Chad

The United States should resist a “business as usual” approach to Chad.  

In assessing Chad’s upcoming elections, the junta’s actions should speak louder than their words.    

In the wake of reports of a Wagner Group plot in Chad, Washington should resist the urge to resurrect Cold War-era partnerships.

Boko Haram's capture of materiel from government forces in the Lake Chad region bolsters the jihadi insurgency's lethality, posing a grave risk to civilians, peacekeepers, and other military personnel.

This update represents violence in Nigeria and related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger from July 31 to August 6, 2021.

Asch Harwood, a former research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations' Africa program, is the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker and the founder of Red Hook Media Lab.  The Nigerian state security apparatus has a long history of human rights violations. Most recently, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a notorious Nigerian police unit, made international headlines for its brutality and a wave of massive protests calling for its disbandment—which were then quashed by security services in a horrifying massacre of peaceful protestors. In many instances, the military’s response to Boko Haram has been similarly heavy-handed and indiscriminate. Abuses have been well-documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and even the State Department. A former colleague of mine gained access in 2017 to a prison holding suspected Boko Haram operatives, where he confirmed the abhorrent conditions and presence of significant numbers of women and children. Nevertheless, members of the military and police have also been victims of Boko Haram in their own right. The impact of the Boko Haram conflict on security services has been far-reaching, but in this analysis, the focus is on the geographic heart of the conflict—Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states in Nigeria, the Lac region in Chad, Diffa in Niger, and Extreme-Nord in Cameroon.     Since 2012, the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) has documented roughly 3,384 state security service deaths in the Boko Haram conflict. The epicenter of the violence is Borno State, which accounts for nearly 70 percent of all security personnel deaths in the NST dataset. Though the militaries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria cooperate under the guise of the African Union-authorized Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the NST does not distinguish the nationality of security personnel victims, only the approximate geographic location.   The deadliest years for security services overall have been 2018, 2019, and 2020, with 2019 the deadliest at an estimated 719 security personnel killed. This represents a shift from the height of the conflict in 2014-2015, when security personnel deaths were relatively low compared to the astronomical number of Boko Haram and civilian deaths, as can be seen in the chart below.   Since 2014, at least, Boko Haram has split into factions which sometimes cooperate. New factions are especially hostile to the police and the security services. In response to high casualty rates, the military and security services have withdrawn into highly fortified encampments. Their death rates have declined, but the jihadi factions are able to move about the countryside almost at will.   In 2019 and 2020, security personnel deaths jumped in Chad’s Lac region. In one incident in Bohoma in 2020, over ninety Chadian troops were killed. But Nigeria, and Borno State in particular, still remain the geographic center of the conflict. The borders in northeastern Nigeria, and particularly around Lake Chad, are porous, facilitating both Boko Haram and MNJTF’s regular movement across them. While these numbers appear to bring a sense of precision to the conflict, important to remember is that the NST relies on open-source reporting of casualties, which is subject to a number of biases in the context of the Boko Haram conflict. For one, many incidents take place in remote areas. As a result, estimates come from the military or Boko Haram themselves, both of which have incentives to downplay the number of deaths on their respective sides while overstating enemy casualties. Nevertheless, they provide a sense of the shape and trajectory of the conflict. The data shows that Boko Haram is far from defeated, and that the decline in military and security-service casualties are likely the result of their withdrawal from much of the countryside.

The ripple effects emanating from the death of Chadian President Idriss Déby on April 20 are only beginning to be apparent. Most immediately, the future of Chad has been thrown into question. Déby reportedly died while on the frontlines fighting rebel forces, just days after cementing his continued grip on power through a staged election devoid of both integrity and suspense. On the one hand, dissolving the parliament and installing a military officer from Déby’s family at the head of a Transitional Military Council is not much of a departure from the way Chad has been governed for decades—it simply sheds the institutional and electoral window dressing that has adorned the military dictatorship. But on the other hand, there was a clear constitutional prescription for how the country was to be governed in the event of the president’s death, and it has been completely disregarded. There may be a great deal of continuity in Chad’s immediate governing arrangements, but it is difficult to argue with the Chadian opposition leaders who have called the developments “an institutional coup d’état.” The repercussions may be felt far beyond Chad’s borders. Should Chad become significantly less stable, it will mean that one of the region’s most competent militaries will have less attention to devote to efforts to combat transnational terrorist threats. Equally, the casting aside of the constitution in Chad could be bad news for Sudan’s fragile transition, in which would-be democrats must find themselves feeling increasingly lonely as many bordering states move in decidedly authoritarian directions. Chad has historically played a complicated role in Darfur, where resurgent violence has tested the Sudanese state’s ability to deliver security for all of its citizens. Instability and the potential for explosive power struggles in Chad complicate the picture and add to the list of pretexts military and militia actors may use to insist that they remain the dominant actors in Sudan’s government. This week’s events in Chad also serve as a reminder that no leader is a permanent fixture on the world stage. It is easy for policymakers in Paris or Washington to forget that the bargains they strike in the name of ensuring stability—or regional influence—can have shorter shelf lives than anticipated when they depend on one strongman’s ability to keep all opposing forces in check. All of the costs, in terms of undermining governance and human rights norms that Chad’s external partners purport to champion, remain to be paid. But the international security gains may prove far more ephemeral.

