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In Africa, Major Power Rivalry Is Not the Whole Story
Any doubts about the bipartisan consensus in Washington around the need to compete with China in Africa were erased in the early months of 2021, when senior Biden administration appointees like U.S. Read More
Top Conflicts to Watch in 2021: Economic, Political, and Humanitarian Catastrophe in Venezuela
Paul J. Angelo is a fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
In this year’s Preventive Priorities Survey, experts ranked “accelerating economic collapse and political instability in Venezuela, leading to further violent unrest and increased refugee outflows” as one of the top conflict risks to watch in 2021. Policymakers from both sides of the aisle continue to view Venezuela as a U.S. foreign policy priority with humanitarian conditions in the Andean nation continuing to deteriorate against a backdrop of political conflict and public health crisis. By income, 96 percent of the Venezuelan population live in poverty. The World Food Program estimates that one in three Venezuelans is food insecure. With a homicide rate around 60 per 100,000 inhabitants, Venezuela is one of the most violent countries in the world. It is no wonder that Venezuela is the source of the largest refugee crisis in the modern history of the Western Hemisphere, with some 5 million Venezuelans fleeing their homeland in recent years.
Sitting atop the world’s largest oil reserves, Venezuela was once the richest country in South America. However, years of corruption, malfeasance, and cronyism by the Nicolás Maduro regime have decimated the country’s productive capacity and gutted social welfare programs. Since claiming victory in a May 2018 presidential election largely viewed as illegitimate, Maduro has cracked down on political dissent and consolidated control over the country’s judiciary and legislature. In December 2020, Maduro loyalists won 91 percent of seats in the country’s National Assembly, the last bastion of opposition power in the country. Most opposition parties pointed to the impossibility of a free and fair contest and boycotted the election, which led to a low turnout of just 31 percent.
Opposition lawmakers, led by Interim President Juan Guaidó, continue to insist on the legitimacy of their existing mandate, even as Maduro’s new legislature takes office in January 2021. However, Maduro has stepped up his harassment and intimidation of civil society groups. In the absence of parliamentary privileges, opposition leaders could also face increased repression, forcing them into hiding or exile. Likewise, longstanding rivalries within the opposition coalition could resurface; some party leaders have publicly questioned Guaidó’s leadership and the opposition’s strategy going forward.
The influx of migrants and refugees will continue to strain neighboring countries, which have struggled to accommodate so many Venezuelans during an unprecedented economic contraction and the COVID-19 pandemic. Transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking and unregulated gold mining, run rampant in Venezuela, corrupting state institutions and providing a critical source of financing to the heavily sanctioned regime. Additionally, the country has become an arena for U.S. adversaries like Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran to undermine democracy, regional stability, and U.S. interests through diplomatic, economic, and military support for Maduro.
The U.S. government has long called for free and fair elections in Venezuela, but the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including the threat of force, failed to unseat Maduro and restore democracy. The incoming Biden administration would do well to focus on attainable goals that ease the suffering of the Venezuelan people and leverage the United States’ network of partnerships to advocate for human rights and democracy in Venezuela through international organizations. Likewise, coordination with Europe on targeted sanctions, combined with incentives such as transitional justice guarantees, could increase pressure on regime officials to engage in dialogue to resolve the political impasse. Subnational elections are due to take place in 2021, affording oppositionists a renewed opportunity to secure free and fair conditions, including international electoral monitoring. Although addressing Venezuela’s economic freefall and political polarization will require massive international support for the country’s reconstruction, empowering the Venezuelan people to reclaim their democracy will be an essential first step in reversing the country’s meltdown.
Top Conflicts to Watch in 2021: What's Next for Syria
Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations.
It has been ten years since Syrians rose up in peaceful protest against Bashar al-Assad demanding political change. In that time, half a million people have died and roughly half the population has been displaced. The uprising turned into a civil war that became a regional proxy battle and a zone where great power competition continues to grind on.
Although in recent years, observers have come to believe that the Assad regime—with both Russian and Iranian backing—will prevail, victory for Damascus remains elusive. The Assad regime controls most of Syria’s territory, but significant regions in the North, Northwest, and Northeast remain beyond its control. In addition, Syria’s sovereignty is compromised. Aside from Russian and Iranian/Iranian proxy forces that support the regime, the United States and Turkey have forces on the ground in Syria and Israel routinely violates Syrian airspace in its low-level war against Iran and its allies. The Syrian Defense Forces—a Kurdish dominated group—continues to fight the Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates for control of Idlib. In this dynamic environment there are several scenarios for increased conflict, including between Turkey and the Kurds, Turkey and regime forces, Turkey and Russia, as well as conflict between the United States and Iranian-backed militias. There is also the risk of miscalculation and accident in the field that could lead to blows between American and Russian forces. And there is ever-present risk of a recrudescence of the Islamic State and other extremist groups. The likelihood of these conflicts materializing vary, of course, but they are all plausible.
