Xi Jinping

As I noted in previous blog posts, China has in recent years embarked upon a global soft power offensive. This charm offensive has included an expansion of Xinhua and other state media outlets into many new markets, as well as professionalizing these news services and hiring many capable reporters. The new charm offensive has included vast increases in aid, much of it part of massive new concepts like One Belt, One Road. It has included an increase in assistance for educational exchanges, new programs for training of foreign officials coming to China on short courses, and an overall effort by Xi Jinping and other senior leaders to portray Beijing as a kind of defender of the global order—at least on trade and climate change, two issues where U.S. leadership appears to be retreating. This attempt to portray Xi as the new defender of the global order was most evident during his visit to Davos, in January. There, he told attendees at the World Economic Forum that Beijing would protect free trade rules and norms, warning that “no one will emerge as a winner in a trade war.” In my previous post, I wrote that, at least in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, China’s massive soft power offensive is not likely to succeed. A decade ago, when I wrote a book on China’s then-rising soft power, it might have; Beijing was perceived more favorably by its neighbors back then, in part because it had been relatively modest in exerting its hard power influence in Southeast Asia. Now, after a decade of squabbling over the South China Sea and East China Sea, and a rising Asian arms race, China’s hard power has become significant, and threatening to neighbors. This hard power, delivered in a manner many Southeast Asian nations view negatively, undermines the entire soft power effort. But, globally, China’s image is better than it is these days in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, in part because nations in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, or the Middle East do not have to think as much about China’s rising hard power. The current partisan dysfunction in Washington also potentially makes China more appealing. But will the global democratic regression—Freedom House has now recorded eleven straight years of democratic regression in its annual Freedom in the World report— somehow boost China’s soft power? On the surface, the idea seems to make sense. If democratic leaders are failing to address major challenges like economic inequality, climate change, immigration, terrorism, technology’s impact on work and the job market, the rising cost of health care, and other issues, is it possible that an alternative model of governance would work—or at least might become more popular among citizens in many nations?   The fact that voters in democracies around the world are increasingly turning to strongman/strongwoman style candidates suggests that there is some pent up demand for an alternative model of governance, even if those strongmen are elected—which China’s leaders really are not. (The groundbreaking work of Yascha Mounk at Harvard suggests that, especially among younger men and women in many democracies, there is a greater willingness than in the past to consider alternative forms of government.) As the thinking goes, perhaps an elected strongman, like the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte or Hungary’s Viktor Orban, can break through political roadblocks, and use the popular will to make important progress on issues like economic inequality, or environmental threats, or sensible immigration? Certainly, strongman-style politicians, many of them using populist rhetoric, have made gains globally in the past decade—from Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand to Duterte to Orban to many others. So, if voters in democracies are choosing strongman-style politicians, wouldn’t they also warm to China’s own authoritarian leaders, who are supposedly delivering the goods at home? Not necessarily. China, too, has in its own way succumbed to this strongman trend. Xi Jinping is now probably the most powerful single leader of China since Mao Zedong. He has built a formidable personality cult around himself—a cult that harkens back to that of Mao Zedong. He also has cracked down hard on all forms of dissent, within the Party and in society at large. But while Xi may indeed be the most strongman-style leader China has had in decades, his style of governance is not necessarily going to boost China’s soft power around the world. Remember that in most countries that have flirted with or voted in strongmen-style leaders, these politicians were still elected. Polling by the Barometer series shows overwhelming support, in most of these countries, for the idea of electing leaders. In other words, citizens of Thailand or Hungary or the Philippines may have voted in what I have called elected autocrats, but they still overwhelmingly prefer to elect their strongmen. This point cannot be overstated. Electing modern strongmen like Thaksin or Orban is dangerous to the future of democracy—they can undermine democratic institutions even while winning elections. But the Orban/Thaksin/Duterte/Erdogan model is probably going to remain more appealing than a China-style approach, which does not really give the public a voice—not even a voice in choosing a leader who could undermine democracy. A model of an unelected strongman, chosen through opaque and byzantine political maneuvering, is indeed unlikely to be more popular than voters choosing an elected autocrat. Choosing an elected autocrat allows for the possibility that voters can eventually turn against and remove the elected leader—although, as Turkey shows, this gets harder over time. China’s system does not allow for that possibility. In my next post, I will address a second major flaw in China’s authoritarian model that undermines its global soft power.

