot of years to understand the history and where we are now. Cynthia, let’s start with you to talk about the ways in which the face of terrorism in America has changed over the past twenty years. MILLER-IDRISS: Thanks, Irina, thank you for the invitation. It’s such an honor to be here and I’m excited to hear the questions from the audience as well. And it’s a great first question. Of course, I could go on for hours to respond to that, so I’ll try to give you the Cliff Notes version of this. Which is to say that it comes as no surprise to anyone in the audience, or really anyone who’s followed the news at all, to know that after 9/11 there was a complete laser focus, I would say, pivoting of global, and national security, and intelligence attention to the threat from international or Islamist forms of extremism. And, we had, of course, many prior waves in this country and elsewhere of what is called often—and I should say the classification terms are difficult here—but I use the term “far-right” to capture white supremacist extremism, but also some anti-government forms of extremism. And we’d had prior waves of that culminating, for example, in the Oklahoma City bombing in the U.S. in 1995, which took the lives of 168 people. But 9/11 really pivoted the attention completely—almost completely, in terms of how resources were distributed. And I should say, not that people weren’t necessarily paying attention, but the political will and the funding wasn’t always there, as I know Farah will agree on that, and we’ve just been chatting about that. But the official attention, the resources, the political will was really dedicated here and abroad to the threat from Islamist extremism. Even around 2008/2009, just after President Obama was elected, we began to see a serious spike both in hate group membership, in the numbers of hate groups, and in the growth of new unlawful militia and anti-government extremist movements like the Oath Keepers or the Three Percenters. These are kind of revolution-oriented or even civil war-oriented unlawful militia or patriot militia movements that seek to thwart what they believe are tyrannical government actions, ultimately culminating in something like 1/6 in the long-run. So there was a steady growth going on for well over a decade. We saw that in episodic terrorist violence, in Oslo in 2011, in places like Charleston in a church, and then at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin. A lot of houses of worship, of course. And then Christchurch, New Zealand, followed rapidly by, of course, there was Pittsburgh first, then Christchurch, followed rapidly by El Paso and other places—synagogues and other attacks here and abroad on religious institutions largely, in addition to targeting ethnic groups, like in that Walmart in El Paso. So we’ve been seeing rising terrorist violence, rising extremist violence, mainstreaming and normalization of extremist ideas, which we saw in things like the Unite the Right rally in 2017 in Charlottesville, where you had scores of young men marching across the college campus unmasked, with their faces uncovered, chanting “Jews will not replace us”—I mean, real propaganda. And then a steady growth in attitudes and plots even that were foiled, and then the spread of propaganda really well documented on any number of measures. That eventually did lead in the fall of 2020 to the Department of Homeland Security in its annual threat assessment declaring that domestic violent extremism in general, and white supremacist extremist in particular, is the most persistent and lethal threat facing the nation, facing the homeland. Most threat assessments in Europe continue to track Islamist forms of extremism as representing the greatest threat, but are increasingly describing far-right extremism as the fastest-growing threat. So there’s some slight differences in how the threat assessments are described, which I can get into in Q&A, but there’s no question, I think, that in terms of lethality, in terms of global percentage of deaths, for example, far-right extremism represented 82 percent of terrorist deaths in 2019 globally across the West. So we have a number of measures that pose to its serious nature, and the pivoting of the threat, and really a pretty delayed reaction to it in terms of the resources, the attention, and the willingness to address it. I think a lot of that changed on January 6. And we saw shortly after that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence sort of slightly revise the threat assessment to note that it’s not just white supremacist extremism but also anti-government extremism, as a form of anti-government extremism that poses the most persistent threat. And I think that that’s true. But we now have quite serious attention, Pentagon issuing its first ever stand down order. We have serious attention in the form of hearings and a number of other committees going on. Sort of the springing into action around the globe, I think, to start to think about solutions. But my negative assessment, and I’ll get into that finally. I’ll just conclude to say it’s still very little very late in terms of the kind of resources that are being devoted in the U.S. I would say much better resources are being devoted overseas in terms of prevention, particularly in Germany and in New Zealand in its response to Christchurch. And I’m happy to get into that in the Q&A. But I’ll stop there. That’s an attempt to kind of do a Cliff Notes thumbnail sketch of the past two decades in a pretty short period of time. FASKIANOS: That was great. Farah, let’s go to you to talk about counterterrorism strategies and practices, and how they’ve changed, and what you see that we need to be doing. PANDITH: Well, first of all, I just wanted to say good afternoon to everybody. And I wanted to highlight the fact that there are three women taking part of this panel. And that’s a terrific thing, because usually you do not see that. So that’s one thing I just want to say. Cynthia’s excellent synopsis of where we’ve been and where we’re going is sobering. And I agree with everything that she had to say. I want to take a step back, though, and talk about the ideology that moves people to think about the “us versus them,” which is really at the heart and the core of all of these different kinds of terrorist organizations. You may believe different things, but ultimately it is an “us versus