Politics, Power, and Preventive Action

Dan Alles is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit last month, leaders from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced that they will deploy four multinational battalions to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. This decision sends an important and reassuring message to the world at a time when some, like Donald Trump, are questioning the reliability and sustainability of the alliance altogether. Although Trump’s comments about burden-sharing have some merit, his judgements are misguided; weakening the current deterrence posture or abandoning the alliance would be disastrous for U.S. and global security. NATO is not only a collective deterrent against Russian aggression, but also a political and military organization that has adapted to meet twenty-first century challenges. Through these developments, NATO has become an indispensable part of U.S. security, and despite some limitations, it should not be abandoned. Although it was founded on the basis of collective defense, NATO broadened the scope of its missions over the past twenty-five years. Today, NATO is a leader in global crisis management and undertakes a wide variety of direct military operations to support this mission. These operations span the globe, from the alliance’s train and equip programs in Afghanistan, to its post-9/11 maritime surveillance programs in the Mediterranean Sea. This fall, NATO will also finalize plans to restart training and capacity building inside Iraq. NATO’s previous operation there, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, concluded in 2011, but the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State has pushed the alliance to return. NATO is able to take action to prevent conflicts in support of a United Nations mandate or at the invitation of a sovereign government. In accordance, NATO also maintains a peace-support presence of about 4,500 troops in Kosovo and continues to support the African Union in its peacekeeping and counter-piracy operations. NATO’s evolution since the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in an immensely integrated military alliance system with a global presence. As such, the benefits of NATO now transcend its direct military footprint and incorporate a variety of tactical advantages as well. These advantages include:           A ready-made multilateral coalition prepared to respond to crisis. A world without NATO would be one where, if the United States wanted to avoid acting unilaterally, it would have to construct a novel coalition for every conflict that arises. Not only would this take more time and cost more money, but it would also be less effective, as the alliance has already worked out its policies and procedures and shared its best practices.             Joint training and deterrence exercises. Conducting training exercises allows NATO to maintain a force readiness and deter potential antagonists. Moreover, joint exercises offer zero-consequence trial runs to test and validate new concepts in demanding crisis situations. This in turn improves the interoperability of both military and civilian organizations.             Consultation and sharing of assessments, military plans and intelligence. NATO is an effective vehicle for intelligence and information sharing among member states. Its mechanisms for intelligence sharing improves coherence among partners, including other international organizations like the United Nations and European Union.             Sharing of military resources and infrastructure. During the Gulf War, NATO did not take a direct role in combat operations, but cooperated to provide logistical support to member forces in region, including organizing transportation, landing rights, port use, air traffic control, and medical support. Similarly, though NATO is not involved in the current coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State, member states contribute resources and facilities to the fight. Turkey’s Incirlik air base, where coalition troops fly sortie missions over Syria and Iraq, is just one example. According to U.S. Air Force data, there was a thirty percent increase in bombs dropped after missions from Incirlik began in 2015.   The overwhelming evidence for NATO’s strategic importance to the United States demonstrates that Trump’s comments about NATO were misguided. Moreover, approaching the alliance with threats to withdraw does not increase U.S. leverage in negotiations. Instead, it merely downplays U.S. leadership and emboldens Russia. In light of Russian action in Georgia and Crimea, and the extension of the Eurasian Economic Union—a trading bloc comprising Russia and former Soviet satellites—the United States should maintain its leadership role in NATO and encourage members to meet spending goals. Today, experts believe a Russian invasion of the Baltic Republics would be successful in a mere sixty hours, leaving NATO with limited bloody options to respond. The agreements at the Warsaw Summit were steps to increasing NATO’s defense posture, but more could be done to ensure that its tactical strengths are matched with an equally strong foundation for deterrence.

The Wall Street Journal published an important story about the Obama administration’s decision in January to ship $400 million, which was first converted into Swiss and Dutch currencies, to Iran on board a cargo plane. The plane delivering the money had reportedly arrived at Tehran’s Mehrabad airport on the same date that four U.S. citizens were released by the government of Iran. This money was owed to Iran for over thirty-five years, dating back to U.S. weapon sales that the Shah’s government paid for, but had not yet been delivered before the revolution. Under President Jimmy Carter, Iran was the number one recipient of all global arms exports. For example, between 1976 and 1978, over $8 billion (in current dollars) worth of weapons were delivered to Iran each year. Thus, the $400 million provided in January 2016 was the first shipment of $1.7 billion (this includes interest) that Obama announced concurrently with the nuclear deal: “Iran will be returned its own funds, including appropriate interest, but much less than the amount Iran sought.” Immediately, charges of paying a ransom for the release of the U.S. citizens was leveled at the White House from opponents of the nuclear deal. Sen. Tom Cotton accused Obama of paying “a $1.7 billion ransom to the ayatollahs for U.S. hostages,” while Sen. Mark Kirk announced: “Paying ransom to kidnappers puts Americans even more at risk.” Presidential attempts to secure the release of U.S. citizens believed to be under Iranian control have a notorious history. President Ronald Reagan’s Iran arms-for-hostage scandal is poorly understood by many, and even among current U.S. government staffers and officials that I speak with. The shorthand historical memory is that, “Reagan gave weapons to Iran for hostages.” Actually, the initiative was partially an effort to counter purported growing Soviet influence within Iran, which a 1985 Special National Intelligence Estimate had warned of. One potential source of leverage that could be reestablished was weakening the total arms embargo that had been in place since 1980. Another side aspect of the arrangement was to raise money—in direct violation of the Bolan amendments—that would support the Contra rebels fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Still, as the masterful Office of Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters report led by Lawrence Walsh makes clear, President Reagan hoped to secure the release of U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon in exchange for U.S. weapons. The scandal stained the president’s reputation, after he first went before the American people and proclaimed “We did not—repeat—did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor will we,” but four months later admitted “what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages. This runs counter to my own beliefs.” The final outcome of the arms-for-hostages disaster was two U.S. citizens released (Reverend Benjamin Weir and Father Lawrence Jenco) and two new hostages taken (Frank Reed and Joseph Cicippio). In exchange for no net gain in released U.S. citizens, President Reagan authorized the delivery to Iran—from U.S.-supplied Israeli stockpiles—the following advanced weapons: Aug. 20, 1985: 96 TOW missiles Sep. 14, 1985: 408 TOW missiles Nov. 24, 1985: 18 HAWK missiles Feb. 18, 1986:  500 TOW missiles Feb. 27, 1986: 500 TOW missiles May 25, 1986: HAWK spare parts Aug. 3, 1986: HAWK spare parts Oct. 28, 1986: 500 TOW missiles