• Ethiopia
    Amid Misinformation and Suppressed Free Speech, Ethiopian Conflict Erodes Abiy's Credibility
    As 2020 draws to a close, the terrible toll of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region is coming into sharper focus. The human costs continue to mount; the United Nations estimates that 1.3 million people need emergency assistance as a result of the conflict, and over 50,000 people have fled to neighboring Sudan. Eritrean refugees that had fled to Ethiopia have reportedly been attacked, in some cases forcibly repatriated. UN agencies remain unable to access some areas with humanitarian relief. And despite the federal government’s assertion that the military operation ended in late November, some fighting clearly continues. The overall number of civilians killed remains unknown. The toll on regional stability will only become apparent over time, but it is already clear that Sudan’s fragile transition is suffering new perils as a result of the conflict in Ethiopia.   Prime Minister Abiy’s credibility is also among the losses. His claims in late November that not a single civilian was killed in the military assault on Tigray were contradicted by desperate testimonials that emerged despite the state’s attempt to impose a total communications blackout across the region. Ample, alarming evidence belies Abiy’s repeated denials of the involvement of Eritrean forces in Ethiopian territory. Journalists are being beaten and harassed, presumably for reporting the truth and sullying the rosy rhetoric from the leadership in Addis Ababa. This loss of credibility may seem insignificant compared with the numbers killed, wounded, and displaced, but it is grave nonetheless. Ethiopia had long played an important stabilizing role in the region, and it had been emerging as a leading voice on behalf of the continent as a whole in important global discussions. Around the world, leaders embraced the vision of a stable, prosperous, inclusive, and accountable Ethiopia—a state strong enough to stand up for African interests and for shared global norms. But now the international community has reason to doubt the veracity of Abiy’s words and to second-guess his intentions—hardly a solid basis for fruitful partnerships. The cost, calculated in missed opportunities, could be staggering.
  • Cameroon
    Lessons From the Past on Cameroon’s Crisis
    Herman J. Cohen is the former assistant secretary of state for African affairs (1989–1993), the former U.S. ambassador to the Gambia and Senegal (1977–80), and was a member of the U.S. Foreign Service for thirty-eight years. The violent conflict in Cameroon, still rarely discussed in Washington, is becoming increasingly dire. Both President Paul Biya’s Francophone regime in Yaounde and the Anglophone separatists in the southwest region are accused of brutal human rights abuses, including the burning of villages, attacks on schools, and the killing of men, women, and children. Despite mediation attempts by the Swiss government and sanctions by the Trump administration, there are no signs of any progress towards a negotiated settlement.  In 1991, I mediated an end to a different African conflict with some striking similarities: the Eritrean war of independence, which raged for nearly three decades. Lessons from that precedent offer clues to a potential endgame in Cameroon. Colonial-style takeovers Both Eritrea and Cameroon’s Anglophone regions were engaged in governing federations with more powerful nations, then lost autonomy when their counterpart took over after deciding the relationship no longer suited them. The Federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea was inaugurated in 1952, with two separate governments having their own legislatures, internal controls, and flags, while sharing foreign policy, defense, and currency. Ten years later, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I unilaterally dissolved that arrangement and annexed Eritrea, sparking the long and bloody war.  In 1961, Cameroon’s Anglophone region voted in a UN-sponsored referendum to join Francophone Cameroon in a very similar federal arrangement. Eleven years later, then-President Ahmadou Ahidjo defied the UN to hold his own referendum on whether to effectively annex the Anglophone areas by unifying the two regions, while conveniently providing Ahidjo with expanded powers. Officially, the vote tally was 99.99 percent to dissolve the federation, with 98.2 percent turnout.   A crackdown by the Francophone authorities immediately ensued. Widespread discrimination against Anglophones was compounded by a takeover of the education and judicial systems to abolish the English language. Like the Eritreans subjected to sudden Ethiopian subjugation, this move to consolidate power understandably upset Cameroon’s minority Anglophone population.  What do these parallels tell us about the crisis in Cameroon? Paul Biya cannot expect to win through war Unlike in Eritrea, tensions grew slowly in Cameroon over decades, before boiling over into the open violent conflict of the last several years. But the twenty-nine-year length of the Eritrean war indicates that bloodshed is likely to persist as long as Anglophone Cameroonians feel their culture and autonomy is being stolen by the Yaounde regime (and as long as they have friendly neighbors on their side of the border.) Prolonging this conflict will not lead to a resolution. A mediated negotiation is the only realistic solution, and the United States can lead it The Ethiopia-Eritrea war ended rapidly after the U.S. became the official mediator. In Cameroon, the lack of progress in Swiss mediation does not simply mean the conflict is unsolvable for now. The responsibility to engage in serious negotiations must be made clear to both sides. They will feel comfortable in offering concessions to an influential mediator like the United States that they would not offer each other.  