them” scenario. And it is rooted in how you think about yourself, and identity, and belonging. And that’s essential to say, because I think that the U.S. government—and we can talk about how international actors have responded to this differently—but our assessment of the forces that move the human emotions have been off. We have not been ahead of the game. We have been playing catch up. We have been thinking about what we think we see in front of us, and analyzing, and articulating a response that is for the very second that we’re dealing with it. There has been very little long-term forecasting of where this is going to be, which has resulted in too little, too late. And it is dramatically shocking to me that here we are in 2021, where in the homeland we are dealing with the kinds of threats that we’re dealing with from the ideology of “us versus them,” when societal sinkholes have been exposed in our country around political lines, around other lines. The audience is American, so you all have been living it with us. These things have pulled apart societies. Communities haven’t come together. You add to that what’s been happening with the technology revolution over the last twenty years, and you see a very sobering sight. And you see an activation of hate and extremism that no one could have imagined. And what that means is that the solutions that we were looking at, right, when we were shocked and appalled at 9/11, and we didn’t know how to handle it, and how do we prevent something like this from happening? We were looking obviously at the kinetic response. How do we make sure al Qaeda doesn’t come back to our country? But soon after that we began to think about, well, how do you build the prevention models within communities so that the people that they’re trying to recruit are not finding this ideology appealing? And, everybody knows twenty years later that it’s a whole of society thing. We’ve been talking about this for fifteen or twenty years. Obviously, it is not just government. It is nonprofits. It is philanthropy. It is business. We know all of that. We know that solutions are local. We know that faith leaders matter. We know that community leaders—and we know all of this stuff. What’s the problem now? The problem has been that while we have piloted some exceptional programs—early days after 9/11, for example, using faith leaders to help us get into communities, for example. Using former extremists to tell their story, whether you’re former FARC, or former al Qaeda, or former Neo-Nazi. I want to tell you how I was recruited, why it was appealing to me, how I left. Those are really important stories to be able to tell. Whether it is education programs in schools—I mean, we piloted many different kinds of things in our country. Meaning, we supported those kinds of things. But we were not looking at the homeland. Our assumption was we got it here. We don’t have the problems that other countries have. We’ll be OK. And how foolhardy is that, to look at that right now, because ideology has no borders. So something that is happening in Oslo affects the guy in New Zealand, right? We learned that the hard way. So when I look at the response, Irina, what I see is good intentions. I see some creative thinking. But I see a very slow and unsteady response in both the scale and the understanding of the global nature of this ideology, and how it pings across the world. We aren’t talking about recruits coming from generations that are much older. We are looking at Millennials. We are looking at Gen Z. And we’re looking at Gen Alpha. We, as the United States, ought to be thinking about how to protect our communities—a fifty-state plan—that allows us to go deep on cultural intelligence so that we understand how the emotions, psychologically, and spiritually, and community-wise are shaping the way people think about their identity, because that absolutely impacts the ability for somebody who’s recruiting that person to do something. So all of this to tell you in the good news category, it’s not like we haven’t tried anything and we don’t know what’s going to work. In the bad news category, it’s, well, what are we doing about scale? While I absolutely am delighted to see a change in the numbers of the amount of money that’s going out in terms of grants to local communities to do work, I’m distressed because I look at the landscape in the years ahead. We cannot expect to get a handle on the ability to build inoculation, and resilience, and prevention on $20 million a year. I mean, that is outrageous. So how do we think differently about this? And then the final thing I just want to say is on the way in which we approached handling preventative strategies in the ideological space, we did it like this: This is the kind of extremism we’re talking about, so here are the kinds of programs we think are going to work for AQ or ISIS. This might work for Neo-Nazis. We have done very little analysis in terms of the nuance within those groups. I don’t see specific programs for how women are getting radicalized. I don’t see specific programs for how you look at young people who are in the Gen Alpha category, for example. So we can do better to say how do we think about the child and adolescent mind? What do we learn from the social scientists that can apply to how we build these programs? What are community leaders saying that they need? For example, the resources on the mental health side, which we are not actually doing properly. All of these things can dramatically shift the safety structure and the safety landscape for our country if we do this right. FASKIANOS: Thank you, both of you. Very powerful. Let’s go to all of you now for your questions and comments. And I can’t believe we have no questions. We do. All right. Syed Sayeed. Be sure to unmute yourself. SAYEED: OK. Good afternoon and thank you to you, first, the Council on Foreign Relations, to organize this forum. And thanks to both the speakers. They have very powerfully stated their introductory framework for all of us to think. My point is that the religious—what shall I say—authorities from Muslims, Christians, Jews are not playing the kind of role that they need to play. Because it doesn’t matter what religion you are talking about, the philosophy of all religions is looking after the humans, and have a framework in which the human individual and human groups can grow and develop in a way that they are going to be stronger in individual roles and group roles, to contribute to the betterment of their own groups and other human groups. I mean, that’s the bottom line of Christianity, of Judaism, of Islam. The wellbeing of humanity is uppermost in all religious thinking. So if the religious leaders around the world can spell this out very clearly for their followers, and for others, it might become a very important factor in the future. They are not playing that kind of role. And I hope and pray that they realize that they have a responsibility, not just a choice but a religious responsibility, to spell out the nature of wellbeing they’re trying to cultivate individuals and groups. And I hope and pray—and I pray that the speakers and the Council on Foreign Relations do play a role to bring about this kind of focus of the international religious authorities. Thank you for the opportunity to make my point. