Energy and Environment

Forests and Land Management

  • Brazil
    A Tale of Two Amazons
    A comparison of two Amazons, one corporate and one natural, underscores the vast discrepancy between the health of the economy and the vitality of the environment. 
  • South Africa
    Despite Land Reform, South Africa Is not Becoming Zimbabwe or Venezuela 
    On August 6, the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board compared South Africa’s Ramaphosa government to the dictatorships in Venezuela and Zimbabwe and their seizure of private property. The focus of the editorial board's ire is proposals within the governing African National Congress (ANC) for constitutional changes that allegedly would facilitate the confiscation of land without compensation. This is an overstatement. The Ramaphosa government is not going down the Zimbabwe or Venezuelan path. More credibly, however, the Journal also attacks the oft-cited claim of those who support expropriation that blacks own a miniscule proportion of land in South Africa.  The ANC's proposed legislation would clarify the constitutional provisions that already provide for the government to take ownership of land, but not expand them. Ramaphosa and the ANC acknowledge that the constitution’s property clause already “enables the state to effect expropriation of land with just and equitable compensation and also expropriation without compensation in the public interest.” State President Cyril Ramaphosa had opposed a constitutional amendment as unnecessary. It is likely that the ANC has adopted the proposal for a constitutional amendment that will do little or nothing to outflank the left opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) on the land question in the run-up to the 2019 national elections.  The EFF has become the third largest party in parliament largely because of its advocacy of “expropriation without compensation” of white wealth in general, farmland and mines specifically. Even so, it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the EFF because of the media attention it gets; it won only 6.35 percent of the total vote in the 2014 elections and 8.19 percent in 2016. This should also be seen as the context for the ANC’s statement that it has identified “139 farms” to be test cases for expropriation without compensation. But, such “test cases” would take years to work their way through the courts. Unlike Venezuela or Zimbabwe, South Africa is a constitutional democracy conducted according to the rule of law with a strong judiciary, civil society, and free press. Hence, Ramaphosa appears to be looking for other ways to increase black ownership of land. Up to now, ANC governments have allotted a miniscule percentage of the budget to land reform, reflecting the traditional urban base of the party and the reality of very rapid urbanization of the country. (The ANC’s base became predominately rural only during the Zuma administration.)  How much of South Africa’s surface is owned by which race is a largely meaningless question. Under apartheid, government-owned land was seen as “white-owned” Now, the government is non-racial. A significant percentage of South Africa’s land is held by tribal trusts, not by individuals. In effect, it is under the control of traditional tribal chiefs. As in the United States, big, commercial farms are increasingly owned by corporations rather than by individuals. In fact, the number of white farmers in South Africa is shrinking, even as the white population has grown by 6.8 percent since the 2001 census. The white percentage of South Africa’s total population continues to decline, largely because of a lower birthrate compared to other racial groups and migration from other African countries. The Journal cites the highly credible South Africa Institute of Race Relations’ (SAIIR) estimate that blacks “control” 30–50 percent of the land, and also correctly notes that where Africans were compensated for the loss of their land under apartheid, the overwhelming majority chose cash rather than land. If land reform would appear to be largely a red herring, why does it resonate among blacks? Part of the reason is the continued under performance of the South African economy and its slow recovery from the worldwide recession that began in 2008. Slow recovery has been exacerbated by the bad economic policies and the corruption, known as “state capture,” of the 2009–2018 Zuma administration. But, perhaps the most fundamental reason for the focus on “expropriation without compensation” is the intractable reality of black poverty. The social and economic realities for the black majority in South Africa have changed little since apartheid, while the gulf between white wealth and that of other racial groups has probably increased. The causes of black poverty range from the ongoing consequences of hundreds of years of exclusion of black Africans from much of the economy to the persistent failure of primary and secondary education for blacks since the end of apartheid. There are many other factors, including the fact that South Africa has eleven legal languages, and English—the language of the international economy—is the first language of less than 10 percent of the population. But, “expropriation without compensation” presents itself as a solution to poverty. That is a more attractive alternative explanation for poverty that more abstract discussions around economic policy or the shortcomings of the educational system.   