There are many people who have ideas about what should happen at the Xi-Trump summit. Almost as important, however, is what should not happen. Here are my suggestions for the top five things President Donald J. Trump should NOT do at his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Mar-a-Lago. 1) Do not go off script, wing it, or freelance. There is no country that parses (or manipulates) words as effectively as China. When Secretary of State Rex Tillerson echoed Chinese phrases such as “win-win” and stated that U.S. policy in North Korea had failed, the Chinese were quick to celebrate the remarks. It did not matter that Tillerson had his own ideas about the definition of “win-win” or that his comment concerning policy failure was set in a larger context. The Chinese will use whatever is said to promote their own narrative. And, as the White House hopefully came to appreciate with the president’s early tweets on the one-China policy, taking words back in diplomacy is a messy process that leaves one disadvantaged in future negotiations. 2) Do not sell yourself too cheaply. There is almost nothing that the Chinese would like more than to take advantage of President Trump’s transactional bargaining tendencies. They have floated, for example, the possibility of investments in three key battleground states—Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin – or support for an infrastructure fund. It is not difficult to imagine President Trump claiming summit success with a pledge for 30,000 new jobs in three states. Putting aside the troubling parallels with how China buys off developing countries in Africa and Latin America, it would be a mistake to give away U.S. leverage before the game is really on. After all, the 90-day review of unfair trade practices that the president has ordered is just underway, and what we really want is fair and open market access for U.S. goods and services. This means a longer-term strategic negotiation based on hard data – not a one-time payoff. 3) Do not ignore politics. North Korea and trade are understandably front and center for the Mar-a-Lago meeting. During his March visit to China, however, Secretary Tillerson also indicated that the United States would “continue to advocate for universal values such as human rights and religious freedom.” Tillerson’s comment matters in many ways: it signals our continued support to embattled activists within China; it reminds the world of the values that the United States represents; and it underpins our support for broader issues of good governance—accountability, transparency, and the rule of law—that affect issues ranging from intellectual property rights protection to food safety. In addition, there is an issue of reciprocity. The United States grants China an open door to advance its values and norms throughout the United States through Confucius Institutes and Chinese government–produced English language radio and television broadcasts; meanwhile China has moved aggressively to shut down avenues in education and media that promote Western values. The United States should ensure that it has equal access to the Chinese citizenry. Openness and fairness matter not only in economic markets but also in markets of ideas. 4) Do not practice issue-linkage. The White House has set getting Chinese cooperation on North Korea as a top priority for the summit. In negotiating with Beijing, however, Washington should not sell-out the U.S. presence in the South China Sea or barter trade in exchange for more cooperation. Not only does the United States have THAAD and the threat of ramping up additional security cooperation with South Korea and Japan as part of its arsenal, there is also a strong contingent of Chinese foreign policy analysts and officials who would like their government to bring more pressure to bear on North Korea. There is no reason to give China something when we don’t have to. 5) Do not forget that “America First” does not mean America only. The United States gives and the United States receives. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United Kingdom and later NATO joined the United States in the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The members of APEC put anti-terrorism at the top of their agenda at the 2001 forum because the United States asked. There is meaning in the word alliance. Our partners can also be valuable with regard to China. In negotiating with China, for example, there is strength in numbers. The United States should consult with and use our allies in Europe and the region to pressure China on unfair trade and other practices. President Trump has also stated that the United States can “solve” the North Korea problem alone. It might be possible—if imprudent—to take action against North Korea without consulting China. But there should be no action taken without consultation and cooperation with South Korea, a U.S. ally who would be most directly affected by any new U.S. policy initiative. The United States should not and cannot “go it alone.”