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Syed. Farah and Cynthia, do you see that the faith community and faith leaders have—that there has been enough done by faith leaders? Or what more could they do? I mean, practical advice on what can be done in their communities, in their synagogues, and churches, et cetera? MILLER-IDRISS: Well, I think that there has been—first of all, thank you to the participant for the helpful comment. And I think that we agree. I think when you have people who are adhering to the tenants of their faith communities, you typically see people who are resisting extremism and working toward a common humanity. What we often see, though, is some manipulation within communities of disinformation, or propaganda, or scapegoating that can exploit, in some cases, across any faith community, some of the tenets of those beliefs. And so I think what we have been seeing over the last few years has been what we call kind of secondary prevention resources being devoted to faith communities to better reinforce prevention of violence by equipping people—what I call equipping the people at the synagogue doors to make sure they can thwart a violent attacker effectively. I mean, it’s important, but it’s not the kind of prevention that I really feel like we need, which is more primary prevention in terms of helping truly inoculate populations against the spread of disinformation, and propaganda, and conspiracy theories in ways that help them recognize and resist from within the mainstream the outreach that comes to them from the fringes. And so I should say, in full disclosure, my research lab is one of the teams that got DHS money that was announced just last week in partnership with the Multi-Faith Neighbors Network in Tarrant County, Texas, and Search for Common Ground, to build a toolkit for faith communities by working with and partnering with faith communities in Texas. And then hopefully we will be empirically testing it to ensure that it is effective as a primary prevention to helping people be inoculated against, recognize, and be more resilient to propaganda and disinformation and extremist ideas. And then hopefully we’ll be able to scale up. There is a plan for scaling up as well if it’s effective. But so there is—so, I’m intimately familiar with one effort, because we’re a part of it and we launch tomorrow, October 1, that work, with our first kick-off meeting. And so we’re about to begin that. And I hope that it’s the start of—and that began because a faith community member reached out to us. So we do—asking for help and assistance. And then we went after—we decided to do it and went after funding to support it. But I absolutely agree that part of the trouble here is a tremendous lack of resources compared to what other countries have to really engage in both the kind of pilot testing we need and the scaling up, along with the evidence and the transparency about what works. We just don’t have anywhere near the kinds of resources that we need to do it. I mean, we’re just scratching the surface. So it’s—I think if we don’t really see either private sector donors step up or the federal government step up, we’ll just be scrambling along to sort of pick up the trails of what’s—little crumbs of things, rather than really trying to build something that’s more comprehensive. That’s my disclaimer about the negative, my pessimistic side. It’s that we just don’t have enough resources. But the optimistic side is that the will is there, I think. The understanding of the need is there. And the creative energy is there. And we’re certainly seeing that from within the faith community as well. FASKIANOS: Great. And Syed, now everybody has raised their hands, which is fantastic, with written questions. So thank you for getting us started. So let’s go next to Tereska Lynam. And you need to unmute yourself. LYNAM: Sorry. FASKIANOS: There you go. LYNAM: So mine is actually a comment that I’d like your reaction from. FASKIANOS: Can you identify yourself, Tereska? LYNAM: Sorry. Tereska Lynam, University of Oxford. And I have been traveling a lot recently, both within the U.S. and internationally. And I’ve never in my life had so many—heard so many political moderates, both inside and outside of the U.S., mention, kind of apropos of nothing, that they believe that the U.S. is headed for a civil war. And I would like to hear your—if you have any reaction to that, what your—if you’ve seen maybe the same thing, or—I don’t know. Thank you. (Laughs.) PANDITH: Tereska, it’s interesting that you’re saying that. I used the term “social sinkholes” when I was giving my overview. And I think that there is deep despair in the United States that is being felt in new ways because we’re able to access things with a swish of our finger on our phones. And so you’re getting a consistent feedback loop on a whole host of different things—both feeling optimistic, and negative, and confused, and whatever you—and fearful. And I think it’s the fear of some of these things that are driving some of those conversations, because we haven’t seen it at this level in this way. No one has a crystal ball to be able to say we’re heading this way or that way, but we certainly know one thing. And that is if we do not talk about the changes that have happened, and why we think they are happening, and address them, we’re in a completely—to use the term “unprecedented” is ridiculous, because post-COVID no one has seen this. But there’s a movement that I concur with you