The question of whether and to what extent the United States should be involved in Syria has vexed two administrations. The conflict’s complexities are also likely to take up time and resources of the new Biden administration. The United States cares about the humanitarian disaster in Syria, wants the end of Assad’s rule, seeks to blunt Iran’s efforts to reinforce its reach in the Levant, and counter Moscow’s growing influence in the region starting with Syria. Yet, American policymakers have neither the will nor the domestic political support to invest military and financial resources to meet Syria’s challenges. As a result, barring a direct escalation of fighting that targets Americans or a significant threat from extremist groups, the United States will likely remain in Syria with modest forces, continue to employ sanctions to deny the Assad regime financial relief or the benefits of reconstruction, and use both as a leverage for a potential political solution, though thus far this policy has not produced the desired results. The status quo may be the best the United States can do, however.
Top Conflicts to Watch in 2021: Increasing Violence in Afghanistan
Laurel Miller is director of the Asia program at the International Crisis Group and former acting special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Department of State.
Although the war in Afghanistan is already one of the world’s deadliest, the risk is high that it might intensify in 2021. A nascent, fragile peace process has not diminished the violence experienced by Afghans, and an uptick in targeted assassinations has sent shock waves through urban areas, even though a U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in February 2020 diminished the Taliban threat to U.S. personnel. That agreement produced the launch of peace talks among Afghans in September, after months of delay. It also committed the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to a total withdrawal of forces by May 2021, and the Taliban to preventing Afghan territory from being used by transnational terrorist groups to threaten the United States and its allies. Currently, the parties’ wait-and-see posture toward the incoming Biden administration—watching particularly for signals of commitment, or not, to the February deal—is slowing the talks. An Afghan political settlement by May is virtually impossible, and an increase in violence and the potential collapse of the peace process was identified as a top concern for U.S. policymakers in this year’s Preventive Priorities Survey.
There are two main scenarios for increased violence. First, if the United States withdraws all forces this year without a political settlement, the peace process would collapse and the scramble for power that would ensue would likely lead the country into a bloodier, multi-sided civil war. Second, if the United States blows past the May deadline without reaching a new timeline understanding with the Taliban—or decides to maintain an indefinite, even if small, military mission—then the Taliban would once again contest the U.S. presence and violence would likely rise. In either of these two scenarios, the disappointment of regional countries that are expecting the United States to leave and the Taliban to gain a share of legitimate power would probably manifest in increased support to the insurgent group. If the peace process plods along during 2021, then more or less a status quo level of violence is most likely; the Taliban probably will not agree to a ceasefire until they secure significant political benefits in exchange. The best scenario for violence reduction would be dramatic progress in the peace process, but this is the least likely scenario for 2021.
The Biden administration will probably prefer to further wind down American involvement in the war in Afghanistan, but will have difficult calculations to make. It will have to decide whether the remaining risk of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan justifies maintaining a troop presence that would be incompatible with any political settlement with the Taliban. And it will have to consider that keeping troops there would tag the administration with responsibility for perpetuating the U.S. role in the twenty-year conflict. Although the differential direct consequences for U.S. security posed by the choice between staying and leaving may be minimal, the administration will also have to weigh the political costs of the ugliness that would follow a withdrawal absent a political settlement—including a possible collapse of the Kabul government, new refugee flows, and roll-back of freedoms for women and others. Afghanistan is not a high-profile issue in the United States now, but might become one in these circumstances. The path of least resistance may be keeping even an underperforming peace process going as long as possible. This peace process still has some chance of producing the best possible outcome, but how long the process can be sustained beyond the May deadline is uncertain.
Top Conflicts to Watch in 2021: A North Korea Crisis
Scott A. Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
As we turn the calendar on 2020 and embark on 2021, the incoming Joe Biden administration faces no shortage of challenges. The priority areas identified by his transition team include overcoming the pandemic, reviving the economy, achieving racial justice, and addressing climate change. Russia, China, and Iran have also been singled out as issues to be addressed. However, the number one concern identified in CFR’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey of foreign policy experts about potential geopolitical risks to worry about in the coming year—namely, a renewed crisis on the Korean Peninsula—has received scant attention in comparison. This is surprising as the issue has hardly gone away—to the contrary, in fact. President Obama warned President-elect Trump in November 2016 that the most vexing international security threat he would face would emanate from North Korea. Two nuclear tests, myriad long-range missile tests, and three Trump-Kim summits later, the magnitude and likelihood of North Korea posing a catastrophic threat to U.S. national interests is greater than it was four years ago.
Despite President Trump’s assertions that he averted a war with North Korea by developing a close personal relationship with Kim Jong-un, Trump’s diplomacy appears to have only changed the tone of the relationship while failing to address the underlying problems posed by North Korea’s ability to launch a nuclear strike on the U.S. mainland.