President Trump has sent a stern warning to Xi Jinping that if China does not help us with North Korea, it will be bad for China and the U.S. will act on its own. Although sounding tough, the President may be dooming his meeting with Xi to just another round of failure on North Korea. The past several years have demonstrated that the long-standing U.S. demand that China must play the central role in a strategy of expanding sanctions with North Korea may be misguided and unrealistic. While China has shared interests in resolving the crisis, there are clear limits to the pressure China is willing to apply. This reticence is due to China's fears of a refugee influx it cannot control if the North Korean regime collapses, and its fear of losing a buffer state on its border. China also benefits from North Korea distracting the U.S. presence in Asia, as China's own presence rises. China's security interests are not going to change. What needs to change is how we work with China. Trump cannot just bully Xi to another nominal yes on North Korea. He needs to work with Xi's security interests, so that China's support for pressuring the renegade state becomes implemented, sustainable policy. Washington has had two long-standing objectives: to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and to reunify the Korean peninsula. President Trump should remain steadfast on the first and return North Korea to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear power. An agreement that only freezes North Korean capabilities will not solve the crisis and will only, again, kick it down the road.   The U.S. is on firm ground demanding North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons. The U.S. unilaterally removed its nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, and South Korea is a member in good standing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea has reintroduced nuclear weapons onto the peninsula in defiance of regional and global obligations. A nuclear capable North Korea will leave open the dangerous alternatives of the U.S. reintroducing nuclear weapons onto the peninsula and/or South Korea and Japan developing their own nuclear arsenal. Despite President’s Trump’s own misplaced musings, U.S. and global security continue to be best served by fewer nuclear weapons at the disposal of dispersed, unpredictable leaders. Kim Jung Un is at the top of that list. But where the U.S. should show flexibility is on reunification. This goal has threatened China’s interest of a buffer state on its border and has inhibited Chinese cooperation on the imminent North Korea threat. Furthermore, unification is also being questioned within South Korea, particularly among the younger generation who are concerned about the economic sacrifice that may be required by the much more affluent South. While we cannot live with a nuclear-capable Kim regime, the question is whether we can live with a non-nuclear Kim regime on a divided peninsula. If the answer is yes, policy options open up to achieve that goal with Chinese cooperation. Since the North Korea crisis first moved to the top of the U.S. agenda in the 1990s, North Korea has focused on the U.S. providing incentives in return for the end of its nuclear program -- food aid, energy aid, security guarantees, and a peace agreement to replace the 1953 truce. Providing these incentives has received skeptical reception in the U.S. given North Korea’s track record of broken agreements, proliferation, and human rights abuses. But, since 1994, China’s economic and security prowess in the region has greatly expanded, including its support for North Korea after the Soviet Union collapsed. The responsibility should shift to China to provide the incentives. It has a lot to offer: security guarantees, by strengthening its 1961 mutual assistance agreement; more investment in North Korean industry and infrastructure; membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; and integration into its One Belt One Road initiative, among others. If more sanctions are needed, China’s leverage may be better played by focusing on North Korea’s illicit economy, a major source of cash flow and an area where some Chinese entities have been implicated -- proliferation, drug trafficking, human trafficking, cyber bank robberies -- as opposed to its legitimate economy. Cracking down on illicit activities requires commitment, financial resources, international support, all of which China can help deliver. Furthermore, North Korea’s legitimate economic development will be a cornerstone of a more stable, nuclear free North Korea and, in the short term, will not offset the loss of cash flow from its illicit practices. Stopping a determined nation from developing nuclear weapons is difficult. Reversing established capabilities is even harder. But it has been done. To move North Korea into the success column, Trump needs to ensure Xi Jinping recognizes North Korea is a U.S. priority, that we are willing to work with China’s security interests, and that the U.S. will keep its eye on the ball and not blink.

China’s central government has cracked down on press freedom as the country expands its international influence, but in the internet age, many of its citizens hunger for a free flow of information.