that I have also seen, policymakers as well as political commentators, thought leaders, and others, who are filled with confusion and despair because they don’t know the way out, because they haven’t seen a model that looks familiar to them that they can figure out what’s the strategy to go forward. That’s my response to it. I also just wanted to say a word about the faith leader thing, just to—I agree with what Cynthia said. And I think there is activation in a new way. There has always been, in my opinion, great desire from faith leaders of all kinds to be helpful in the fight against hate and extremism. That’s been my experience since 9/11. But I also agree with the point that there are also negative influences in the faith community that want to stoke a fire in a particular way. And I certainly have seen that, we can see that in our own country with, I mean, somebody like Terry Jones, who most people forget, but he made a huge difference to the way in which Muslims understood themselves in America, in terms from a safety point of view. But also the way Muslims around the world understood what they believed America to be, because he was going to burn the Quran. So there are aspects to this that are really important. And one last point, when we talk about faith leaders. I just want to make the point, with the change in the kind of fear that we’re looking at right now around ideology—from the violent far-right and particularly the white supremacist movements—you haven’t seen a reaction in America that is asking Christian leaders to talk about what Christianity stands for in the way in which after 9/11 they demanded that everybody that, quote, “looked Muslim” said something about the fact that AQ did not represent Islam. And I’m not—I’m simply saying this for one reason: The universe and the expectations have shifted over twenty years. And what we see as necessary has shifted over twenty years. And I think that there is great need to reassess what we ask for from our own neighbors and from our faith leaders and our community leaders in this moment in time. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go to a written question from Abbas Barzegar. And, Abbas, do you want to just ask it yourself? OK. BARZEGAR: Yeah, I’m happy to do so. FASKIANOS: Oh, great. Wonderful. And identify yourself. It’s great to hear from you. BARZEGAR: I’m Abbas Barzegar here, now with a group called Horizon Forum. And we work on informing philanthropy and grant-making institutions about domestic hate groups and extremist groups. So the question was around cultural intelligence. Farah, you mentioned this. And I just—it’s a friendly question, asked in good faith. But one of the direct grievances that is often mentioned by domestic extremist groups and hate groups is government surveillance, government intrusion into the community, et cetera. And so I worry about—I’d like to hear more about what you think is an effective strategy there? Because I would hate for government to play an increasing polarizing role in the field, to become a participant in the polarization rather than some—an actor that can deescalate the tension. PANDITH: Abbas, I’m so glad you asked that question. And I take with the spirit that you intend it. And I too agree with you, we don’t want a security state upon us. However, that’s not what I meant. (Laughs.) So culture—I have a piece coming out with sparks & honey that—which is a cultural intelligence firm in New York—that will go into great detail here. But as I looked at the experimentation over the last twenty years on how we can be predictive and forecast better, the only tools in our toolbox around that was human intelligence. It was really trying to—trying to gather—the old forms of information. And I thought to myself: If we’re able to predict years in advance that veganism is going to be on the rise, or cannabis is going to be the thing that everybody’s talking about, or that this product is what everybody’s going to be using in their households, why is it that we cannot understand through our daily lives—this is not surveillance. This is information that marketing firms have. This is not going to mosques and churches and spying behind a pew or a thing. That is not what I’m talking about. I’m talking about the touchpoints that put together signals that are able to tell you: Something really interesting is happening with Generation Z. They’re moving in this direction just the same way we can tell they’re becoming more directive around what products they buy because of what the companies stand for. Just the same way we can tell that Gen Alpha, even though they’re super young, are going to be moving in a direction that’s very different from their parents, who are Millennials. And this is why, because these are the things that have been around them. This is what they’ve been exposed to. But that requires us to be alert and on it with the signals that we see, not signals that we’re gathering in super secret, horrifying ways. And I feel very strongly that one of the missing pieces in understanding society is that we’re not looking at society. We’re not seeing things. We’re compartmentalizing  what brands people are going to buy, or what products might be interesting. And that may be fine for the bottom line of a company, but I want to understand from an emotional and psychological thing, could we have understood twenty-five years ago, because of the signals that we were seeing within society, the way people were acting, talking, buying things, doing things—could we have built a map that said: Something really odd is happening around identity and belonging? And this fear around America not being white—a predominantly White nation is going to have an effect in a way that is really X, Y, or Z. Could we have done that? That is the question I’m asking myself. And I look at the trajectory of the hybrid extremisms, the surge in money and organization and all of the things that we know are happening in the terrorist front, and I am really worried about the future. And so what I am asking myself is: How do we forecast better? What can we think about and do differently? So that is what I mean by cultural intelligence. I am not talking about a police state that is—we already know that Apple and Google and whatever are taking our data, and all that. That’s not—it is understanding how to put those pieces together with social scientists and others who can say: These are indicators for societal change in this particular way. I hope that I explained that. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Simran Jeet Singh, with The Aspen Institute’s Inclusive America Project. Simran, do you want to ask your question? All right, so I’m going to ask it. So thanks to you both for your presentation. And his question is regarding the role of race and religion in relation to how we perceive threats. To what extent do you see Christianity animating the surge of far-right white nationalism in the U.S.? And what effective responses, if any, have you seen that might serve as good models for us? MILLER-IDRISS: Well, I can start by saying I think,  the way that I typically describe this is what—there are two major sides to the far-right extremist spectrum. One is—and they intersect and overlap with each other. But one is sort of anti-government, anti-democratic, authoritarian, refusal to protect minority rights, et cetera, et cetera. The other is based on a range of supremacisms. And the idea of supremacism, the most common expression in the United States historically, and the one that has posed and still poses the most lethal threat in terms of terrorism, is white supremacy—white supremacist extremism. But we also have Western supremacy. We have Christian supremacy. We have male supremacy. In ways—I mean, we’ve seen rising incel—involuntary celibate—violence and terrorist actions against women. We have seen the self-described Western chauvinist Proud Boys, who are, very, and increasingly, across Europe in particular, a very strong anti-Islam and Islamophobic ideologies couched as pro-Western, right? So what you have are far-right groups, and political parties even position themselves as protecting women’s and LGBTQ rights because they argue that those are Western values that have to be protected from a threat—that supposed threat of Sharia law. And of course, we saw that here with forty-three states putting forward over the past twenty years actual legislation to anti-Sharia legislation. So we have this real deep Christian supremacy, even—or couched sometimes as Western supremacy—that is really baked in many ways to this Islamophobic and anti-Islam thinking that also often bleeds into anti-immigrant scapegoating in general. And it’s policies even that either are explicitly kind of Muslim bans or that are using fearmongering and scapegoating against immigrants to kind of stoke that same type of fear and protectionist idea of an existential threat that’s coming. So that’s a kind of rambling way of saying: Yes, there absolutely is. Even when it’s not explicit. I think even when we don’t hear explicit pro-Christian or sort of Christian extremist thinking—although there is, of course, Christian nationalism and Christian white nationalism going on. When we don’t hear it, it’s often coded as Western or even as anti-immigrant, where Western is framed as superior, right? And a lot of even language we’re hearing right now around immigrants at the border supposedly carrying COVID, right, that that is—that the source of—I mean, very anti-science, right? Anti—not—explaining disease in ways that are very typical for the scapegoating of immigrants historically over time, and not rooted in the science of how this disease is spreading, and why, and where. So that’s a longwinded explanation and way of saying that I think we have to be looking at these intersections around the way that supremacism works. And that even when white supremacy isn’t explicit ideology that’s stated, or sometimes denied, right? We have groups that are denying that they’re white supremacists but positioning themselves as Western supremacists. There’s often a civilizational kind of rhetoric or language behind it that is still—and I think very much traces back also to the post-9/11 climate. I mean, we have to understand that, of the real Islamophobia industry and its efforts to stoke Islamophobia in the population, and the way that that fostered an anti-immigrant and pro-Western kind of ideology. So and then the only thing I will say about the solutions here is that we need to involve faith communities, but we also need to help understand at a very basic level, within the education system, what does it mean to have supremacist kind of thinking across the board? How does that intersect with male supremacisms, Western supremacisms? Because it’s everywhere. It’s baked into the history of this country and it’s baked into  everything from gender pay gaps to all kinds of things, right? I mean, the fact that Farah mentioned right at the beginning that there are three women here, that is also—I am often the only woman in the room in these kinds of conversations. And I’m sure you are too, Farah. So that is really, really notable. And just the history of how these types of assumptions get made about who has a voice and who speaks is also part of this story. So I think we need to engage faith communities. But it has to be part of a much bigger set of engagements about how to combat supremacism as a rule, even as we combat the most lethal threat from that, which is white supremacist extremism. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m now going to next to Ani Zonneveld. ZONNEVELD: Hi. Good morning, good afternoon. Ani Zonneveld, Muslims for Progressive Values. Thank you for pointing out the importance of culture. And there’s clearly a lot of good ideas out there. But culture is so poorly funded. And as you look at the plethora of problems that we have, the religious influence on culture, that connection is really underestimated by our policymakers. The costs of changing hearts and minds, from my experience with working with religious leaders who are human rights affirming, it just took five years to do that. And it took less than $270,000 to do that in one country, which is the cost of one bomb. Our foreign policy of bomb and rebuild, bomb and rebuild does not work. At what point are we going to wake up to a more enlightened foreign policy and the funding that goes into it? Number one. Number two, the success of the Taliban and the response from the Muftis of the world congratulating the Taliban was shocking and appalling. And these are Muftis representing governments, right? These are—as you know, probably Farah—the Muftis are not just some ad hoc committees. They are set up by governments. What do we have and what powers do we