  • South Africa
    Ramaphosa Confronts Land Reform in South Africa
    The predominance of white ownership of land [PDF] is taken by many—perhaps most—South Africans as emblematic of the persistence of apartheid injustice. Hence, there have long been calls for the expropriation of white-owned agricultural land without compensation. That was a central tenant of the Pan-African Congress, a liberation-movement rival of the now-governing African National Congress, and of the Economic Freedom Fighters, at present the third largest party in parliament. (It has 25 seats compared to 89 for the Democratic Alliance and 249 for the ANC.) At its December 2017 party convention, the ANC also supported expropriation without compensation and on February 27, 2018, parliament overwhelmingly voted to begin a process that would amend the constitution to allow for expropriation of without compensation. The persistent poverty of much of its black majority is the greatest challenge to South Africa’s democratic government. Inequality of wealth largely follows racial lines. In 2015, more than 55 percent of South Africans were poor. According to Statistics South Africa, less than 1 percent of the total white population was poor, while 63 percent of black people, 37 percent of coloured people, and 7 percent of Indian/Asian people were poor. The nine percent of South Africa’s population that is white holds the lion’s share of the country’s wealth. Most blacks see their poverty as the direct consequence of apartheid. While it is true that since the transition to non-racial democracy the small black middle class has grown and a few oligarchs have emerged, wealth inequality among blacks is now much greater than that between whites and blacks. Many may be asking whether South Africa is going down the road of Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe seized white-owned agricultural land and helped destroy the economy. The short answer is no. For a start, South Africa is a constitutional democracy, not a parliamentary democracy, which means that the constitution limits what parliament can do. More to the point, it specifically guarantees the right to private property, meaning that expropriation without compensation would be immediately challenged in the courts. Therefore, the constitution must be amended. This vote has begun that process, but it is difficult and time-consuming.  Cyril Ramaphosa, state president and leader of the governing ANC, publicly supports expropriation without compensation, but also stresses that commercial agriculture and the country’s food security must be protected. A businessman and an oligarch, he is also committed to growing the economy to address poverty; that requires the confidence of foreign and domestic investors that their property rights will be respected. Therefore, white-owned farms, which dominate commercial agriculture, will likely be protected in the interest of the economy. South Africa is now about 60 percent urban, and urbanization is proceeding rapidly. Further complicating forced expropriation is the fact that African small-scale farming is not popular. Of those South Africans compensated for apartheid-era expropriation of their land, nearly all of them chose financial compensation rather than the return of their land. Of the land that has already been redistributed by the state, a credible estimate is that 70 percent of it is no longer in production. Nevertheless, land reform is an emotional and symbolic issue, especially in rural areas, and it is easily exploited as an issue by populist politicians. Where the practical need for land reform is most pressing is in urban and suburban areas, where there is substantial pressure from people leaving rural areas to look for work. Hence the emergence or expansion of informal settlements, mostly on government-owned land. State-owned land and tribal trust lands provide a possible venue for land redistribution without an impact on investor confidence or agricultural production. By and large, however, tribal chiefs would not like that approach because their control of tribal lands is basic to their local power. These chiefs were an important political constituency of former president Jacob Zuma, whom Ramaphosa has driven from office. This could spell an end to vetoes on land redistribution by tribal chiefs.
  • Brazil
    Teaching Notes: Deforestation in the Amazon
    The Amazon rainforest absorbs more greenhouse gases than any other tropical forest. But in Brazil, deforestation has claimed nearly a fifth of its tree cover, which threatens biodiversity and contributes to climate change.
  • Brazil
    Can Deforestation be Stopped?