Chad strongman Idriss Deby's death on April 20, allegedly in combat with rebel forces that had crossed over from Libya, is bad news for the immediate struggle against jihadi radicalism in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon. The news is also unwelcome for France and the United States. Deby had been a staunch ally against jihadi radicalism in the Sahel, and especially against Boko Haram and its factions. His army, the beneficiary of substantial French investment, is commonly regarded as the best in the region. Chad hosts the headquarters of the French Operation Barkhane, numbering just under 5,000 fighters. Deby cooperated with the U.S. military, allowing it to maintain a drone base to aid in the fight against jihadism. The French government has stated that "France lost a brave friend" and that France supports Chad's "stability and territorial integrity." Deby is an example of the dilemma faced when the United States, France, and other Western powers tie themselves to autocratic strongmen—for that is what Deby was. He ruled Chad for a generation, faced numerous attempted coups, and manipulated the constitution and the electoral process to, in effect, make himself president for life. He also accumulated an estimated personal fortune of $50 million in one of the poorest countries in the world. Domestic opposition had been growing. His immediate placeholder, the "National Council of Transition," appears to be beholden to the military. It has made Deby's son the interim president, itself a coup: under the constitution that role falls to the speaker of parliament. For now, it looks like the essence of the Deby regime will continue. But what about the rebel columns advancing on N'Djamena? The ambitions and grievances that drive them presumably do not go away with Deby's death; France and to a lesser extent Nigeria will likely be decisive as to what happens next on that front. As for the Chadian people, initial reports are of fear of the unknown, especially the possibility of civil war. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