have in our funding policies with these governments in reigning in this radical influence? Thank you. PANDITH: Ani, it’s great to see you on this screen. I hope that you’ve been well through this pandemic. Well, there are two things I want to say—(laughs)—about your excellent points. The first is, I look to the American public to ask their elected leaders why they are spending so little on soft power. I mean, that is fundamentally the bottom line. If we, as members of our country, don’t demand a more realistic assessment of the power of soft power, we’re going to get what we got. And we have—I did an assessment with folks around soft power. And when I asked, do you know how much money we spent on trying to stop ISIS using the ideology of ISIS compared to how much we used in the kinetic war, people would imagine it was 15 percent, 20 percent, 25 percent. And I said it was 0.0138 percent. That is how much money—because we don’t value it. We say we do, but we don’t. So the only way to change that on the foreign policy side is to demand that Congress give more money to our instruments of soft power across government, but also demand that—and this is a really important point—I think we are one of the most generous nations in the world on the philanthropic side. And there is a lot of money that goes to incredible causes in our nation. And I’m really proud of that as an American. But I have firsthand experience over twenty years of asking foundations, family foundations, large foundations, private philanthropists, begging and pleading with them to give money towards fighting the ideology of “us versus them.” Eyes glaze over first. Secondly, there is this problem of—and the Congress had the same problem—can you prove to us that if we give you this dollar that that person will never be radicalized? Well, no. I can’t. I mean, how can I prove? How can I promise you that? That is the metric they are expecting. And so you got very little money from NGOs going into helping—sorry, very little money from philanthropists given to NGOs which are doing the bulk of the work, and should be. And one of the big things that I have a problem with is you’re asking NGOs to fight for money to do this really important work, which often means that they have to review really horrible videos and information that they’re getting. Beheading videos or horrible things that they’re seeing on TikTok or, pick your social media platform. And there’s no support on the mental health side or anything for these NGOs, because they’re so small. They’re not Facebook. (Laughs.) They’re not—they don’t have quiet rooms and free food, OK? These are NGOs that are fighting for every dollar. Why am I saying all this? I 100 percent agree with what you’re saying about why our value system is shifted. But it is not just government. It is also where philanthropy must put their money as well. Then your second question on—or, comment, rather, on the Taliban and other organizations—other nation-states that have religious instruments that support what the Taliban is doing. It is outrageous that we aren’t doing more to call them out. I mean, Ani, you and I have had the conversation about Saudi Arabia. You and I have had the conversation about what I saw around the world with the billions of dollars they spent over decades to transform the way people think about what it means to be Muslim, so there’s a monolithic way that you must be. But America and other nations—it’s not just the United States—have to be clear about what they stand for in this way. You are 100 percent right when you say we have nations like Pakistan who are openly talking about how great it is that they are—that they’re going forward doing the work of—that no one else could do. The Taliban is doing really, really well. You don’t see America following up in the way in which we would expect them to. So all of the points that you are saying are correct. But it comes down, from my perspective, to what the American citizen demands of our elected leaders, and how we articulate that. FASKIANOS: Great. I’m going to go next to Sharon Welch who has written, I think, two questions and raised her hand. So why don’t you just ask the one that you want. WELCH: One of the things that I’m interested in is if you’ve found anything that’s successful in countering the spread of disinformation. I’m now working for League of Women Voters. When we talk about free and fair elections, and the difficulty of misinformation, I know there was a recent study from MIT that showed that even with amplification false information spread more quickly than true information. So what projects are you seeing that’s helping counter that? MILLER-IDRISS: I’m so glad you asked. (Laughs.) Because I run a research lab that has spent the past year pilot testing a number of things to see what works. And we’re now in the scale-up phase and expansion phase. And to our great delight, everything we tested—from an animated video about the Boogaloo, to acted videos on—inoculation videos on white supremacy, scientific racism, and male supremacist content, and anti-vax content. And then a parent’s—a series of resources for parents and caregivers—everything was effective in all of our pre and post testing and assessment of what worked. In different ways, though. So we have some of those findings up on our website, others out in preprint. I’m happy to try to share them. We’re trying to—one of the struggles of this work is that there’s never enough public communication about what we know. Now we know a lot of things, and we’re trying to figure out what’s the best way to get it to the public. But, for example, we built every source for parents and caregivers, and a whole series of resources for teachers, coaches, mental health practitioners, others who work with youth, in partnership with the Southern Poverty Law Center. We have built out a dedicated website, which I’ll drop in the chat. But one of the things we did was test that resource with 755 parents and caregivers to see what they learned. Did they improve their ability to recognize warning signs of extremist radicalization? And did they feel more empowered to intervene if they did see those signs in a child that they knew? And one—it was really fascinating. It moved the needle in the right direction on every single measure, except for one group with one measure. Which is that the most educated group of parents did not improve their