The electoral victory of Mr. Donald Trump has placed U.S.-China relations in a dicey situation. While ordinary Chinese—most of whom dreaded a Hillary Clinton presidency—were delighted that their wishful thinking came true, political leaders in Beijing appeared to be caught off guard by Mr. Trump’s stunning defeat of his Democratic opponent. They are concerned about the “improper” remarks made by the president-elect and the lack of experience of his foreign policy team. Memories are still fresh of 1993–1994 when Bill Clinton, whose party had been out of power for twelve years, brought the relationship to a low ebb by establishing the link between progress in human rights and the “most favored nation” tariff treatment for China. Beijing had additional reasons to be anxious at this “hinge moment” in U.S.-China relations. The president-elect is inclined to trust his own instincts and not to overthink things. Also, his appointed foreign policy/national security team seems to favor a more hawkish China policy. It is no wonder that ever since the election dust settled, Beijing has dispatched several delegations to the United States to suss out the foreign policy direction of the new administration. Meanwhile, Beijing has held out an olive branch to President-elect Trump. The very day Mr. Trump’s election victory became known, President Xi Jinping reportedly sent a congratulatory note and expressed his willingness to work with the president-elect to “uphold the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.” Xi’s goodwill was returned by Mr. Trump in their first phone call conversation in mid-November, who said that that he was on “the same side” as Xi in the bilateral relationship and believed that the two would have “one of the strongest relationships for both countries moving forward.” While it is hard to dispute that developing a stable, predictable, and comprehensive relationship with China is in the United States’ national interest, to translate the goodwill into policy reality requires the new administration to send clear signals to China to avoid miscalculations and misreading of U.S. China policy. For that purpose, the new administration may consider:                       Articulating U.S. national interests in Asia and beyond. Given the uncertainties and complexities surrounding Mr. Trump’s Asia policy, the new administration has some serious soul-searching to do: Is the United States still committed to sustaining its primacy in East Asia as a resurgent China reclaims hegemony in the region? How should the new administration reconcile the era of U.S. global leadership and President-elect Trump’s insistence on “America first?” Is the U.S. national interest best served by identifying itself as an “indispensable” Pacific power? Can the United States risk a trade war with China without jeopardizing its strategic interests in the region? In the absence of an explicit answer to these questions, the policy framework for U.S. engagement in Asia would be in disarray. Clarifying U.S. strategic commitments in the region. Mr. Trump’s election remarks on allies “paying up” and the pledge to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) have already made U.S. allies and partners in Asia unnerved and upset. This, together with his emphasis on U.S. domestic issues and lack of interest in policing world affairs, has cast a shadow over the advancement of the Asia rebalance strategy. While the new administration may scale back its implementation, a wholesale abandonment of the strategy may cause further instability by emboldening aggressive opportunism while crippling its alliance system in the region. The United States should make it clear that abandoning TPP does not entail the weakening of U.S. strategic commitment to the region or the forgoing of the efforts to maintain regional balance of power. Indeed, even the so-called off-shore balancing strategy does not fundamentally contradict with the Asia rebalance strategy in terms of the strategic objectives; the only difference is the means: the former favors using local powers (e.g., Japan and South Korea) to check the rise of a potential hostile power, and the United States will act as a balancer of last resort. Sustaining U.S. trade and economic relationships in the region. Trashing TPP is not tantamount to U.S. disengagement from Asia’s burgeoning multilateral economic architecture. On the one hand, by joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) where China is poised to dominate, the United States can allay the fears of its allies and friends who have found themselves in a next-to-impossible situation to resist the China juggernaut. This is definitely not a zero-sum game. Indeed, as far as President-elect Trump’s plan for $1 trillion in infrastructure investments is concerned, Washington may gain a great deal by actively participating in these multilateral institutions. On the other hand, U.S. withdrawal from TPP may highlight the need for the United States to engage and invest in bilateral trade and economic institutions such as the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue (SED) and the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) as instruments of pursuing U.S. economic interests in the region. Promoting U.S.-China cooperation in global governance. Over the past years, both countries have worked together in addressing global challenges including terrorism, the North Korean nuclear threat, and Iran’s nuclear program. Last year, the U.S.-China partnership extended to other areas including climate change and global health. Just last week, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on jointly supporting the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Given the presence of “stressor variables” in the bilateral relations (e.g., frictions in the South China Sea and the potential confrontation over trade issues), cooperation in global governance could serve as a “stabilizer” and ensure that differences and conflicts do not derail U.S.-China relations. Furthermore, U.S.-China cooperation over global governance is consistent with Mr. Trump’s idea of asking other countries to chip in more towards global affairs.   Nearly forty-five years ago, when Mao Zedong received Richard Nixon, he said: “I like rightists [Republicans].” While President-elect Trump is not President Nixon, his Chinese counterpart might like dealing with a businessman-turned-U.S. president because he is pragmatic. That may bring a slight dose of optimism to the world’s most complex and consequential bilateral relationship. Read more about how the Trump administration should approach U.S. policy toward China, Japan, Korea, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