Despite the Trump administration's supposed neglect of Africa, it has in fact been heavily invested in conflict resolution there: currently it is working to end saber-rattling between Egypt and Ethiopia over the latter's move to dam the Nile river. President Trump has appointed a highly capable U.S.-Africa diplomat, Tibor Nagy, to the assistant secretary position I once held. Ambassador Nagy is an excellent choice to oversee this process. There are additional incentives for President Trump to pursue peace in Cameroon. The administration’s efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict are likely to be met with failure. By contrast, ending the Cameroon conflict, while difficult, is within this administration's grasp, and it would do far more to improve U.S. standing in Africa than John Bolton's aggressive anti-China, anti-Russia campaign there. The longer the conflict lasts, the less likely that Cameroon will remain a single nation Eritreans refused to accept any federation with Ethiopia after three decades of war. There was simply too much bitterness. Even after the independence accords, a two-year border war in 1998 killed hundreds of thousands; it did not officially end until Ethiopia’s new premier Abiy Ahmed made an unexpected, unilateral peace overture last year.  It may not be too late to return to the UN-approved federation between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon that existed prior to 1972. That arrangement would provide Anglophones with the autonomy they deserve. But time is running out. Genuine democracy is a requirement for post-conflict stability For decades, Ethiopia’s domestic politics relied on a coalition of ethnic parties, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which originally fought the military dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s. Consternation over the dominance of one small ethnic group, the Tigrayans, eventually led to deadly protests and the ouster of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn last year. In November, Prime Minister Abiy moved to merge the EPRDF parties into a single unit, but this was met with protests by the Tigray constituency, and may ultimately lead to further destabilization just as ethnic tensions in the country are especially inflamed. The weakness of Cameroon’s democratic institutions is aggravated by the monopoly of Paul Biya’s ethnic group, the Beti, over political and economic power. Many of the non-Beti French speakers feel just as marginalized as Anglophones. Ethnic domination within a putative democracy is inherently unsustainable. And after thirty-seven years of autocratic rule and fraudulent elections under Biya, Cameroon’s problems may not end with any resolution of the Anglophone crisis.
  • Eritrea
    How Long Must Eritrea Wait for Change?
    Last week, the Committee to Protect Journalists ranked Eritrea "the most censored country in the world." That unsurprising conclusion is only the latest dubious distinction for Eritrea, a state that often seems frozen in an authoritarian limbo in the midst of a region characterized by profound changes.  The much-heralded 2018 peace deal with Ethiopia removed the Eritrean government’s primary rationale for its vice-like grip on power and disregard for the civil and political rights of its people, but it did not in fact lead to the opening of political space. In June, over a hundred prominent African intellectuals wrote to President Isaias Afwerki, expressing concern about political prisoners and the steady stream of young asylum-seekers desperate to escape the constraints of life in the Eritrea that Isaias has created. In response, the Ministry of Information questioned their motives, declared them uninformed, and noted that policy formulation and implementation is the responsibility of “the government and the people of Eritrea alone.”  But Eritreans are not free to express themselves on these issues, and the government’s claim to legitimately represent the will of the people rests on its own self-regard and delusion. President Isaias and those who continue to enable him are right about some things. Eritrea’s history is a painful one, and they should not dismantle the machinery of repression that is so pervasive in Eritrea because of pressure from outsiders. They should dismantle it because Eritreans deserve better. A ruling elite so consumed by the past should be aware that history, including very recent African history, is replete with liberators who became oppressors. It is difficult to see the appeal in emulating their examples.  The status quo doesn’t just condemn Eritreans to languish under stifling state control, and it doesn’t just irrevocably tarnish Isaias’s legacy. It threatens the integrity and future of Eritrea itself. By denying citizens the right to freely debate their aspirations for Eritrea’s future, by refusing to implement the constitution to provide a frame for future decision-making, by conflating dissent with treason, the current government renders the state more and more brittle, and closes off avenues for peaceful, progressive political development. The autocratic paralysis at the top may achieve what so many years of international treachery and indifference could not—it may irreparably weaken the resilience of one of the world’s most resilient nations. 