ability to recognize disinformation as a result of our intervention. And the reason why is because they came in so confident—so much more confident than everybody else that they already knew how to do that. And then they engage in our intervention, read our resource. And they got less confident, because they realized then how coded this stuff is, how complicated it is when kids encounter it through means and online gaming sites, in emojis, in anime, all kinds of places online that they weren’t anticipating, through coded speech, in really difficult youth cultural ways. And they got less confident. So we saw that as a win, because we corrected what we see as overconfidence, essentially. But it also taught us that that group of parents was never going to reach out to that resource on their own, because they didn’t think they need it. And so one of the things we’re trying to do, every partnership we engage in, every research project we do, every intervention we do have evidence associated with it. So we do agree to engage with the city, for example, and mayor’s office right now, but only if we’re allowed to pilot test and do pre and post testing and evidence. Because we really want commitment to transparency on all the measures. So we have our full reports, all of the instruments up and available, for example, on that whole SPLC study. So we have found our video-based inoculations moved the needle, helped people be less persuaded by extremist propaganda. So I’m happy to share that. You can visit our website. I’ll drop it in the site. But there is some good evidence, including from our lab, about what works. But it doesn’t always work the same way for every person, I guess is what I would sum up. FASKIANOS: That’s fantastic. And after this webinar we’ll send out the link to this video as well as links to Cynthia’s resources. So everybody, if you don’t get it in the chat we will circulate it, and anything that Farah wants to send out as well, because we want to disseminate good information and have you share it with your networks and in your communities. So I’m going to go next to Thomas Uthup, who has raised his hand and also written his question. Tom, over to you. UTHUP: Hi. Thank you very much for this discussion, which has been fascinating. Yes, my—it’s actually a two-part question. But before I say that I wanted to thank CFR, and Irina, and Professor Miller-Idriss, and Farah Pandith for this fascinating discussion. Professor Idriss, please say hi to Shamil for me. Both of you have touched on the global element of this far-right extremism, but I wonder if you could elaborate a bit on the ideological, beyond the inspirational, direct inspiring Christchurch, and online connections between far-right groups across the world. I remember twenty years ago doing some research on one of the extremist groups in India, which actually duplicated the language used by Hitler in Mein Kampf, but sort of Hitler’s language about the Jews, these people just substituted Muslims. But everything else was exactly the same. Also, one thing that has puzzled me is how the far-right groups in the U.S. seem to attract minorities. For example, Enrique Tarrio, at least to me, seems like a Hispanic leader of the Proud Boys. And you would think that that they would not find these kinds of groups attractive. And the same thing, I think Ali Alexander is African-American but born a Muslim. Thank you. MILLER-IDRISS: Well, thank you, Mr. Uthup. I’ll try to answer these quickly. I’d love to hear Farah’s answer to these as well. But on the second question, that gets to that issue of supremacisms and the intersecting supremacisms that I talked about, because one of the things we see is that we do have members of ethnic minorities joining groups across the far-right spectrum that are, in this case, ostensibly and officially not white supremacists, but are Western supremacists and misogynistic. And so you have groups that are attracting people based on the idea of anti-immigrant, or anti-Islam, or a Western civilizational rhetoric that  obviously is linked to white supremacy and white supremacist thinking, but is not officially—is a related form of extremism. And I think when you see that people are attracted to this supremacist kind of thinking in different expressions—and the far-right is a—includes a spectrum of those expressions that intersect and mutually reinforce each other, but don’t always come out in the same exact way—then I think it makes a bit more sense. On the global question, I’ll just say that  there are a lot of things to say about that, about the global interconnectedness. But one of the things that’s happened over the last ten years or so that is really important at mobilizing white supremacist extremisms, is the emergence of a consolidated conspiracy theory called the great replacement, which united what had been an American-based conspiracy theory called white genocide with a European conspiracy theory called Arabia. This idea that different groups were responsible for it but that through demographic change and immigration there was the eradication of white civilizations or of European ones. That came together for complicated reasons that I’ve written about and can explain in depth another time, in something called the great replacement. And that now has mobilized. And it enables basically—we’ve seen Jews be attacked for it, we’ve seen Muslims be attacked for it, we’ve seen Latinos be attacked for it. It enables the target groups to be diverse. Anyone who threatens white or Western civilizations is a target because through demographic change and immigration they’re seen as an existential threat. And then people are called upon to act heroically to thwart it. And I think that that’s really important, this idea that people are drawn for kind of positive reasons. And it sounds twisted. They believe they are engaged in a quest to make a real difference that is, even if they see themselves as martyrs, to inspire others. And so that’s global, because it’s seen as a threat—at least, it’s global across Western civilizations—seen as a threat from immigration demographic change, this idea of a genocide or a replacement. They even will compare that, and have compared the experience of white civilizations, to Native Americans. That’s a frequent trope. I’ve heard it for twenty-five years, this idea that white civilizations are going to be forced onto reservations because