I was struck by a recent headline in the South China Morning Post heralding Xi Jinping’s political gains at home from his diplomacy abroad. If the assessment is correct, it would suggest that a series of foreign policy travails has only served to heighten Xi’s popularity; by almost any objective calculation, it has been a challenging summer for Xi and his foreign policy team. First, and most significantly, in July, a tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against China and for the Philippines in the latter’s case regarding territorial claims in the South China Sea. Certainly China’s pre-established non-compliance with the ruling limits the efficacy of the decision. Nonetheless, as legal scholar Tara Davenport argues, the award has a number of additional important ramifications, including: pushing China to clarify its policies, providing private actors such as oil companies with a legal decision on which to base their investment decisions, and serving as a “focal point” that can be used by other claimants to pressure China to adjust its behavior. China even tried to round up countries in its own version of a “coalition of the willing”—but we all know how that ends. Second, Hong Kong voters turned out in record numbers to vote in the Legislative Council elections over the first weekend in September. The results swept into office several young democrats, who have been pushing for greater political autonomy—even independence—from Beijing. One of them, 23-year old Nathan Law, received the second highest number of votes in the Hong Kong island constituency. With their victories, the democrats retain enough seats to veto any efforts by the pro-Beijing government to effect constitutional change. Third, China suffered a few high-profile setbacks in its going global strategy for Chinese state-owned energy companies. Australia rejected a bid by China’s State Grid Corp. to buy a majority stake in Australia’s electric grid—Ausgrid. And in the United Kingdom, newly-elected Prime Minister Theresa May put a temporary hold on the Hinkley Point nuclear power plant, in which China has a one-third stake. Previous Prime Minister David Cameron had hailed the plant as a “historic deal.” In both cases, Chinese officials or official media stated that further Chinese investment could well be harmed by these setbacks. Fourth, China’s G20 moment was hijacked by the confusion surrounding President Obama’s path off his airplane. Did China deliberately snub President Obama by not providing a red carpet descent off his plane? Was the United States simply being difficult? Did a Chinese official really yell, “This is our country!” at a U.S. official? Inquiring minds apparently wanted to know more about this event than about international efforts to combat global corruption or to reform international financial institutions. And finally, China failed to deliver on its Olympic promise, earning just over half the gold medals of the United States and one fewer than the United Kingdom. No one outside China really cares how many medals China wins; people care how athletes from their own country fare, about athletes with compelling personal stories, and about athletes that transcend nationality like Usain Bolt. However, the Chinese media made such a fuss about the fact that the number of gold medals didn’t matter that of course, everyone understood that it really did matter. It is possible, but unlikely, that some of these hits to China’s soft power will prompt Beijing to consider how its policies at home and its diplomacy abroad may contribute negatively to its international image. In the Orwellian world of China, however, it is likely that none of this actually matters and some of it never happened. China won’t abide by the South China Sea ruling, it will continue to crush democracy in Hong Kong, there will be other energy deals to be had, the G20 in Hangzhou was a “great success,” and no one cares about winning medals at the Olympics. And if the South China Morning Post has it right, through it all, Xi can win at home by losing abroad.

Bochen Han is an intern for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Driving through any Chinese city, town, or village today it’s hard to miss the 24-character set of “core socialist values” (shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan) that adorn almost every public surface—restaurant menus, billboards, taxi cabs. In Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, schoolchildren must recite them on demand. In Chaohu city in Anhui province, citizens were encouraged to hang values-inscribed lanterns for the Spring Festival. Southwest, in Sichuan province, officials popularized the values by including them in riddles. This idealistic set of twelve “core socialist values” was first defined at the 18th National Congress in 2012, and again highlighted in the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference this March. Government guidelines released at the end of 2013 encouraged  inclusion of the values in the overall national education plan and instructed that they be “made a way of thinking for students”. While most of these values are predictable (integrity, patriotism, civility, etc.), several stand out as seemingly incongruous with the common Western understanding of China, and with China’s long-established wariness of importing Western political democracy: freedom, justice, equality, democracy, and rule of law. None of these phrases in and of themselves is new. Since his ascension, President Xi Jinping has made “rule of law” a policy cornerstone (the concept itself stretches back to the second or third century BCE). “Rule of law” was the theme of the Fourth Plenum in 2014, and has featured prominently in government documents ever since. What Xi means by this has been vigorously discussed by both Western and Chinese analysts; some see it as merely a tool for party control and others approach it more optimistically, arguing that at the very least, it’s unprecedented recognition that the government needs to improve governance and address public grievances. As for “democracy,” the actual term stems