  • Eritrea
    Authoritarianism in Eritrea and the Migrant Crisis
    One of the leading sources of refugees in Europe is the impoverished east African nation of Eritrea. Many fleeing describe chronic human rights abuses.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    “Time to Bring Eritrea in From the Cold”
    The former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Herman J. (Hank) Cohen wrote an important article in African Arguments entitled “Time to Bring Eritrea in From the Cold.” For those involved in policy formulation and implementation in the Horn of Africa it is a “must read.” In a few short and lucid paragraphs Ambassador Cohen reviews the sorry history since 1997 of the tangled relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with the complications posed by Somalia and al-Shabaab, the jihadist organization with ties to al-Qaeda, and the U.S. response. By 2008, the administration of President George W. Bush determined that Eritrea was a “state sponsor of terrorism” and imposed sanctions. Subsequently, President Barack Obama’s administration said that Eritrea allowed arms shipments to be delivered to al-Shabaab. In 2009, the administration sponsored a UN Security Council resolution (UNSC 1907) that in effect made Eritrea the international pariah it is today. But, times change. Cohen recalls that “all available intelligence” indicates no Eritrean contact with al-Shabaab since 2009. Further, as Cohen points out, Eritrea is fearful of Islamic radicalism. There are signs of a warming in the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This confluence provides a special opportunity for a new approach to Eritrea with positive implications for the Horn of Africa. Normal relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea would be a win-win not only for both countries economically as well as politically, but also for the Horn of Africa region. How to move forward? Specifically, Cohen suggests that a European member of the Security Council should propose the repeal of UNSC 1907, and the United States should agree to abstain. He also proposes a face-saving solution to the long standing border issues between Ethiopia and Eritrea, to be mediated by a neutral European nation. Cohen shows that the benefits for U.S. policy would be significant. Normalization of Ethiopian/Eritrean relations would open the space for the United States and others to encourage better governance in both countries, and military cooperation between the United States and Eritrea could materially assist in the struggle against jihadi terrorism in the region. Ambassador Cohen makes a compelling case for a rethink of U.S. policy in the Horn and he proposes a practical strategy for moving forward.
  • Eritrea
    Lyons: Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict Fueling Somalia Crisis
    Terrence Lyons, an expert on the Horn of Africa, says despite U.S. concerns about al-Qaeda, it is local rivalries driving conflicts in Somalia and elsewhere in the region.
  • Wars and Conflict
    Violence in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia vs. Eritrea
    This publication is now archived. What is behind the latest round of violence in Ethiopia?The surprising success by opposition candidates in May’s parliamentary elections, experts say. The opposition won 176 seats out of the 547-member parliament and polled particularly well in urban areas like the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. Stunned by the outcome, the government, run by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, enacted a controversial measure stipulating that only a party with 51 percent of the parliamentary seats can table an issue. Opposition leaders, who claim they won a majority of the seats and say the election was tainted by voter fraud, staged a protest in June, resulting in clashes with security forces that left thirty-six dead. Then, during a November 4 African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa—the AU’s headquarters—protesters again took to the streets, throwing stones and burning tires. More than forty protesters were killed, and hundreds of rioters were arrested, accused of treason and trying to topple the government. The main opposition party, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), has said it will boycott parliament until an international investigation is held. The AU, silent during past crackdowns, condemned the most recent round of violence, while the United States and European Union have called for an international inquiry. Many outsiders have called for a coalition of sorts between CUD and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Meles’ ruling party. Meles has refused any sort of power-sharing arrangement. Why is the violence in Ethiopia so worrisome?Ethiopia has been hailed by the West as a democratic model for Africa. Meles, who overthrew the Communist military regime of Mengistu Haile Marim in 1991, is seen as a pragmatic figure in African politics. A reformed Marxist, Meles has shown some success at delivering food, water, and electricity to Ethiopia’s some 70 million people, while good rains in recent years caused the largely agrarian economy to grow by a whopping 11 percent last year. Ethiopia, which is wedged between Somalia and Sudan, has also emerged as a regional ally of the United States on issues like counterterrorism and the fight against AIDS. For Meles’ efforts, Ethiopia has emerged as Africa’s largest recipient of foreign aid ($1 billion, not including food aid). British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in particular, has showered Meles with praise and chose him, along with Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, to sit on the Commission for Africa, a UK-sponsored body that deals with aid, debt-relief, and trade concessions. What is Ethiopia’s border dispute with Eritrea?Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia by popular referendum in 1993 after thirty years of secessionist struggle; however, bilateral relations soon deteriorated. Much of the tension stemmed from a personal feud between Meles and Eritrea’s leader, Issaias Afwerki, former allies. In the 1990s, Eritrea de-linked its currency, the nakfa, from Ethiopia’s, disrupting bilateral trade and further fueling hostility in Addis Ababa. Finally, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of illegally occupying the border town of Badme, while Eritreans feared Ethiopians might invade and take back one of their ports. The region in dispute, which comprises a few hundred square miles of largely uninhabited, unfertile land, “has no significance whatsoever but became a point of national pride on both sides,” says Princeton Lyman, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. War erupted in 1998. Some 70,000 lives were lost during the two-year conflict. In December 2000, a tentative agreement was reached in Algiers with both sides claiming victory. The countries agreed in advance to allow the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague to decide their border dispute. To the shock of the Ethiopians, however, in May 2002 the court gave Badme, the most hotly contested area, to Eritrea. Meles agreed to the new borders “in principle,” but never fully accepted the court’s ruling. His government also refused to remove its troops from some of the territory, including Badme, awarded to Eritrea. Tensions between the two neighbors have once again escalated. Eritrea recently put restrictions on UN peacekeepers deployed to the region—some 3,300 in total—and barred UN helicopters from Eritrean airspace. Sixty percent of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ)—a demilitarized zone between the two countries—currently cannot be monitored, according to the BBC. This has fueled Ethiopian suspicions that Eritrea is amassing troops along the contested border. In response, Ethiopia has deployed nearly half its armored units to the border. The United Nations has reclassified the situation from “stable” to “tense.” What’s the connection between Ethiopia’s domestic turmoil and its dispute with Eritrea? Some experts say Ethiopia ’s recent troop buildup is merely an effort to shift attention away from the elections and their violent aftermath. They say Meles could be provoking another war with Eritrea to unite Ethiopians and strengthen his own popularity. Others say this strategy will only add to Meles’ problems. “The [government’s] calculation is that it would be poor politics for CUD to interfere with the military in a time of crisis,” writes Yohannes Woldemariam, a U.S.-based Eritrean, in a November 7 Sudan Tribune op-ed. “Using force against Eritrea does not, however, eliminate opponents.” The Amhara—Ethiopia’s traditional ruling ethnic group, now part of the opposition—have been highly critical of Meles, an ethnic Tigrayan, for giving away Ethiopia’s only two ports to Eritrea. “The Amhara have never forgiven the Tigrayans for that,” Lyman says. “Ironically, the opposition would take a tougher line on Eritrea.” From Eritrea’s perspective, Ethiopia ’s parliamentary results are an indication of Meles’ weakness, Lyman says. What is the likelihood of another war? It’s unclear, experts say. The UN Security Council has urged both sides to refrain from force and return to the bargaining table. If fighting breaks out, the 3,300-member UNMEE (United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) force on the ground, which acts more as a monitoring force than a combat one, will be largely unable to prevent full-scale war. One of the chief sticking points is the fate of Badme. One solution is for Ethiopia to give the town and nearby region back to Eritrea, but leave Ethiopia in charge of administrative duties. Another obstacle to peace is the political disarray in Ethiopia, including the AU’s inability to pressure Meles to reach a compromise with Ethiopia’s opposition. Across the border, Lyman says, the diplomatic process is also hurt by the lack of effective dialogue between the West and Eritrea, which the U.S. State Department recently labeled among the seven worst human-rights offenders in the world. Afwerki, Eritrea’s autocratic leader, has suspended elections, booted out the USAID mission, and driven out many of the Eritrean expatriates who returned after 1993 to rebuild their country.