    Why has Brazil slashed deforestation over the last decade while Indonesian deforestation has accelerated? The two countries lead the world in deforestation, which, after energy use, is the top source of greenhouse gas emissions. In the last week, each country has released an emissions-cutting plan in anticipation of the Paris climate summit that relies heavily on avoiding deforestation. Figuring out why Brazil has succeeded while Indonesia has lagged can provide insight into how both countries can do more. Earlier this year I gathered a multidisciplinary group to explore the Brazilian experience and extract lessons for climate policy. Some of the highlights are summarized in a short report that we’ve just released. We looked at a wide range of issues, many of which are discussed in the report, but I was particularly intrigued by our discussion of why Brazil and Indonesia turned out so differently from each other. The most obvious reason is that Brazil had an earlier start. Its government has been focused on reducing deforestation for over a decade; the Indonesian government hasn’t started looking at the issue seriously until more recently. This is actually good news, since it’s something that time should overcome. Governance and rule of law also stood out as big factors. Both countries have fairly decentralized governance – a feature that should make controlling deforestation difficult since decisions from the center don’t always translate into action. But Indonesian governance is considerably less centralized, which puts Indonesia at a disadvantage. Similarly, since avoiding deforestation requires effectively enforcing laws, corruption is a big barrier to success. Brazil obviously has its fair share of corruption problems, but Indonesia is arguably worse. Both of these factors make avoiding deforestation more difficult in Indonesia. But there’s a bright side: neither needs to be permanent. Governance structures change over time; countries also reduce corruption and improve the rule of law. None of this is easy, of course, and it’s unlikely to happen just to facilitate avoided deforestation, but it at least offers some promise. The last factor that came out in our discussion, though, augurs much more poorly for Indonesian prospects. Amazonian timber has typically been cleared to create cropland or pastureland, or, more simply, to establish ownership of a given tract of land. The wood itself is typically mostly worthless. In contrast, in Indonesia, the trees that are cut down are usually highly valuable. That means that the economic incentive for deforestation is much stronger in Indonesia – which, in turn, means that policy needs to lean much harder against deforestation in order to succeed. This factor suggests that replicating the Brazilian experience in Indonesia will be more difficult than many would hope. The full report on the workshop dives into a bunch of other issues – including the prospects for private sector led efforts to reduce deforestation, new avenues that public policy might pursue to keep trees standing, and the possibility that the decline in Brazilian deforestation might reverse. Download it here.
  • Climate Change
    Reducing Deforestation to Fight Climate Change
    Overview Deforestation is a major man-made source of greenhouse gas emissions, and is especially significant in countries with large tropical forests, including Brazil and Indonesia as well as countries in Central Africa, like the Democratic Republic of Congo. Forests naturally act as a storage unit, or "sink," for carbon emissions into the atmosphere, absorbing about one-third of the carbon dioxide emitted by cars, power plants, and factories every year. But forests, when cut down, are also a source of emissions as they release the carbon stored in their leaves, trunks, and roots into the atmosphere. In recent years, many policymakers have come to see reductions in deforestation (or "avoided deforestation") as a potentially low-cost way to curb greenhouse gas emissions. To achieve these reductions, they have pursued a range of approaches, from tougher local and national legislation prohibiting the destruction of forests to financial incentives for protecting them. Yet there is widespread agreement among analysts that the full hoped-for potential of avoided deforestation has not been realized. The Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) hosted a workshop designed to draw lessons from Brazil's recent success at limiting deforestation, understand why countries such as Indonesia have so far struggled, and identify ways to further reduce deforestation. The workshop, involving roughly two dozen participants including corporate decision-makers, economists, scientists, nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, investors, and current and former policymakers, set out to unpack the roles played by government policy, civil society pressure, technology, and private sector initiatives in countering deforestation with a view to understanding how best to limit it in the future. This report, which you can download here, summarizes the discussion's highlights. The report reflects the views of workshop participants alone; CFR takes no position on policy issues. Framing Questions for the Workshop Deforestation in Climate Change Policy How significant a contributor to climate change is deforestation? How significant will it be in the future? How much might avoided deforestation be reasonably expected to contribute to climate change mitigation? What are recent and expected trends in Amazonian deforestation? What are the economic and political factors contributing to deforestation in the Amazon? How is Brazil engaging in international climate diplomacy with respect to deforestation?                            