On April 11, Chadians went to cast their votes to elect a president. The electoral commission is to certify the outcome by April 25. Not that the outcome was ever in doubt: incumbent president Idriss Deby, born in 1952, said publicly that he knew in advance that he would win "as I have done for the last thirty years." In 2018, he engineered a new constitution that would enable him to win the presidency two more times—by rigging if necessary—thereby remaining in office until 2033. As in past elections, opposition candidates ran but none really had a chance of winning; seven of the seventeen applicants for the presidential race were rejected, while others boycotted the vote. Chadians know that their elections do not reflect the popular will: on election day, observers said that turnout was low and unenthusiastic.  This election, like previous ones that Deby won and others conducted by African big men, is essentially a pageant, designed to underscore to Chadians his legitimacy and to mollify foreign partners. It is an "election-like event"—the form of a genuine election absent the substance. The event is far from an opportunity for Chadians to express their political preferences. Deby, a general with extensive French military training, made his way into politics through the army. As of now, with a firm grip on the military and government institutions (including the electoral commission), a willingness to use violent repression if he deems it necessary, and considerable political skills, Deby appears set to remain president for life—absent an unexpected palace coup that likely would be bloody. He has never let human rights considerations get in his way. He has done well out of public office: one estimate of his personal wealth is $50 million from holding military and civilian office in one of the poorest states in the world. Yet Deby poses a policy dilemma for Western governments devoted to democracy and human rights. He is a staunch ally against Islamist radicalism. His army is the best in West Africa, thanks to substantial French investment. The country hosts a large French military base, and some U.S. military personnel are also present. The Chadian army, alongside that of Nigeria and South African mercenaries, drove Boko Haram out of a part of Nigeria's Borno State. Deby is an example of the Sanskrit proverb "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"; his foes are frequently the same as the West's. For nations as well as individuals, it is not always possible to choose your friends—hence Western cooperation with Chad while overlooking Deby's big-man rule. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 17 to October 23, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   October 17: Three #EndSARS protestors were killed in Osogbo, Osun. October 17: One #EndSARS protestor was killed in Abuja, FCT.  October 17: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ikorodu, Lagos.  October 18: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Dikwa, Borno.  October 19: Six #EndSARS protestors were killed in Abuja, FCT. October 19: Six were killed when a prison in Benin, Oredo, Edo was broken into. October 19: Four #EndSARS protestors were killed in Etsako West, Edo.  October 19: Six Chadian soldiers and ten Boko Haram militants were killed in a clash on the Chadian side of Lake Chad. October 19: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" ISWA militants in Abadam, Borno.  October 20: Two police officers and six others were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ibadan, Oyo. October 20: Six civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ikorodu, Lagos. October 20: Three civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Abuja, FCT. October 20: Two police officers and three protestors were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Orile, Ikeja, Lagos.  October 20: Police officers killed two #EndSARS protestors in Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos. October 20: Police officers killed fifteen #EndSARS protestors in Ibeju/Lekki, Lagos. October 20: Bandits killed twenty-two in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. October 20: Four civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Kano, Kano. October 20: Two police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Aba, Abia. October 20: Three civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Jos, Plateau. October 20: Seventeen were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Mushin, Lagos. October 20: Four were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Epe, Lagos. October 20: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Oredo, Edo. October 20: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. October 21: Three were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Port Harcourt, Rivers. October 21: Three police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Oyigbo, Rivers. October 21: Two civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Enugu East, Enugu. October 21: Bandits kidnapped a family of four in Katsina, Katsina. October 21: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Njaba, Imo. October 21: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Mbaitoli, Imo. October 21: One police officer and one civilian were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ado-Odo/Ota, Ogun. October 21: Two civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ikorodu, Lagos. October 21: Police officers killed three #EndSARS protestors in Ondo, Ondo.  October 22: One police officer was beheaded in #EndSARS-related violence in Nnewi, Anambra. October 22: Three were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Onitsha, Anambra. October 22: Two police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ibadan, Oyo.  October 22: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Akure, Ondo. October 22: Kidnappers abducted two pastors and one church member in Aniocha South, Delta.  October 22: Police officers killed five looters in Alimosho, Lagos. October 23: Five were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Calabar, Cross River. October 23: One customs officer and one aggressor were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Illorin, Kwara. October 23: Two police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Nnewi, Anambra.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 19 to September 25, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     September 19: Bandits kidnapped forty-two people in Maru, Zamfara.  September 19: Police officers killed two robbers in Suleja, Niger state.  September 19: Communal violence led to four deaths in Awka South, Anambra.  September 20: Nigerian soldiers killed three civilians in Andoni, Rivers.  September 20: Boko Haram killed seven Nigerian soldiers in Damboa, Borno while "many/scores" (estimated at twenty) of Boko Haram militants were killed.  September 20: Suspected herdsmen killed five in Guma, Benue.  September 20: Gunmen killed two soldiers and one police officer while two of the attackers were killed during a clash in Ukwa West, Abia.  September 22: Military air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  September 23: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram commanders in Kukawa, Borno.  September 23: Communal violence led to two deaths in Izzi, Ebonyi.  September 24: Suspected herdsmen killed five in Jos South, Plateau.  September 24: Nigerian troops killed twenty-one bandits and lost three soldiers in Faskari, Katsina.  September 24: Chadian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Barkalam and Bilabrim, Chad.   September 24: Air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. September 25: Air strikes killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  September 25: Boko Haram killed twelve police officers, five soldiers, four militia members, and nine civilians in Kukawa, Borno.  September 25: Nigerian troops killed two kidnappers in Nasarawa, Nasarawa.  September 25: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Takum, Taraba. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 12 to September 18, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     September 12: Bandits killed one and kidnapped sixteen in Chikun, Kaduna.  September 12: Bandits killed two in Okene, Kogi.  September 13: A military air strike killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Birnin-Magaji/Kiyaw, Zamfara.  September 14: Bandits killed two Federal Road Safety Corps officials and kidnapped ten in Karu, Nassarawa.  September 14: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped "many" (estimated at ten) in Safana, Katsina.  September 14: Bandits killed one and abducted one in Faskari, Katsina.  September 14: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Takum, Taraba.  September 14: Nigerian troops killed four militants in Bade, Yobe.  September 15: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Gboyin, Ekiti.  September 15: Military strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  September 15: ISWA killed eight in Kaga LGA and three in Konduga LGA in Borno.  September 16: Kidnappers abducted eight in Chikun, Kaduna.  September 17: Bandits killed two police officers and kidnapped two civilians in Tangaza, Sokoto.  September 17: Police killed two robbers in Suleja, Niger.  September 17: Boko Haram killed ten Chadian soldiers in Lake Chad. September 17: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  September 17: Boko Haram killed three in Magumeri, Borno.  September 18: Bandits killed five farmers in Malumfashi, Katsina. September 18: Gunmen kidnapped seven in Igabi, Kaduna.  September 18: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped three in Dekina, Kogi. September 18: Kidnappers abducted two in Chikun, Kaduna. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 25 to 31, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1596464749403'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   July 25: A Nigerian task force killed three kidnappers in Okene, Kogi.  July 25: Boko Haram killed ten soldiers in Damboa, Borno.  July 25: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Jibia, Katsina.  July 26: Boko Haram/ISWA executed three of their own in Kukawa, Borno.  July 27: Herdsmen killed a police officer in Bassa, Plateau.  July 27: Police officers killed two kidnappers in Ishielu, Ebonyi.  July 27: Militia members killed five in Toto, Nassarawa.  July 28: Kidnappers abducted five in Suleja, Niger state.  July 28: Police officers killed three bandits in Dutsinma, Katsina.  July 29: Gunmen killed fourteen in Kotonkarfe, Kogi.  July 29: Robbers killed four police officers in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi.  July 29: Four robbers and one police officer were killed during a bank robbery in Kajola, Oyo.  July 29: Bandits killed one and kidnapped three in Chikun, Kaduna.  July 30: A Boko Haram mortar attack killed seven in Maiduguri, Borno.  July 31: Boko Haram killed ten in Tenana, Chad.  July 31: Gunmen killed a traditional ruler in Nassarawa, Nassarawa. July 31: Herdsmen kidnapped two in Isi-Uzo, Enugu.