immigrants will eradicate them, just as they did the Native American tribes. So we saw that in a recent manifesto of the terrorist in El Paso, for example. So those kinds of—that level of existential threat and fear is what’s at the root. But it’s global now, and in ways that have made it much more powerfully shared across online spaces. I could go on, but I have to stop, I think, to—I really want to hear what Farah has to say about this as well. PANDITH: I just want to add one small thread to the question about sort of—you’ve talked about your experience in India and taking Hitler and making it fit for what they want to do. And obviously—I just want to remind people that what we’re seeing right now in terms of the sophistication, if we can use that word, and savviness from these groups is really quite dramatic. It’s almost like a uniform that people use to sort of build that spirit. There is a—they share memes, they adopt memes. They’re looking at successful models to see what worked. As evil and horrible as ISIS was, they were really successful. (Laughs.) I mean, they were very successful. They got people from all over the world to come to the so-called caliphate. There was a look, there was a feel, there was an image, there was a whole thing all set up. So even though you may not buy into the ISIS ideology, boy, you want to do what they did so that you can get their money, their organization, their look, their power. So you do see other kinds of groups going, OK, if they were doing it this way, or this was the way they recruited, this is the way they raised money. We’re going to do it too. So I think we—this goes back to my theme of understanding the complexity of the moment we are in today, alongside the most obvious things which are obviously the technology landscape has completely shifted everything. But there’s a financial piece also that I just want to highlight, because that is making it possible for this global movement—whatever it is—to be activated. They are not going to be able to do the work that they’re doing if they weren’t funded, and they were not organized in this way. So I think that there are aspects to this that when people are looking at what the threat is and what’s coming, there are places to plug. And we could cut things off, if we were only to do it in a more strategic way, as opposed to sort of just analyzing it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. We are at the end of our time. And I would ask each of you just to leave us with—and somebody put this in the chat, Zarrir Bhandara, that obviously religious leaders and clergy have a great responsibility. So what would you leave this group with as the top two things that they should be doing, or could be doing in their communities to help? MILLER-IDRISS: Oh, hard question in thirty seconds or so. But I would say helping people to understand how they’re being manipulated by the persuasive extremist tactics, propaganda, and rhetoric—whether that’s the weaponization of youth culture, the positioning of the far-right as the counterculture to a triggered mainstream that can’t take a joke—as we often see happening online—or the scapegoating of immigrants, or the ways in which in every—we’re seeing the mainstreaming of extremist ideas and the normalization of some of those ideas come across in many more spheres of life. So there’s no longer just a destination. And I think it’s on the obligation—it’s the obligation of everyone in the mainstream to build resilience to it. And that’s part of what it means to recognize that democracies are fragile, and that for a country that likes to think of itself as a beacon of democracy, it maybe is more of a shock to realize how fragile it is. But it’s all the more incumbent on all of us, I think, to understand that you can’t just defend democracy with force, but you have to do it with education. And that education starts in every community, including faith communities. So I think it’s on all of us to take this up in whatever small way we can. And it can feel overwhelming, and that you can’t do anything about it. But that’s the beauty of community-based resilience, is that every community can. So I think it’s actually an empowering moment for local communities to step up and really engage. FASKIANOS: Farah. PANDITH: So I would just say that—yeah—there are three things I would say. The first is solutions are available and affordable right now. And you cannot feel like putting your hands up in the air, like what are we doing to do? I realize you can’t boil the ocean, but to Cynthia’s point you need to start small in your local community, this is how it matters. Two, you must—must, must, must—put the pressure on elected leaders to put this into their framework as a priority. We have an obligation as members of a society to be able to build the kind of societies that we want. There are more of us than there are of the extremists. So let’s use that power and do more. And the third is, coalitions are our friend. And I think America has a great legacy of building coalitions to move things. And I think we are late to the game on hate and extremism. Everybody is fearful. We are a country that is a gun culture, so that—there’s an aspect of that as well, that if I go too far, I’ll be killed. There are requirements in terms of our own individual response to being an active actor in our community not to look away, and to do what we can do. So what Cynthia says about it takes all of us, that is my mantra. And I completely agree. Let us ask all of the members of community to put the red lines down on hate and extremism and build the communities that we want. FASKIANOS: Well, thank you both. We could go on for hours but, unfortunately, we can’t because of time. And we appreciate the time that you’ve given us today and the work that you’re doing in this space, and to all of you for your questions and comments. As I said, we will send out a link to the video, to the resources that Cynthia and Farah have mentioned. You can follow Farah on Twitter at @farah_pandith and Cynthia at @milleridriss. So I encourage you to sign up for their tweets. And I also hope you will follow us at Twitter at @CFR_Religion. And please reach out to us at [email protected] with any suggestions of topics that you would like us to cover going forward. We appreciate you both and all of you. So thank you very much. PANDITH: Thank you. MILLER-IDRISS: Thank you.