Government-Driven Efforts to Reduce Deforestation How much of the avoided deforestation "opportunity" is likely to be exploited through government driven initiatives, whether they involve one or more country (bilateral or multilateral) or are purely domestic? What is the state of public sector support for international initiatives to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+)? Through carbon markets? Through direct payments from governments? Could the inclusion of deforestation goals, or other related elements, in a Paris agreement encourage additional and effective support from donor countries? Are there other opportunities for international political leverage on avoided deforestation that are not primarily centered on paying for avoided deforestation? International Private Sector Initiatives to Curb Deforestation How have private sector-led moratoria on deforestation functioned in Brazil? How significant a factor have they been in influencing deforestation? What concurrent factors (e.g., passage or enforcement of deforestation laws, public and consumer attention, availability of finance) have contributed to the efficacy of the voluntary initiatives? What lessons could other governments, sectors, or companies learn from the Brazilian experience, and are there ways to encourage such learning? Are there steps short of regulation that can governments (whether in Brazil or elsewhere) could take to encourage additional private sector action and make it enduring? Charts From This Report  
  • Fossil Fuels
    The Shale Boom Won’t Be Repeated on Federal Lands
    A visit to Yellowstone National Park last week has me thinking about federal lands. In the fight over whether the U.S. oil and gas boom is happening because of or despite President Obama’s policies, perhaps the most commonly heard fact is this: oil production is surging on non-federal lands but is down on lands controlled by Washington. This observation, many claim, shows that oil and gas production is up despite U.S. policy to thwart it – and a policy reversal would send oil and gas output far higher. An intriguing little study published earlier this week by the Center for Western Priorities pokes some enlightening holes in that argument. The study authors observe that recent gains in U.S. oil and gas production have been driven primarily by production from shale plays. Then they ask a simple question: How much of the U.S. shale oil and gas resource is located on federal lands? The answer, they find, is less than 10 percent – a surprising figure given that about 30 percent of U.S. land is federally controlled. The upshot is that opening more federal land for shale development wouldn’t have huge consequences. [UPDATE: Michael Wara makes an important observation in the comments: many shale resources are controlled by BLM even if the lands above them aren’t. That makes federal decisions critical in some cases.] One can quibble around the edges with the study: it seems to mis-classify some plays (it divides them into oil, gas, and mixed, not always correctly), and it focuses on surface area covered by various plays rather than on the volume of resource underneath. But the first problem has no impact on the aggregate results. And the second is just as likely to cause the authors to overestimate the fraction of shale opportunities that are on federal lands is it is to lead them to underestimate it. A look at this map, which appears to have informed the new study, helps explain what’s going on. The vast bulk of federal land is located west of the Rockies, but the great majority of the U.S. shale resource is located east of the Continental Divide. Even in California, where federal lands cover a large part of the state, they don’t overlap much with the shale resource; that remains true even if you look at more expansive definitions of that resource than the new study uses. This isn’t to say that there aren’t big oil and gas production opportunities on federal lands. Shale isn’t the only game in town: there are large conventional and offshore resources on federally controlled tracts, and production from them could increase substantially with policy changes, though with attendant costs (more on that in another post). But this ought to be separated from the question of whether the shale boom would be a lot bigger with more access to federal lands. It probably wouldn’t be.
  • Fossil Fuels
    The Odd Politics of Drilling on Public Lands
    I’m in Ohio this week talking to people about the Utica shale boom. I’ll have more to say later, but right now, I want to share an interesting bit of one conversation I had yesterday. I was talking to a dairy farmer who is adamant that his community should not be allowed to stop him from leasing his land to gas drillers. He treated me to an impassioned defense of private property rights, and warned against infringing on peoples’ freedom to contract. But then he pivoted from what had seemed like a pure pro-drilling stance. Ohio has started to lease public lands to drillers, and that’s made him furious. Part of this was a simple desire for conservation. But the bigger concern he had was that more drilling on public lands would drive down the price of natural gas. That, of course, would hurt the value of his mineral rights. It’s an interesting angle that I hadn’t thought about before. When it comes to oil, the United States remains a big importer, and thus benefits as a whole when more U.S. oil production lowers world prices. That’s true even if many U.S. producers lose out. But that isn’t necessarily true for gas, where the United States is on the fence between being self-sufficient and being a small exporter. Producing more from public lands will lower prices and therefore transfer wealth from private producers to private consumers. I’m not quite sure how it would shake out on net -- I suspect it depends on some finer details. Regardless, though, this could mix up the politics of natural gas production in this country. Broad participation in natural gas production by private property owners could create a peculiar new constituency that’s pro-gas but against drilling on public lands. It’s something worth watching out for.