back over a century to when Japanese writers added it to the Chinese lexicon during the Meiji Revolution. (Technically, citizens can elect members to the local People’s Congresses.) Freedom, justice, and equality are also oft-repeated buzzwords that the Chinese understand as ideals to work toward, rather than proclaimed accomplishments. Again, none of these phrases is really new, nor do they suggest a newfound desire for China to adopt the tenets of liberal democracy as understood in the West. What does make the situation interesting is that Xi has decided to go beyond espousing the rhetoric in national policy forums and government documents, and is now using terms like “rule of law” and “democracy” in a popular, value-driven context. Furthermore, while every Chinese leader comes in with a new set of guiding moral principles (coupled with a vigorous propaganda campaign), those undertaken by Xi’s predecessors did not raise eyebrows. Hu Jintao’s “Eight Honors and Eight Shames” and Jiang Zemin’s “Three Stresses” both remained comfortably within the Chinese rhetoric and targeted for Chinese consumption. Why would Xi do this? Why expend the effort and resources to popularize centuries-old terms, and ones already espoused in state documentation? Primarily: to win hearts and minds, both at home and abroad, and for all types of people. Xin Ming, professor at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, said that core socialist values had an important position in China’s soft power efforts. With the advent of social media and the proliferation of people-to-people exchanges, the Chinese people are increasingly questioning China’s place in the world and the contradictions inherent in China’s rise. Growing insecurity and dissatisfaction have carved a void begging to be filled. While there is little evidence that anyone takes the values seriously—the local fervor for riddles and lanterns is just the typical response to any top-down directive —it may signal, for the cautiously optimistic, that the country is moving in the right direction, and thus tamp down any nascent dissent. The fact is, despite frequent internal criticism, most Chinese people want to believe that China is on the right path. Nothing is more comforting than hearing that China, too, has what everyone else has. By adopting language pleasant to Western ears, it’s clear that Xi meant this to be far more than a domestic propaganda campaign however.  Indeed, Xi, himself, alluded to the core socialist values in his first speech to the UN General Assembly last September, stressing that values such as freedom, justice, democracy and equality are “common...[to] all of mankind and the lofty goals of the United Nations” and that China would work hard to “renew [its] commitments to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter”. State-owned publications do not shy from proclaiming that the views of Chinese leaders on values are also “hailed by the international community,”and that “China always regards its contributions to the values shared by [mankind] as a criterion to assess its performance.” While there’s no doubt that such values should be interpreted in the Chinese context, this is still quite the rhetorical departure for a state in which cultural relativism has been a favorite trump card. The power of launching a widespread, in-your-face campaign is that these core values reach beyond keen China-watchers and diplomats. Xi’s values campaign is as much for the foreign tourist as it is for the Chinese layperson. For the average foreigner not well-versed in Chinese politics, or one accustomed to stories about China’s vengeful authoritarianism, core socialist values can foster a sense of commonality with their Chinese peers. Non-specialists and specialists alike, also want to believe that China on the right path—the same path as the West. Perhaps all of this comes from recognition of failure, or frustration at being misunderstood. In recent years, the Chinese leadership has encouraged the growth of think tanks and promoted Confucius Institutes, but like its megaphone diplomacy, these efforts have borne little fruit. Xi has realized that it’s useless to sell China in a language not understood by outsiders. Maybe the Chinese government has finally caught on that before it could project a palatable national image, one more in line with its self-proclaimed desire to be a responsible stakeholder, it must convince its people too. So, at the end of the day, can we sum up Xi’s campaign as simply another aspect of his soft power project—one that cleverly appropriates Western rhetoric? After all, China has long run away from terms that even hinted links with Western democracy. Any mention of “universal values” from the state media, even in a positive light, is accompanied by reminders to respect cultural diversity. Xi could very well go further in enhancing “justice” and “rule of law” without getting anywhere close to the intentions of the UN Charter. The recent foreign NGO law, marketed as a step toward stronger rule of law, is one cause for concern. In his outburst in Canada early last month, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made it clear that there was no easy reconciliation between Western and Chinese values, despite what his commander-in-chief espouses. A less cynical observer might say that this “core socialist values” campaign should not be so easily dismissed. Given China’s jealous protection of its image and its full awareness of the implications behind word choice, it’s unlikely that Xi would go out of his way to say things, much less repeat them, if he doesn’t mean them at all. After all, Xi has something to lose here. Core socialist values will no doubt become more entrenched in the public consciousness and raise expectations— and this can backfire to undermine the CCP’s original vernacular co-optation. For the activists and reform-minded, this language provides the tools to carve more spaces for incremental change. As for the average laypeople, they now have the language to engage more purposefully with Westerners and Western discourse, which, for better or for worse, could be a starting point for widespread grassroots contention. China wants to engage the world on its own terms, but the very contradictions inherent within its new core values suggest that there is malleability with its stance. The limitations to reform are real, as are the forces for change.  

