The U.S. War in Afghanistan

Al-Qaeda operatives hijack four commercial airliners, crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. A fourth plane crashes in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Close to three thousand people die in the attacks. Although Afghanistan is the base for al-Qaeda, none of the nineteen hijackers are Afghan nationals. Mohammed Atta, an Egyptian, led the group, and fifteen of the hijackers originated from Saudi Arabia. U.S. President George W. Bush vows to “win the war against terrorism,” and later zeros in on al-Qaeda and bin Laden in Afghanistan. Bush eventually calls on the Taliban regime to “deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land,” or share in their fate.

President Bush signs into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for attacking the United States on September 11. This joint resolution will later be cited by the Bush administration as legal rationale for its decision to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism, including invading Afghanistan, eavesdropping on U.S. citizens without a court order, and standing up the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The U.S. military, with British support, begins a bombing campaign against Taliban forces, officially launching Operation Enduring Freedom. Australia, Canada, France, and Germany pledge future support. The war’s early phase [PDF] mainly involves U.S. air strikes on al-Qaeda and Taliban forces that are assisted by a partnership of about one thousand U.S. special forces, the Northern Alliance, and ethnic Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. The first wave of conventional ground forces arrives twelve days later. Most of the ground combat is between the Taliban and its Afghan opponents.

The Taliban regime unravels rapidly after its loss at Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces loyal to Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek military leader. Over the next week Taliban strongholds crumble after coalition and Northern Alliance offensives on Taloqan (November 11), Bamiyan (November 11), Herat (November 12), Kabul (November 13), and Jalalabad (November 14). On November 14, the UN Security Council passes Resolution 1378, calling for a “central role” for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery.

After tracking al-Qaeda leader bin Laden to the well-equipped Tora Bora cave complex southeast of Kabul, Afghan militias engage in a fierce two-week battle (December 3 to 17) with al-Qaeda militants. It results in a few hundred deaths and the eventual escape of bin Laden, who is thought to have left for Pakistan on horseback on December 16—just a day before Afghan forces capture twenty of his remaining men. Despite intelligence pointing to bin Laden’s presence in Tora Bora, U.S. forces do not lead the assault, which is carried out by a ragtag Afghan contingent led by Hazrat Ali, Haji Zaman, and Haji Zahir. Some critics will later question why U.S. forces did not take a more assertive role in the engagement.

After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invites major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and a group led by the former king (but not the Taliban), to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions sign the Bonn Agreement, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1383. The agreement, reportedly reached with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because of Iran’s support for the Northern Alliance faction, installs Hamid Karzai as interim administration head, and creates an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in Kabul. The Bonn Agreement is followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on December 20, which establishes the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF.

The end of the Taliban regime is generally tied to this date, when the Taliban surrender Kandahar [PDF] and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar flees the city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders. Despite the official fall of the Taliban, however, al-Qaeda leaders continue to hide out in the mountains.

President Bush calls for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute. “By helping to build an Afghanistan that is free from this evil and is a better place in which to live, we are working in the best traditions of George Marshall,” he says, evoking the post-World War II Marshall Plan that revived Western Europe. But the United States and its allies do not come close to Marshall Plan-like reconstruction spending for Afghanistan. The U.S. Congress appropriates over $38 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009.

Chairman of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan Karzai is picked to head the country’s transitional government. His selection comes during an emergency loya jirga assembled in Kabul, attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women) from Afghanistan’s 364 districts. Karzai, leader of the powerful Popalzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns, returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban. Some observers allege Karzai tolerates corruption by members of his clan and his government. The Northern Alliance, dominated by ethnic Tajiks, fails in its effort to set up a prime ministership, but does succeed in checking presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the elected parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president.

The U.S. military creates a civil affairs framework to coordinate redevelopment with the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations and to expand the authority of the Kabul government. These so-called provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, are stood up first in Gardez in November, followed by Bamiyan, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat. Command for individual PRTs is eventually handed over to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states. While credited with improving security for aid agencies, the model is not universally praised. Concern mounts that the PRT system lacks central controlling authority, is disorganized, and creates what a U.S. Institute of Peace report calls “an ad hoc approach” to security and development. Such criticism grows beyond the PRT program and becomes a common theme in the NATO war effort, as a maze of national caveats restricts the activities of member forces. Critics contend this limits the coalition’s effectiveness.

