Conflict Prevention

In a new paper, Steven A. Cook, the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at CFR, discusses how great power competition is altering the prospects for managing conflicts in the Middle East, and how Washington should avoid the kind of strategic errors that have provided opportunities for other major powers, notably Russia and China, to undermine U.S. policy. These actors—and to a lesser extent India and the European Union—have sought greater influence in the region. While competition among major powers has not led to direct confrontation yet, powerful actors have still sought to establish, extend, and reinforce influence and prestige at each other's expense. Meanwhile, cooperation remains episodic and circumstantial. Although the United States remains an important—even the most important—external actor in the region, American leaders and the foreign policy community are debating whether Washington should be the primary provider of security in the region. This debate, coupled with actual American disengagement in certain places, has had three significant effects: regional powers have taken matters into their own hands, external actors have seized opportunities to exercise power, and major powers and their allies have either refused or failed to compel regional powers to resolve existing conflicts. Developments in places as far as Europe or the South China Sea could also sharpen competition or pave the way for greater cooperation. Given the unpredictability and uncertainty of events, however, one development is clear: the American moment of regional supremacy—when no state or combination of states could hope to challenge U.S. power and influence—is over. The Middle East is now up for grabs among a variety of regional powers and external actors, including the United States. This power vacuum has made the region less secure and competition has affected the trajectory of conflicts in the region. In this new paper—part of a larger series on managing global disorder—Cook takes a deep dive into how great power competition is affecting the prospects for regional peace. For all the challenges the United States faces in the Middle East, it remains the region's most important, powerful, and influential actor, so it is essential to understand how the trajectory of great power competition is shaping the potential for the United States to cooperate with other major powers and mitigate conflict.

Paul J. Angelo is a fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In this year’s Preventive Priorities Survey, experts ranked “accelerating economic collapse and political instability in Venezuela, leading to further violent unrest and increased refugee outflows” as one of the top conflict risks to watch in 2021. Policymakers from both sides of the aisle continue to view Venezuela as a U.S. foreign policy priority with humanitarian conditions in the Andean nation continuing to deteriorate against a backdrop of political conflict and public health crisis. By income, 96 percent of the Venezuelan population live in poverty. The World Food Program estimates that one in three Venezuelans is food insecure. With a homicide rate around 60 per 100,000 inhabitants, Venezuela is one of the most violent countries in the world. It is no wonder that Venezuela is the source of the largest refugee crisis in the modern history of the Western Hemisphere, with some 5 million Venezuelans fleeing their homeland in recent years. Sitting atop the world’s largest oil reserves, Venezuela was once the richest country in South America. However, years of corruption, malfeasance, and cronyism by the Nicolás Maduro regime have decimated the country’s productive capacity and gutted social welfare programs. Since claiming victory in a May 2018 presidential election largely viewed as illegitimate, Maduro has cracked down on political dissent and consolidated control over the country’s judiciary and legislature. In December 2020, Maduro loyalists won 91 percent of seats in the country’s National Assembly, the last bastion of opposition power in the country. Most opposition parties pointed to the impossibility of a free and fair contest and boycotted the election, which led to a low turnout of just 31 percent. Opposition lawmakers, led by Interim President Juan Guaidó, continue to insist on the legitimacy of their existing mandate, even as Maduro’s new legislature takes office in January 2021. However, Maduro has stepped up his harassment and intimidation of civil society groups. In the absence of parliamentary privileges, opposition leaders could also face increased repression, forcing them into hiding or exile. Likewise, longstanding rivalries within the opposition coalition could resurface; some party leaders have publicly questioned Guaidó’s leadership and the opposition’s strategy going forward. The influx of migrants and refugees will continue to strain neighboring countries, which have struggled to accommodate so many Venezuelans during an unprecedented economic contraction and the COVID-19 pandemic. Transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking and unregulated gold mining, run rampant in Venezuela, corrupting state institutions and providing a critical source of financing to the heavily sanctioned regime. Additionally, the country has become an arena for U.S. adversaries like Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran to undermine democracy, regional stability, and U.S. interests through diplomatic, economic, and military support for Maduro. The U.S. government has long called for free and fair elections in Venezuela, but the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including the threat of force, failed to unseat Maduro and restore democracy. The incoming Biden administration would do well to focus on attainable goals that ease the suffering of the Venezuelan people and leverage the United States’ network of partnerships to advocate for human rights and democracy in Venezuela through international organizations. Likewise, coordination with Europe on targeted sanctions, combined with incentives such as transitional justice guarantees, could increase pressure on regime officials to engage in dialogue to resolve the political impasse. Subnational elections are due to take place in 2021, affording oppositionists a renewed opportunity to secure free and fair conditions, including international electoral monitoring. Although addressing Venezuela’s economic freefall and political polarization will require massive international support for the country’s reconstruction, empowering the Venezuelan people to reclaim their democracy will be an essential first step in reversing the country’s meltdown.

Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations. It has been ten years since Syrians rose up in peaceful protest against Bashar al-Assad demanding political change. In that time, half a million people have died and roughly half the population has been displaced. The uprising turned into a civil war that became a regional proxy battle and a zone where great power competition continues to grind on. Although in recent years, observers have come to believe that the Assad regime—with both Russian and Iranian backing—will prevail, victory for Damascus remains elusive. The Assad regime controls most of Syria’s territory, but significant regions in the North, Northwest, and Northeast remain beyond its control. In addition, Syria’s sovereignty is compromised. Aside from Russian and Iranian/Iranian proxy forces that support the regime, the United States and Turkey have forces on the ground in Syria and Israel routinely violates Syrian airspace in its low-level war against Iran and its allies. The Syrian Defense Forces—a Kurdish dominated group—continues to fight the Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates for control of Idlib. In this dynamic environment there are several scenarios for increased conflict, including between Turkey and the Kurds, Turkey and regime forces, Turkey and Russia, as well as conflict between the United States and Iranian-backed militias. There is also the risk of miscalculation and accident in the field that could lead to blows between American and Russian forces. And there is ever-present risk of a recrudescence of the Islamic State and other extremist groups. The likelihood of these conflicts materializing vary, of course, but they are all plausible. The question of whether and to what extent the United States should be involved in Syria has vexed two administrations. The conflict’s complexities are also likely to take up time and resources of the new Biden administration. The United States cares about the humanitarian disaster in Syria, wants the end of Assad’s rule, seeks to blunt Iran’s efforts to reinforce its reach in the Levant, and counter Moscow’s growing influence in the region starting with Syria. Yet, American policymakers have neither the will nor the domestic political support to invest military and financial resources to meet Syria’s challenges. As a result, barring a direct escalation of fighting that targets Americans or a significant threat from extremist groups, the United States will likely remain in Syria with modest forces, continue to employ sanctions to deny the Assad regime financial relief or the benefits of reconstruction, and use both as a leverage for a potential political solution, though thus far this policy has not produced the desired results. The status quo may be the best the United States can do, however.

Laurel Miller is director of the Asia program at the International Crisis Group and former acting special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Department of State.  Although the war in Afghanistan is already one of the world’s deadliest, the risk is high that it might intensify in 2021. A nascent, fragile peace process has not diminished the violence experienced by Afghans, and an uptick in targeted assassinations has sent shock waves through urban areas, even though a U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in February 2020 diminished the Taliban threat to U.S. personnel. That agreement produced the launch of peace talks among Afghans in September, after months of delay. It also committed the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to a total withdrawal of forces by May 2021, and the Taliban to preventing Afghan territory from being used by transnational terrorist groups to threaten the United States and its allies. Currently, the parties’ wait-and-see posture toward the incoming Biden administration—watching particularly for signals of commitment, or not, to the February deal—is slowing the talks. An Afghan political settlement by May is virtually impossible, and an increase in violence and the potential collapse of the peace process was identified as a top concern for U.S. policymakers in this year’s Preventive Priorities Survey. There are two main scenarios for increased violence. First, if the United States withdraws all forces this year without a political settlement, the peace process would collapse and the scramble for power that would ensue would likely lead the country into a bloodier, multi-sided civil war. Second, if the United States blows past the May deadline without reaching a new timeline understanding with the Taliban—or decides to maintain an indefinite, even if small, military mission—then the Taliban would once again contest the U.S. presence and violence would likely rise. In either of these two scenarios, the disappointment of regional countries that are expecting the United States to leave and the Taliban to gain a share of legitimate power would probably manifest in increased support to the insurgent group. If the peace process plods along during 2021, then more or less a status quo level of violence is most likely; the Taliban probably will not agree to a ceasefire until they secure significant political benefits in exchange. The best scenario for violence reduction would be dramatic progress in the peace process, but this is the least likely scenario for 2021. The Biden administration will probably prefer to further wind down American involvement in the war in Afghanistan, but will have difficult calculations to make. It will have to decide whether the remaining risk of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan justifies maintaining a troop presence that would be incompatible with any political settlement with the Taliban. And it will have to consider that keeping troops there would tag the administration with responsibility for perpetuating the U.S. role in the twenty-year conflict. Although the differential direct consequences for U.S. security posed by the choice between staying and leaving may be minimal, the administration will also have to weigh the political costs of the ugliness that would follow a withdrawal absent a political settlement—including a possible collapse of the Kabul government, new refugee flows, and roll-back of freedoms for women and others. Afghanistan is not a high-profile issue in the United States now, but might become one in these circumstances. The path of least resistance may be keeping even an underperforming peace process going as long as possible. This peace process still has some chance of producing the best possible outcome, but how long the process can be sustained beyond the May deadline is uncertain.

