Tracking China’s Investment in Overseas Airports

Overview

Since 2007, Chinese entities have invested in sixty overseas airport projects, a much smaller number than the 129 overseas port projects documented in “Tracking China’s Control of Overseas Ports.” While it is common for Chinese entities to own equity shares in overseas ports, only in one out of forty-six overseas active airport projects does China have equity ownership.    

The “China Overseas Airports Tracker” visualizes and details China’s investment in overseas airports across regions and over time. The database supporting this interactive includes sixty airport projects financed, constructed, leased, or acquired by various Chinese entities. Various state-owned entities and private companies have invested in a wide range of different-sized airport projects, from thriving international hubs such as London’s Heathrow Airport to a singular airstrip on Kanton Island, Kiribati.

Of the sixty projects, forty-six are active, one has been paused indefinitely, nine have been canceled, and four have been sold. Reasons for cancellation, sale, and suspension of airport projects include financial issues (on the side of the Chinese entity and on the side of the host government), the host country government deciding they no longer needed the project or did not consent to the proposed terms of the deal, legal opposition (resulting in cancellation of the contract), and national security concerns, as well as local residents’ opposition and the need to compensate local inhabitants for land.

Where Chinese Entities Are Investing and Host Governments’ Responses

China has acquired or helped finance and construct at least one airport on every continent except Antarctica. Those projects span Asia, the Caribbean, Central America, Europe, the Middle East/North Africa (MENA), Oceania, South America, and sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is by far the region with the most active Chinese overseas airport projects, followed by Asia, MENA, the Caribbean, Europe, South America, Central America, and Oceania.

Some host governments have been able to leverage Chinese interest in a specific airport project to maximize their own benefit. For example, in Ghana, the Chinese mining firm Cardinal Namdini Mining Ltd wanted to construct an airstrip in Ghana’s Talensi District for its exclusive use to enhance its mining activities; however, the Ghanaian Ministry of Transport appears to have convinced the firm to build an airport to help serve the entire Upper East Region of Ghana instead.

The Chinese Entities Involved in Overseas Airport Investments

Our data shows that central-government-owned financial and nonfinancial entities have been the primary actors in China’s overseas airport investment and construction. However, local-government-owned companies and large private companies have also participated in the endeavor.

The top three Chinese entities most frequently involved in financing and constructing overseas airport projects include the Export-Import Bank of China, China Harbour Engineering Company, and China State Construction Engineering Corporation. Other central-government-owned entities, such as China Investment Corporation (a Chinese sovereign fund), subsidiaries of China Railway, China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, China CAMC Engineering Corporation, China National Aero-Technology International Engineering Corporation, Aviation Industry Corporation of China, and Sinohydro, have also invested in or constructed such projects. 

Notable local entities include Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group, Shanghai Baoye, Changjiang Yichang Waterway Engineering Bureau, Jiangxi International Economic and Technical Cooperation, Beijing Urban Construction Group, and Weihai International Economic and Technical Cooperative.

Large private companies, such as Alibaba and HNA Airport Group (a subsidiary of HNA Group), have also invested in overseas airports through lease or construction investment.

China’s Investment and Controlling Shares in Foreign Airports  

China began investing in overseas airports around 2007. The number of new Chinese overseas airport projects started each year has remained relatively constant over time, spiking in 2013, the same year that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was formally launched.

Chinese entities engage in overseas airport projects most frequently through construction investment, followed by contract construction, acquisitions, and leases. Available data on project value shows that Asia was the region that received the most investment, followed by MENA and sub-Saharan Africa. The value of those airport projects ranges from $2.1 million to $2.8 billion. The median value of the active airport projects is $180 million.

There are no overseas airport projects in which a Chinese entity owns a majority stake. The maximum equity stake currently owned by a Chinese entity is 10 percent (in Heathrow Airport).

Dual-Use Potential of Overseas Airports With Chinese Involvement

All airfields can be used by military helicopters, regardless of runway length, width, and material. In that sense, all airports have dual-use potential, irrespective of who constructed or financed them. For users interested in a closer analysis of an airport’s capacity to handle various aircraft, this tracker provides details about runway material, runway length, and runway width for each runway at a given airport project. However, in collecting data for this research, we do not find any evidence suggesting Chinese entities explicitly intend to prepare overseas airfields for military use by the People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese military.