NATO assumes control of international security forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, expanding NATO/ISAF’s role across the country. It is NATO’s first operational commitment outside of Europe. Originally tasked with securing Kabul and its surrounding areas, NATO expands in September 2005, July 2006, and October 2006. The number of ISAF troops grows accordingly, from an initial five thousand to around sixty-five thousand troops from forty-two countries, including all twenty-eight NATO member states. In 2006, ISAF assumes command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the U.S.-led coalition, and also becomes more involved in intensive combat operations in southern Afghanistan.

In historic national balloting, President Karzai becomes the first democratically elected head of Afghanistan. Voters turn out in high numbers despite threats of violence and intimidation. Karzai wins with 55 percent of the vote, while his closest rival, former education minister Younis Qanooni, polls 16 percent. Karzai’s election victory is marred by accusations of fraud by his opponents and by the kidnapping of three foreign UN election workers by a militant group. But the election is nonetheless hailed as a victory for the fragile nation; Afghans had not gone to the polls since 1969, when they cast ballots in parliamentary elections during the reign of King Mohammed Zahir Shah.

Signaling the persistent challenges facing the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, bin Laden releases a videotaped message three weeks after the country’s presidential election and just days before the U.S. election, which President Bush wins. In remarks aired on the Arab television network Al Jazeera, bin Laden taunts the Bush administration and takes responsibility for the attacks on September 11, 2001. “We want to restore freedom to our nation, just as you lay waste to our nation,” bin Laden says.

More than six million Afghans turn out to vote for the Wolesi Jirga (Council of People), the Meshrano Jirga (Council of Elders), and local councils. Considered the most democratic elections ever in Afghanistan, nearly half those casting ballots are women, viewed as a sign of political progress in a highly patriarchal and conservative society. Sixty-eight out of 249 seats are set aside for female members of Afghanistan’s lower house of parliament and 23 out of 102 are reserved in the upper house.

At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, rifts emerge among member states on troop commitments to Afghanistan. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer sets a target of 2008 for the Afghan National Army to begin to take control of security. “I would hope that by 2008 we will have made considerable progress,” he says, “with a more stable political architecture in place, and with a strong interface between NATO and the civilian agencies and effective, trusted Afghan security forces gradually taking control.” Leaders of the twenty-six countries agree to remove some national restrictions on how, when, and where forces can be used. But friction continues. With violence against nongovernmental aid workers increasing, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticizes NATO countries in late 2007 for not sending more soldiers. “Our progress in Afghanistan is real but it is fragile,” Gates says. “At this time, many allies are unwilling to share the risks, commit the resources, and follow through on collective commitments to this mission and to each other. As a result, we risk allowing what has been achieved in Afghanistan to slip away.”

President Obama announces a new strategy for the war effort, linking success in Afghanistan to a stable Pakistan. The core goal of the strategy, as outlined in an interagency white paper, is “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” The strategy urges the passage of increased aid to Pakistan and a strict standard of measuring progress in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Plans also call for the deployment of an additional four thousand soldiers to help train the Afghan army and police force. Afghan President Karzai welcomes the strategy, stating that the plan will bring Afghanistan and the international community closer to success.

Senior U.S. military officials and commanders, altering course from the Bush administration, call on NATO nations to supply non-military assets to Afghanistan. Officials stress the need for NATO members to step up in building Afghan civil society, such as providing resources for PRTs. A two-day NATO summit in early April ends with a promise by NATO nations to send an additional five thousand troops to train the Afghan army and police force, and to provide security for the country’s August presidential election.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates replaces the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General David D. McKiernan, with counterinsurgency and special operations guru General Stanley A. McChrystal. McKiernan’s removal comes eleven months after he assumed command of NATO forces in Afghanistan. Gates says the Pentagon needs “fresh thinking” and “fresh eyes” on the Afghanistan war at a time when many analysts say operations there are spiraling out of control. Reports indicate that the appointment of McChrystal is intended to bring a more “aggressive and innovative” approach to the Afghan war effort in tune with a more focused counterinsurgency strategy.

U.S. Marines launch a major offensive in southern Afghanistan, representing a major test for the U.S. military’s new counterinsurgency strategy. The offensive, involving four thousand Marines, is launched in response to a growing Taliban insurgency in the country’s southern provinces, especially Helmand Province. The operation focuses on restoring government services, bolstering local police forces, and protecting civilians from Taliban incursion. By August 2009 U.S. forces are to number between sixty thousand and sixty-eight thousand.