It is not clear that Kim’s self-restraint on long-range missile testing will continue. At the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) Eighth Party Congress staged only days prior to the Biden administration’s inauguration, Kim characterized the United States as its “foremost principal enemy,” and criticized U.S. perceived “hostile policy” toward North Korea despite North Korea’s “good-will efforts.” Military parades staged in conjunction with the Eighth Party Congress and on the October 10, 2020, 75th anniversary of the WPK revealed that North Korea has strengthened its conventional forces and has developed but not yet tested several new types of missiles capable of delivering a nuclear strike on the United States. While the Trump administration has left the door open to diplomatic negotiations since a one-day meeting with North Korean officials in Stockholm in October 2019, North Korea has refused to come to the negotiating table.
Meanwhile, Kim’s 2018 summitry gambit and accompanying economic hopes have turned to distress in the face of ongoing sanctions, North Korea’s COVID quarantine, and flooding from a series of typhoons, putting even greater pressure on Kim to achieve an economic breakthrough. North Korea’s Eighth Party Congress addressed these and other economic challenges while pledging to continue its military development and promising to respond to “force with toughness” and “good faith in kind.” This was as close as Kim came during the eight-day Party Congress to providing a signal of intent to open negotiations with the Biden administration.
In addition, many analysts expect North Korea to revert to its traditional playbook by returning to nuclear and missile tests as means by which to test new leaders as Kim has previously done with Obama, Xi Jinping, Park Geun-hye, and Trump. North Korea’s purpose in pursuing provocations would be to push North Korea closer to the top of the Biden administration’s agenda by generating a crisis atmosphere and shaping the space and prospects for diplomatic negotiations. Anticipation of North Korean provocations is so high that analysts have either rushed to recommend that Biden extend an early olive branch to North Korea in an effort to forestall a crisis or speculated about how to capitalize on a crisis to induce North Korea to return to denuclearization negotiations.
Regardless of whether Kim Jong-un is motivated by domestic economic distress or the desire to redress long-held international grievances, North Korea’s insistence on presenting itself as an entrenched nuclear weapons state remains at odds with the longstanding U.S. policy and international security norms upheld by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But North Korea’s capabilities are also an undeniable reality and an international security threat that must be managed to avoid catastrophic results. The Biden administration will need to devise a set of early actions to reassure North Korea of its willingness to engage in negotiations, reduce the risk of North Korean miscalculation, and forestall likely attention-grabbing provocations by North Korea, regardless of whether they emanate from manifestations of Kim’s military strength or his economic weakness.
What to Worry About in 2021
With attention focused on a slew of pressing domestic crises the new Biden Administration will have to contend with, U.S. policymakers should not ignore the risks of serious international conflicts emerging. To help officials decide where to focus their conflict prevention efforts, the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) conducts an annual Preventive Priorities Survey (PPS) to anticipate and rank potential conflicts or crises that could erupt or escalate over the coming year.
For thirteen years, CPA has polled hundreds of American foreign policy experts in the Fall and asked them to evaluate rank thirty contingencies that could plausibly emerge in the next twelve months. The contingencies are ranked both in terms of their likelihood of occurring and their potential impact on U.S. interests. This year, there are several significant takeaways.
First, concerns over North Korea’s further development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles was the top-ranked contingency this year, with experts judging it to be both a high-likelihood and high-impact risk. The Biden transition team has said little about the threat that North Korea poses, but North Korean leader Kim Jong Un appears intent on challenging the new administration. Just last week, Kim touted recent advances in both the North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and called the United States his country’s “biggest enemy.”
Second, in what likely reflects heightened concern over the growing risk of military confrontation between the major powers, a severe crisis between the United States and China over Taiwan rose to a Tier I risk for the first time in 2021, and a military clash between China and India over their disputed borders was assessed a Tier II risk. Moreover, experts remain concerned about an armed confrontation in the South China Sea involving U.S. and Chinese forces, even though this was the only contingency assessed as low likelihood in this year’s survey.
Third, eight entirely new contingencies appear in this year’s survey, including intensifying conflict in Ethiopia, a confrontation between India and China, civil war in Lebanon, conflict between Greece and Turkey, interference and unrest in Belarus, the collapse of negotiations around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the breakdown of a democratic political transition in Sudan, and renewed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As in previous years, Africa and the Middle East remain the most-crisis prone regions for 2021.
Finally, two direct threats on the U.S. homeland remain Tier I concerns. A highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure was assessed as having an even chance of occurring as compared to previous surveys; in addition, following a broad trend, concerns over a mass-casualty terrorist attack against the United States or a treaty ally declined again: respondents only assessed this contingency as being moderately likely.
It is important to note that certain serious threats are excluded from this survey. CPA only included contingencies where U.S. military force could plausibly be employed. Therefore, crises that have the potential to harm U.S. interests but that are not inherently violent—including climate change, natural and man-made disasters, and economic or public health-related events—were not included. Given the nature of the exercise, the results of the PPS should also be interpreted as a snapshot assessment, as they reflect expert opinion of respondents at the time the survey was conducted. Recognizing this, CPA tracks ongoing conflicts with our Global Conflict Tracker and assesses possible flashpoints and U.S. policy responses with our Contingency Planning Memoranda.