Domestically, China has been implementing a military-civil fusion strategy to develop and manage domestic dual-use airports, as evidenced in the “Action Plan for Building a Strong Civil Aviation Nation in the New Era” released by China’s Civil Aviation Administration in 2008. Researchers in China also called for developing an integrated civil-military (national defense) air traffic control system.

The dual-use potential of an airport is influenced not only by its physical attributes but also by the technologies equipping it and supporting its operations. A notable example of dual-use technology is the air traffic control system. In the early 1990s, the State Economic and Trade Commission listed developing an indigenous air traffic control system as an area of major national investment for science and technology research. In recent years, the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese air traffic control system equipment manufacturers to export and supply overseas airports. For example, in 2020, the China Civil Aviation Administration hosted a seminar connecting representatives from eleven equipment manufacturers with China Civil Aviation Airport Construction Group, encouraging domestic equipment manufacturers to be part of China’s overseas airport construction supply chains.

Why Some Projects Were Canceled

Airport projects have been canceled most frequently in Europe, followed by sub-Saharan Africa. Projects in Europe are mainly discontinued due to legal opposition and national security concerns. For example, in Toulouse, France, China Airport Synergy Investment Limited originally acquired a 49.99 percent stake in the airport in 2015 (which at the time was a controversial investment due to the Chinese identity of the new investor). The deal was later canceled in 2019 by order of a French court. Some active projects, such as Alibaba’s logistics hub at Liège Airport (Cainiao Liège eHub) in Belgium, are coming under scrutiny by government and intelligence officials over concerns of spying and interference activities, which could result in the project’s future suspension or cancellation.

In sub-Saharan Africa, it seems that many host country governments are exercising caution after being burned by burdensome, BRI-related white-elephant projects in the past; they are more closely considering the terms of the deals offered by China and whether a project is truly necessary. For example, in Sierra Leone, the planned Mamamah International Airport project was canceled after the government decided it would be “uneconomical” to build a new airport, as the existing airport was already underutilized.

Data Notes

The data in this tracker was independently collected from publicly available sources such as news articles, company press releases and news updates, and government reports and announcements. If there were multiple sources with conflicting data for a specific element of a project (such as investment total), we listed the more conservative estimate.

Each row in the dataset is a project. Multiple projects sometimes occur at the same airport. We distinguish between “airport projects” and “airports,” as some airports, for example, are built or expanded in multiple phases and could have received Chinese investment for one or more of those stages of development. Data on runway material, length, and width reflects the airport where the project is located.

For this tracker, “ownership” is defined as a Chinese entity having a definitive equity stake in the specified airport, hangar, or other physical entity itself. It does not include concessions for airport management and/or operations or leases.

An “airport lease” is a long-term agreement by which the airport’s owner or landlord (the lessor) grants the use, management, and/or operations of the airport to the tenant (the lessee) for a specified period in return for payment. No equity is exchanged in a lease agreement.

A “contract construction project” is one in which a Chinese contractor participates in building the airport (e.g., through winning a construction bid) but no Chinese money is involved.

A “construction investment” is one in which Chinese money (e.g., a loan from the Export–Import Bank of the Republic of China or investment by a private Chinese company) funds the project, even if Chinese contractors are also involved in the construction.

The runway material reported is the material of the planned final runway; if the runway is incomplete (e.g., if the planned runway is supposed to be asphalt but is currently dirt), that status is marked in the notes column of the data sheet.

The runway length is measured from threshold to threshold and is reported in meters. If there is a displaced threshold, it is measured from the displaced threshold. If a displaced threshold exists, that is marked in the notes column of the data sheet.

The runway width is measured excluding shoulders and is reported in meters; it was identified using threshold markings whenever possible.

To request the data in spreadsheet format, fill out the data request form. The typical response time is five business days from the date of submission.

For more about China’s investments in infrastructure across the globe, visit “Tracking China’s Control of Overseas Ports,” where we track China’s growing maritime influence through investments in strategic overseas ports. Users can plot the location of each port and view satellite images alongside detailed information on the share of Chinese ownership, the total amount of Chinese investment, and the port’s suitability for use by the Chinese military.