After more than two months of uncertainty following a disputed presidential election on August 20, Afghan President Karzai wins another term. The August 20 election, which pitted Karzai against top contenders Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, was marred by fraud allegations. An investigation by the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission finds Karzai won only 49.67 percent of the vote, below the 50 percent-plus-one threshold needed to avoid a runoff. Under international pressure, Karzai agrees to a runoff vote on November 7. But a week before the runoff, Karzai’s main rival Abdullah pulls out, and Karzai is declared the winner. Concerns over Karzai’s legitimacy grow, and the United States and other international partners call for improved governance. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ties all future civilian aid to greater efforts by the Karzai administration to combat corruption.

Nine months after renewing the U.S. commitment to the Afghan war effort, President Obama announces a major escalation of the U.S. mission. In a nationally televised speech, the president commits an additional thirty thousand forces to the fight, on top of the sixty-eight thousand in place. These forces, Obama says, “will increase our ability to train competent Afghan Security Forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.” For the first time in the eight-year war effort, a time frame is put on the U.S. military presence, as Obama sets July 2011 as the start of a troop drawdown. But the president does not detail how long a drawdown will take. Obama says U.S. national interests are linked to success in the Afghan war effort, and argues that this temporary surge will force Afghan political and military institutions to assume responsibility for their own affairs.

At a summit in Lisbon, Portugal, NATO member countries sign a declaration agreeing to hand over full responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. The transition process is set to begin in July 2011, with local security forces taking over control in relatively stable provinces and cities. The initial handover is to coincide with the start of a drawdown in the one hundred thousand-strong contingent of U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan, though the number of U.S. soldiers leaving is expected to be a token amount. But many in Afghanistan and in the West, including members of the Afghan parliament, are concerned about the ability of national forces to take over from international troops.

President Obama outlines a plan to withdraw thirty-three thousand troops by the summer of 2012—the surge troops sent in December 2009—including ten thousand by the end of 2011. Polls show a record number of Americans do not support the war, and Obama faces pressure from lawmakers, particularly Democrats, to sizably reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan. After the surge troops leave, an estimated seventy thousand U.S. troops are scheduled to stay through at least 2014. Obama confirms that the U.S. is holding preliminary peace talks with the Taliban leadership. With reconciliation in mind, the UN Security Council days earlier splits a sanctions list between members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, making it easier to add and remove people and entities.

The U.S. war in Afghanistan marks its tenth anniversary, with about hundred thousand U.S. troops deployed in a counterinsurgency role, primarily in southern and eastern regions. President Obama plans to withdraw all combat troops by 2014, but serious doubts remain about the Afghan government’s capacity to secure the country. Amid a resilient insurgency, U.S. goals in Afghanistan remain uncertain and terrorist safe havens in Pakistan continue to undermine U.S. efforts. A decade in, the war’s tolls include 1,800 U.S. troop casualties and $444 billion in spending. The costs have eroded U.S. public support, with a global economic downturn, a 9.1 percent unemployment rate, and a $1.3 trillion annual budget deficit. While there are military gains, hopes for a deal with the Taliban to help wind down the conflict remain riddled with setbacks. Afghan President Karzai suspends the talks following the September 20 assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the government’s chief negotiator, which Afghan officials blame on the Pakistan-based Haqqani network. The group denies it.

Ten years after the first international conference that discussed Afghanistan’s political future, dozens of countries and organizations meet again in Bonn, Germany, to devise a roadmap of cooperation beyond the international troop withdrawal in 2014. Afghan President Karzai says the country will require $10 billion annually over the next decade to shore up security and reconstruction, and commits to tackling corruption in exchange for continued international assistance. The conference fails to achieve its objectives—to lay down a blueprint for Afghanistan's transition to a self-sustaining and secure government—as the insurgency continues to rage, and Pakistan, a crucial player, refuses to attend.

Newly elected Afghan President Ghani signs a power-sharing agreement with his chief opponent, Abdullah, who had mobilized thousands of protesters as he challenged the voting results. The agreement, brokered after intensive diplomacy by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, establishes the role of chief executive for Abdullah. While the agreement staves off civil unrest, it ushers in protracted government dysfunction as Ghani and Abdullah tussle over their respective prerogatives, such as appointments to security posts, at a time when the Taliban are making gains in the countryside. Ghani, a former World Bank specialist, is a Pashtun from the country’s south, like Karzai, but is seen by the Obama administration as a welcome change. Karzai had railed against civilian casualties in the U.S. war effort and was seen as fostering public corruption.