  • Technology and Innovation
    Is There a Plan B for Cancun?
    The United States framed the agenda for the Cancun climate talks last month when it called for a “balanced” outcome from the negotiations. By that, it meant that it wanted to see progress on all key elements of the Copenhagen Accord. Most countries accepted that as a guiding principle for the talks, even if they were skeptical of its wisdom. But after eight days, with tensions remaining over transparency rules and the future of the Kyoto protocol, it is unclear whether a balanced outcome is possible. The official line from most negotiators remains unchanged, and optimism has picked up in the past day, but in the background, there is an inevitable question: if a balanced outcome proves impossible, is there any alternative? In one sense, I don’t see any way that the United States can budge from its demand for a balanced outcome. The Copenhagen Accord, which the United States remains a fan of, was a delicate political deal, and moving forward on only part of it would undermine its integrity. In particular, that means that a standalone deal on money for developing countries – probably the most important element to the developing countries here in Cancun – is impossible (and unwise). But there are other areas that weren’t at the core of the Copenhagen Accord that might, as a result, be candidates for discrete progress. The first, and in some ways simplest, is warming agents other than carbon dioxide. People refer to this as the “Non-CO2” agenda. HFCs, ozone, black carbon, and methane are all potent contributors to global warming, and reducing emissions of any of them is much cheaper and in many ways simpler than cutting carbon dioxide. Moreover, since these species (other than HFCs) don’t stay in the atmosphere for a long time, cutting them now could help avoid climate tipping points. And since they aren’t addressed by the Copenhagen Accord, moving forward on this file without broader progress wouldn’t really undermine the Accord’s balance. The main danger on this one, I’m told, is that it could engender a backlash, since some see it as a way to avoid taking responsibility for carbon dioxide emissions. The second candidate for separate action is the effort to avoid deforestation, which contributes a substantial fraction of global carbon dioxide emissions. There’s been significant progress here, and many believe that a deal is doable. And while forests are mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord, they aren’t a core part of that deal, which means that movement here could potentially come without prejudice to the ultimate fate of the Accord. The big problem is that the form of the deal – big sums of money in exchange for pledges not to cut down forests – mirrors the basic Copenhagen deal in many ways, and may play very badly in the United States. The last area that might be separable – and this is a stretch – is technology. There’s been a lot of talk about setting up centers to support the innovation and diffusion of climate-friendly technology in the developing world. This is pretty much a no brainer, since it can benefit inventors and businesses in both the developed and developing worlds, all while helping address climate change. But while it wasn’t featured in the Copenhagen Accord, technology has always been a core element of the climate talks, making negotiators considerably more reluctant to give on this front without making progress on the others. It’s too early, of course, to write off a balanced (if inevitably modest) outcome from the talks. And any action of one of these standalone areas without broader progress could kill whatever momentum the Copenhagen Accord has left. That said, I wouldn’t count these possibilities out.
  • Peru
    Peru’s Mineral Wealth and Woes
    Peru has avoided the development problems seen in other extraction-dependent economies, but experts say the country faces governance hurdles, especially on the environment.
  • Forests and Land Management
    Deforestation and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions
    Loss of forests is a major contributor to greenhouse-gas emissions. Plans to devise a policy tool for using trees for carbon dioxide sequestration are now under way.