Scott A. Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. As we turn the calendar on 2020 and embark on 2021, the incoming Joe Biden administration faces no shortage of challenges. The priority areas identified by his transition team include overcoming the pandemic, reviving the economy, achieving racial justice, and addressing climate change. Russia, China, and Iran have also been singled out as issues to be addressed. However, the number one concern identified in CFR’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey of foreign policy experts about potential geopolitical risks to worry about in the coming year—namely, a renewed crisis on the Korean Peninsula—has received scant attention in comparison. This is surprising as the issue has hardly gone away—to the contrary, in fact. President Obama warned President-elect Trump in November 2016 that the most vexing international security threat he would face would emanate from North Korea. Two nuclear tests, myriad long-range missile tests, and three Trump-Kim summits later, the magnitude and likelihood of North Korea posing a catastrophic threat to U.S. national interests is greater than it was four years ago. Despite President Trump’s assertions that he averted a war with North Korea by developing a close personal relationship with Kim Jong-un, Trump’s diplomacy appears to have only changed the tone of the relationship while failing to address the underlying problems posed by North Korea’s ability to launch a nuclear strike on the U.S. mainland. It is not clear that Kim’s self-restraint on long-range missile testing will continue. At the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) Eighth Party Congress staged only days prior to the Biden administration’s inauguration, Kim characterized the United States as its “foremost principal enemy,” and criticized U.S. perceived “hostile policy” toward North Korea despite North Korea’s “good-will efforts.” Military parades staged in conjunction with the Eighth Party Congress and on the October 10, 2020, 75th anniversary of the WPK revealed that North Korea has strengthened its conventional forces and has developed but not yet tested several new types of missiles capable of delivering a nuclear strike on the United States. While the Trump administration has left the door open to diplomatic negotiations since a one-day meeting with North Korean officials in Stockholm in October 2019, North Korea has refused to come to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, Kim’s 2018 summitry gambit and accompanying economic hopes have turned to distress in the face of ongoing sanctions, North Korea’s COVID quarantine, and flooding from a series of typhoons, putting even greater pressure on Kim to achieve an economic breakthrough. North Korea’s Eighth Party Congress addressed these and other economic challenges while pledging to continue its military development and promising to respond to “force with toughness” and “good faith in kind.” This was as close as Kim came during the eight-day Party Congress to providing a signal of intent to open negotiations with the Biden administration.  In addition, many analysts expect North Korea to revert to its traditional playbook by returning to nuclear and missile tests as means by which to test new leaders as Kim has previously done with Obama, Xi Jinping, Park Geun-hye, and Trump. North Korea’s purpose in pursuing provocations would be to push North Korea closer to the top of the Biden administration’s agenda by generating a crisis atmosphere and shaping the space and prospects for diplomatic negotiations. Anticipation of North Korean provocations is so high that analysts have either rushed to recommend that Biden extend an early olive branch to North Korea in an effort to forestall a crisis or speculated about how to capitalize on a crisis to induce North Korea to return to denuclearization negotiations. Regardless of whether Kim Jong-un is motivated by domestic economic distress or the desire to redress long-held international grievances, North Korea’s insistence on presenting itself as an entrenched nuclear weapons state remains at odds with the longstanding U.S. policy and international security norms upheld by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But North Korea’s capabilities are also an undeniable reality and an international security threat that must be managed to avoid catastrophic results. The Biden administration will need to devise a set of early actions to reassure North Korea of its willingness to engage in negotiations, reduce the risk of North Korean miscalculation, and forestall likely attention-grabbing provocations by North Korea, regardless of whether they emanate from manifestations of Kim’s military strength or his economic weakness.