President Trump outlines his Afghanistan policy in an address to troops in Arlington, Virginia, saying that though his “original instinct was to pull out,” he will instead press ahead with an open-ended military commitment to prevent the emergence of “a vacuum for terrorists.” Differentiating his policy from Obama’s, Trump says decisions about withdrawal will be based on “conditions on the ground,” rather than arbitrary timelines. He invites India to play a greater role in rebuilding Afghanistan while castigating Pakistan for harboring insurgents. He also pledges to loosen restrictions on combat even as the United Nations reports an uptick [PDF] in civilian casualties caused by Afghan and coalition air strikes. A political settlement with the Taliban, Trump says, is far off.

President Trump abruptly breaks off peace talks a week after top U.S. negotiator Khalilzad announced that an agreement had been reached “in principle” with Taliban leaders. In a tweet, Trump says he canceled a secret meeting with the Taliban and Afghan President Ghani at Camp David after a U.S. soldier was killed in a Taliban attack. The Taliban say they are “committed to continuing negotiations,” but warn that the cancellation will cause an increase in the number of deaths.

Representatives of the Taliban and of the Afghan government and civil society meet face to face for the first time in Doha, Qatar, after nearly twenty years of war. The direct negotiations, which were delayed for months over a prisoner swap proposed in the earlier U.S.-Taliban deal, begin after the Afghan government completes the release of five thousand Taliban prisoners. During opening remarks, both sides express eagerness to bring peace to Afghanistan and establish a framework for Afghan society after U.S. troops withdraw. The government pushes for a cease-fire, while the Taliban reiterate their call for the country to be governed through an Islamic system.

Acting U.S. Defense Secretary Christopher C. Miller announces plans to halve the number of troops in Afghanistan to 2,500 by mid-January, days before President-Elect Joe Biden will be inaugurated. Thousands of troops had already been pulled out following an agreement with the Taliban in February, moving closer to fulfilling President Trump’s campaign promise to end the so-called forever wars. The announcement comes as negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban are deadlocked and the militant group continues to launch deadly attacks. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg warns that withdrawing troops too early could allow Afghanistan to become a haven for terrorists and the Islamic State to rebuild its caliphate. 

Facing little resistance, Taliban fighters overrun the capital, Kabul, and take over the presidential palace hours after President Ghani leaves the country. Taliban leaders say they will hold talks with Afghan officials to form an “open, inclusive Islamic government.” Former Afghan President Karzai and Abdullah, formerly the chief executive under Ghani, create a council to facilitate a peaceful transition to a Taliban government. The takeover follows the Taliban’s rapid advance, during which they captured all but two of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals and seized border crossings. Afghan security forces in some areas reportedly negotiated surrenders and avoided fighting the Taliban.

President Biden says his administration made the right decision in ending U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, arguing that the U.S. counterterrorism mission is complete. But he acknowledges that the troop withdrawal has been “messy” and blames Afghan security forces for failing to counter the Taliban. Meanwhile, the United States deploys six thousand troops to evacuate U.S. and allied personnel and secure Kabul’s international airport, where chaos erupts as thousands of Afghans attempt to flee. Biden says the military will help evacuate thousands of Afghans who worked with the United States, and he expands refugee-status access for vulnerable Afghans.

Thirteen U.S. service members are killed and at least eighteen are injured in an attack at a checkpoint outside the Kabul airport, where thousands of people are being evacuated. They are the first U.S. service members killed in action in Afghanistan since February 2020. At least 170 Afghans are also killed. The Islamic State in Khorasan claims responsibility, and several days after, the United States launches an air strike targeting a suspected plotter from the group. However, the Pentagon later admits that the strike was a “mistake” and killed ten civilians, including seven children.

The last U.S. military forces depart Afghanistan, leaving it under Taliban rule. The exit follows a chaotic, two-week withdrawal process during which more than 120,000 people are evacuated. The next day, President Biden says the United States should learn from its mistakes and that the withdrawal marks the end of “an era of major military operations to remake other countries.” Thousands of Afghans who assisted the United States and its allies, as well as up to two hundred Americans, remain in Afghanistan. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken says Washington will work to get them out and that future U.S. engagement in Afghanistan will focus on diplomacy.