At the end of March, I testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on the economic aspects of the “rebalance” to Asia.  I have testified before the commission several times, know a number of the commission members, and typically enjoy the experience. This time was no different. However, I was struck by the number of “gut check” questions, as one commissioner put it—questions where the answer appears clear, even obvious, but with a bit more pushing becomes less clear and less obvious. Here are some of the “gut check” questions that the commissioners asked that have made me take another look: Should we be concerned about the attempted acquisition of Starwood hotels by the Chinese insurance company Anbang, given the opacity of its funding and ties to the Chinese government? (Technically, of course this issue is moot since Anbang withdrew its offer, but the issues surrounding Chinese direct investment in the United States remain.) The reflexive answer is that we should not treat Chinese companies any differently than those of other countries. Business deals should proceed as long as these companies are acting according to U.S. law and—if required—pass a review of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). On deeper reflection, however, the answer may well be that Chinese state-owned companies—or even private companies with opaque sources of financing that likely include the Chinese government—may demand an additional layer of scrutiny.  When Chinese firms buy U.S. technology companies, for example, should the United States be thinking two or three steps ahead as to the potential security risks—even if the one-off purchase does not appear to pose a problem? Or are there political concerns that need to be considered? As one commissioner noted, with Dalian Wanda’s buyout of AMC theaters, will that movie chain ever show a move about Tibet? My takeaway is that the CFIUS review may well not be enough. The United States needs to be thinking in a more strategic, integrated fashion about Chinese investment in the United States and the acquisition of U.S. companies as well as what the ramifications might be for U.S. political and security interests. There are some indications that the Chinese government is trying to rein in Chinese overseas M&A for its own domestic economic purposes, and thus a potential investment lull could provide a good time to undertake a review of how we evaluate Chinese investment into the United States. Does the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) serve U.S. interests? My reflexive answer—and the general consensus in China/Asia think tank circles—is that the TPP is a no-brainer. Stronger environmental and labor standards, greater intellectual property rights protection, and a raft of tariff reductions all appear to benefit U.S. firms. In addition, for Asia scholars, there is the credibility issue: the TPP is the centerpiece of U.S. economic engagement in the region. Not ratifying the TPP is the equivalent of dealing a death blow to U.S. influence in the region, and, as President Obama stated, permitting China to write the rules of the road. Of course not every U.S. firm will be a winner—trade agreements are all about tradeoffs—but overall, the United States will benefit. In my gut, however, I wonder whether we have a complete enough picture of how great the wins and losses for U.S. companies will be. The studies of the TPP that I could find in preparing for my testimony were conflicting, not comprehensive, and in some cases outdated. And while credibility in the region is crucial, it should not override consideration of the greatest good for American firms and workers. My takeaway is that Congress should commission an independent report on TPP tradeoffs so that the next administration and Congress can make its assessment based on the greatest possible number of facts and least amount of supposition. What are Chinese intentions? This issue was actually raised first for the panel before mine that was convened to discuss security issues. The answer was that we can’t know what their intentions are; we need to deal with the facts on the ground. I think, however, that it is important to try to get at intentions. Take a look at Xi Jinping’s statements on any given issue from the South China Sea to China’s role as an economic norm-setter. They are full of intent. Indeed, there is very little mystery about Xi’s endgame. Dealing with outcomes or “facts on the ground” lends a sense of objectivity and distance, which analysts generally prize. However, we will never get ahead of the curve if we don’t risk considering what the Chinese leadership is attempting to accomplish overall. We will be caught in a never-ending tactical rather than strategic game. Better to risk being wrong about Chinese intentions than to avoid the issue. U.S. policy toward China is messy and appears likely only to get messier. Even with its economy slowing, China’s size and ambition make its decisions and actions a potential game changer. No one wants to have one set of rules for how we deal with China and another for how we manage relations with everyone else. And no one wants to be irrationally fearful of China. However, these are not good reasons not to take a step back and acknowledge that the U.S. system may well be inadequate to the challenge at hand and that managing the uncertainty that China presents may necessitate rewriting the rules for everyone. Getting that process started would be a worthwhile effort for the remaining months of the Obama administration. At least that is what my gut is telling me.