With attention focused on a slew of pressing domestic crises the new Biden Administration will have to contend with, U.S. policymakers should not ignore the risks of serious international conflicts emerging. To help officials decide where to focus their conflict prevention efforts, the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) conducts an annual Preventive Priorities Survey (PPS) to anticipate and rank potential conflicts or crises that could erupt or escalate over the coming year. For thirteen years, CPA has polled hundreds of American foreign policy experts in the Fall and asked them to evaluate rank thirty contingencies that could plausibly emerge in the next twelve months. The contingencies are ranked both in terms of their likelihood of occurring and their potential impact on U.S. interests. This year, there are several significant takeaways. First, concerns over North Korea’s further development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles was the top-ranked contingency this year, with experts judging it to be both a high-likelihood and high-impact risk. The Biden transition team has said little about the threat that North Korea poses, but North Korean leader Kim Jong Un appears intent on challenging the new administration. Just last week, Kim touted recent advances in both the North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and called the United States his country’s “biggest enemy.” Second, in what likely reflects heightened concern over the growing risk of military confrontation between the major powers, a severe crisis between the United States and China over Taiwan rose to a Tier I risk for the first time in 2021, and a military clash between China and India over their disputed borders was assessed a Tier II risk. Moreover, experts remain concerned about an armed confrontation in the South China Sea involving U.S. and Chinese forces, even though this was the only contingency assessed as low likelihood in this year’s survey. Third, eight entirely new contingencies appear in this year’s survey, including intensifying conflict in Ethiopia, a confrontation between India and China, civil war in Lebanon, conflict between Greece and Turkey, interference and unrest in Belarus, the collapse of negotiations around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the breakdown of a democratic political transition in Sudan, and renewed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As in previous years, Africa and the Middle East remain the most-crisis prone regions for 2021. Finally, two direct threats on the U.S. homeland remain Tier I concerns. A highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure was assessed as having an even chance of occurring as compared to previous surveys; in addition, following a broad trend, concerns over a mass-casualty terrorist attack against the United States or a treaty ally declined again: respondents only assessed this contingency as being moderately likely. It is important to note that certain serious threats are excluded from this survey. CPA only included contingencies where U.S. military force could plausibly be employed. Therefore, crises that have the potential to harm U.S. interests but that are not inherently violent—including climate change, natural and man-made disasters, and economic or public health-related events—were not included. Given the nature of the exercise, the results of the PPS should also be interpreted as a snapshot assessment, as they reflect expert opinion of respondents at the time the survey was conducted. Recognizing this, CPA tracks ongoing conflicts with our Global Conflict Tracker and assesses possible flashpoints and U.S. policy responses with our Contingency Planning Memoranda.