  • Global
    Land Reform Revisited
    This publication is now archived. IntroductionLand is a sensitive, even sacred, issue in many parts of the world. "I shall never sell the land! Bit by bit, I will dig up the fields and feed the earth itself to the children and when they die I will bury them in the land, and I and my wife and my old father, even he, we will die on the land that has given us birth." This sentiment, expressed by Pearl S. Buck in 1932’s The Good Earth, remains a strongly held conviction among farmers today. The challenge of fairly distributing land that, for historical or political reasons, has been concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy owners has been around for centuries, and demands for land redistribution echoed across what used to be known as the "Third World" throughout the Cold War. Now, those demands are back, and in their latest form, they are no less challenging from a political, cultural, and economic perspective. What is land reform?At its essence, land reform is about redistributing arable land, whether previously collectivized by the state or held by rich farmers. The distribution usually proposes to take from the rich and give to the poor. The process sometimes involves compensation schemes, but in many places, farmers are forced by the government to give up their land at prices the owners regard as unfair. Other times, large-scale landowners are simply evicted without their consent. The goals of land reform are multifold: reducing poverty, expanding rural development, or returning land to its previous owners. Often, land reform is a consequence of post-colonial or post-communist economic and social needs. Other times it is driven more by ethnic and racial divisions, or an interest in manipulating political sentiment, than by any desire to redistribute land equitably. Most rich landowners in southern Africa, for example, are white, while most landless people are black. Zimbabwe’s government has pursued land reform with a punitive tone. South Africa, which began its land reforms in earnest only in 2005, has been more cautious, fearing the economic damage that the flight of white farmers could bring. What is the history of land reform?Land reform dates back to Roman times and the agrarian laws passed by the Senate around 133 BC, which indirectly led to the undoing of the Roman Republic and presaged the emergence of feudalism. In more modern times, land reform has often followed revolutions in countries like Mexico (1917), Russia (1917), and China (1949). Later, it was coupled with decolonization in the developing world, particularly in African and Arab states. Land reform has also caused instability and even foreign intervention, as in Guatemala in 1954, when the United States helped overthrow an elected government because "its land-reform initiatives were unacceptable to American capital," said Julia Sweig, director of Latin American Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. What are some different types of land reform?According to Joshua Muldavin, professor of human geography and rural development at Sarah Lawrence College, land-reform movements generally fall under two categories: transformational and populist. Transformational reform, he says, "is not just about breaking up concentrated land holdings or redistributing land but about breaking down the systems that created them, like feudalism, communism, or capitalism." Populist reform, on the other hand, focuses solely on breaking up large land holdings to redistribute to small holders. "It’s a policy shift, not structural," he says. "Governments do it in response to rural unrest, or to undermine revolutionary movements that challenge the state." Often after populist land reforms there is a re-concentration of land holdings, which then requires another round of land redistribution. Does land reform generally work?That depends on the region. It has a poor record in places like sub-Saharan Africa, where it has led to lower output and even greater inequality. On the other hand, land reform was successful in Japan, South Korea, and in pockets of India One reason land reforms faltered in Africa is that land was often seized from skilled farmers and handed to unskilled ones. Another problem, Muldavin says, is that the land most often redistributed to the poor is the lowest quality and least arable land available, which leads to lower agricultural output, leaving poor peasants open to criticism for poor farming practices. Further, many of the land holdings are not redistributed to the poor but to political cronies with little farming experience—so called "cell phone farmers." There are a number of other impediments to land reform, including climate, the rising costs of farm production, and the volatility of global agricultural prices. Where have land reforms recently been enacted? Asia. Land reform has had some success in Asian countries. In Taiwan, for instance, land was confiscated from absentee landlords and given to small landowners. South Korea, Japan and parts of India enacted reforms that are also viewed as successful by experts. In China, land reform went through a series of stages, the most infamous of which was the harsh collectivization under Mao Zedong in the 1950s, which helped create an artificial famine that killed some 30 million people. Muldavin