Nkasi Wodu is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. In January 2006, a fledgling group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta People (MEND) kidnapped a group of oil workers, setting in motion a series of high-profile abductions of oil workers and attacks on oil facilities. Nigeria’s oil revenues fell, fomenting instability in the Niger Delta region. Militant groups under the platform of MEND unleashed coordinated attacks on Nigeria’s oil and gas infrastructure from 2006 to 2009. The pace of attacks fell after President Umaru Yar’Adua established an Amnesty Program that ostensibly included disarmament of militants, job training programs for ex-militants, and a system of payoffs that especially benefitted their leaders. When they were active, the Niger Delta militants were often enmeshed deep in the creeks of the region, in makeshift camps cautiously hidden from view to protect against possible aerial bombardment and attacks by the Nigerian military. From those hideouts, militants orchestrated attacks on oil facilities and kidnapped workers. In response, the Nigerian military chased them all over the creeks of the Delta—sometimes inflicting casualties, at others outwitted by a ragtag group with little formal training in warfare. According to a UN Development Program report, the difficult topography in the region “encourages people to gather in small communities—of the estimated 13,329 settlements in the region, 94 percent have populations of less than five thousand,” though the regional population is estimated around thirty million in total. In the Delta’s small settlements, “infrastructure and social services are generally deplorable.” The report highlights the paradox of an oil-rich region mired in poverty: “ordinarily, the Niger Delta should be a gigantic economic reservoir of national and international importance,” due to the scale of its resource wealth. However, “in reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.” This reality animates the various armed groups that have emerged in the region. MEND, the Niger Delta Avengers, and the Niger Delta Green Justice Mandate have all insisted that the federal government address issues of poverty, neglect, and environmental degradation. And because of the failure of successive governments to address these issues, armed militants remain active. These groups evade the military as they traverse the creeks and tributaries of the region to bomb oil facilities or abduct oil workers. In 2016 alone there were more than twenty attacks carried out on oil facilities in the region. Sometimes, these attacks are carried out with the knowledge and tacit support of local people. In October 2020, a group known as the Reformed Niger Delta Avengers issued a warning to the Nigerian government, threatening to resume attacks if their eleven demands are not met by the new year. The relationship between armed groups and the indigenous populations of the region is complex. Militants clearly employ techniques to attract local people and then lock them into a network of incentives. These range from persuasion to coercion, and are designed to control, corral, manipulate, and mobilize populations. Armed militants in the Niger Delta continually seek to legitimize their actions in the eyes of the local population. Residents of the region—particularly in the coastal communities where militant activities are rife—experience neglect, deprivation, and a lack of infrastructure. School buildings and health centers, already decrepit, are often times not operational because teachers and doctors do not want to travel to work. Abject poverty is widespread, with a teeming youth population that is either out of school, unemployed, or both. Delta residents feel a great sense of frustration at the almost total abandonment by successive federal and state governments, which receive huge sums from the oil drilled in the residents’ backyard. Armed groups tap into these frustrations frequently by projecting themselves as freedom fighters, supposedly risking life and limb to agitate the government for a better life in the Delta. People see the agitations of the armed groups as an expression of their internal frustrations and yearnings to hold federal and local governments to account for failing to fulfill their responsibilities. Of course, sometimes militants use fear to keep the people submissive. Yet, armed groups have also taken up the role of philanthropists, providing welfare to a people weighed down continuously by the burden of living in a paradox. Militant leaders have been known to utilize proceeds from oil bunkering activities to provide scholarships to students, build health centers and schools, and resolve disputes in their communities. By doing this, they seek legitimacy from the people, who are then willing to overlook—even excuse—their criminal enterprises. The federal government’s response to the issue of militancy has always been to deploy more soldiers to the region to restore calm. These deployments often result in heightened insecurity in the region. Human rights violations occur frequently; communities have been raided and in some cases bombed. And herein lies the problem: what is usually meant to be an operation to restore order takes the form of an occupation or invasion by a force that the people consider alien to them. Military activities erode further the trust deficit between the state and the people. To address sustainably the issue of militancy in the region, the government should do two things. It should first seek to delegitimize armed groups by building trust with the people. It can do so by asserting its authority—not through military might, but by providing basic services, such as education and proper health facilities. For many Niger Delta communities, the most visible signs of development are infrastructure built by international oil companies or former militant generals, while many of the waterways are dotted with military assets of the Joint Task Force. A running joke in the region goes that while development remains elusive, the ballot box has no problem getting to Delta communities on election days. The federal government should also exercise good faith by committing to its obligations under the Strategic Implementation Work Plan, established in 2017 in response to militant agitations in the region, as well as the Action Plan enacted by the Ministry of the Niger Delta. Prioritizing the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill is another necessary step. When Niger Delta residents see more development and fewer bullets from the military, agitations of armed groups in the region will cease.

The United States and its partners in the Americas have made little progress on ending the dire political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Only with the cooperation of crucial partners in the European Union can the U.S. government hope to reach a resolution in the stricken South American nation.

For peace to take hold in Afghanistan, formidable challenges will need to be overcome during the talks.

The Center for Preventive Action has compiled an accessible overview of the Afghan peace negotiations, including the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the U.S.-Afghan government joint declaration, and the ongoing intra-Afghan process.