argues that the redistribution of large-scale collective farms - i.e., "de-collectivization" that occurred in China during the late 1970s, had mixed effects. On the one hand, it created "noodle-strip farms"—named because of their narrow size—which initially increased productivity. But it also led to loss of economies of scale and to land degradation. The resulting stagnation in China now threatens the continuation of its current economic boom, experts say. While most peasants still have access to small subsistence plots, Muldavin says a new wave of landlessness in China, approaching 70 million peasants, is a serious challenge to the state’s legitimacy. In other South Asian countries like the Philippines, on the other hand, most of the country’s arable land remains in the hands of a few politically connected farmers. Former Soviet Union. In Russia, where a land-reform bill set off fisticuffs on the floor of the Duma in the mid-1990s, private land ownership remains a controversial subject. According to the Economist, "it exists in theory, not in practice." Formerly collectivized land has been handed out to around 280,000 families since the early 1990s. Many farmers, however, chose to remain on the Kremlin-run cooperatives because the large size of the farms—roughly 100 acres (versus an average of two acres in China)—meant it was virtually impossible to till without state assistance and access to credit to purchase machinery, says Roy Prosterman, founder of the University of Washington’s Rural Development Institute. Opposition to a land-reform bill in nieghboring Kazakhstan was so great it led to the ouster of the country’s prime minister two years ago. Africa. On the issue of land reform, "there has not been much to cheer about," said Peter Honey, associate editor of the South Africa-based Financial Mail, in an interview with PBS NewsHour. Land reform has occurred in a number of post-colonial countries, including Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. One of its main purposes was to reverse past land seizures perpetuated against indigenous populations during colonial times. "There was a moral and legal reason to do it, but you don’t want to ruin your economy and you want to properly compensate the owners of the land," says Tom McDonald, partner at the law firm Baker & Hostetler and former U.S. ambassador to Zimbabwe. Honey says the most successful cases on the continent involved farms where white farmers were retained to train the new black landowners. Latin America. Experts say one of the main problems with land reform in Latin America, particularly in places like Brazil, is that only around 20 percent of the workforce remains agricultural. "Most of the population has moved to cities and transplanted the rural problems of poverty to an urban setting," Prosterman says. "Brazilians would have been far better off carrying out a comprehensive land-reform package a generation ago," before the problems of crime, drugs, and poverty crept into their cities. Still, since about 1 percent of Brazil’s population owns half of the country’s arable land, the issue has continued to bubble to the surface—including last May, when it sparked two weeks of protests. In Venezuela— where nine of ten Venezuelans live in cities—President Hugo Chavez has announced plans to seize some 3.7 million acres of "idle" land and redistribute it to 100,000 small farmers, or campesinos. Bolivia’s newly elected Evo Morales, a leftist, intends to speed up land reform; nine years after its last legislation on the issue, just 17 percent of 107 million hectares have been redistributed. Why has land reform largely failed in southern Africa?In places like Zimbabwe, once Africa’s bread basket, out of 4,500 farms confiscated by the state in recent years, only a few hundred remain fully operational. "Land reform was basically hijacked as a political weapon [for Robert Mugabe’s regime] to hold onto power," McDonald says. "It’s unfortunate because what we’ve seen is the devastation of their economy." Many of the white farmers whose lands were seized were never compensated because the state could not—or would not—come up with the money. Part of the blame lies with the international community, Muldavin says. "There’s certainly been a failure on the part of large financial institutions like the World Bank and first-world countries to come through with the level of compensation promised to help buy up these large landholdings for redistribution to landless farmers," he says. The biggest victims of Zimbabwe’s land reforms were black Zimbabweans, 90,000 of whom lost their farming jobs, writes Joshua Kurlantzick in The New Republic. "Mugabe has seized nearly 11 million hectares of land, much of which has gone to his political supporters," he writes. Others say the "willing-seller, willing-buyer" program popular among sub-Saharan African countries has not proceeded fast enough, partly because white farmers have artificially inflated the price of their landholdings, making them virtually impossible to purchase. Only 4 percent of South Africa’s arable land, for instance, has been redistributed since 1994. In October, the government served its first seizure order to a white farmer; Pretoria says it plans to redistribute 30 percent of commercial farmland by 2015. Malawi only began major land reform in 2002.